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

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The inner history of the Balkan war

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The inner history of the Balkan war

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THE INNER HISTORY OF THE BALKAN WAR

The Collected Works of
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The Inner History of the Balkan War

By

Lt.-Colonel Sir Reginald Rankin Bt.

'*Unoque die Romana reprendit*
Quotquot ter denis acies amisimus annis.'
CLAUDIAN, *De Bello Getico*

VOLUME TWO

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LONDON
JOHN LANE THE BODLEY HEAD LTD

First Published in 1914
Collected Edition . . 1930

Printed in Great Britain by
RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED
BUNGAY
SUFFOLK

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THE INNER HISTORY OF THE BALKAN WAR

CHAPTER XII

TURKEY

October 17, 1912–January 9, 1913

N October, 1912, four hundred and fifty-nine years had passed since that fatal day when on May 29, 1453, the last Christian Emperor of the East, Constantine XIII., had laid down his life for his country and for his God at the Gate of St. Romanos, and Muhammed II. had proclaimed God and His Prophet from the dome of St. Sophia. Even in the darkest hour of their defeat whispered prophecies had assured the trembling Greeks who celebrated the Holy Mysteries in mean churches amongst the hovels of the Fanar that the Church of the Divine Wisdom would once more be restored to the Christian Faith, that the Crescent would give place to the Cross, and that the " times of the Gentiles " would have an end. The words in which Hebrew seers had foretold the restoration of the Jews to their cherished Temple at Jerusalem were applied by the Greeks to their own destinies, and all through the long centuries of Turkish tyranny the Faithful have never ceased to believe that these promises would one day be fulfilled. Some chronologists had explained that these " times " would end about the middle of the nineteenth century, and this belief had caused much excitement amongst the Greeks at the outbreak of the Crimean War. It is true that the result of that war was to give Turkish misrule

a new lease of life, but her wounds were not to be healed, and the events of the last thirty years had made the hopes of the Greeks run high.

The rest of Europe believed that the Turks would be the victors. Only a few soldiers who knew of the work which had been done by the Balkan peoples in their efforts to prepare for the contest had faith in their success. The Turks themselves were confident of victory, and it is probable that their German instructors shared in their belief.

Who would be the first to take the offensive. Upon the offence everything depended.

I quote the estimate given by that most experienced and able judge, the military critic of *The Times*.

"For Turkey, as for the allies, all depends upon the fortune of war in the principal theatre. So far as we know, Bulgaria has raised and armed nearly 400,000 men, of whom conceivably there are 250,000 in the field army south of Stara Zagora, which is reported to be King Ferdinand's headquarters. With these there must be reckoned, until authentic reports come in, some 50,000 Servians, so that we can, until more accurately informed, place the main army of the allies at 300,000 men.

"On the Turkish side it is supposed that there may be 200,000 men on the line Adrianople-Kirk Kilisse, and that a steady stream of reinforcements, including troops set free by the peace with Italy, will cause these numbers to increase daily, whereas Bulgaria has said her last word and has nothing to fall back upon. To what extent the two main armies have detached force to right and left—for example in the Tundja Valley—and what may be the numbers of the general reserve of these armies we do not know, but the general character of the theatre of war conduces to some dissemination of force, and the strongest staff will be that which will

resist this fatal tendency and bring up all available force at the decisive point.

"On which side will the initiative lie? It should be with Bulgaria, which is apparently ready first and is believed to possess a numerical preponderance, but if her concentration took place at some distance from the frontier and that of Turkey was more forward, Turkey may endeavour to secure the advantage of the initiative and to throw the main burden of war upon her enemy's provinces. Without questioning the merits of Bulgarian organisation, or the success of King Ferdinand's concentration, we cannot feel sure that the Bulgarian staff is capable of manipulating deftly these large masses. There are very few staffs in Europe capable of the task, and even they are only kept up to the mark by constant practice, which has not been open to Bulgarian leaders. It must also be said that the reported destruction by the Bulgarians of a railway bridge between Seimenli and Adrianople throws a little doubt upon Bulgarian intentions, and a preliminary defensive, however seemingly little suited to the situation in its broader aspects, must not be ruled out until our information is more complete. In such a defensive deployment many second-line troops, which are of scant value for offensive war, could be utilized, and as Moltke could be quoted as a partisan of this form of proceeding we must not entirely close our minds to the possibility of it.

"Nevertheless, a resolute offensive is always the best way of imposing our will upon an enemy, and we must incline to the belief that Bulgarian strategy is not unmindful of the fact. In this case we must suppose that orders for a general advance were given on October 18, and that, unless the Turks seize the initiative and advance, Bulgarian columns will cross the frontier within the next few days. All along this frontier, and on both sides of it, advanced troops are doubtless holding

every avenue of approach, and to some of the combats which will ensue we shall probably attach undue importance. The air will be cleared when we know where the chief efforts are being made, and, till evidence is given to the contrary, we must take it that the valley of the Maritza and the railway will remain the chief line of Bulgarian advance.

"A military nation like the Turks is quite capable of taking the initiative, even if inferior in numbers. To allow their old vassals to invade Turkey would be an insult to Turkish pride, and no one can deny that a first victory on Bulgarian soil would raise the fighting fury of the Turks to fever heat and would have moral and material consequences of great moment. From these tendencies there might result a series of encounter-battles—that is to say, actions in which each side takes the offensive—which would continue with varying fortune until the dominance of one side or the other became marked. From the point of view of ultimate success a Turkish delaying action until the forces from Asia Minor are in line promises best; but moral considerations dominate in war, and it remains invariably true that the offensive is the best means for enchaining the sentiment of superiority to the standards of an army. This is a maxim which von der Goltz and his officers are certain to have impressed most forcibly on their Turkish disciples." *

It was long ere the Turks opened their eyes to the realities of the situation. Even after their defeat at Kirk Kilisse Nazim Pasha could telegraph that the situation was good, that the spirit of the troops was excellent, and that having received their reinforcements they were impatient to take part once more in the conflict. He added that there was every hope of success.

* *The Times*, Saturday, October 19, 1912.

Mr. Ward Price writes:

"The wreckage of an army is not a pleasant sight. There were bandaged heads with the blood staining through the lint in sickly shades of green and yellow. An old man astride a little barebacked donkey was trailing one bare foot wrapped in a crimsoned rag; a young fellow on a horse was held up by two other cripples on either side, his head drooping on to his right shoulder with an unnatural twist.

"It was almost uncanny to think that it was the agreeable Bulgarians with whom I had been staying six weeks ago who had smashed and broken and savaged the sturdy Turkish peasants into these faint, limp, drooping-eyed wrecks who lay on the floor of the carts just as they had happened to fall when lifted in. And all in the cause of progressive decentralisation in Macedonia!

"The fortitude of these Turks is wonderful. I saw two men with bullet wounds in their legs who had limped thirty-five miles, one, groaning at every step, being helped by a wounded friend, the other alone, using a rifle as a crutch.

"We saw Tchorlu on a far hill by the light of a pure sunset of flaming gold that filled the hollows of the plain with violet shadow; while above the silver evening-star shone in a pale green sky. The grim warfare of men could not mar the peace of Heaven." *

Want of organisation was the cause of all the Turkish disasters. Her German advisers had committed every blunder which had been perpetrated by the French before the war of 1870.

"My recollection of the campaign will always be of bleak plains, with a rabble of disordered soldiery slouching from one horizon to the other across them, but always towards the rear. There were officers who had lost their

* *Daily Mail*, Saturday, November 2, 1912.

men, men who had lost their officers. There was no discipline, no plan. Bullock-carts were jostling ammunition wagons. Wounded men were limping by the side of empty ambulance tumbrils.

"Straggling knots of men with their belts full of unfired cartridges were halting when they liked and going on when they liked. No one was in command of them, and they did not know or care to what unit they belonged or where they were going. I never saw one regular formation of troops for the march anywhere within twenty miles of the front.

"The food supply was as hopeless as the rest of the gigantic muddle. One flat loaf of rye bread, 8 inches across, had to last each man four days. Certainly it was the most delicious bread I have ever tasted.

"One thing did strike me. Among all the expressionless, trudging thousands I passed as they crawled eastwards I saw very few Nizams—the troops of the first line, the part of the army with the best and most modern training. The fugitives were nearly all the untidy, bearded, parchment-skinned peasants of the Reserve. Quite a number of them were armed with old Winchester rifles.

"One can only suppose that the majority of the Nizams had stayed and got killed. And as many reservist battalions had only eight or ten officers to 700 or 800 men, there were not enough to hold them in the firing-line.

"As for the ghastly lack of efficient transport for the wounded, it would need a Zola to describe the horrors endured by the men hit in the battle. I asked a medical officer how it was that the only wounded I saw were injured in their limbs. 'Because those hit in the body die,' he said.

"Worst of all, it seems that there is no spirit, even of despair, among the Turks. No preparations are being made to defend the Tchataldja lines before Constantinople

except the concentration of masses of half-fed, weary soldiery there.

"Here in the capital are two possibilites of disorder: one a revolution of the Young Turk Party against the Government, the second looting and pillage by the hungry Turkish soldiers falling back. I saw in my wanderings last week dozens of ransacked cottages belonging to Turkish peasants who had fled before their retreating compatriots. At least half a dozen villages were burnt out within twenty miles of which the Bulgarians had not approached."*

"The Army Corps have not one-half of the officers, or one-third of the non-commissioned officers that they should have. Moreover, the state of mind of the officers is alarming. They are courageous enough, but have no confidence. They talk of dying at their posts, but not of victory. As to the qualifications of the officers holding the chief commands, they have distinguished themselves in Leagues or Committees and were not chosen for their military ability."†

Yet the Turks were still confident of their power to come out as victors in the end. A circular sent out by the Porte on November 4 to its representatives abroad said:

"The object and intention of the Imperial Government being always pacific it was in order to defend itself against the four Balkan States that it had recourse to arms, notwithstanding the fact that its military preparations were incomplete.

"The Imperial Government is firmly resolved to employ every effort to safeguard its rights, but seeing that these efforts necessitate a greater sacrifice of men the Government, in order to spare the shedding of further blood and to furnish a fresh proof of its love of peace,

* *Daily Mail*, Monday, November 11, 1912.
† *Morning Post*, Friday, November 1, 1912.

invites the mediation of the Powers with a view to ending the war."

The Turks in vain attempted to make a stand at Tchorlu, but were driven from it, and retreated in haste to the lines of Tchataldja. Had the Bulgarians been able to advance at once it was thought on November 1 that they would have entered Constantinople by November 10.

The causes of the Bulgarian delay were explained by the military correspondent of *The Times*.

"The exhaustion of the Bulgarian armies after their splendid efforts is natural enough, and the bold character of their tactics has probably involved heavy losses and immense difficulties in the disposal of the wounded. The question of ammunition is also very likely serious, for the expenditure during seven days of continuous combat must have been great. The Bulgarian soldier carries 120 rounds in the three pouches of his equipment. The pack ponies or battalion carts carry another 40 per rifle, and the ammunition column 90. This makes 250 rounds, which are not more than enough for three days' hard fighting, and it is not at all improbable that a deficiency of gun and rifle ammunition has been experienced. The countryside has also been deserted by the inhabitants, and supplies must be scarce, while the communications are long and the roads have been bad. The Bulgarian fortress artillery is not known to possess more than 50 Canet and Krupp guns of 12 and 15 centimetres, besides a few 24-cm. Creusot guns, and this is little enough to make an impression upon the solid defences and large armament of Adrianople, let alone Tchataldja.

"Now that the Turkish Army in Thrace has been decisively defeated, these things may make no difference to the final result, but they may help to explain the delay which Lieutenant Wagner excuses. We are still

without news of the garrison of the lines and of its present armament. There should be 200 guns in the lines, and working parties should be at work night and day to dig trenches, prepare obstacles, and cut down the forest in front of the right centre of the position, where it is weakest. By damming the Kara Su, the broad and open valley in front of the strong centre of the lines should be made impassable at this season of the year, but between things that should be done and things that have been done there is probably a wide gulf. A British general with 50,000 men in the lines, three days for preparation, and the power of large reinforcement from Asia Minor would think of anything but surrender, and even if the Turks have lost heart they have the strongest political motives for continuing the defence to the bitter end." *

"The battle of Lule Burgas was, though the Turks would not believe it, a death-blow to their hopes of victory. When the news reached Constantinople panic reigned supreme. The population were maddened with the stories of outrages perpetrated upon the hapless Moslem peasantry. Men began to throw the blame for their disasters upon Germany. A state of siege was proclaimed at Constantinople upon October 30.

"The inhabitants have been ordered to be in their houses at 10 o'clock. The semi-official reason given for the adoption of this measure is the passage of prisoners through the streets during the night, but the real reason they have tried to convey is the threatening attitude of the troops near the capital and the Mohammedan population, particularly the law students, who are calling for the massacre of the Greek population.

"The Christians have been quietly arming themselves recently, and it is no longer doubtful that panicky conditions are beginning to prevail.

* *The Times*, Tuesday, November 5, 1912.

" The excitement of the Mohammedans is doubtless due to the fact that, despite all the efforts of the Government, news of repeated Turkish defeats brought in by fugitives has gradually percolated, and the condition of the temper aroused is much as I indicated would be the case a fortnight ago.

" The Government Press is frankly warning the population that any excesses will result in the prompt appearance of foreign warships in the Bosphorus.

" In the meantime arrangements for feeding the troops are practically broken down. A mutinous spirit prevails, especially among the reserves, and it is said that the troops sent up the line towards headquarters at Tchorlu had nothing but uncooked flour for a week.

" The railway service is disorganized. The troops coming from Smyrna had during a five days' journey only some lumps of hard biscuit and water. One man, on a boat crossing the Bosphorus from the Anatolian station, explained that he had two broken teeth, and had been unable to bite the biscuit provided, and that the water given only sufficed to moisten it a little.

" The men who fled from Kirk Kilisse assert that when trucks with bags of flour arrived the soldiers ripped open the sacks and stuffed the raw flour by handfuls into their mouths.

" The disorganization of the railway service is vouched for by officials of the line. They complain that the Turkish military authorities have no idea of the capacity of a single line. Trains are rushed up the line at insufficient intervals, resulting in some very serious accidents.

" It is freely asserted that the Krupp guns are in no way equal to the Creusot gun possessed by the Bulgars, and that the German-trained officers are responsible for the defeats.

" The latter fact doubtless is partly due to the abolition, under the new regime, of rankers, who were closely

in touch with their men and understood by them. The German-trained gentlemen-officers are not understood by the troops, therefore they are not followed so readily.

"In Macedonia the Turkish officials admit that the day is going against them. On the other hand, it must be remembered that there is still a strong unbeaten army between Uskub and Salonika."*

Mr. Alan Ostler, the correspondent of the *Daily Express*, who had himself been hurried along by the retreating Turks in their wild flight from Lule Burgas, had the honour of an interview with the Sultan, to whom he described the pitiful condition of the refugees.

"I told him of the awful devastation of the country through which I had ridden, every village being empty of population, and in most cases burnt.

"'Practically the entire population of Eastern Turkey is coming to Constantinople,' I said. 'The people have piled their belongings on bullock-carts and are blocking the roads for 15 and 20 miles at a stretch.'

"I pointed out to His Majesty that thousands of wounded soldiers from the army were mingled amongst the hordes of villagers.

"'All are starving,' I said, 'men, women, and children, for no food of any kind is available.' It was impossible for me to describe adequately the misery and suffering of the refugees.

"I impressed on His Majesty the urgent need for some prompt organisation of relief measures, unless these hordes of famished and terror-stricken people were literally to starve to death at the gates of the capital.

"The Sultan was visibly much troubled as he heard my story.

"When at the close I told the Sultan that I intended describing the conditions I had seen to the readers of

* *Daily News*, Wednesday, November 6, 1912 (C. Tower).

the *Express*, His Majesty grasped my hand and thanked me personally with great warmth.

"I learn this evening that efforts are to be made to ship as many as possible of the fugitives to Asia, but there is a great lack of organisation.

"Already the starving hordes that are surrounding the city have brought dysentery with them, and unless something is done immediately a famine on a scale never before experienced will result. With the army itself unfed, it is impossible to feed the fugitives, and myriads must starve to death." *

Such were the practical results of the work of Marshal von der Goltz and the German Military Mission to Turkey. The naval advisers of the Turks were Englishmen.

The Turks are excellent diplomatists, and a note to the Turkish representatives throughout Europe was soon despatched to emphasise the Ottoman love for peace, to invite the mediation of the Powers, and to explain that the disasters of Turkey were due to the fact that the Turkish lamb had been caught all unprepared by the savage wolves from the Balkans. Time, however, was fighting for the Sultan and the war would go on for a long time.†

The morrow of the despatch of that note, Tuesday, November 5, was for the European population of the capital, a night of terror. As yet no warships were at hand except the weakly-armed "stationnaires" or European guard-ships which at all times lie in the Bosphorus for the use of the Ambassadors. All men prayed for the presence of the English fleet off the Golden Horn.

"The situation in Stambul is hourly getting more dangerous.

* *Daily Express*, Monday, November 11, 1912.
† *Daily News*, Tuesday, November 5, 1912.

"Last night was one nobody here is likely to forget. We knew that the situation was dangerous, and the delay in sending the cruiser was inexplicable, particularly as it was stated that the Turks themselves had suggested the measure.

"Here in Pera we were comparatively safe, but a nameless fear held, and still holds, the foreigners across the water, especially regarding those who have not yet arrived from the outskirts of the city. We were flying ere we knew from panic in the night. Towards nightfall small bodies of defeated troops began to enter the city. The men were cowed by defeat, but desperate with hunger, for they had been fed last nearly eighty hours previously. They were rain-sodden, and filled with the conviction that their defeat was due to the Christians who had enlisted with the Turks.

"We knew, too, that the Kurdish volunteers had marked their road to the Black Sea ports with a long line of horror, and they stated that many thousands of others were arriving. At any moment one nervous person firing a pistol, one excited Greek making an unwise observation, might provoke an appalling massacre. The first to suffer would be the Christian Ottoman subjects, on whom the Turks lay all the blame of their defeat.

"A Turkish officer lying wounded in Gulane Hospital —a man trained in Berlin—told me that all the disasters had been caused by the Christians in the army and the Bulgarian Komitadjis within the Turkish lines. He manifestly believed the statement, and a similar conviction, even more forcibly expressed, exists amongst the lower classes.

"To show how easily disaster may ensue I will quote one instance of last night.

"Just before dusk some Greek fishermen in a sailing-boat near Galata Bridge shouted to a companion some

congratulation on the Bulgarian victories. Suddenly a caique slid alongside, a Turk swung himself aboard the fishing-boat, a knife gleamed, and the Greek fell overboard dead. One second later a revolver cracked twice, and the Turk and his companion in the caique fell. Immediately revolvers were at work all round. Thirty-six Greeks and Turks were killed and wounded before a police boat shot out of the darkness. Then a bayonet gleamed, and the tumult was suddenly hushed.

"It was a night of terror. Even here in Pera women ran at the noise of a falling iron shutter, and the crash of a broken plate-glass window in the Grande Rue sent passers-by scuttling for doorways. Throughout the town only one question was asked, 'When does the English Fleet arrive?' When we replied that only one cruiser was coming and that she would not pass the Dardanelles until daybreak people stared and shivered.

"Nobody inquired for Russian, Austrian, French or German boats; it was always the British Fleet for which they asked, in shop and counting-house, in hotel and drawing-room, in Galata, Pera, and Stamboul. Not until yesterday had I realised the magic that enables the White Ensign to calm people half-crazy with the terror that walketh in darkness.

"Let me add that I believe that the Europeans, anyhow in Pera, are safe from all except the sudden knife of some maniacal priest. The Government has issued rescript after rescript, warning the population of the dire vengeance that will fall on them, their Empire, and their faith, if one hair of a European's head is injured; but these warnings will not protect Christian Ottomans.

"The situation is such that the Government have not dared to publish the admission that they have asked for the intervention of the Powers as a last hope. Their

efforts now are to keep the beaten Militia away from the city, and prevent a panic such as occurred at Demotica, where they could only be quelled at the bayonet's point.

" It is impossible to obtain a reliable account of the fighting which preceded the retreat to Tchataldja. A Turkish army surgeon describing the fight at Tchorlu, which seems to have been the last stand, said to me yesterday: ' I have seen battlefields before, but never yet saw a field which was so entirely covered with dead, and, worse still, wounded, for whom there is no possible succour at hand. It was simply an appalling shambles. The Bulgarian fire was annihilating, and our troops, once retiring, could not hold together. They were mowed down like grass.'

" One of the old-time rankers, lying with a shattered leg at Gulane, said to me: ' If you want to explain our defeat, say that we had no commandants. We were shepherdless, guideless, and foodless.'

" When I turned to a private, wounded at the capture of Lule Burgas, asking his experience, he said, ' Fighting began and lasted for ever and ever. Then I was wounded, and was glad, as I had been fighting for five days, when a rifle bullet smashed my knee-cap.'

" Appalling scenes are to be witnessed at Gulane Hospital, which only takes the worst cases of the 25,000 wounded men already in the city, and they are only relieved by the charm of the Turkish ladies, who have put off a lifetime's traditions with their yaschmaks, have donned Red Crescent dresses, and with nuns are washing and tending the wounded, including Bulgarians.

" Amongst the fugitives here is an Ottoman Christian schoolmaster of Monastir, one of the leaders of the anti-Turkish movement in Macedonia. Knowing that the Turks in Monastir would kill him first in the event of a massacre, he fled from the city at nightfall, when the Servian guns were heard near. Travelling afoot

all night, he hid in the forest during the daytime. He had only one loaf of bread, and drank rain-water when he saw it glistening in the puddles. Walking by night and hiding by day, he finally reached friends, who smuggled him into Salonica. On the arrival of an Austrian-Lloyd steamer, he swam out to her boat before she touched the shore, and threw himself on the protection of the officer commanding. Finally, as he climbed later up the gangway he turned and threw his fez into the water with an exclamation of disgust.

"Official arrangements have been made that in the event of any disturbances in the city all members of the British colony are to be sent on board the two ships that have been detained for the purpose of embarking refugees.

"Similar arrangements have been made for the subjects of other European Governments.

"Hopes are entertained that before the end of the week an armistice may have been arranged." *

After the evacuation of Tchorlu the Bulgarians pressed on for the coast of the Sea of Marmora. Their objective was Rodosto, a large commercial port, lying 75 miles west of Constantinople, with a population of 25,000, of whom 13,000 are Turks, 6000 Armenians, and 4000 Greeks.

At Rodosto the Turks could disembark reinforcements from Asia Minor. On November 10, the Bulgarians who had been concentrated round Lule Burgas received reinforcements of Serbs, and at once advanced, seizing Tchorlu and the hilly country north of Rodosto, and finally occupied the village of Kavalli so as to cut the communications between Tchorlu and Rodosto. By a daring raid their cavalry rushed the Turkish cavalry barracks north-west of the place, and drove in the outposts.

* *Daily News*, Thursday, November 7, 1912.

The garrison of Rodosto was composed of a few Kurdish irregulars, gendarmes, Mustaphis, and the remnants of the third infantry regiment which had suffered terribly at Lule Burgas. The Kaimakam had fled a week before, but a deputation of Turks and Greeks who drove out from the town for six miles on the Muradli road to offer the surrender of the place did not meet a single Bulgar. However, the Government sent the warship *Masudia* with a few half-starved soldiers and a torpedo-boat to strengthen the defenders, and the Kaimakam emerged from his hiding-place only to fly once more when the foe really drew near. Colonel Remzi, the commandant of the place, had at his disposal about two thousand men, with but few guns, posted on an open tableland without a single trench. The inhabitants were in a state of panic, and cordons of soldiers were drawn round the quays to prevent them from escaping. The commander had no news of the enemy's position.

By the occupation of Rodosto the Bulgarians interrupted all communication by land between Constantinople and the rest of Turkey in Europe, whilst the Greek fleet, cruising in the Ægean for many weeks, kept the Turkish battleships at anchor in the Dardanelles. The capture of Rodosto thus rendered it hopeless for the Turks to attempt to reinforce their armies in Macedonia, in Epirus, and in Albania.

The horrors of famine were raging all over the Turkish districts of Rumelia. They lacked none of the awful features which always accompany famine in an Eastern war.

All Eastern Thrace was an unpeopled waste. The Moslem peasantry had fled before the Bulgarian invaders, as the villagers of Benjamin once fled before the Assyrian.

Mr. Alan Ostler, the correspondent of the *Daily Express*, writes:

"From the Bulgarian frontier as far south as a line drawn roughly across to Visa, the country, with the exception of Adrianople, is actually in the hands of the Bulgars.

"But infinitely more serious to the Turkish people than the mere military occupation of that tract of land by a hostile force, is the fact that the native population has been driven out of it.

"The entire population of the countryside is fleeing southwards. Not only the population of the district held by the Bulgars; nor of the regions in which actual fighting has taken place. The entire population.

"Here, close as I am to Constantinople, I am writing in a village entirely occupied by the Turkish soldiery. I cannot, for any amount of money, hire a roof to shelter my horses, my servant, and myself. The inhabitants—some six or seven thousand, judging from the number of the houses—have fled; their houses, their school, mosque, church, public buildings, are crammed with men and horses. Horses are tethered in the school, and the rough deal benches at which little children sat a week ago are used as mangers. Maps have been torn from the wall, desks have been broken up, to make fires.

"Presently, some building will catch fire, and a score more will follow suit. To-morrow, it may be, half this village will be blackened ruins. . . .

"That is the state of a town only thirty-five miles from the capital of Turkey. Now let me try to describe the depopulated, devastated land through which I have ridden during the last few days.

"It is pillaged, burnt, ruined, peopled only by retreating soldiery and fleeing peasants.

"The Bulgars have not yet been further south than Sakis Euren, or at most, than Karistiran, whither they pursued the Turkish rearguard last week, only to withdraw at once.

"It is not warfare, but panic, that has ruined that stretch of country; not fighters, but fugitives.

"After the fight at Lule Burgas I went down into Karistiran, on my way to Tchorlu. I went with the retreating army. After Karistiran night came on, and I, having made a détour (because the press of soldiers and carts was too thick to allow of any passage at the bridges till daylight should come again), lost my way in the darkness.

"Then it was that I first began to realise that, great as is the tragedy of the army, the tragedy of the people of the country is far greater. Whenever I rode towards a village, I found it empty, or made into a bivouac for soldiers. Whenever I asked a peasant the way to Tchorlu, he said he did not know it, and gave me to understand that he did not live in that district, but was a refugee from the north. Until at last I reached Tchorlu, I found not a single native of the part of the country through which I was riding.

"At Tchorlu, some few hundred terrified souls, unable to get away, were still barricaded in their houses, and in one of these I got quarters for the night.

"Since then I have not slept in an occupied house, nor eaten properly-cooked food. I have gone for a day and a half without eating at all, and for two whole days without drinking, because I was afraid to touch the corpse-fouled water of the streams. Sometimes my servant roasted corn-cobs, and we hung them at our saddles, and nibbled the hard grains as we rode along.

"One happy day we came upon a flock of geese on the green of a deserted village. We lured them into an empty house with grain from our horses' nose-bags, killed two, and ate them both, hardly waiting till they were roasted. Once, too, finding in a house of the better class leaves of tobacco hanging in bundles under the thatch, we chopped them up, and making pipes from

corn-cobs, with straws for stems, sat by our camp fire —there was no food to cook that night—and, for the first time in many days, delightfully smoked.

"Throughout the area marked black upon my map I could not, even with a belt full of gold round my waist, buy food of any kind, at any price, save only at Tchorlu and at Tchataldja.

"And, all day and every day, the roads by which I have travelled have been crowded with fugitive peasants.

"Crowded! The word does not begin to describe their state. In open, rolling country, not unlike some vaster Sussex downs or Salisbury Plain, I have seen daily the long, sorrowful trains of buffalo-carts, extending in close line from horizon to horizon.

"Suppose the entire agricultural population of England from as far north as York were to pour, panic-stricken, down every highway and byway leading to London. Suppose that they had left their homes, left their houses, villages, and market towns quite empty, taking with them only such few household goods as could be packed, together with the women and children, upon a country cart.

"Suppose that, instead of metalled roads, trodden paths were their avenue of retreat; paths turned by rain into rivulets of mud, and trampled by the hordes of fugitives into quagmires half a mile broad, where horses would sink belly-deep in clinging black slime, and carts be buried to the axle. And suppose that, with these fugitive wretches, there pushed and struggled a disorganised mob of starving soldiers, perhaps a hundred thousand strong, ranging the fields for roots and the hedgerows for berries to eat, burning deserted cottages to taste a little warmth, and, it may be, driven to rob the peasant fugitives of the little stores they carried in the carts.

"*If that were to happen in England, England would be as Turkey now is.*

"If you can imagine that!

"But you cannot. If we were invaded, and our armies beaten, still our non-combatants, I think, could never be driven in panic-stricken flight from their homes.

"With these unhappy people it is different. War, in this part of the world, has never recognised non-combatants. The home, the crops, the goods, the women of the people of an invaded country in the East are the lawful spoil of the victor.

"It is because they and their kind have taught and learnt this bitter lesson for ages that the population of invaded Turkey are now emigrating *en masse*—emigrating they know not whither. Dumb as their own dull cattle the rag-wrapped men who walk by the buffalo-carts stare ever straight ahead in hopeless misery, longing for the next horizon to show them food and safety.

"They will go to Constantinople for the most part, though some have made for ports like Silivri and Rodosto, whence attempts are being made to ship them over into Asia Minor. But the greater part, it seems, are making for the capital.

"What will happen to them there? Constantinople cannot hold a tenth of them. Turkey, who cannot feed her own starving soldiers, certainly cannot feed these hordes, whose scant provisions cannot carry them through the wasted region they have still to traverse. They will simply lie down outside the walls of Constantinople and starve to death.

"I saw, near Tcherkeskeui three days ago, one of these long, low wagons slowly toiling nearer and nearer to a point where, by the roadside, seemed to lie a soldier's crumpled greatcoat, with a huge, black, shiny busby where the wearer's head should be.

"As I overtook them, a child, a girl of ten or twelve, jumped from the wagon-shaft and ran towards the object. And at that the busby rose up with a horrid squawking, and resolved itself into a cloud of unclean birds! Their meal had been a Turkish soldier. Now he lay, with great eye-cavities picked bare and fleshless cheeks, one arm bent impossibly behind him, and his side smashed in by the wheel of some cart.

"The girl knelt down and searched hastily through the pockets of the coat. She opened the rain-sodden leathern wallet, pulling feverishly at the buckles. Then, finding nothing, she beat the stiff body with her flat hands, sprang up and ran back whimpering, to the wagon, her knuckles at her eyes. *She had hoped to find something to eat.*

"Constantinople, largely ignorant of the awful conditions at the front, remains extraordinarily calm. Business continues as usual, and the music-halls and other places of amusement are still filled nightly with gay crowds, as though there was nothing so remote as war.

"Nothing more unlike a city with an enemy hammering at its gates can be imagined.

"The commanders of the foreign battleships are thoroughly prepared for every eventuality.

"The scheme drawn up, to be put into operation if landing becomes necessary, allocates machine guns to all the commanding positions in the European quarter.

"Every sailor will know what his position will be ashore. Maps have been made for the instruction of the officers, and a great feature of the scheme is that it can be put into execution well within an hour's time.

"Europeans regard their position here as perfectly safe. Practically the only danger now is the retreat of the disorganised rabble of Turkish troops into the city.

"The first part they would reach would be Stamboul,

where even a slight disorder would quickly swell into serious rioting, and possibly result in a big fire in the bazaar quarter.

"If the Bulgarians prevent a rush of the beaten soldiers into Stamboul, it is believed that the entry of the victorious army would be quietly effected.

"Small bands of armed firemen are patrolling the city, and the authorities say that their arrangements are adequate, but in the confusion before the fall of the city the inclination of the authorities might be to let matters take their own course and to leave everything without a directing hand.

"Many reports are current that rather than allow the Bulgarians to sing a Te Deum in the St. Sophia mosque, or replace the Crescent on the dome by the Cross, the Turks will blow up the sacred edifice. This is extremely improbable.

"Everything points, if peace is not immediately concluded, and if the Bulgarians act swiftly and handle the position firmly, to a peaceful entry into the oft-threatened centre of the Ottoman Empire.

"Refugees, who for days have been camping in the streets, courtyards, and floors of the mosques, are being removed in shiploads to the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

"It is estimated that 50,000 have passed through the city. The overcrowding on the ships is terrible. The sanitary arrangements are hopelessly inadequate, and a serious outbreak of disease is inevitable.

"The plight of the refugees, left to shift for themselves as regards food and clothing, is deplorable, and, packed like cattle on board ship, they present a most pitiful spectacle, especially the very young and old.

"The weather here is very warm, and all the conditions are present for the outbreak and spread of disease.

"I visited several of the mosques to-day, including St. Sophia. There, save for the corners reserved for religious

ceremonies, the whole building is still taken up by soldiers and refugees, sleeping, eating, cooking and doing all sorts of work.

"At the War Office a complete chaos is reigning. Squads of raw recruits and reservists were being drilled outside the building in elementary military exercises, and their awkward movements were watched by an idle, chaffing crowd.

"These and hundreds of other soldiers cannot be sent to the front because there are no weapons available. Several hundred troops who were sent to Tchataldja without rifles returned to the city because there were no arms for them at the front." *

The natural results followed, and by Sunday, November 17, cholera had broken out amongst both armies who were in their death-grapple at Tchataldja.

It was reported as early as November 12 that the Porte had applied direct to Bulgaria to arrange an armistice.

On November 13 the Ministers of the Great Powers at Athens, Belgrade, Cettigne, and Sofia were instructed to inquire upon what conditions the Allies would agree to an armistice.

Before, however, their Cabinets had replied, fighting began at Tchataldja, and the decisive battle of the war appeared to be at hand. A telegram from the correspondent of the *Reichspost* announced on November 15 that the Bulgarians had succeeded in breaking through the Turkish lines at Hademkeui and in rolling up the Turkish defence. Sofia journals asserted that the Bulgarians had captured six of the Tchataldja forts, two of them important and modern, after desperate fighting. On November 17 the Turkish rule at Constantinople appeared to be doomed, and the commanders of the European warships in the Bosphorus decided to land sailors, who were not to

* *Daily Chronicle*, Saturday, November 16, 1912.

appear in the streets, but to proceed to posts allotted to each detachment, where they were to remain until their intervention might be required.

Heavy firing could be distinctly heard at Constantinople, and from five o'clock in the morning crowds were assembled on the roofs and in the open spaces to listen to the boom of the guns.

"The cannonade of the artillery and fleet is so intense that houses at Kermer Burgas, a dozen miles away from the front, are violently shaken.

"Although considerable excitement prevails, the population remains calm.

"A great sensation was caused by the news of the discovery of a Young Turk plot to establish a Republic under Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the Young Turk military leader who successfully planned the revolution which overthrew Abdul Hamid, and who until a few months ago was Minister of War, when he was replaced by Nazim Pasha."

But it was not written that the Cross should once more be placed upon Santa Sophia in November 1912. Just as the plague saved Jerusalem from the Assyrians, so Constantinople was saved from the Bulgarians by the cholera. Once more the Turkish Empire, or such remnants of it as are left in Europe, has been given a space for repentance. Will that space be wisely used?

The Balkan Allies transmitted their proposals for an armistice to Constantinople on November 19, accompanied by the main conditions for the conclusion of peace. Thanks to the energetic efforts of the Russian and English Ministers at Sofia, and possibly with some regard to the result of the fighting before Tchataldja, the principal condition permitted Turkey to retain Constantinople and a strip of coast territory in Europe. It was said that the conditions for an armistice included the surrender pure and simple of Adrianople and Durazzo, and also of the

Tchataldja lines. The cessation of hostilities appeared to be in sight. Their reply was conveyed to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. Turkish feeling became more hopeful, especially as the check sustained by the Bulgarians before the lines of Tchataldja became known.

"Pera was now held in considerable force, naval detachments occupying the Embassies, Consulates, foreign schools, and other buildings with machine guns. All arrangements had been completed, and the position of Europeans caused no anxiety. The landing of marines undoubtedly had a calming effect on the population in Stamboul.

"Public excitement was rising a little, but careful observation and inquiry revealed no reason for the belief that the entry of the victorious enemy would be accompanied by difficulty or disorder. For example, the danger of the Turks blowing up mosques might be dismissed, as these buildings, especially the Sophia Mosque, were filled to overflowing with patients, mostly suffering from cholera.

"During Sunday night no fewer than 6000 sick, a large percentage of whom were suffering from cholera, were brought from the front and put in mosques, which were hastily converted into improvised hospitals.

"The scenes in these crowded buildings were beyond all description. It was impossible to attend to a tithe of the sufferers, many of whom were carried into the mosques only to be soon carried out again dead, without having received any attention in the interval. Round the mosques the sick were lying in hundreds.

"There had been 4000 cases in the army within the last forty-eight hours. The plains in the rear of the army were thickly dotted over with corpses." *

The terms rumoured to have been proposed by

* *Daily Chronicle*, Thursday, November 21, 1912.

Bulgaria proved incorrect. The Bulgarians merely demanded that the Turks should not reinforce the Tchataldja lines, although they required that Yanina should at once be handed over to the Greeks and Skutari to the Montenegrins. The Turkish Council of Ministers regarded these terms as absolutely unacceptable, and on November 21 sent orders to Nazim Pasha to resume hostilities at Tchataldja without delay. The Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, said that the Turks would fight to the last cartridge.

The Bulgarians, however, were willing to modify their proposals, and on November 22 it was agreed that Dr. Daneff, President of the Sobranye, General Savoff, the Commander-in-Chief, and General Fitcheff, Chief of the Staff, should be commissioned to leave at once for the lines of Tchataldja to meet the Turkish delegates. The Bulgarians, from a wish to be able to come to a settlement directly with Turkey, without the intervention of the Powers, gave up all idea of entering Constantinople. They, however, proposed to ask for a War Indemnity from Turkey. At the Bulgarian headquarters Servia was represented by General Chepovitch and Greece by M. Frantzis. The Turks named as their delegates the Commander-in-Chief, Nazim Pasha, Izzet Pasha, Osman Nizami Pasha, Ambassador to Berlin, Hadi Pasha, Chief of the Staff, and Reshid Pasha, Minister of Commerce. It was agreed that their first meeting should take place on November 25.

In the eyes of many Turkish authorities the situation was by no means desperate.

"Every day strengthens the conviction that the Bulgarians will not succeed in piercing the Tchataldja lines, and this, together with the diminution in the violence of the cholera outbreak, and the arrival of fresh troops from Adana, renews confidence and hope in both civil and military circles.

"The Ottoman Government appears to be decided not

to accept a discussion of the surrender of Adrianople, Yanina, and Skutari, and all the more so because it is returning to its hope of breaking up the Balkan coalition and inducing Greece to negotiate separately. In Ottoman circles the conviction also exists that Montenegro, completely exhausted and with inadequate artillery, is absolutely incapable of capturing Skutari.

"As for Servia, it is stated that England and France have informed Russia that they would not risk war in order to ensure for Servia a port on the Adriatic Sea, while Germany is reported to have assured Austria of support with all her strength, as in the Bosnian affair, so that Servia would find herself alone in face of Austria in her most critical position.

"This view of the situation inspires civil circles with the hope that, with sufficient firmness, peace can be concluded on a basis of the preservation of the whole of Thrace, with Adrianople and Lule Burgas, and autonomies in Macedonia and Albania, with Christian or even foreign Governors, but with the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan.

"As for military circles, they are much more sanguine. They consider that now, with the accumulation of fresh troops and the perfecting of restoration of the *moral* of the old troops, the Tchataldja lines are impregnable; and that, if the negotiations are broken off, Turkey could immediately assume a vigorous offensive.

"As a characteristic illustration of this change of feeling, I may quote a letter from a general officer now in the Tchataldja lines, which was read to me by its recipient. 'Now,' he writes, 'we have ninety-nine chances in a hundred of driving the Bulgarians back over the frontier, and, with the help of God, in a short time I shall be able to write to you from Sofia.'" *

Austria had already mobilised 300,000 men on the

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, November 25, 1912.

Servian frontier, and the Chief of the Austrian General Staff had paid a visit to the Chief of the German General Staff at Berlin. Rumania too was rumoured to be preparing to mobilise.

Bulgaria seemed to be drawing back her troops, and matters at Tchataldja were left in the hands of the diplomatists. Hadi Pasha, from political considerations, replaced Izzet Pasha as one of the Turkish delegates.

The first meeting between the delegates took place on November 24. The original Bulgarian demands, which were very drastic, were rejected by Turkey. They involved the surrender of Yanina, Skutari, Adrianople, and Durazzo, and retirement from the Tchataldja lines, and would have left Turkey nothing but Constantinople and the territory enclosed in a line running from Midia on the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora near Gallipoli.

The Porte, however, stood firm, as it was believed both at Vienna and Berlin that the Bulgarian Army was all but exhausted, and the assertion that Greek and Servian troops would be brought up to assist in the attack on the Tchataldja lines was not believed. France was doing her utmost at Belgrade to smooth down the dispute between Austria and Servia. Turkey felt she was being abandoned.

At Constantinople "the indifference of Europe, especially Great Britain, to the fate of Turkey has produced a marked impression in Government circles. Great Britain, said the Grand Vizier, was losing her prestige here in consequence of it. For the peace of Europe a strong Turkey was necessary. Otherwise it would not be long before Europe felt the consequences of its present policy."

At last on December 3 an armistice was signed which was to extend over the whole duration of the peace pourparlers.

During the armistice the armies were to remain in their actual positions.

The armistice had been drafted by Dr. Daneff, and contained the following conditions:

"1. The belligerent armies remain in the positions they at present occupy.

"2. The besieged fortress shall not be revictualled.

"3. The revictualling of the Bulgarian Army shall be carried out by way of the Black Sea and Adrianople, commencing ten days after the conclusion of the armistice.

"4. Negotiations for peace shall begin in London on December 13."

The armistice was signed by the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries on behalf of Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro. The Greek Government reserved for twenty-four hours its decision as to signing the protocol, but even should Greece not sign it, she would, nevertheless, take part in the peace negotiations.

The reasons for the delay of Greece were that she found herself unable to agree to terms the effect of which, it was pointed out, would be to enable Turkey to accumulate any amount of food, munitions of war, and coal throughout the theatre of operations. In addition the moral result that such conditions would have both upon the Turkish Army and population, who would regard them as having been imposed by a victorious Turkey upon Allies reduced to impotence, would be enormous.

Turkey, however, had long been intriguing to detach Greece from her allies.

"The Greek Minister in London said:

"'It is only just that the following points, for which I can vouch, should not be lost sight of in judging the Greek attitude. Immediately prior to the war the Porte approached M. Venezelos with tempting offers, wishing to detach Greece from the Alliance. These were indignantly rejected. Then Turkey declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia, but not upon Greece, once more with

the object of detaching her from her Allies, but Greece declared war against Turkey.

"'Quite recently, immediately before Turkey's demand for an armistice, the Porte once more addressed itself to the Greek Premier with offers of a separate peace, and again M. Venezelos in honourable faith to his Allies declared that he would on no account come to even a partial understanding without the full knowledge, co-operation, and consent of the Allies.

"'Greece's contribution in the present war had not been confined to the uninterruptedly victorious operations of her army of 140,000 men. The action of her fleet may be justly considered as the one decisive factor in the whole war. Without the presence of our ships Turkey would have been able, within ten days at the utmost of the declaration of war, to bring her best troops from Asia Minor and Arabia, and land them at Dedeagatch on the flank of the Bulgarian armies, thus rendering their magnificent victories quite impossible.

"'The Greek fleet has also paralysed the whole of the system of the Turkish railways by interrupting the supply of coal, thus compelling the reinforcements from Asia Minor to arrive weary and footsore after long and exhausting marches. One must also consider the moral effect of the much-vaunted Turkish fleet not daring to show its nose outside the Dardanelles in view of the presence of Greek ships.'" *

As regards Bulgaria, it was soon realised that Adrianople would prove the critical point in the negotiations.

The signature of the armistice is thus described by the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*:

"The last meeting of the plenipotentiaries, like the preceding ones, took place in the train which brought the Turkish representatives as far as the bridge over the Kara Su.

* *Daily Chronicle*, Wednesday, December 4, 1912.

" This is a solemn hour, in which the face of Europe is being changed.

" The armistice will be followed within ten days by a congress of Balkan and Turkish representatives, which will be held in London, and will establish the conditions of peace.

" The Greek plenipotentiaries had not received instructions, and, therefore, they withdrew from the ceremony of signing the armistice.

" The principal conditions of the armistice are the maintenance by the armies of their reciprocal positions and the right of the Bulgarians to revictual their army by way of the sea, and to pass military trains through Adrianople.

" The trains will be able to carry goods of any kind.

" Either adversary wishing during the course of the negotiations to resume hostilities will have to give four days' notice, and this condition makes the continuation of the war practically impossible. It is an armistice *sine die*.

" The signature of the armistice was an act of great solemnity.

" The time was a quarter-past seven. For two hours the discussions between the Bulgarian and Turkish plenipotentiaries had been prolonged upon a question in regard to which an agreement seemed to be impossible. There was one last point to which the Turks clung with the utmost tenacity. It concerned the most serious condition which the Bulgarians imposed, namely, that of being allowed to pass their military trains, no matter what they might be carrying, through besieged Adrianople. With this concession the fortress, created to prevent the use of the railway by the enemy, would lose its value, and its splendid resistance would be rendered useless.

" In the whole of the military history of the world, there is no example of a situation so strange and painful as that of a blockaded and famished fortress, which could

not be revictualled, being forced to allow the enemy's convoys loaded with food and arms to pass through it. To the garrison there only remained the honour of not having surrendered. Adrianople was virtually subdued.

"It will be easily understood how reluctant the Turks were to give way to the inexorable will of the victors. They made one proposal after another which might mitigate the harshness of the Bulgarian demand, but they encountered a firm and irreducible determination. The colloquy languished. There were long intervals of silence, which were broken only by some common-place exchange of courtesies, such as the offer of cigarettes or coffee; it was felt that the decisive moment, upon which war or peace depended, was approaching.

"Night had fallen, and in the interior of the railway carriage the lamps had been kindled for some time. The meeting took place, like the preceding ones, in the Turkish train, which at half-past four in the afternoon had emerged from among the Turkish positions, and had slowly descended the slopes of the fortified hills, appearing and disappearing between the entrenchments until it had stopped at the bridge over the Kara Su, at the foot of the Ottoman forts. That small black convoy, which glided slowly down the bare hills, was the only living thing in the vast, desolate, hostile landscape which was darkening with the declining day.

"From the train of the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries, in which I had been invited to take a place with my colleagues, Naudeau and Victoroff, we attentively followed the slow progress of the Turkish train, which in that place, and at that hour, assumed a somewhat solemn and mysterious aspect. It came like an imposing and prodigious ambassador, to bring a verdict of life or death for a whole multitude of men; it came to tell us whether or not other human hecatombs were necessary in order to confirm the triumph of Bulgaria. Our convoy had already

traversed the encampments—the great towns of canvas glistening on the other side of the hills, all teeming with soldiers and veiled by the smoke of the watch fires—and we were passing close to the trenches, on the black parapets of which we saw in the twilight the outline of a moving embroidery of heads. Further on was the deserted field of battle.

"At our approach a company of Turkish infantry on the other side of the Kara Su formed up alongside the railway, and remained motionless, like a vast grey hedge. Almost at the same moment the two trains reached either end of the bridge, of which only one footway remains intact. A minute later the plenipotentiaries of the Balkan States passed in Indian file close alongside the steel parapet. With Dr. Daneff and Generals Savoff and Fitcheff representing Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, there was the Hellenic Minister, M. Panas, representing Greece. They were followed by a suite of officers.

"A Turkish military command rang out in the silence, and the guard of honour rigidly presented arms. The Bulgarians and Greeks returned the salute. Rechid Pasha, Nazim Pasha, and an officer of the Turkish General Staff, were standing outside their railway saloon.

"Precisely at five o'clock the plenipotentiaries shut themselves in the compartment where the sittings have been held. A few minutes later the Greek Minister, deeply moved, and with a serious expression on his face, came out and went away without saying a word. He was accompanied by the Greek Attaché, and they both went to resume their places in the train which had brought them to the place of meeting.

"What had happened? Greece had withdrawn from the agreement. The Turkish and Bulgarian officers belonging to the two suites, who were conversing together in low tones in the neighbouring compartment, became silent when they observed the old diplomatist pass with

frowning brows before the windows of the carriage, and for some minutes none of them spoke.

" A new situation had been created. The solution of the riddle occupied every mind, and the thought of new and imminent battles cut short the polite frivolities of those enemies, who were so strangely united in the saloon carriage. No sound came from the neighbouring compartment, and it seemed as if the plenipotentiaries were sitting in silence around their table.

" Time passed slowly, and one had the impression that an obscure menace was being matured. It was felt that the prolongation of the colloquy, which had to be definitive, signified that a serious obstacle to an agreement had arisen. This time the armistice did not represent only the suspension of hostilities. Owing to the singular conditions of war, an armistice could not be arranged without solid guarantees of peace; it should have almost the value of a preliminary treaty.

" We dimly understood that behind the military discussion there might be some secret political design which decided the bases of peace. It was really peace which we were awaiting in that memorable hour. If the plenipotentiaries should separate without having come to an understanding, perhaps, when the next day dawned, the tumult of battle would again have invaded the funereal valley, and the battle would be more desperate and bitter than any other.

" Later on we learned what had happened among the plenipotentiaries. At the time every minute that passed was full of doubt and anxiety. Night came on. The two engines had lighted their great round eyes, a reflection of which trembled in the waters of the Kara Su, the terrible stream which merits its name of " black." In the mud of the river hundreds of Bulgarian soldiers disappeared while trying to ford it as they fearlessly advanced to the attack of the enemy's positions about sixteen days ago.

" In the last glimmer of twilight which still reddened the distant marsh of Boyuk Chekmedje to the west we perceived all around us on the muddy plain the most advanced trenches of the Bulgarians, which were dug on the night of the battle, some two hundred paces from those of the enemy, and close to these were winding lines of disturbed ground which marked the supreme and most sanguinary stage of an heroic attack by some small, dark objects which lay all around; they were corpses which had been piously covered by a few spadesful of earth thrown hurriedly over them while the hurricane of the enemy's lead was still falling, and which remained as they had fallen. The air was full of a terrible odour of death.

" A deep but immensely remote hum, a dull roar, scarcely perceptible in the quiet of the night, came from the west. As in other moments of absolute calm, the echo of the artillery at Adrianople reached us apparently from the direction of Stamboul. Battle was raging more furiously than ever around the besieged city, and its terrible roar insinuated itself amongst the words of the plenipotentiaries.

" When darkness had completely invaded the land, no light shone in the lugubrious landscape, and the two trains appeared to be alone in an immense desert of shadows. The decisive colloquy between the two belligerents seemed to be surrounded by something imposing and full of anguish. We all felt the sinister, tragic grandeur of the scene in the midst of which Mussulman power was slowly dying.

" In the apparent solitude myriads of eyes were gazing towards us. Invisible crowds were silently waiting for the fatal minute to strike. Taking advantage of the darkness, some Turkish soldiers approached us from trench to trench, and we saw them assembling about a hundred paces from us. Dark shadows passed over the parapets of

a redoubt. We were within speaking distance of the forts.

"As I have already stated, the discussion was prolonged upon the right of the Bulgarian military trains to pass Adrianople. That right would deprive the Turks of any hope of resuming the war with success— if they cherished such a mad hope.

"After a long silence, Nazim Pasha suddenly exclaimed: 'Well, let it be so; but wait ten days before sending your trains through; wait for the beginning of the peace negotiations in London.'

"Dr. Daneff, who was sitting opposite the Turkish Generalissimo, rose, and solemnly extended his hand, saying: 'It is finished; we are in agreement.'

"It was twenty minutes past seven. The plenipotentiaries, moved by unrestrainable emotion, all rose to their feet. The tension had been too long and too intense. Under an impassible, impenetrable appearance, these men of politics and war had felt the most penetrating anguish and doubt under the tormenting weight of responsibility, in a tumult of uncertain hopes. A sudden reaction came to their tired minds, a wave of emotion seized them when the last barrier which separated them had fallen; their impassivity vanished; for one moment they forgot the tremendous struggle between their nations, and with a spontaneous, irresistible gesture they exchanged an embrace and a kiss.

"Savoff, the Bulgar Generalissimo, and Nazim Pasha, the supreme commander of the Turkish Army, clasped each other in silence. The joy of triumph and the pain of defeat vanished for one moment beneath a wave of human fraternity. It was a moment of noble and silent abandonment.

"Then General Fitcheff summoned M. T. Chaprachikoff, Private Secretary to King Ferdinand, who acts as secretary to the Bulgarian mission, and who was in the

neighbouring compartment, and asked him to make four copies of the armistice agreement. The news immediately passed through the train. All the silent officials were on their feet.

" Bottles of champagne were opened, and Nazim Pasha, pale but full of dignity, appeared at the door with a glass in his hand. With a serious voice he turned to the Bulgarian officers and said, ' Gentlemen, I drink to the health of the valiant Bulgarian army.' His hand trembled slightly as he carried the glass to his lips. ' To the health of the valiant Ottoman army,' the officers replied.

" After this first moment of excitement and emotion, the generals retired. There was a scarcely concealed expression of sadness on the faces of the Turkish officers as they compelled themselves to resume the attitude of courteous hosts. With a little trace of embarrassment conversation was resumed upon remote questions about which nobody was thinking

" Precisely at eight o'clock the plenipotentiaries listened to the reading of the armistice agreement, and placed their signatures to the document, which was drawn up in French. The official signatures will be affixed to-morrow, at ten o'clock.

" The state of war remains, but the war is virtually ended.

" Nazim and Rechid Pashas, having resumed their impassive and correct aspect when they reappeared before the Bulgarians, retired in the flickering light of torches to their train accompanied by the Turkish officers. A few minutes later we were proceeding towards the station of Kanakja, from which we had started.

" A crowd of soldiers ran up when the train arrived, but, on hearing the news that an armistice had been signed, they gave three cheers, the sound of which spread to the neighbouring encampment. We heard the cheers echoing over the hills towards the headquarters, but we

also heard the sound of the bombardment of Adrianople—a strange commentary on an armistice! and the thunderous voice of battle aroused a vague doubt in our minds as we thought of all that still remains obscure and inexplicable in this historical hour, while the frontiers of five nations are being displaced and an Empire five centuries old is crumbling, while the geography and politics of Europe are assuming aspects that are still mysterious, and 700,000 men still remain in arms in the battle positions, awaiting the dawn of a new era." *

Servia and Montenegro had asked Bulgaria to represent them. When the Greek delegate arrived at Tchataldja, he found that the terms of the armistice had been arranged in his absence. He referred them at once to Athens, but the Greek Government refused to sign them.

The Hellenic Government addressed a long, dignified, and touching appeal to the Governments of the Allies, beseeching them not to take any course calculated to weaken or endanger the League. At the same time, Greece offered all her naval and military resources in case Turkey was not disposed to accept terms less damaging to the interests of the Allies.

"This appeal formed an important historical document which, when published, will show that Greece, far from having any intention of breaking away from the League, has put forward every effort to maintain it in its original form." †

But the Furies were not yet appeased. The innocent blood which during the long centuries of Turkish rule had been shed like water in Thrace, in Armenia, and in Macedonia, was still crying for vengeance from the ground; and the Peace so confidently foretold by diplomatists and by journalists proved, indeed, to be no Peace. Blood had to be wiped out with blood. Scarcely had the

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, December 9, 1912 (Luigi Barzini).
† *Daily Telegraph*, Thursday, December 5, 1912.

question of Adrianople, which had so long occupied the Conference of the Balkan and Turkish delegates in London, been settled by its surrender to Bulgaria, when a revolution broke out at Constantinople. The Young Turks came into power, Nazim Pasha was murdered, negotiations were broken off, and the blood of Nazim Pasha was only atoned for by further hecatombs at Adrianople, at Yanina, at Tchataldja, and at Skutari.

We have seen that on November 16 the Government discovered a Young Turk plot for the establishment of a Republic, and that the arrest of the chiefs of the Committee of Union and Progress had been immediately ordered.

"The real leader of the movement was undoubtedly Djavid Bey, who escaped arrest.

"Talat Bey, ex-Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, was less fortunate. He was serving with the army at the front as a volunteer, and when he heard that the plot had been discovered he attempted to escape but was caught when about to flee the camp.

"Two of the alleged conspirators offered serious resistance. Djamboulat Bey, an ex-Minister, shot at and mortally wounded the gendarme sent to arrest him. Djamboulat was tried, sentenced to death, and shot.

"Another prominent conspirator was Husein Djahid Bey, then directing affairs from Constanza, and editing the journal *Tanin* there.

"There were a large number of arrests in the army. All the military conspirators will be tried by court-martial at once.

"The police found traces of a second plot by ulemas or priests, but though this is not regarded as serious, it shows potentialities."*

Arrests and courts-martial, however, only scotched but did not extinguish the fire of rebellion, which continued

* *Daily Chronicle*, Friday, November 22, 1912.

to smoulder during the sittings of the Peace Conference at St. James's Palace, possibly, as subsequent discoveries served to show, with the encouragement of some officers amongst the beleaguered garrison of Adrianople.

The negotiations in London must now be briefly described.

Turkey would not give up Adrianople whilst the fortress still held out; such was the main obstacle in the way of peace. At the luncheon given to the Peace Delegates in the Guildhall in London Mr. Asquith might speak of his confident hope that the struggle would be closed by a "Peace of London," which would do much to promote peace and happiness throughout the world, but at Constantinople the Government, itself the child of a *coup d'état*, saw at every moment the swords of military conspirators hanging over its head.

Such was the state of affairs for some weeks. Turkey would not give way as to the possession of Adrianople or cede those islands of the Archipelago which are adjacent to the Dardanelles or to the coast of Asia Minor. Bulgaria would not sacrifice in vain the blood which she had shed before Adrianople. The question of the Sacred Places in the city rose into prominence, and the Mosque of Sultan Selim was invested with an accession of sanctity which amused the antiquarian and did not deceive the diplomat.

From the armoury of German learning, and from the archives of the Vatican, the Porte drew weapons which it brandished in the defence of Islam against the Cross. A division of Adrianople was proposed. The portion of the city beyond the Maritza, which contains the railway station, was to become Bulgarian; its centre, with the Holy Places, glowing in thrice-brightened haloes, was to remain Turkish: Tsar Ferdinand was to become Administrator of Adrianople; whilst the Sultan's authority was to be represented, as in Egypt, by a Resident, whose

functions were to be to draw his salary and to do nothing; in fine, Tsar Ferdinand was to be a kind of Vicar-General for the Sultan, whose spiritual authority was to be exercised by a Naib-es-Sultan, or Spiritual Viceroy. The plan was, doubtless, modelled on a scheme for the settlement of the Roman question which was proposed by Cavour through the Jesuit Carlo Passante in 1860, and which was within an ace of being accepted by Pius IX. This suggestion was that Victor Emmanuel should govern Rome and the Patrimony as the Vicar of the Church, but that Pius IX. should remain their sovereign. The question of the position of England as regards Turkey in Koweit, and other territories on the Persian Gulf, seems likely to be settled upon very similar lines. However, the Bulgarians are a plain people, and with the cry of "Adrianople for Bulgaria," they quickly broke through these diplomatic filaments.

On January 9, 1913, it was officially announced that the Porte had addressed to the Ottoman Ambassadors abroad a circular intimating that if the Balkan delegates did not by the end of the week accept the proposals of peace formulated by Turkey, the Ottoman delegates in London would be immediately invited to return to Constantinople.

"'Whatever happens,' continued the Note, 'the Porte is firmly resolved to maintain its point of view as explained during the course of the negotiations in London in regard to Adrianople and the Ægean Islands, seeing that the sacrifices to which it has already consented have reached the extreme limit.'"

"The general opinion is that any step taken by the Powers, even if supported by a naval demonstration, with the object of compelling the Porte to conclude peace on the basis of the cession of Adrianople, is doomed to failure.

"The Balkan Envoys in London had again emphasised the fact that they would not re-enter the conference unless

Turkey gave way on the question of Adrianople and the Ægean Islands.

" It is reported that suggestions have reached the Allies in guarded form that the Powers were likely to advise that those islands nearest the Dardanelles should be retained by Turkey, that those nearest to Greece should be ceded to Greece, and that possibly some others might be made autonomous.

" Assuming that there is any good foundation for these intentions attributed to the Powers, the Allies, it is further stated, would not be likely to adopt a defiant attitude and decline to further negotiate, although the cession of the islands was included in their demands.

" ' But if,' said a delegate emphatically, ' we learned to-day that Turkey would yield Adrianople, we would not consent to resume negotiations on that basis alone, but would flatly refuse unless the status of the Ægean Islands were left open to discussion and reasonable arrangement.' " *

Gossip at Constantinople reported that England had done her utmost to secure the retention of Adrianople by Turkey in exchange for concessions to her own advantage with regard to the Bagdad Railway.

On the afternoon of January 9 the Porte made known that it would not accept the proposals put forward by the Allies, but would decline the intervention of the Powers, and recall its delegates from London, unless its own counter-proposals were accepted. A meeting of Ambassadors was held at the residence of the Margrave Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who is the *doyen* of the Corps at Constantinople, in order to draft a Collective Note to be handed to the Porte. Public opinion, however, held that this step would be doomed to failure, even if the Powers supported it by a naval demonstration, if they insisted on the cession of Adrianople.

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, Friday, January 10, 1913.

Neither the army, where feeling ran high in favour of the maintenance of the war, nor the general public would by that time have allowed any Ottoman Government to make such a sacrifice, although they would have agreed to the conclusion of a peace which would retain Adrianople for Turkey, even with the fortifications dismantled. It was rumoured, indeed, that the armistice had been broken, and that a party of Bulgarians who had been endeavouring to cut the telegraph near Lake Derkos, at the northern end of the Tchataldja Lines, had been driven back by the Turks with some loss.

CHAPTER XIII

THE GREEK OPERATIONS

Macedonia

THE Greek Army in Macedonia was commanded by Crown Prince Constantine, and included the pick of their forces, amongst whom were many foreign volunteers. Amongst the Evzones (Rifles) were many Americans, who had been engaged in tobacco planting in Greece. The Turks had concentrated a force of 30,000 men at Sarandoporo under the command of Hassan Taksin Pasha, but sustained a crushing defeat.

By Tuesday, October 22, the Turks were in full retreat on Serfidje (Servia), completely demoralised, and the Greeks were following close on their heels. Two million rounds of cartridges, four siege guns, four field batteries, and hundreds of blankets and greatcoats were found in the track of the flying army.

It was expected that the Turks would have defended the Stone Gates, the pass leading from the basin of the Xeragi River to that of the Vistritsa, but the Greeks met with no resistance in occupying the approaches to the pass.

They were jubilant at the results obtained. As a high officer said, "We expected much greater resistance, but when officers in the army engage in politics it means that the *moral* of the men is sapped. This has happened in Turkey."* The Greeks had learnt this lesson in the war of fifteen years before.

* *Daily Express*, Wednesday, October 23, 1912.

Two Greek divisions operating in Western Thessaly defeated the Turks at Deskati and drove the enemy before them to Kossani.

Hope ran high, and, if the gossip of Athens was to be trusted, M. Venezelos hoped that the war would have been finished and the country have resumed normal conditions before Christmas, but preparations were being made in view of a lengthy campaign.

Two days later 480 Turkish prisoners, taken after Sarandoporo, arrived at Tirnovo.

On the same day (Tuesday, October 29) the first flight made by any aviator in time of war took place.

" Kamborios, one of the army aviators, left Larissa this morning on a Blériot machine. He made a great flight, travelling at a height of four thousand feet over the mountains." *

It is a curious reflection that amongst those mountains must have been Olympus, where the old Greek gods held high revels, and whence Zeus hurled his thunders.

Aviation was practised thousands of years ago; to-day it is but a revival of a lost art. Most people think that Daedalus was a myth, yet Juvenal says he was an aviator:

> Graeculus esuriens in caelum, iusseris, ibit.
> Ad summam non Maurus erat neque Sarmata nec Thrax
> Qui sumpsit pennas, mediis sed natus Athenis:

which I translate—

" If you were to tell a half-starved little Greek cad to go to Heaven, he'd get there somehow. It wasn't a Moor, a Slav, or a Thracian who first put on wings, but a fellow dragged up in the slums of Athens."

And so was his son Icarus an aviator who, as many of his successors have done, set another example of self-devotion and courage and fell into the sea.

It ran in families, as it does now; the Wright brothers are the Daedalus and Icarus of our times.

* *Daily Express*, Wednesday, October 30, 1912.

I do not know whether M. Kamborios is an Athenian. If he is, I trust he will not think that I am applying the quotation from Juvenal in any depreciatory sense to a brave man who dared in his flight over the Olympian heights dangers far more real than the fabled thunderbolts of Olympian Zeus.

Fresh regulations were issued by the Greek censorship at this time, and no message was allowed to pass which related to any movements of the Greek army; so particulars as to its movements now grew more scanty.

The Turks abandoned the famous Meluna Pass, the southern gate of Macedonia, without a fight.

"To-day (Wednesday, October 30) the Queen of Greece made her first trip into Macedonia, driving from Larissa to Elassona, where she visited the hospitals. The town of Elassona is a collection of miserable hovels, divided into two sections, Greek and Turkish. The leading Greek priest welcomed Her Majesty in the name of the population, and Her Majesty replied saying that she was pleased to visit a Greek city outside of, but so near to, Greece.

"The Metropolitan of Athens is on his way to the front to give the blessing to the troops before the last great fight between Cross and Crescent. He said he hoped to meet the army at Veria."* Veria is the Beroea where St. Paul resided after his expulsion from Salonika, and King George was there celebrating the anniversary of his accession to the throne on October 31.

From Veria the Greeks advanced down the Vistritsa towards its junction with the Vardar, where at Janitsa (Yenije) they fell in with a Turkish force of 33,000 men, only 6000 of whom formed part of the army they had vanquished at Sarandoporo. The remaining 27,000 had been opposing the advance of the Bulgarian army on Seres.

In the two battles at Sarandoporo and Janitsa, the

* *Daily Express*, Wednesday, October 30, 1913.

Greek Army disposed of 60,000 of the enemy's forces, made 37,000 prisoners, captured 106 guns, 75,000 rifles, and enormous quantities of stores and ammunition. Their losses in the campaign from the crossing of the frontier in Thessaly up to Salonika amounted to 3752 killed and 9452 wounded.

The road was now clear for the Greek advance upon Salonika, the ancient Thessalonica, to whose inhabitants St. Paul addressed the two Epistles to the Thessalonians. It had been in the hands of the Turks since 1430. Although often attacked by Bulgaria and Servia, it never belonged to either Empire.

The city lies on a crescent of low hills facing the gulf of the Ægean to which it gives its name, and a little to the eastward of the mouth of the Vardar, the ancient Axios, the chief river of Macedonia, down whose valley runs the railway which connects the Danube with the Ægean. It is the best harbour except Constantinople in the Balkan Peninsula, and, when in the hands of a capable government, will become the Hamburg of the Mediterranean, if its Custom House is managed with common honesty. The population is 121,600, including 60,600 Jews, who regard themselves as of Spanish origin dating from 1571, and speak a corrupt Spanish amongst themselves, and 20,000 Moslems. Salonika is one of the two heads of the great railway which runs through Central Europe from Paris by Vienna, Buda Pesth, and Belgrade, the other terminus being Constantinople.

Such is the city which surrendered to the Greeks on Friday, November 8, 1912.

The Greeks had, indeed, already shown their flag in Salonika harbour. On the night of October 31, some Greek torpedo vessels had made their way into the roads and torpedoed the Turkish warship *Feth-i-Bulend*. Between seventy and eighty of her crew went down with her. The crew of the despatch-vessel *Fuad*, which a Greek

torpedo missed, became somewhat nervous and fired on a fishing-boat which they took for the enemy. They then mutinied and shot their captain, and many of them were in turn shot by their other officers. A panic set in amongst the Mussulman population, but it was arrested by the arrival of the French warship *Bruix* and the British warship *Hampshire*.

The bridge over the Axios (Vardar) was passable, and over it the Greeks advanced from Janitsa.

The following account was telegraphed to Athens by the Crown Prince of Greece :—

" ' All day and night yesterday our troops were crossing the Axios bridge. Last night the Consuls-General of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, with the Commandant of Salonika and a representative of Takzin Pasha, the commander of the Turkish Army, came to find me in my headquarters at Topsin, in order to submit to me proposals for the capitulation of the town and the army. They asked that the army, while engaging to remain neutral until the end of the war, should be allowed to retain its arms.

" ' I refused, making the surrender of arms a condition *sine qua non*, and only conceding that their arms should be returned to them at the end of the war. I gave them until six o'clock in the morning to reply. As it happened, at five o'clock in the morning the Commandant of Salonika, accompanied by the Diplomatic Agent, returned with counter-proposals, admitting in principle the surrender of arms, but demanding the exemption of 5000 rifles destined for the instruction of recruits. This request being refused, they departed, after having obtained a further delay of two hours in order to make an arrangement with the Turkish commander. As they had not returned at the stipulated time, I ordered our troops to march, which they did at nine o'clock in the morning.

" ' When our lines drew near the enemy's advanced

posts, towards half-past four in the afternoon, Takzin Pasha sent an officer with a letter declaring that he accepted my conditions. I therefore suspended the forward march, and sent two officers to draw up a protocol for the surrender of arms and the capitulation of the town invested by our troops. The Turkish officers have been authorised to keep their swords, on condition that they give their parole to take no further part in the war.'

"A great silver diadem of laurel leaves, surmounted by the two-headed eagle of Byzantium, is being made in Athens for presentation to the Crown Prince on his return.

"M. Ractivan, the Minister of Justice, left here this evening for Salonika with a large number of administrative officials. He is going as the representative of the Government, and not, as was previously stated, as Governor of Salonika. M. Ractivan will retain his position as Minister of Justice."

Within twenty-nine days the Greek army had marched over mountain roads, paths, and passes in wet and cold. It fought two hard-contested battles at Sarandoporo and Janitsa. In both it covered itself with glory, and gave an example of endurance rarely surpassed by any army. For thirty-six days it marched incessantly. It covered nearly 500 miles on foot over mountain roads and paths, without any lengthened halt.

As one correspondent wrote: "I can give a better idea of what it went through by mentioning that during the days I followed the army I twice went thirty-six hours without food, my best bed was in a barn, and I had to pass several nights in the open near a camp fire. We experienced ten degrees of frost at Kardjalar, and torrential rains such as are usually only encountered in tropical Africa. Many died of exposure. The percentage of sick reached a climax at Vodena. Still the spirit of the men was

unimpaired."* If a war correspondent, possessed of means, and whom every officer was anxious to oblige, fared so badly, it is easy to imagine what the soldiers must have suffered.

"The capitulation of Salonika to the Greeks was signed at the Konak at midnight on Friday, November 8.

"The entry of four battalions of Greek troops was the sign for an outburst of enthusiasm from the Greek section of the population." †

Amongst these troops were many American and English volunteers, and for the first time the sound of an English cheer or an American College yell struck upon many a Greek, Jewish, and Turkish ear.

The Turkish troops who surrendered at Salonika numbered 25,000.

"Our entry was a triumphant progress.‡ The streets were packed and the Pioneers' Regiment were obliged to force a way with the butts of their rifles.

"The Greeks of Salonika, whose tongues had been muzzled for weeks past, gave free vent to their joy at seeing the Greek uniform. The Turks scowled in solemn silence. The balconies on the Marina were crowded with ladies, showering flowers on us and cheering the mud-splashed uniforms.

"After us came battalions of Evzones (Highlanders), long-limbed mountaineers in khaki greatcoats hiding their no longer white kilts—simple men from the highlands of Greece who could not hide their satisfaction at their reception, letting out yell after yell in response to the cheers of the people, and at the same time hoisting their little tasselled skull-caps on their bayonets, and waving them to the girls in the balconies.

* *Daily Telegraph*, Tuesday, November 26, 1912.
† *Daily Express*, Monday, November 18, 1912.
‡ *Daily Express*, Wednesday, November 13, 1912.

"The mitrailleuse batteries were especially noted, and tired mules carrying them received many a cheer of encouragement and praise.

"Then was the greatest scene of all when the shot-pierced flag of the Evzones came into view, the little blue standard with a white cross, which meant so much to the people, who now had a new-born feeling of pride. They saw the standard for the first time in their city, and they pressed round the bearer, content to touch it with their finger-tips, and then stood with bared heads accepting with gratitude the blessings which the army chaplain, bearing a great gold cross, bestowed as he rode by."

I cannot but recall those noble lines in which Aeschylus awoke the thunders of a theatre thronged with the men who but seven years before had struck down the pride of Persia in the waters of Salamis:

ΧΟΡ. τοὶ δ' ἀνὰ γᾶν 'Ασίαν δὴν
οὐκ ἔτι περσονομοῦνται,
οὐκ ἔτι δασμοφοροῦσιν
δεσποσύνισιν ἀνάγκαις,
οὐδ' ἐς γᾶν προπίτνοντες
ἄρξονται· βασιλεία
γὰρ διόλωλεν ἰσχύς.
οὐδ' ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν
ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται γὰρ
λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν,
ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς.
αἱμαχθεῖσα δ' ἄρουραν
Αἴαντος περικλύστα
νᾶσος ἔχει τὰ Περσῶν.

Aeschylus, *The Persians*, 584–597.

which I may, perhaps, English roughly thus:

Chorus. No longer now will Persia give the law
To Asia's tribes, no longer will they bear
Their tribute to a despot master, now
No longer grovel prostrate on the earth
Making his word their will, for now the strong

Kingdom hath met her doom. No longer now
Will men set guards upon their tongues, for lo!
A free people hath been set loose to speak.
Now is the yoke which bound their courage loosed,
For Ajax' sea-girt isle the Persian holds
For ever in her fields, soaked red with blood.

Great were the rejoicings at Athens when the news arrived that Salonika had fallen. One hundred and one guns thundered whilst *Te Deum* was being sung in the Cathedral in the presence of the Cabinet, the Municipality, and the civil and military authorities. Enthusiastic crowds acclaimed M. Venezelos, who was afterwards congratulated by the municipal authorities. All the public buildings were hung with flags. The legations of the Allied States were surrounded by cheering multitudes. What, indeed, did the fall of Salonika mean? It is a strange thought that it has been left for our generation alone of all those who have lived since the surrender of Granada on January 2, 1492, to see a great Christian city rescued from the infidel, and brought back once more under the standard of the Cross.

In our day we have seen many a great and venerated Moslem sanctuary pass into European hands; within a brief thirty years Kairouan, Cairo, Khartum, Kano and Fez have been occupied by European armies, whilst Khiva and Bokhara tremble before the Ukases of the Russian Tsar. But since the fateful day when Granada bowed her haughty neck to the Castilian conquerors, and the soil of Spain was freed from its Moorish tyrants, no such victory, even if we take into account the storming of Buda and the transient Austrian occupation of Belgrade, has been won for Christianity as has been gained by the liberation of Salonika.

It was in Macedonia that the Gospel was first preached to the European world; it was to the Thessalonians that St. Paul foretold the impending advent of the Antichrist,

whose coming was to many a trembling monk fulfilled in the inrush of the Tartar and Turkish hordes. Was it not fitting then that Salonika should be the first city to be freed in that war of liberation from which we trust and hope that such great good will spring for Europe and for mankind?

What may Europe and the world owe to the recovery of Salonika from a rule which has so long held in abject ignorance the populations, brutalised by its tyranny, over which it has domineered?

These results, if not so great as those which followed the discovery of America, may yet be of no slight importance.

From its geographical position Salonika is called to be the Hamburg or the Antwerp of the Eastern Mediterranean. If it is farther distant from the harbours of America than are Genoa, Marseilles, or Barcelona, it is the nearest good European haven to the ports of Asia, of Africa, and of Australasia. The haven of the Piraeus, which under no circumstances could ever have really good communications with the Continental railway system, cannot hope to rival its northern neighbour, whilst, now that the barriers raised by Turkish jealousy have been thrown down, the broad valley of the Vardar which communicates with the Danube basin by comparatively easy passes, and which of old gave passage to that Via Egnatia by which the riches of the East travelled from Constantinople to Western Europe, has allowed of railways being constructed which place Salonika in the closest connection with Hamburg and with Paris. Whatever may be the future which lies before the Bagdad Railway, it is improbable that the distant havens of Koweit and Bassora in the burning and unhealthy coast-lands of the Persian Gulf can ever hope to rival Salonika, whilst much of the river-borne traffic of the Danube, which, though it is carried cheaply, can only reach the seas beyond Europe by the

long and circuitous passage through the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, may possibly be diverted to the harbour on the Ægean. Salonika in the hands of a modern and civilised Power will be the first port on the Mediterranean.

Only one of the allied States can be the mistress of Salonika, and that mistress must be Greece.

It is true that the rural districts of Macedonia almost down to the seaboard are inhabited by Slavs, whether of Serb or Bulgar race, and that ethnographical maps of recognised authority colour the country as Serb almost at far as the mouths of the Vardar and the Vistritza; but even in rural Macedonia there are important Greek, Wallachian (the Kutso-Vlachs), and Albanian elements in the population, and it would be far from correct to say that in Salonika itself the bulk of the inhabitants are of Slav origin. But in the case of a port like Salonika, considerations other than ethnographical must have their due weight. Whatever may be the good qualities of races like the Bulgars and the Serbs, it cannot be said that they have ever shown any great aptitude either for dealing with business on a world scale or for administering international interests such as those which are at stake in Salonika. On the other hand the Greeks rank amongst the best traders and financiers in the world, and a love of the sea is in their blood. If Salonika is to become all that it can become, Salonika must be a Greek city. The fact that it has at the same time to be the chief port of the Balkan States on the Ægean may, it is to be hoped, lead to the establishment of a Balkans Customs Union, which (as was the case with Germany) may be the first step to the re-establishment of that Roman Empire of the East which would do more than any other scheme which can be devised to secure peace by stilling the ambitions of the Great Powers of Europe. When the Palace of the Blacharnae once more sees a Roman Emperor and a dynasty ruling by the free choice of the

Balkan sovereigns and peoples, but, like the German Emperor, by hereditary right, the Eastern question will have been solved once and for all. The solution was suggested by Mr. Gladstone when he uttered that great truth that the Balkans are for the Balkan peoples. The Custom House of Salonika may be the foundation-stone of their future Empire, but if Salonika is to be all that it can and should be, that Custom House must be honestly administered. Corruption and a greedy horde of place-hunters are what have kept Greece from Salonika for eighty years. If the management of Salonika is allowed to fall into the hands of the satraps of the Hellenic polling-booths Salonika will remain a second-rate provincial town—and may quite possibly see her interests sacrificed to those of the Piraeus, as those of Venice were to Trieste in the days of Austrian rule. If Salonika can be administered like Hamburg, she will rival, if she does not surpass, the great Elbe port within fifty years, and long before that time she may have become the greatest commercial outlet of the Roman Eastern Empire. M. Venezelos may, if he can silence his Cleons, be the Bismarck of the Balkans.

But if M. Venezelos is to secure the re-establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire, he must be prepared to make a great sacrifice, a heroic renunciation. Humanly speaking, it is all but impossible that the diadem of the restored Empire can be worn by King Constantine of Greece.

We live in a democratic age, and if the Allies are destined to restore the Eastern Empire that Empire can only be the outcome of the free will of four, if not five, free peoples, three of whom are Slavs. It cannot derive its origin from the rights which the Divine Will bestowed upon the Comneni and the Palaeologi.

In a Balkan Confederation the Slavs will form the majority. Consequently the future ruler of the Eastern Empire must be the ruler of a Slav people.

But God fulfils Himself in many ways, and it may be His pleasure that the fresh, unworn intellect of the Slav race, tempered as it is with that deep sense of religion and that resignation which, in some degree, make them mentally the kinsmen of those Turks whose kingdom has been given to them, should be the channel through which new life will be infused into the veins of a worn-out world.

The Greeks have poured out their blood like water to give freedom to Epirus, to Macedonia, to Crete, and to the islands of the Ægean. They have quitted themselves on the battlefield like men. Yet the subtle, restless Greek intellect, keen it may be, yet fickle and fond of change as ever it was of old, does not, as their dead king saw, offer a firm ground on which to raise the fabric of an Empire such as will endure through the ages for the happiness of mankind. But if the Greeks are shifting sand, the slow, stolid, patient, hard-working Slav, at once a peasant and a mystic, is solid rock, and upon that rock an Empire may be reared which will defy the storms of centuries. To a Greek Empire of to-day the wranglings and dialectics of its parliaments would prove a greater solvent than all the dialectics and wranglings of its theologians were to the older Empire. Those who slew the Empire of the East were the men who framed its creeds. Constantinople atoned for the errors of those who refused to accept the decisions of the Council of Florence by enduring 450 years of Turkish rule.

But, however this may be, the Greek victories in the present war have brought great good to humanity, and her sons have not poured out their martyr blood in vain. It may well be that the recovery of Salonika is the crowning triumph which will fall to the Greek race once more risen to life from its grave of centuries; that Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, not King Constantine, will be anointed Roman Emperor in Santa Sophia. Yet, on the chancel arch of St. Demetrius those words in which the Christian

Church sums up her victories, " Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat " (Christ conquers, Christ reigns, Christ rules), may be inscribed as fitly as they will be in the dome of Saint Sophia, when it once more glitters with the emblems of Christ triumphant, Christ All-ruling, and is once more crowned with the Cross of Christ. Let Greece, to restore the Eastern Empire, sacrifice her own feelings. Her greatness does not need the Caesar's diadem, and, even in this world her self-denial will find its reward. Greece, standing by herself, yet the possessor of some of the most important naval bases in the world, will always be the puppet, if not the prey of the Great Powers ; as a member of an Eastern Empire she will be their equal and will speak with her enemies in the gate. To retain Salonika Greece must re-establish the Eastern Empire. Without one a Greek Salonika has no future.

From the first the question of the future of Salonika aroused much ill-feeling amongst the members of the Balkan League. Greece had come late into the field. It was said that there was no Treaty in existence which regulated her share in the partition of the Turkish spoils. Whilst the Greek Army was advancing from Thessaly, a Bulgarian force had, as we have seen, been making its way south-west through the vilayets of Drama and Seres, and was said to be within striking distance of Salonika when the Greeks entered it, a statement angrily denied by the Greeks. As a matter of fact, if the Bulgarians had really been threatening the city, the Turkish generals could never have concentrated their forces at Janitsa, three days' march to its north-westward. The battle of Janitsa led to its surrender.

Two days after the fall of Salonika 16,000 Bulgarian troops entered the town and remained there sixteen days, until they were conveyed in Greek transports to Dedeagatch. As a matter of fact, although much tall talk was indulged in between the Greek and Bulgarian newspapers,

there was at that time no ill-feeling between the Cabinets, and no permanent harm seemed to have come of the dispute.

As early as November 23, the presence of Bulgarian troops at Salonika was a cause of trouble.

On December 3 Austrian official circles believed that "serious dissensions exist between Greece and Bulgaria on account of Salonika. It has even been reported during the last few days that 3000 Greek soldiers attempted to enter Seres, a town already occupied by the Bulgarians, but that they were repulsed by the garrison, losing 250 killed."

These assertions were denied by the Greeks, but the stories continued to be circulated for some time.

As late as December 16 it was stated that "it is to be hoped that peace will speedily be concluded, as the present strained relations between Greeks and Bulgars are fraught with danger.

"Some incidents have already ended fatally. The other day, for example, a Greek soldier entering a tramcar brushed against a Bulgarian soldier, who had already found a place. The Bulgarian snatched off the Greek's cap and trampled it underfoot. The Greek drew his bayonet and killed the Bulgar. On Saturday morning last a detachment of Cretan gendarmerie went to close the office of the *Bulgarin*, a Bulgarian newspaper which had been suspended by order of the Greek authorities. On arriving at the office the Greeks found it already occupied by Bulgarian soldiers, who refused to clear out. Both sides loaded their rifles and sent for reinforcements, and in a couple of minutes the narrow street was occupied by at least a company each of Greeks and Bulgars glaring at each other with loaded rifles and fixed bayonets. Only the opportune arrival of General Andreieff and the Prefect of the city prevented a collision. This affair caused quite a serious panic even in the streets some distance from the scene of the action.

" A party of eighty Greeks had gone to occupy Demir-Hissar, but, on arriving at that place, they found it already in Bulgarian occupation. The Bulgars received the Greeks as their guests, and billeted them in small parties in different houses; then, when the Greeks were off their guard, their wily hosts laid hands on them and sent them back under escort to Salonika.

" A Bulgarian chief named Dumboulakoff is terrorising, pillaging, and murdering Greeks and Turks alike in the Nigrita district, to the north-east of Salonika. He is reported to have entered the Greek church of Ligovani during service, which he interrupted, instructing the priest to pray in future exclusively for the Tsar Ferdinand, and to omit the name of the Greek King from his prayers. Dumboulakoff took the Turkish villagers of Ligovani outside the village and made them a target for the rifles of his band, the Greek military ' authorities ' not daring to interfere because (1) they were too weak, and (2) they had been ordered to avoid quarrels with their ' Allies.' "

The Greek official Report as to the fall of Salonika formally denied all the Bulgarian assertions.*

" In view of a report by the Bulgarian General Todorov on the capitulation of Salonika, the following report, addressed by General Danglis, Chief of the Greek General Staff, to the Minister of War, dated November 11, is published:

" ' On October 21 (old style) (November 3, new style), we received at headquarters a letter emanating from the Consul of a Great Power, in which it was stated that conferences for the capitulation of the town were taking place between the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Takzin Pasha, and the Consuls of the Powers. This information agreed with that from other trustworthy sources, showing that owing to its defeat at Yenidze on October 19 and 20

* *Daily Telegraph*, Friday, November 29; Tuesday, December 10; Saturday, December 21, 1912.

the Turkish Army was completely disorganised, and incapable of offering resistance. On October 24 and 25 the Greek Army, composed of six divisions, passed the Axios, and marched against the Turkish Army at Salonika on the evening of the 25th.

"'At that time there was no information of the approach of the Bulgarian Army. The French, German, Austro-Hungarian, and British Consuls, accompanied by Sherif Pasha, the Military Governor of Salonika, appeared at headquarters, and offered the surrender of the town and the Turkish Army. During the night of the 25th Takzin Pasha, in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief, sent Sherif Pasha and M. Carapiperis as his special representatives to treat for terms of surrender. The Crown Prince, not accepting their conditions, ordered at six o'clock on the morning of the 26th a general attack on the Turkish Army occupying the positions east of Gallikos, while simultaneously a division of cavalry carried out an encircling movement, *via* Vathylakos and Dapatgli, which was completed at noon on the 26th. Takzin Pasha was thus forced before a battle began to accept all our conditions for the capitulation of the army.

"'At Karabournou shortly afterwards a cavalry officer arrived, announcing to the Crown Prince that about noon Bulgarian horsemen had made their appearance at Apostolar, 30 kilometres from Salonika. The officer who commanded them had informed the aforesaid Greek officer that he intended to pass the night at Giourdino, 25 kilometres from Salonika, and that 15 kilometres behind the cavalry, or 45 kilometres from Salonika, was a Bulgarian division. The latter, in fact, passed the night of the 26th at Giouvesna, 30 kilometres from Salonika. The same night the protocol for the surrender of the Turkish army was signed, and part of our Seventh Division occupied the railway station.

"'The same evening the Crown Prince warned the

commander of the Bulgarian division by letter that it was useless for him to advance on Salonika, seeing that the army there, having capitulated, was about to lay down its arms. On the morning of the 27th, while this disarmament was beginning, the Bulgarian division was marching from Giouvesna to Salonika. When it arrived near Boldji, General Kalaris, commanding the Second Division, seeing that the Bulgarian army was forming for battle, warned the divisional commander, General Todorov, in writing, to halt, as the Turkish army had surrendered.

" ' General Kalaris's letter was delivered to a Bulgarian officer, who transmitted it to General Todorov. In spite of that, the Bulgarian troops having passed the lines of the Second Division, fired five to six gun-shots at the Turkish soldiers who were disarming. Takzin Pasha, advised of this, addressed a protest to the Crown Prince. After a further communication, the Bulgarians halted at Aivali. However, during the whole of the 27th the disarmament continued, and Salonika was occupied by the Constantinopoulos Regiment of Evzones and the Seventh Division.

" ' On the 28th the Bulgarians continued their advance, halting a few kilometres from the town. A Bulgarian officer then proceeded to the Governor's Palace and requested the Assistant Chief of the General Staff to authorise the Bulgarian Army to enter Salonika. Colonel Dusmanis observed that the demand ought to be addressed by the General to the Crown Prince. General Todorov, accompanied by the Bulgarian Minister in Paris, M. Stancioff, and a reserve officer of the Bulgarian Army as interpreter, asked for an audience of the Crown Prince.

" ' The audience was granted, and, on a formal declaration being given recognising the occupation of the town by the Greeks, and that there was no question of a joint-occupation, and that hospitality was only asked for two battalions which had suffered severely from bad weather, the Crown Prince assented to the request on condition

that he referred it to the Greek Government. M. Stancioff begged his Royal Highness, if the Greek Government did not agree to two Bulgarian battalions staying in the town, to communicate this to the Bulgarian General, giving ten hours for reply. Simultaneously, General Todorov informed the Crown Prince, through M. Stancioff, that the two battalions, during their stay in Salonika, would be under the orders of the Greek commander of the Salonika garrison, and would every day send an officer to receive his orders.' "

The story of a Bulgarian ultimatum to the Greeks at Salonika was also satisfactorily explained away.

" The story of the Bulgarian ultimatum to the Greek Crown Prince at Salonika, threatening to enter the town by force, is totally untrue. While at Salonika I had access to official communications which passed between the two armies, and can say authoritatively that the request, as *à droit d'alliés*, of the Bulgarian Princes to enter the town with two battalions was graciously conceded. I was present when the Turks capitulated at 5 P.M. on Friday, November 8, five miles outside Salonika. I myself entered the centre of the town the following morning, November 9, at 8 o'clock. The Bulgarians entered on the following Monday, November 11, at noon. The rather liberal terms conceded to the Turkish Army are fully explained by the pressure exercised on the Crown Prince by the foreign Consuls at Topsin on the Thursday night, November 7, and by the anxiety to save the large Greek population of the town from the horrors of street fighting.

" The accusation that the Greek Army stole a march on their Bulgarian Allies to enter Salonika before them has been refuted since by so many independent witnesses, not only from the Greek side but by English, French, and German correspondents who were with the Turks at Salonika, that it is hardly necessary for me to repeat what has already been published in my telegrams. It should suffice to state again that the best judges in the

matter are the Turks themselves, and they one and all, from their generals downwards, affirm that there never was nor could there ever have been any question of surrendering Salonika to others than the Greeks.

"Greece is accused of disloyalty to her Allies. The facts, however, do not support this opinion, and if any disloyalty exists it looks as if it comes from the part of Bulgarian irresponsible persons, politicians, and military jingoes, who by such assertions, not in conformity with well-established facts, seek to take away from the Greek Army what belongs to it.

"I am a witness that from the beginning of the war until the unfortunate friction that arose from the occupation of Salonika the whole of this country's people, politicians, army, and officers entered the struggle in a spirit of perfect loyalty to their Bulgarian Allies, and when news was received of the victories of the Bulgarian Army they were acclaimed with joy and with no idea of antagonism. So much so that I was very much astonished, knowing as I did the animosity and hatred that separated them in the past.

"It is a thousand pities that such dissensions have arisen to separate again the two peoples, and one can only hope that the two great heads of the coalition, King Ferdinand and M. Venezelos, will find a way out of the present difficulties. I am sure that M. Venezelos, at least, will leave no stone unturned to bridge over the differences that have arisen. Admirable tact and a cool head are common to both, and as they are both omnipotent in their respective countries the finding of a middle way will not prove beyond their powers. The march of events, too, seems to help towards such solution."

In March 1913, however, a far more serious conflict took place at Nigrita, a village with a mixed population, in the vilayet of Seres, 33 miles north-east of Salonika.

It had been occupied by a Greek garrison, when a

Bulgarian column appeared and asked for admission. The Greeks refused, but were warned that if they maintained their opposition to the entry of the Bulgarians, the place would be bombarded within forty-eight hours. As a matter of fact the bombardment began within twenty-two hours, and the Bulgarians succeeded in occupying one-half of the place.

"The Bulgarian force, consisting of 2 squadrons, 4 Krupp guns, and 600 bayonets, remains facing the Greeks on the right bank. The Greeks, who are superior in numbers, are all infantry, and there appears no doubt that heavy reinforcements are arriving, in addition to which a battery left here to-day, ostensibly for the same destination.

"The numerous recent incidents in the Nigrita district, which individually might mean little, suggest, when taken collectively, a Bulgarian intention of penetrating southward. The situation is undoubtedly growing in gravity."*

The Greek Operations in Macedonia after the Fall of Salonika—Greek Naval Operations

The second stage of the Greek operations in Macedonia brought their army from Salonika to Florina, where they joined hands with the Servians who had descended southward from Monastir, where they had gained a victory in which the Turkish commander, Fethy Pasha, met his death.

The Crown Prince of Greece, telegraphing from Banitza on November 20, said:

"After crossing the passes of Gornitsovo and Kerli-Derven, our army deployed along the line from Tamperdani to Florina, occupying the latter town. The Turkish

* *The Times*, Monday, March 17, 1913.

Monastir Army, attacked by the Servians, who cut its line of communications with Resnia, retreated towards Florina, where the Greek Army cut off the retreat of the rearguard, and large quantities of ammunition and stores fell into the hands of the Greeks. The Turkish forces, who retreated towards Florina, numbered some 30,000 men." *

At Florina the Greeks found 210 wagons laden with stores which the Turks had brought from Monastir.

In an encounter with the Turks during the advance on Florina the Greeks lost several guns, which the Turks used with effect against the Servians during the battle of Monastir, where they were subsequently retaken by the Servians.

"It is not correct to say that the Servian advance southward was of any extraordinary rapidity. On the contrary, while the Greeks were at Ostrovo, November 10, on their advance from Salonika to Monastir, they were wondering what the Servians were doing after the battle of Kumanovo, fought seventeen days previously, October 23. They certainly were not at all surprised when, on the afternoon of November 19, the news reached the Greek Crown Prince from Athens of the surrender of 50,000 Turks to the Servians at Monastir—news which afterwards proved to be false. The Greeks advanced, notwithstanding this news, and it was only after the entrance of the Greek Army into Florina, on November 20, that contact was established with the Servians from Monastir.

"One-half of the Turkish Army at Monastir made good their escape from the Servians by the road round Lake Prespa to Janina, where the Greeks were then fighting them, and the other half retreated to Florina, where at the passes of Gornitzovo and Kerli-Derven the Greeks defeated and routed them, taking 4000 prisoners,

* *Morning Post*, Friday, November 22, 1912.

23 guns, and trainloads of stores and ammunition of great value." *

The Turkish Army retreating from Monastir surrendered only in small detachments. On November 28 the Greeks had a lively encounter with Turkish soldiers near Lake Ostrovo, and the Turks sustained considerable losses. The railway from Florina to Monastir, running over the Banitza and Sorovitz passes, was guarded by Greek troops.

It was during the second stage of the Macedonian campaign that the Greek Fleet for the first time took any active part in the operations of the war.

The importance of the Greek Fleet to the Allies was well explained by the Greek Minister in London early in December when defending his countrymen against a charge of slackness in their conduct of the campaign.

" Greece's contribution in the present war has not been confined to the uninterruptedly victorious operations of her army of 140,000 men. The action of her fleet may be justly considered as the one decisive factor in the whole war. Without the presence of our ships Turkey would have been able, within ten days at the utmost of the declaration of war, to bring her best troops from Asia Minor and Arabia, and land them at Dedeagatch on the flank of the Bulgarian armies, thus rendering their magnificent victories quite impossible. The Greek Fleet has also paralysed the whole of the system of the Turkish railways by interrupting the supply of coal, thus compelling the reinforcements from Asia Minor to arrive weary and footsore after long and exhausting marches. One must also consider the moral effect of the Turkish Fleet not daring to show its nose outside the Dardanelles in view of the presence of Greek ships." †

Forty-two Greek transports were at one time engaged in

* *Daily Telegraph*, Saturday, November 23, 1912.

† *Morning Post*, Wednesday, December 4, 1912.

enshipping 16,000 Bulgarian troops at Salonika to transport them to Dedeagatch. Island after island in the Archipelago was being occupied by the Greeks, and but for the continued presence of the Italians under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne in Rhodes and the other islands known as the Dodecanese, which they had seized during the war, the cross of Greece would soon have floated over every island in the Mediterranean, save Cyprus, where the Greek tongue is spoken.

At noon on November 21 a Greek squadron cast anchor off Mytilene. The Mutessarif was invited by the Greek commander, Admiral Koundouriotis, to proceed on board his flagship, and when the invitation had been repeated he did so. Admiral Koundouriotis demanded the immediate surrender of the town. The foreign Consuls and the Vali, in order to avoid bloodshed, begged the Admiral to grant a respite, so that if the Turkish garrison did not consent to surrender it might have time to retire into the interior.

The Admiral granted a respite until 12.30 P.M. On its expiry, the naval landing corps occupied the town, and the Greek flag was hoisted amid enthusiasm. The Turkish troops, numbering 700, withdrew into the interior of the island, whither they were pursued by the naval landing corps and the Greek troops. Subsequently the squadron returned to Lemnos. Thus Mytilene, the best harbour in the Northern Ægean, passed into Greek hands. It is the capital of Lesbos, an island with an area of 675 square miles, and a population of 107,000, of whom 72,000 are Greeks and 13,700 Mohammedans. The mountains, rising to 3075 ft., are covered with pinewoods. On their slopes are oliveyards and the vineyards which produce the wines so famous in antiquity, which inspired the verse of Terpander and Alcaeus. Lesbos is the birthplace of Sappho. Alcaeus never celebrated greater triumphs than those of the Greeks in the present war.

The Turks in the interior of Lesbos held out until December 21. Their surrender was announced to the Ministry of Marine at Athens by a telegram from Homer's birthplace, Chios.*

"A messenger has just arrived with the news that the Turkish Army in the island of Mytilene has surrendered. Shortly afterwards a wireless despatch from the commander of the auxiliary cruiser *Makedonia* stated that 1700 Turkish prisoners were being embarked in the harbour of Molyvo."

Chios was occupied by the Greeks on November 24.

On December 1 an official telegram said "that the progress of the Greek Army is proceeding slowly but surely. The Turkish troops have been surrounded and all the fortified positions have been occupied by the Greeks.

"The Agii Pateres monastery has been bombarded and demolished by a Greek warship. It had been transformed by the Turks as a central depot for provisions and stores. The bombardment, which was carried out at a range of ten kilometres, was completely successful."

Chios has an area of 319 square miles and a population of 59,000, of whom 56,000 are Orthodox Greeks. Its mountains rise to a height of 4155 ft. The chief products are resin, mastic, oranges, citrons, and lemons. There are also mines of antimony and quarries of variegated marbles. From 1204 until 1346 it was in the hands of the Venetians, and subsequently of the Genoese, from the latter of whom it was taken by the Turks in 1556.

As at Lesbos the garrison and the local authorities fled into the interior of the island, where they held out until January 2, when they surrendered.

The advance of the Greek troops into the interior of the island was continued vigorously all day. The Turks made a stubborn resistance, but were forced to retire from one position after another. One Greek battalion advanced

* *Morning Post*, Monday, December 23, 1912.

towards Saint George and occupied a position at Agii Pateres. The Turks were also attacked at Cardamyli and Volisso and driven back. They subsequently joined forces and prepared to offer fresh resistance, but later surrendered unconditionally. The Greeks took 1800 prisoners, two guns, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, stores and victuals. The Greek losses were two killed and twelve wounded.

On the Albanian coast on December 4 two Greek gunboats bombarded Vallona,* which is not fortified. Some of the shells fell between the Italian and the Austro-Hungarian Consulates. In view of the panic caused among the people, Ismail Kemal Bey, the Albanian leader, sent out a party to parley with the gunboats, the senior officer of which replied that he had received orders to blockade the Albanian coast as being Turkish territory, and that he considered that he had acted within his rights. He declared that the town ought to surrender to the Greeks, who would treat the Albanians as their brothers. The two gunboats thereupon left.

Ismail Kemal Bey at once addressed telegrams of protest to the Great Powers and to the Greek Government.

He also landed troops to occupy Sasseno, an islet which is the landing-place of the cables from Italy to Albania, and which commands the entrance to Vallona harbour.

On December 7 this incident evoked some comments in the Italian Chamber.

" Marquis di San Giuliano, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to interpellations by Signori Salandra and Galli regarding the bombardment of Vallona and the occupation of Sasseno by the Greeks, said that the Italian Government had declared to the Greek Government in friendly but firm terms that, while willing to respect the

* *Morning Post*, Friday, December 6, 1912.

liberty of operations of belligerents, Italy could never consent to the Bay of Vallona, of which the island of Sasseno was an integral part, belonging to Greece, or being transformed into a naval and military base. A similar step had been taken by Austria, with whom Italy was in intimate agreement. The Minister, in conclusion, said, 'We have grounds for hoping that the question will be decided in conformity with our legitimate interests, and that our cordial relations with Greece will continue to expand and develop.'"

The semi-official explanation of the incident given at Athens was: "For several days the Greek gunboat *Pensios*, which was blockading the coast, noticed bodies of armed men on the shore. Fearing that she was going to be attacked, she fired several shells on them, whereupon the men waved a white flag and gave the ship to understand that they were not Turkish soldiers, and had no hostile intentions. It is pointed out, moreover, that none of the Greek projectiles took effect on the Albanians."

The fleet also played an active part in the operations which led to the occupation by the Greeks of the Albanian coast of the Channel of Corfu.

On December 7 "the 1st Regiment, under Colonel Mexas, landed at Santi Quaranta at half-past ten. Under the protection of the guns of the Greek warships in the offing, the Greek flag was hoisted amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the Greek portion of the population. The Turkish authorities submitted to the Greek commander.

"The Greek cruiser *Makedonia* captured the Italian steamer *Adriatico*, which was embarking Albanian insurgents and provisions, and is escorting her to Corfu."*

Greek sea power was indeed hampering the Turks in every way. As the Greeks had the command of the sea, whilst the Bulgarians blocked every land approach from

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, December 9, 1912.

Constantinople or Gallipoli to the interior of Turkey, it was impossible for the Turks to bring their Asiatic divisions to the theatres of war in Macedonia, Albania, and Epirus. They were consequently deprived of the aid of their best troops. It was thought, indeed, that their main object in arranging an armistice was to gain time to bring up these divisions.

But the Turkish fleet was after all in being. Since the Revolution of 1908 it had been reorganised by English officers, and in 1909 had received an addition of four ironclads purchased from Germany. In the Black Sea Turkish ironclads had menaced Varna, but had been driven off by Bulgarian torpedo destroyers. They held undisputed control of the Sea of Marmora, and by covering both flanks of the lines of Tchataldja, did much to check the progress of the Bulgarians. In the middle of December, it was said at the request of the ladies of Constantinople, the Minister of Marine decided to undertake offensive operations in the Ægean. The Turkish Fleet, which had been lying in the Dardanelles, put to sea on December 17.

Of this engagement a foreign naval officer, who was passing near the scene of action on a neutral steamer, gives the following account, which is in the main confirmed by other independent reports.*

"About 8 A.M. the Turkish Fleet issued from the Dardanelles to a distance of about six or seven miles, where it drew up in line of battle. Beyond the forts of Kum-Kaleh was the flotilla of Turkish destroyers and torpedo-boats, also cleared for action. The Greek Fleet made its appearance from behind the island of Imbros, led by the ironclad *Averoff*, which was closely followed by the *Hydra*, the *Spetsai*, the *Psara*, and nine destroyers. The Greeks took up a frontal position about seven miles

* *Morning Post*, Saturday, December 21; Monday, December 23; Saturday, December 28, 1912.

from the enemy. The Turks were the first to open fire, and it was ten minutes later when the Greeks replied. The Turkish guns appeared to be much more precisely trained than those of the Greek ships. The Turkish grenades fell like hail among the Greek ships, while the fire of the latter was directed either too far or too short. The Ottoman squadron did not change its position during the engagement, which lasted from 9 to 10.30 A.M., but the Greek ships continually altered their front. Half an hour after the engagement began many of the Greek vessels commenced to dodge in and out of the insular shelter of Imbros.

"After an exchange of shots at long range the smaller Greek warships retired, leaving the *Giorgios Averoff* to bear the brunt of the fighting. The *Giorgios Averoff* seemed to be using only guns of the smaller calibre, and appears to have been struck by three or four shells. Finally she slowly retired. The Turkish Fleet after the battle returned to its anchorage with flags flying and bands playing. The ships were greeted with acclamations from the crowds lining the shore.

"During the engagement the Greek torpedo flotilla and a submarine remained under cover behind Rabbit Island (Towshan). To-day the Turkish torpedo-boats made a reconnaissance, but saw no traces of the Greek Fleet.

It will be seen that a second naval action took place near the entrance to the Dardanelles on December 19.

In any case the Turks were in a position to make an attack on Tenedos, which had been occupied by the Greeks on November 6. It took place on December 22. The Minister of Marine at Athens published the following account:

"According to a telegram from the Governor of Tenedos the Turkish battleship *Torgut Reis* and the cruiser *Medjidieh*, accompanied by three destroyers, appeared at

eleven o'clock this morning before the entrance to the Dardanelles. The battleship and cruiser remained under the protection of the forts, while the destroyers rapidly advanced on the town of Tenedos and fired twenty shells. On the appearance of the destroyers off Tenedos the Turkish inhabitants endeavoured to hoist the Turkish flag and went off in boats to receive the warships, raising cheers. A small force of Greek bluejackets, who were on the island under a non-commissioned officer, fired on these mutineers, of whom three were killed and twelve wounded. After their fire, which had no effect, the Turkish destroyers quickly re-entered the Dardanelles."*

The immediate effect of these operations was that Turkey preferred to admit Greece to take part in the Conference in London without having signed an armistice, and, it was rumoured, would in no case assent to Greece signing one. The naval successes of Turkey and the continued resistance of Yanina had inspired military circles at Constantinople with a desire to continue the war, whilst, on the other hand, Turkish statesmen wished to attain a peace which would not impose too heavy burdens and sacrifices upon Turkey. The mediation of the Great Powers was anxiously desired.

Notwithstanding the fact that negotiations for a Balkans Peace were in active progress in London, naval operations still continued in the waters lying in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

On January 3 the Turkish Fleet left the Dardanelles at half-past seven in the morning with formal orders to fight a decisive engagement with the Greek Fleet. An hour and a half later it encountered the Greek Fleet off Tenedos. After a sharp cannonade lasting fifteen minutes both fleets drew off, neither being the worse for the encounter.

Further engagements took place on Saturday,

* *Morning Post*, Monday, January 6, 1913.

January 18, and Sunday, January 19, which are described at length in official reports by both sides.

Telegraphing on January 18, Admiral Koundouriotis, the Greek commander, said:

"'All last night, Friday, January 18, the Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh*, escorted by a torpedo-boat destroyer, was reconnoitring between Tenedos and the island of Mavries. This morning the whole Turkish Fleet emerged from the Straits, steaming towards Imbros. Later it turned towards the south-east coast of Lemnos and reached a point twenty miles north-east of Tenedos. The Greek Fleet immediately advanced to meet it.'

"At 9.50 A.M. Admiral Koundouriotis again telegraphed:

"'The whole of the Turkish Fleet has now come out of the Straits. We are going to meet it. The Turkish Fleet is composed of the battleships *Hair-ed-din*, *Barbarossa*, *Torgut Reis*, *Messudieh*, *Assar-i-Tewfik*, the cruiser *Hamidieh*, and thirteen torpedo-boat destroyers and torpedo-boats; and the Greek Fleet of the battleships *Hydra*, *Spetsai*, *Psara*, and the armoured cruiser *Giorgios Averoff*, and eight destroyers. Admiral Koundouriotis sent the following wireless message to the Fleet: "I recall my order of December 3. The future of our beloved Greece depends upon to-day. Fight like lions."'

"According to reports telegraphed by the Governor of Tenedos, the naval battle began at 11.25 A.M., and both sides fought fiercely. At 12.50 P.M. the Turkish Fleet began to withdraw slowly towards the north-west of Tenedos. At 1.10 P.M. the Turkish battleships turned in hurried disorder towards the Straits, firing at long intervals against the *Giorgios Averoff*, which pursued them at about three miles' distance. At 1.25 P.M. the *Giorgios Averoff* was getting nearer and nearer to the enemy's fleet, which was still retreating in disorder and firing intermittently with their stern guns. The cruiser *Hamidieh* headed the

procession, followed by the battleships *Messudieh*, *Barbarossa*, and *Torgut Reis*. One of the latter had ceased firing. At 1.50 P.M. the *Giorgios Averoff* was rapidly overhauling the Turkish ships, which were retreating at full speed towards the Straits. The *Giorgios Averoff* increased her fire. At 2.30 P.M. the battle ended. The Turkish ships had regained the Straits. The *Barbarossa* and the *Torgut Reis* were for a long time enveloped in smoke, but they continued firing slowly. On entering the Straits they both had lists to starboard, the flagship, which had ceased firing for some time during the retreat, being the worse. The Greek Fleet, assembled off the north-west of Tenedos, abandoned the pursuit when within range of the guns of the Turkish fortresses, afterwards cruising off the mouth of the Straits.

"At 5.10 P.M. Admiral Koundouriotis sent the following wireless message:

"'We have defeated the enemy's fleet, which was steaming towards Lemnos, and have pursued it almost to within the Straits, where it took refuge in disorder. The battle lasted three hours. We had only one man slightly wounded, and the *Giorgios Averoff* has insignificant damage. Our fighting power remains unaffected.'"

It was semi-officially reported at 2.30 P.M. on January 18 that the Turkish Fleet which left the Dardanelles in the morning had been completely destroyed by the Greek Fleet. On the receipt of the news a crowd assembled outside the Ministry of Marine and cheers were raised. A later official statement said: "No definite information is available as to the losses sustained by the enemy."

This engagement was the severest which took place between the Greek and Turkish Fleets during the whole war. Encouraged by the reports of the success of the cruiser *Hamidieh*, which, as we shall see later, after escaping from the Dardanelles, had sunk a transport

filled with troops in the harbour of Syra and carried terror through the Archipelago, the Turkish commander ventured south of the island of Tenedos, but began to retire slowly immediately the Greek Fleet was sighted. For three and a half hours there was a vigorous exchange of shots. The Turkish vessels fired over 800 shells and claimed to have inflicted important damage on the Greek ships, but the Turks also suffered severely. The battleship *Assar-i-Tewfik* was badly knocked about, and the *Torgut Reis* was struck by several shells. One exploded in one of her turrets, killed or disabled every man inside it, and put both the guns out of action. The wounded brought to Constantinople had mostly swollen and blackened faces. The Turkish loss was 4 officers and 36 men killed and 164 wounded.

According to the Turkish official account, the Ottoman Fleet emerged from the Dardanelles at dawn on January 18, and fought an engagement with the Greek Fleet off Lemnos. During the battle, which lasted three hours, a number of Turkish projectiles struck and inflicted damage on the Greek vessels. After the engagement the Ottoman Fleet returned victoriously to the Dardanelles.

On the following day another engagement took place off Tenedos which lasted several hours, heavy losses being sustained on both sides. The Turkish Fleet again returned safely to the Dardanelles and its wounded were removed to Constantinople.

The tale of the Greek successes in the Archipelago was ended by the occupation of Samos, which took place on March 15.

"Greek troops, escorted by the cruiser *Spetsai* and two destroyers, landed yesterday morning at Vathy, in Samos, and occupied the island. They were received with great enthusiasm." *

* *The Times*, March 17, 1913.

Samos is an autonomous principality with an area of 190 square miles and a population of 48,500, nearly all Orthodox Greeks. It has large zinc and silver-lead mines and also exports wine, oil, mastic, emery, and fine white marble.

The comparative inactivity of the Greek Fleet after the armistice is not easy to explain. They might have done much to facilitate the reduction of the Lines of Bulair by transporting Bulgarian troops from the Thracian mainland to the western shore of the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and so taking them in the rear. Had the forts of Gallipoli fallen the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora would have been opened to them.

Possibly the explanation of their inactivity may have been the fact that the Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh* was in the Mediterranean. She had made her way out of the Dardanelles by night, unperceived by the Greek scouts, although the moon was shining. On January 15 she made a dash into Syra harbour, and sank the Greek cruiser *Makedonia* which was lying there.

"The *Hamidieh* was built by Sir William Armstrong, Whitworth, and Company, and was the vessel damaged in the Black Sea by Bulgarian torpedo-craft. Her presence in the Aegean should greatly hamper the operations of the Greek Fleet.

"The Greek auxiliary cruiser *Makedonia*, which was sunk in the harbour of Syra on Wednesday after bombardment by the Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh*, is reported to have sustained comparatively little damage. She is lying half out of the water, and it has been found possible to save the Bethlehem guns. Work has been begun with a view to raising the vessel.

"It appears that during the bombardment the *Makedonia* was struck in her coal-hold by the shells. As a result fire broke out, but the promptness with which the ship was sunk prevented serious damage being done

by the flames. The *Hamidieh's* hurried departure for Smyrna is probably accounted for by the danger in which she stood of running short of coal.

"The Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh*, after leaving Syra where she shelled and destroyed a powder magazine, proceeded to Beirut; but observing there the approach of a warship, probably the German cruiser *Breslau*, and taking her for a Greek ship, she cut her anchor and departed at full speed. On Saturday evening the *Hamidieh*, sighting two destroyers and supposing them to be Greek, fled to Port Said." *

Several Greek vessels were detained in the neighbourhood of Port Said, which the *Hamidieh* used as its base, withdrawing at intervals through the Suez Canal to coal in the Red Sea. Others, when the *Hamidieh* was known to have emerged from Port Said, were employed in convoying the transports which conveyed reinforcements and supplies from Salonika to the forces round Skutari and Yanina. Thus the whole Greek navy was paralysed by a single cruiser in being, and it is, perhaps, not too much to say that that single cruiser may have saved Constantinople. The presence of one or two Greek ironclads and of a convoy of Greek transports in the Sea of Marmora would have enabled the Bulgarians to land their troops in Stambul. The one great fault committed by the Balkan Powers was the failure on the part of Greece and Bulgaria to purchase or to construct ironclads. Bulgaria had just the same right as Rumania to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. The one prudent precaution taken by Turkey was the purchase of four obsolete ironclads from Germany in 1911, and the reorganisation of her fleet under the auspices of English officers, whose comrades were at the same moment training the Greek Fleet for war.

The name of the *Hamidieh* will go down in naval history side by side with that of the *Alabama*.

* *Daily Telegraph*, Saturday, January 18, 1913.

Early in February the hydroplane was for the first time used in war. Appropriately enough the aviator started from the Bay of Mudros, in that Lemnos where Hephaestos fell when hurled from the crystal battlements of Heaven, and sailed over those waters where the Nereids had gazed in wonder at the *Argo* as she sped back from Colchis laden with the Golden Fleece, and which had been cleft by Leander's arms as he hastened to his lady-love.

" The military aviator Michaelis Mutusis, accompanied by an officer named Moriatikis, made a brilliant and successful reconnaissance of the Turkish Fleet, passing safely over the entrance to the Dardanelles. The destroyer *Velos* left Lemnos an hour before the hydroplane started, and preceded it in the direction of the Straits. At about nine o'clock the hydroplane appeared over Purnia Bay, flying towards Samothrace, and passed over Imbros in the direction of the Dardanelles. It disappeared over the Gallipoli Peninsula.

" At 11.30 the hydroplane was seen returning, and the *Velos* went to meet it. Hurrahs were exchanged between the aviators and the crew, and a launch was lowered to bring the former on board and tow the machine to the vessel.

" The aviators reported that all had gone well during the flight. They had flown to Nagara and had reconnoitred the Turkish Fleet. Their route was *via* Cape Suvla and the Peninsula of Gallipoli and over the town of Maidos. They twice traversed the Straits and twice circled over Nagara. There they saw the assembled Turkish Fleet. When they were certain that they were over the arsenal they dropped four bombs. The Fleet could be seen with great distinctness. On the return journey they observed on the ships small puffs of smoke, and some of their guns flashed forth. From these they gathered that the warships were opening fire on them, but they were not struck. They again crossed the Penin-

sula of Gallipoli, following a zigzag course, and returning by the same route as they had come by. It was therefore easy for them to examine the Turkish encampments there. The peninsula had the appearance of an enormous military arsenal. Small puffs of smoke along the route again showed that the Turks were firing at the hydroplane. Leaving the peninsula behind they decided to re-enter the Bay of Mudros, but carburettor trouble brought the trip to an end.

"M. Mutusis afterwards declared that this trip had shown the ease with which a successful reconnaissance might be carried out by hydroplane. During the flight over Nagara, M. Moriatikis examined the Turkish fortress with glasses. He stated that the result of the expedition had exceeded all expectations, and he was of the opinion that hydroplanes were capable of rendering important services to the Navy in warfare. The trip occupied two and a half hours, during which time 112 miles were covered."*

It is a strange coincidence that, as we have seen, the first aviator who used an aeroplane in actual warlike operations was a Greek, who in his first flight flew over Olympus.

With the battle of Florina the war, so far as the Greek Army was concerned, virtually ended as regarded Macedonia, and most of the troops were transferred to Epirus.

The King of Greece continued to reside at Salonika, despite the fact that the population was not altogether reconciled to his rule. On November 17 a fire which was fortunately quickly extinguished broke out in the cellars of the Governor's Palace, and two boxes of dynamite were subsequently discovered in them. The Greek Governor maintained all the Turkish officials in the Prefectures, mayoralties and other offices in their positions, and released all the political prisoners. Queen Olga

* *Morning Post*, Saturday, February 8, 1913.

gave directions for the distribution of daily rations of bread to 6000 Mussulmans, 3000 Israelites, and 1000 Greek families at Salonika. Princes Boris and Cyril of Bulgaria resided for some time in the town, and a Bulgarian and a Servian division were included in its garrison. The Metropolitan of Salonika was decorated with the Greek Order of the Saviour, and the Mussulman community appeared to become reconciled to Greek rule. In an address to King George on his birthday they spoke of him as their Sovereign, and declared that henceforth they would live under the protection of the Greek laws. Little did they dream that within three months their notables would be attending him on his path to the grave. The homage of the Mussulmans of Salonika was no empty show. Unfortunately, however, friction arose between the Greeks and Servians in the outlying parts of the province, and disputes arose which seriously hampered the trade of the port.

Early in January matters grew somewhat serious: "The Servians, after the retirement from the Florina district of the Greek 6th Division, which is now embarking for its destination in Epirus, crossed the temporary frontiers and occupied villages which were held by Greeks. The Greek soldiers were disarmed and ordered away from these villages. A Servian official arrived at Florina, stating that he had been sent to take over the administration of the town. The Greek Prefect refused to give way to him. Pourparlers are now going on between the two allies, but the Servians state that the question of Florina cannot be discussed.

"The Greek Government are now paying the salaries of the Turkish officers of Hassan Takzin Pasha's army, the commander himself receiving £100 monthly.

"Salonika merchants who see themselves threatened with ruin as the result of the application of Excise duties in the territory conquered by the Servians and Bul-

garians are in a very excited state, and are busily occupied in organizing protests to the foreign Consuls and Powers, both privately and through the instrumentality of the Chamber of Commerce." *

Such episodes undoubtedly put heart into the Turks, and may have contributed in some measure to bring about the revolution of January 23.

From the campaign in Macedonia we must, however, now turn to that in Epirus, which in the end came to be identified with the siege of Yanina.

The Campaign in Epirus—The Siege of Yanina

The Greek plan of campaign in 1912 was not unlike their plan of campaign in 1897. It involved an advance of two armies, one on each side of that great central branch of Pindus which forms the backbone of Northern Greece, and is, in reality, the southernmost prolongation of the Alps. We have already seen how the Greeks advanced through Macedonia; we have now to see how they advanced through Epirus from Acarnania. The Greeks entered the town of Preveza on November 4. The road from the Greek base on the Gulf of Arta, whose waters have witnessed the world battles of Actium and Lepanto, to Yanina, lay over the Pass of Pentepegadia, where in 1897 Clement Harris died a hero's death for Greece. On this occasion the Turkish forces were ill prepared for resistance, since the Porte, exhausted by the Tripolitan campaign, had left her western provinces to defend themselves, and General Sapoundzakis occupied the village of Anoghi and several other strategic positions near the pass without difficulty. Terrible atrocities were, however, committed by the Albanians, and many villages were destroyed in the neighbourhood of Yanina. It was expected also that the Turks would plunder the

* *The Times*, Friday, January 3, 1913.

port of Sagias, the residence of numerous Greek merchants, which lies opposite Corfu.

By November 16 the Greek Army had left Pentepegadia and was advancing on Yanina. The Turkish Army at that place was supposed to number about 25,000 men, and was rumoured to be in favour of surrendering owing to lack of food.

So close did the fall of Yanina seem that correspondents at Arta were almost afraid to undertake the short journey to Athens and back lest they should miss the entry of the Greek troops into the town. In the meantime Greek forces were pushing forward into the extreme north of Epirus, and on November 18, Khimara, a harbour on the Straits of Otranto to the south of Vallona, was occupied by Major Spiromilo, who, though a member of the Greek Parliament, is a native of the district. Khimara is the centre of an autonomous district consisting of seven villages, and its inhabitants, who are born soldiers, have often revolted for Greece against Turkey. It was hoped that the occupation of Khimara would lead all the Albanians south of the new boundary which Greece intended to trace in Epirus, to submit to Hellenic rule. Preveza was settling down as a Greek town, and the Turkish torpedo-boat *Attalia*, which had been sunk at the time the place surrendered, was refloated and found to be perfectly intact after a fortnight's immersion. Kamarina, due west of Arta, was occupied on November 25.

But Yanina proved to be far more capable of resistance than any save its garrison had supposed. The campaign in Epirus was only just beginning in earnest. The inhabitants of the country were greatly divided. If in some places the tribes were Philhellenic, in others hostile Albanian bands supported by Turkish soldiery were roaming about, and were determined to carry on the war even though peace were made. They were in utter ignorance of what had taken place elsewhere, and believed

that Turkish armies were occupying Larissa and marching upon Bulgaria. The more fanatical ridiculed the idea that the Faithful could be defeated, and perpetrated atrocities on their Christian neighbours in the expectation that Greece must in the end succumb. Metsovo had been occupied by the Greeks, and an attempt of the Turks to recover it had been repulsed, yet eleven villages were burnt in the Zagory district immediately to the north of the place. Forty had been destroyed elsewhere. The Turkish lines before Yanina were plainly visible from the Greek advanced positions, and it was clear that the whole garrison had come out to resist their advance and to assist in the defence of Bizani Fort. The Turkish bands which were roaming about Epirus offered considerable resistance to the Greek forces because they were constantly being reinforced. On December 4, despite the protests of the popular leader, Ismail Kemal Bey, President of the Albanian Provisional Government, two Greek gunboats bombarded the unfortified town of Vallona, and the senior officer defended his action on the ground that he had received orders to blockade the Albanian coast as being Turkish territory. He declared that the towns ought to surrender to the Greeks, who would treat the Albanians like brothers.

This fraternal offer was not wholly reciprocated. The Albanians had encroached upon Greek territory in Epirus and continued to lay claim to Yanina. Moreover they were offended at the engagements into which Greece had entered with Servia as to the delimitation of Albania. However, Greece was disposed to consent to the establishment of an autonomous Albania, provided that it only included the territories of which the Albanians were in effective occupation.

A report published by the Hellenic authorities gives a good account of the events of the campaign down to the middle of December.

"After their defeat last month at Monastir by the Servians the Turks drew off southward in the direction of Koritza and Yanina. The retreating Turks were hard pressed by the Greeks near Florina and lost a number of guns and prisoners, but succeeded in rallying at Koritza, which they occupied in some strength. Ali Riza Pasha, after restoring the Turkish organization at Koritza, marched south to Yanina with some 20,000 regulars. Djavid Pasha was left with about the same number at Koritza, but on December 13 or 14 he also retired upon Yanina with 5000 men. The remainder of the Turks, two days later, attacked the Greek cavalry at Biklista. They were repulsed, and the Hellenic troops, concentrating from Florina and from Kastoria via Kostenitza, attacked the Turks, who held the crest of the Morava Planina and the Zangoni gorge. The Greek attack was made on December 19, and after suffering considerable losses the Hellenic Army under General Damianos forced the defile and drove the Turks south and west beyond Koritza, which was occupied in force. Part of the defeated army retired in the direction of Yanina, being pursued by the Greeks, but the majority dispersed among the hills. Three of the few remaining Turkish guns were captured.

"In the Yanina district Essad Pasha's force of between 10,000 and 12,000 regulars, reinforced by the remnants of the two Turkish armies from the north under Ali Riza Pasha and Djavid Pasha, had entrenched itself in a crescent-shaped position to the south of Yanina, the two horns of the crescent resting on the mountains to the north of that place. The Turkish lines ran through Bizani, Rapsista, Peristeri, Bezduni, and Kastritza. To the south of these lay the Greeks under General Sapoundzakis, between Dodona and Kritovo, with a small mixed force under Riciotti Garibaldi at Drisko on the Yanina-Metsovo road. On December 20, 21, and 22 the Turks

made a series of attacks on the Hellenic lines. On the first day there was serious fighting on the Greek left at Dodona, and after a whole day's engagement, during which the Greek divisional commander lost his only son, and Djavid Pasha is believed to have been killed, the Turks were repulsed; on the second day (Saturday) the attack was general all along the line, but again the Turks were unsuccessful, and on Sunday a final assault on the Greek centre at St. Nicholas led to the same result. The Turks have now retired behind their positions and the Greeks are expecting their Northern Army to advance from Koritza, while further reinforcements are moving westwards along the Metsovo road towards Drisko. The campaign in Epirus thus bids fair to be localized within a few days in an investment of the last remaining Turkish Field Force in Europe in the immediate vicinity of Yanina." *

Very serious fighting took place at Philippiades and Pentepegadia on December 12. On that day a general offensive movement against the Turks was resumed all along the Greek front. At 6.30 in the morning the army opened a general attack on the right wing. In spite of an incessant fire the Turks occupied Aetorachon. The Greek artillery, firing with marvellous precision, succeeded after a duel lasting four hours in silencing the hostile batteries at Lagatora. Officers and men showed exemplary courage and dash. General Sapoundzakis personally directed the operations. Fighting was interrupted at nightfall, but was resumed on the following day, when after repeated attacks the Greek troops took the Turkish advanced works in the direction of the Bizani fortifications at the point of the bayonet and camped there. They took from the enemy three quick-firing guns, a large quantity of war material, and a quantity of tents.

* *The Times*, Tuesday, December 24, 1913.

"For the purpose of making a diversion which would necessitate the despatch of Turkish troops from the main force at the moment of the Greek attack on Yanina, two battalions of infantry and four guns were landed at Santi Quaranta. As a result of this, the Turks were obliged to detach eight battalions with two batteries of artillery and two siege guns. After some skirmishing, in which they lost five killed and nineteen wounded, the Greeks retired upon Santi Quaranta and embarked in good order in the transport which was waiting for them, and moved to another point on the coast of Epirus." *

It was firmly believed at Athens that, as the result of these operations, the fort of Bizani, the advanced guard of Yanina, which was regarded by the Turks as impregnable, could not hold out more than a few hours longer. After desperate fighting on December 16, the batteries of the position, which was so strong by nature, were silenced by the accurate Greek fire. One shell blew up the artillery magazine, and other shells destroyed in succession all the enemy's batteries. From the summit of the mountain opposite the great confusion prevailing in Bizani was clearly seen. As the right wing of the Greek Army advanced impetuously towards the fort, Turkish soldiers could be seen hurriedly removing the guns, whilst others were rushing from the place. Its fall would have opened the road to Yanina.

The Crown Prince's army advanced into Epirus by way of Koritza.

On December 19 the Greeks forced the fortified pass of Tsorgoni, and also the difficult passes in the Morava Mountains.

"The left wing of the army of the Crown Prince attacked the Turkish force, 15,000 strong, which defended Koritza and which was the last remnant of the army of Monastir under Ali Riza Pasha. The main attack was

* *Morning Post*, Wednesday, December 18, 1912.

made against the Zangoni Pass. The Turks were badly beaten and dispersed into the mountains towards Albania and Epirus. The Turks fought very stubbornly, almost all of them coming from Asia Minor. The whole of the Turkish artillery fell into the hands of the Greeks." *

The enemy were seized with panic and fled towards the south, and the Greek Army under General Damianos occupied Koritza, and then pursued the enemy towards Yanina.

" The army had advanced in three columns, the south division marching by the high road, the fifth division following a route through Branista and Pliassa, and the third division making its way by Bamban and Kalyvia.

" This expedition against Koritza has been one of the most difficult imaginable, as bad roads had to be traversed and mountains as much as 4942 feet high surmounted, while the country through which the army had to pass was very poor and it was extremely difficult to obtain provisions." *

The Turks, however, claimed that on December 15 they won an important success. An official report stated that after a six hours' battle in the Soulie Dagh hills, the Greeks were defeated, with a loss of 400 killed and 126 wounded, and had abandoned three quick-firing guns and large quantities of rifles on the field. The Albanian auxiliaries had fought well in support of the Turkish troops.

The Greek predictions as to the approaching fall of Bizani proved to be too optimistic, and the Turkish successes were probably more complete than the authorities at Athens chose to admit.

On December 29 a lively artillery duel accompanied by a furious attack by the Turks began at Bizani. The Turks concentrated their forces on the right wing and assaulted the Greek forces. After some fierce fighting

* *Morning Post*, Thursday, December 19, 1912.

General Sapoundzakis, who had hurried up with reinforcements, succeeded in repelling the enemy and making a counter-attack. The Turks, however, continued to make assaults all through the night, but were driven back with heavy losses. During these engagements the Greeks showed themselves worthy descendants of their ancient heroes.

"Lieutenant Kalaris, the son of the general commanding the second division, although he was suffering from a severe attack of fever, insisted on taking his place at the head of his men among the advanced posts to repulse night attacks, and was struck by a bullet in the forehead.

"At dawn the following day his father, the General, made his appearance, and the sad news was announced to him. He asked to see the body, and, after kissing the blood-stained forehead of his son, said, 'This day, my child, is one of sorrow for the father, but of joy for the General. Lieutenant Kalaris, you have done your duty, sleep in peace.' Then, turning to an officer, he said, 'See to the funeral arrangements,' and, mounting his horse, went off with his staff to fight until the evening."*

New Year's Day was ushered in by a bombardment. From 3 A.M. to 6 A.M. a battery of the Greek siege artillery fired on the great Turkish bivouacs to the left of the Yanina road, and on the Bizani lines. The enemy's artillery did not reply. At about 3 A.M. the Turks attacked the Greek centre and left wing, but were repulsed.

Fighting continued throughout the month of January without very definite results. On January 20 the Greeks commenced a general attack on Bizani, the key to Yanina, and for a time made good progress.

According to statements made by three refugees who succeeded in crossing to the Greek lines, there were 10,000 wounded in Yanina at the beginning of February, and the garrison held out chiefly through the efforts

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, January 2, 1913.

of the Austrian Consul. Ten days' provisions were left. Very severe fighting took place at Philippiades on February 9, when the Greek advanced posts made a night attack on the enemy's position on the right of their lines. The Turks replied with a warm artillery fire. The Greek artillery then came into action and silenced the Turkish guns after a bombardment of two hours.

On February 10 the Turks made an attempt to occupy the Zakrovo Pass, but were repulsed by the Djorna detachment, and retired, leaving behind many killed and large quantities of rifles and stores. Colonel Mathiopoulos was slightly wounded. The Greek losses were insignificant.

But all this fighting proved of little effect. On March 4 a general attack on the fortifications of Yanina was begun on a new plan.

The Crown Prince ordered a concentrated bombardment of the enemy's positions, and on March 4 the Greek guns poured some 10,000 shells into the Turkish lines. The Bizani fort was bombarded by ten siege guns placed at Kanata, which were hidden from view by the ridge of an intervening hill. Its batteries did not reply at first, but later in the day returned the Greek fire, which by the evening had silenced six of them. In the meantime large bodies of Greek troops, advancing rapidly from the left, approached the Manoliasa heights. During the night the bombardment slackened, but on March 5 it was again resumed, 15,000 shells being fired during the day. The Greek troops on the left attacked the enemy, who fled towards Yanina, closely pursued across the plain. By 11 A.M. Bizani had been completely silenced and the eastern forts were in Greek hands.

In the afternoon the Greeks continued their advance and occupied the mountains and Saikni El batteries, taking numerous prisoners. Their right wing held its position, but a division advancing rapidly from Metzovo

occupied Drisko and Koutovraki. By 3 P.M. the Turks were totally scattered and flying in a mad panic towards Yanina. The few officers who, here and there, had kept a knot of men together saw them swept away by the flood of fugitives. That evening the Greeks encamped at Duruti outside Yanina. All through the night strings of stretchers bearing wounded kept pouring into the first-aid hospital at Chani Fitelias, where a motor with the Metropolitan of Yanina and two Turkish officers on their way to the Crown Prince arrived at 4 A.M. They had come to treat for the surrender of Yanina. Essad Pasha's army was completely demoralised, and he had no choice left but to surrender.

Thus Bizani, a first-class natural modern fortress upon which one million pounds had been spent, fell after a siege of four months. For two miles in front of the town the road was strewn with Turkish corpses. The Greeks had carried away their dead.

The town was surrendered formally on March 6, to General Soutzes, the commander of the Greek cavalry, by Vehid Bey, the brother of Essad Pasha, who was visibly moved as he approached the General who stood waiting for him outside the gate. Then the cavalry entered the streets, which were thronged with cheering crowds, and rode straight to the Great Square, where the Turkish garrison was paraded and disarmed. The garrison numbered originally 10,000 regulars and 7000 irregulars, the Turkish loss during the four months' siege being 7500. Essad Pasha had but little ammunition left, and truly said he had resisted until further resistance was madness.

"The official entry of the Crown Prince and his Staff into Yanina took place at noon. Six battalions of Evzones were the feature of the triumphal progress through the town. The condition of the troops is excellent, considering that they have undergone three months' exposure

round Bizani, and the whole army, generally, is in finer condition than at the time of the surrender of Salonika. This is principally due to the excellent transport service between Preveza and the front by motor lorries and mules, and barges along the River Luros. The troops have thus had one hot meal with meat daily, while hot tea with rum or brandy was served out every morning, and all were provided with fresh warm underclothing and socks.

" The Crown Prince is deservedly the idol of the army, for he has succeeded in six weeks, with negligible losses, in reducing a fortress hitherto considered impregnable.

" It has been a beautiful spring day, and the snow-covered mountains made a wonderful setting for the procession through the Government square. Yanina itself, at the head of the Lake, looked like a newly-crowned Queen.

" The Turkish Army was not really starving; flour and sugar were lacking, but there was plenty of meat and maize. There has not, therefore, been great suffering in the town.

" The whole of Greece celebrated the victory. Congratulatory telegrams from all quarters were sent to the Crown Prince. Princess Sophie has also been the subject of popular manifestations. As a result of this fresh feat on the part of the Crown Prince, which adds another important province to Greece, and the bravery shown by the other Princes during the war and the assistance rendered by the Princesses, the dynasty may now be considered to be naturalized and definitely linked to Greece.

" The following incident, which has hitherto been kept secret, occurred during M. Venezelos's recent visit to Epirus: While he was gazing at Bizani from the top of a hill opposite in company with the Crown Prince and the other Princes, a shell burst a few yards away and a

splinter wounded the Crown Prince's son slightly in the cheek.

"Besides the troops who have been made prisoners, 6000 Turkish sick and wounded have been handed over to the Greek Army.

"The Crown Prince issued the following order of the day to the Army:

"'Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

"'The capture of Yanina has added a new and brilliant victory to your glorious exploits. After crossing all Macedonia and scattering two hostile armies, you have set the seal to your deeds of arms by the capture of a fortress considered impregnable. The heavy sacrifices, privations, and fatigue you have endured are only equalled by your courage. You have added fresh trophies to those taken in Macedonia. A hundred guns and another army, with its commanders, colours, and munitions, are in your hands. Your colours have been crowned with fresh glory, and the whole nation admires this new achievement. I am proud to be the commander of such an army. I offer you my congratulations.

"Two squadrons of cavalry reconnoitring to the north of Yanina captured 2300 Turkish fugitives." *

These were the remnant of a body of 2500 Turks, who has escaped northwards during the pursuit on the evening of March 5. The remainder scattered and eventually joined hands with Djavid Pasha's forces from Monastir in Central Albania.

After holding a reception at Government House the Crown Prince and his sons and brothers rode through the town without an escort, and were warmly acclaimed by the population. The Mohammedan and Jewish quarters were strongly picketed.

"The Crown Prince issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Epirus guaranteeing to them 'their lives,

* *The Times*, Monday, March 10, 1913.

their honour, and their goods,' but stating that any attempts to provoke disorder would be summarily dealt with."

Columns were sent to occupy Argyrokastro, where two Turkish battalions were defeated and taken prisoners at Premeti, 46 miles north of Yanina. The Metropolitan of Paramythia, at the request of the local Turkish notables, telegraphed to ask for Greek troops to be sent there, and by March 13 Colonel Ipitis was able to telegraph from Paramythia:

"Following my proclamation in the name of the King of the Hellenes, the Crown Prince, and the Government to the notables, beys, and agas regarding the submission of the inhabitants of Southern Epirus without distinction of race or religion, I am able to report the occupation and submission of the whole of Southern Epirus as far as Kalama and beyond Philiates. I have disarmed the inhabitants. The Ottoman Deputy, Mehsin Dino, accompanied by several beys and agas of Castri, have made complete submission." *

The Greek campaign in Epirus was ended, at a cost to the Greeks of 15,000 killed and wounded, of whom 1800 had fallen before Yanina. They took about 109 guns, 430 officers, 38,000 soldiers, and large quantities of transport wagons.

On March 13 Queen Olga landed at Preveza on her way to Yanina. Within a few days it was destined that she should be recalled to Athens to weep beside the coffin of her murdered husband.

King George's Death

King George's prediction that he would return by sea from Salonika was, alas! destined to be fulfilled. For the four months of the occupation he had been living very

* *Morning Post*, Friday, March 14, 1913.

simply in a small villa overlooking the sea, about two and a half miles from the town. He was accustomed to take an afternoon walk either to the White Tower or to the Cavalry Barracks at the Lesser Karaburun, attended only by a single equerry, for he had dismissed his escort of gendarmes. On Monday, March 17, he was returning from the White Tower with his equerry, Colonel Frangoulis. He was in a happy, contented mood, and was talking of the war, of the success of the Greek arms, of the capture of Yanina and of Salonika, and of this fitting climax to his fifty years' reign. His jubilee was to fall on October 29. "To-morrow," continued the King, "when I pay my formal visit to the Dreadnought *Goeben*, the German battleship is to honour the Greek king here in Salonika. This fills me with happiness and contentment."

These proved to be the Monarch's last words, for at that moment a shot rang out from behind. Colonel Frangoulis sprang round and seized the hand of the assassin, which was already poised for a second shot. Covering his royal master with his body, he grabbed the assailant by the throat and held him fast until passing soldiers ran to his aid. But the first shot had found its billet, for King George had already sunk to the earth. His Majesty was placed in a carriage, his head resting on his arm. He continued to breathe for a short time, but before the hospital was reached life had become extinct.

The bullet, fired at a distance of two paces, entered the back below the shoulder-blade. There was great hæmorrhage, the jewelled cross which the King always wore being stained with blood. The assassin was one Alexander Skinas, a Greek of feeble intellect, who stated that he was driven to desperation by sickness and want. The crime, therefore, was without motive.

"The effect at Salonika is most impressive. As the

tidings spread, groups of grief-stricken people gathered at the street corners and conversed in muffled accents. The troops were recalled to their barracks. The shops and cafés were closed. The tramways were stopped. The lights were extinguished, and Salonika to-night has a dead and deserted appearance that fittingly expresses its sorrow at the loss of a ruler who, in so short a time, has made himself beloved by one and all. As I write the church bells are tolling, and the shrill call of the Last Post echoes along the deserted street." *

Thus died King George I., at the age of sixty-eight, and in the fiftieth year of his reign. With the exception of the venerable Emperor of Austria, he died the *doyen* of European rulers. He had found Greece all but a desert; he left her a strong and prosperous kingdom: his adaptability had maintained him on the throne; *cedendo vicit*. As one who knew him well wrote, " In the relations of private life King George was an amiable man, a devoted husband and father, and a kind friend. He was specially cordial to Englishmen, with whom he always conversed in their own language, which he spoke perfectly." Speaking in the name of the British Navy, Rear-Admiral V. A. Montagu wrote, " His Majesty always evinced a special interest in seeking the society of our naval officers, when squadrons or detached ships were happily detached to Greek waters, and during the course of his long reign nothing could have exceeded his invariable kindness and hospitality upon all occasions. The British Navy has indeed lost a true friend, and one whose charming personality can never be forgotten."

The funeral of the Hero King was like that of no sovereign who has ever reigned on earth, save that of our own Hero Queen whom he knew so well. Like Queen Victoria, King George was carried to his grave by the paths of the sea. Around the Royal Yacht *Amphitrite*,

* *Daily Telegraph.*

which bore his corpse from Salonika to the Piraeus, sailed as his escort ships from the great navies of the world. The Greeks were the first Sea Kings; the first victory won for Liberty on the sea was won by Greek ships at Salamis. Was not King George a Dane? a son of that race of Sea Kings whose virile blood has given France and England so much of their greatness and of their fame?

Nor was his triumph in death less at Salonika. The troops of a whole division lined the route of the procession. All the town was draped in black, and the doors of all the houses on his way. The remains of the King were borne on a gun-carriage. King Constantine and the members of the Royal Family followed the gun-carriage. The Bulgarians were represented by a detachment, and a delegation of a hundred Mussulmans followed the bier from the Palace to the quay.

The German cruiser *Goeben* was amongst the escort of the *Amphitrite*. In his last hours King George had spoken of his approaching visit to her, and now all that she could do was to pay her homage to the dead.

As the long line of ships steamed in stately sorrow through those clustered islands, from whose every mountain-top the flag of Greece now waves, one could not but remember that it is to the life-work of King George that the isles of Greece owe their new-found liberty.

The passage of the *Amphitrite* through that wine-dark sea, whose every wave rolls out the story of the glorious past of Hellas, past that Sunium where Byron, for once a false prophet, mourned the death of freedom and of Greece, was delayed by fog, Salamis did not rise into sight, and the Royal yacht did not reach the harbour of the Piraeus until the forenoon of March 27. The streets were thronged with people, silent and solemn. About eleven the funeral bells tolled out, and the boom of the port batteries heralded the approach of the Royal dead.

Through a lane of warships of the Great Powers the *Amphitrite* passed into the inner port. The Royal coffin was seen resting on her deck, surrounded by its naval guard, and draped with the Greek and Danish flags. Many an officer on the *Yarmouth*, from which Saint George's flag was flying at half mast, must have thought of that January sunset with its blaze of fire when the great Queen came to Portsmouth on her journey to her last home at Frogmore. The coffin was carried ashore by the Royal Princes, followed by King Constantine supporting his mother. Amid the boom of the cannon the procession started from the Piraeus along that road which has so often been trodden by those sages and those apostles who gave us the life of the mind and the life of the soul. The King was borne on an oaken carriage drawn by fifty-two warrant officers and men. All that is great in Greece followed in his train. In the distance gleamed on the Acropolis the glorious ruins of the Parthenon and of the temple of that Winged Victory, who with King George returned once more to her ancient seat. Beyond the ring of distant mountains which bear names famous in story throughout the ages towered blue against the far-off sky. From the Piraeus to Athens the corpse was carried by train. Through a city draped with black, with purple, with myrtles, with the martyr's palm, where the death-like silence was broken only by sounds of weeping, the Royal mourners followed the coffin on foot to the Cathedral. The poor little cheap building dates from the days of Grecian poverty, but it was the thank-offering of Greece to the All-Ruler for her liberation from the Turk. Into that building the Royal Princes bore the coffin, which was placed on a dais surrounded by large golden candelabra, each bearing a hundred lighted candles, whilst the high Greek ecclesiastics in their gorgeous pontifical robes recited the prayers for the dead. The widowed Queen knelt sobbing and praying at its head.

Then the Royal mourners departed, and the church was closed to be prepared to receive the crowds who were coming to pay their last reverence to their King. On the morrow the whole city filed past the coffin; by the order of the Minister of Public Instruction all the school children were admitted, and many of them wept bitterly.

The Cathedral is humble enough, but loving hands hid its poverty in flowers. "They came from all over the new Hellenic, the reconquered Hellenic country. They are also intensely significant proofs of the amazing reconquest which the King lying dead in his coffin before us lived to see fulfilled. On thousands of wreaths one reads the names of towns and villages Turkish for centuries, and now Greek again, and sending their tribute to the King whose reign was made great by the war which won them back to Hellas."* Truly the City of the Violet Crown, once again Lady of the Provinces, no more a captive, proved herself worthy of her name. "It is with a garland that Athens crowns her sons living and dead after a struggle like theirs." Everywhere in Athens were to be seen pasted up the black-edged cards which are used to announce a death; they bore the words, "Mega Ethnikon Penthos" (A Great National Grief). Working men wore them bound on their sleeves with crape.

The flag which had been raised to begin the fight for freedom in 1821 was borne before the coffin; forty bishops from the provinces redeemed for ever from the Turk in glorious vestments shimmering with delicate hues of gold and silver, and with embroideries whose every tone vied with the flowers around, stood before it, wearing jewelled tiaras which had come down to them from bishops who had chanted in Santa Sophia thanksgivings for the victories of Emperors of the Romans. Sixty-two Metro-

* *Daily Telegraph.*

politans in all were present at the funeral. Every land in Europe had sent its representatives to honour one who was the kinsman of nearly every Christian ruler. We marvel at the list of the nations who passed before the great King on the plains of Enos. What would a Homer or an Herodotus have said if they could have seen princes of the blood royal, gathered from every land between the Rhiphaean Mount and the Sacred Cape to pay the last honour at the foot of the Acropolis to a ruler who had come to it from the land of the Hyperboreans?

The prayers themselves were simple. Of all the funeral ritual of the Holy Orthodox Church in which the Greek tongue, if in a dialect which would be scorned by the classic purist of the schools, has an awe-inspiring beauty all its own, no passages had been used save those which correspond with that simpler Danish Service which would have been read over the departed monarch had he been laid to rest in the great brick Cathedral which towers at Roeskilde over the green pastures of Zealand and the still waters of the Isa Fjord. They consisted mainly of passages from the Gospel of St. John, which were to be said again in the Danish tongue when the dead King was laid in his last home amongst the pine woods of Tatoi. But in this Greek church the clergy and the Greek Orthodox congregation pray fervently for the departed King, and the Metropolitan truly says that though remaining in another faith the late sovereign was a bulwark of the Greek Church.

But the committal has been said as princes, priests, and soldiers knelt in reverence. Then the Metropolitan rises and speaks in a voice sounding through the Cathedral. He speaks of the late King's long and gloriously ended reign, he extols his devotion to his adopted country and its Church, but the most dramatic passage is the peroration when, addressing the present King, he says: "Thou bearest the name of Constantine and art the heir

of Constantine the Eleventh, the last Emperor of Constantinople," and recalls the tradition and the prophecy of the Greek Church, that when a Greek Emperor shall reign again at Constantinople, the door walled by Turks at St. Sophia shall be reopened, and the religious service be resumed again exactly at the moment when the Turks in 1453 burst into the Cathedral.

This tradition is that when the yelling hordes rushed over the sacred threshold, a priest was consecrating the Blessed Host at the High Altar. The wall of the church opened; he walked in, and it reclosed behind him.

Had the Metropolitan known it, he might have mentioned another coincidence of singular omen. On March 30, whilst the sobbing crowds at Athens were filing past King George's bier, at Rome a procession of devotees bearing the Eucharist were filing through the gloomy gangways of the Catacombs on the Appian Way, and the vaults of the great crypt in the catacomb of Sta. Domatilla, which bears the names of those earliest of Roman martyrs Saints Petronilla, Nereus, and Achilles, were ringing with the chants which celebrated the sixteenth centenary of the issue of the Edict of Milan. By that edict Constantine the Great put an end to the persecution of the Christians; and it was on October 27, 313, that the first Christian Roman Emperor saw before the battle on the Milvian Bridge that vision which determined him to give the Roman world to Christ. It was the monogram of the Saviour in Greek characters surrounded by the motto, " In hoc signo vinces." That motto is the motto of the Hellenic kingdom.

From Athens the King was carried to be laid beside an infant daughter in the Royal Mausoleum which he had built for himself at Tatoi.

I cannot forget that it was at the Ceramicus, but a few hundred yards away from the Metropolitan church of Athens that Pericles pronounced that noble oration over

the heroes who had died for Athens in the Peloponnesian War, which fits both so well the soldiers who have died for Greece in this war and their martyred king. I quote from Jowett's translation:

"I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man's worth; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the State more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth, or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined, at the hazard of their lives, to be honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness; but in face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but in the battlefield their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune

they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory.

"Such was the end of these men; they were worthy of Athens, and the living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue."

The statesmen and philosophers of old Athens have done much to make and to mould that world whose representatives from every country under Heaven bowed before King George's tomb. Yet a Christian may remember that we owe it to the Hebrew tent-maker, who once upon Mars' Hill made their Unknown God known to his Athenian hearers, that the Metropolitan of Athens could teach their far-off children to forgive their enemies. Nor will he forget that it was to their Corinthian fellow-countrymen that those words were written which tell how Death has lost his sting and how the Grave is swallowed up in Victory.

King George's political will contained some valuable advice to his successor and to his other children.

"King Constantine is urged to love whole-heartedly his 'dear little country,' and to serve his people faithfully —with courage but also with patience. 'Let the night pass before coming to a decision. Never let the sun go down upon your wrath. Be calm and never forget that you are reigning over a southern people who are easily roused and may in a moment do and say many things which they will probably forget a few hours after. For this reason never fall into a passion and never forget that it is often preferable that the King should suffer rather than his people. Do not lose sight of the fact that the interest of the people must be placed before all other interests, and God will help you in your heavy task. Always love your mother. Give your children a good Greek education for they must be Greeks and nothing else. Love your brothers. I ask pardon of all whom I may have wronged.'

After declaring his undying love for his wife, King George concludes by invoking a blessing on his country." *

After the advance to Argyrokastro the Greek army took little part in active operations which came to an end with the signature of the Armistice of Tchataldja, and public interest became preoccupied with the disputes between the Greek and Bulgarian forces in Macedonia.

* *The Times*, Monday, April 14, 1913.

CHAPTER XIV

MONTENEGRO, GREECE, AND ALBANIA

IT may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the policy pursued by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey with regard to Servia and Montenegro was, under all the circumstances, the only one possible if an Armageddon were to be averted. They may have been timid, over timid, about Constantinople; they have been rightly bold about Skutari. When even statesmen like Sir Wilfrid Laurier, speaking in the Canadian Parliament at Ottawa, can talk of "poor little Montenegro" being bullied, it is clear that to outsiders this policy could not but lend itself to misinterpretation.

Englishmen, so far as they understand diplomacy at all, prefer straightforward diplomacy. They do not understand plans of covering insurance policies, such as that treaty by which Russia, whilst remaining "a friendly and allied nation" with France, secured herself a good understanding with Germany by a separate agreement in which France was not included.

The man in the street looks upon France and Russia as his friends. Long may he do so. To the man in the street it seemed almost like an act of treachery, as I have already said, that Mr. Asquith should take part with Austria against, as he supposed, France and Russia. Why, he asked, should the Prime Minister choose the very moment, when Mr. Churchill, Colonel Seely, and Mr. Lloyd George had been so welcomed in France and

Spain, to declare that we are not bound by Treaty to send troops overseas to aid France?

Mr. Asquith was right. Had he supported the policy which the man in the street thought was that of Russia, war must have followed. Though the Russian peasants recked nothing of the southern Slavs, Pan-Slavism in the great towns was at fierce heat, and at any moment an explosion of popular feeling might have led to the fall of M. Sazonoff's ministry. His successors would have supported Montenegro to the death.

But the English Minister knew that Montenegro was in the wrong. It is true that for a short time after the fall of the Servian Empire Skutari formed part of the Servian principality of which Montenegro is a fragment, but to-day Skutari is Albanian, and, what is more, Northern Albanian and Catholic. Its Gheg inhabitants dread and hate the Montenegrin rule. The Slav races of the Orthodox Faith have no great respect for the language and religion of other nationalities, even when these are themselves of Slav origin. What has been the fate of the Poles at the hands of the Russians, of the Ruthenians at the hands of the Poles of Galicia?

As that most able and fair-minded writer Mr. Nevinson points out in his appeal in favour of the Albanians, Albania, at least the Ghegs of Northern Albania and Skutari would far rather live as an autonomous province under Austrian protection "than be exposed to the tender mercies of their ancient foes, the Slavs of Montenegro." The Catholic tribes to the north-east of the city find Skutari essential to their very existence. "Unless they can pasture their flocks and herds on the sea-coast marshes below Alessio in winter, they will die of starvation. To reach the coast they must pass through Skutari or its immediate neighbourhood, and unless their means of access is in Albanian hands they must perish." *

* *Westminster Gazette*, Wednesday, April 9, 1913.

Montenegro can manage Albania through her sheep-folds, as Austria manages Servia through her sties. It is marvellous to see how swine-fever breaks out in Servia whenever there is a little diplomatic tension between the neighbouring powers, and how soon the transport of pigs from Belgrade to Semlin is prohibited.

Montenegro is a country of flocks, and, doubtless, fluke in sheep might prove as potent an instrument in her dealings with Northern Albania as the swine-fever bacillus does in Austrian hands against Servia.

Hence the virtuous Montenegro which Mr. Nevinson so aptly describes as "having developed a taste for living on its past," is, in reality, acting like a private-school bully towards Albania. She leans upon the support of Russia and attempts a war of conquest. Fortunately for the world, however, Russia has not given her any guarantee.

Had Mr. Asquith, in deference to the Pan-Slav agitation, refused to support Austria and Germany, what would have been the result? Austria would have broken away from the Concert of the Powers and blotted Montenegro from the map, possibly after a prolonged struggle with the Balkan allies.

After all, Austria has a right to expect some gratitude from Servia and Montenegro.

By Act 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, the civil administration of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, "which extends between Servia and Montenegro in a south-easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitz," was, at the request of Austria, left in the hands of Turkey, but Austria-Hungary reserved to herself the right of keeping garrisons in it, and of keeping up military and commercial roads.

It is true that Austria has waived this right *de facto*, and that during the present war she has allowed both Montenegro and Servia to treat the Sanjak as Ottoman territory, but she retains her rights *de jure* and at any

moment might put them in force. If she were to overrun Montenegro, Austria would undoubtedly do so. In that case a war between Austria and Russia, supported by Servia and Bulgaria, might follow.

Under these circumstances it was just that the English Government should intervene to save Montenegro from herself, and should, therefore, stand by the Concert of the Powers in the endeavour to put a stop to its career of conquest.

Once more Mr. Gladstone's great words, "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples," were to be justified.

Montenegro was fully aware of the possible outcome of her obstinacy, and is said in consequence to have entered into some curious negotiations with Servia.

King Nicholas, it is true, in his interviews with Press correspondents, was magnificently defiant. "I assure you that we mean to keep the land we have retaken during the war. I began to reign as a mere lad, I have been at perpetual war with the Turks. Why? Because they took away the most fertile land our ancestors had more than 300 years ago, and my people cannot live on these rocks which you can see all around you.

"The world condemns me for causing trouble. But the world forgets that my subjects must regain that fertile land belonging to the Zeta Valley if we are to go on living. Yes, it is a matter of life and death. Modern conditions demand industry and agriculture.

"We mean to take Skutari, which holds the key to that land, and we mean to keep it. Old as I am and used to fighting, I have never seen such determination amongst my people as I have seen in the present war. They know only too well that it is far better to die fighting than to go on living as we are doing now.

"As to Skutari, it was ours before the Turks took it from us. My ancestors are buried in the city. The very churches there were built by them.

"The Albanians have never been united as a State. Even Scander Beg, the hero of whom one now hears so much, only ruled over one small tribe. They are not even united as to religion, some being Mohammedans, others Christians. The fact that they have settled in Skutari does not weaken our claim to regain what we have lost.

"Skutari will be my capital in future." *

It is perfectly true that King Nicholas is the descendant of that noble Servian of Frank origin, Balcha, who, when the old Servian Empire broke up after the assassination of Urosh V. in 1367, seized the fortress of Skutari and founded a principality which lasted until 1484, when Balcha's successor Ivan the Black was driven by the Turks from his capital Jabliak, and took refuge in the Black Mountain. But if such historic claims are to prevail against present-day facts, Europe would, indeed, be in a parlous state. For instance, Servia could claim Ragusa as having been the capital of a Servian Empire about the year 900.

But assassination is not an unknown weapon of political warfare in the Balkan States, and King Nicholas, as Bourchier has pointed out, has before him the fact that "since the fiasco which followed the grant of a Constitution, the Radical element in Montenegro has existed in a state of sullen discontent. Its ranks have latterly been swollen by thousands of reservists returned from the United States, whose minds have been steeped in Republican doctrines. Would the dynasty survive a renunciation of the dearest hopes of the nation unaccompanied by any corresponding advantage? Great distress and suffering will follow the close of the war, and if national humiliation is added popular discontent may culminate in a catastrophe. In face of such a prospect King Nicholas may naturally prefer the lesser evil—

* *Daily Telegraph*, Saturday, April 5, 1913.

the risk involved in non-compliance with the behests of the Powers. He knows that come what may the Powers will not force him to abdicate, as his subjects may do if he disappoints their fond desire." *

What, indeed, have the Powers to gain by the substitution of a Montenegrin Republic, in the hands of the wildest Socialists, for a Montenegrin Kingdom? When Austria held Venetia and Lombardy, she found Switzerland a thorn in her side. Yet Switzerland, during the Austrian tenure of Lombardy, was only just becoming a middle-class State, and Austria had a strong following in nearly every Swiss canton. But Switzerland was under the guarantee of the Powers, and, therefore, immune from chastisement.

But a Socialist Republic in Montenegro would be in a very different position. It would be a constant lodestone to all the anti-Austrian elements in the Croatian provinces, and would not be protected by any of the Powers. Austria would, undoubtedly, put an end to it once and for all without delay.

Perhaps foreseeing the risk of a Republic in Montenegro King Nicholas appeared to have devised a scheme by which he might save the estates and property of himself and his family, whatever might be the outcome of the complications about Skutari.

"According to his entourage,† King Nicholas is firmly resolved on the plan he will follow in the event of force being employed by the Powers. The general plan has been prepared for some time, and has been worked out in consultation with the King of Servia.

"In the event," proceeds *Reuter*, "of Montenegro being unable to obtain what she considers necessary for her continued independence, the King will abdicate, and, with his family, will leave the country. Montenegro

* *The Times*, Thursday, April 10, 1913.
† *Westminster Gazette*, Wednesday, April 9, 1913.

will then cease to be independent, and will effect a union with Servia under the sovereignty of King Peter. King Nicholas and his family will, as the result of an agreement already concluded, reserve to themselves the right of succession to the Serbo-Montenegrin throne, and would in the meantime be in receipt of an appropriate Civil List."

Such agreements, which are known as Erbverträge (Succession Agreements), are well known in the older history of diplomacy, especially in Germany, where an arrangement very much on the same lines as to the succession is in force to-day between the Royal Houses of Prussia and of Bavaria. It is interesting, too, to remember that it was under such an agreement, dating from the time of the Emperor Lewis the Bavarian, a contemporary of our own Edward II., that the Electoral Dignity was transferred from James I.'s son-in-law, Frederick Elector Palatine, to Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, because Frederick had usurped the kingdom of Bohemia. In his attempts to secure the restoration of the Electorate to his brother-in-law, Charles I. was led into the line of action which, in the end, brought him to the scaffold.

If such an arrangement were to take effect in the case of Servia and Montenegro, Servia, by incorporating the smaller power, would form a strong Serb Kingdom extending from the Danube to the Adriatic, with a port at Antivari. It would thus block the access of Austria to the Aegean and might even injure her influence in the Adriatic. Moreover, a Serb Empire, which would be separated from the Austrian Croats only by religious difference, would form a constant danger to Austria, because it would necessarily excite disruptive influences in her Croatian provinces. Such a Servia would from economic causes be impelled to agitate for the formation of a Balkan Confederation, in order

to supplement her very insufficient outlet to the sea at Antivari—an outlet which she could only reach by crossing the Montenegrin mountains, by an access to Salonika through the valley of the Vardar, unless, indeed, she preferred to make an attempt to seize Cattaro.

I would quote * the weighty words as to the relations between *Slaventum* and *Germanentum* which were uttered in the Reichstag by the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the debate on the introduction of the Army Bill. He was dealing with the new situation created by the events in the Balkans.

"From the beginning of the Balkan War the Great Powers had laboured to localize it. No Great Power had desired to share in the territorial alterations in the Balkans, but a state of tension had existed for months which caused Austria-Hungary and Russia to take extraordinary military measures. He would not say that the danger of war had at any moment been immediate, but it had constantly required the whole sense of responsibility of the Governments most nearly concerned to deprive the differences of opinion and of interests of a sharpness which might have led to war. The Chancellor continued:

"'Europe will feel grateful to the English Minister for Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary devotion and spirit of conciliation with which he conducts the discussions of the Ambassadors in London and with which he has constantly been able to bridge over differences. Germany shares all the more sincerely in this gratitude, because she knows herself to be at one with the aims of English policy, and, standing loyally by her allies, she has laboured in the same sense.'

"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg then remarked that Sir Edward Grey had explained in the House of Commons the results which had been reached in the Conference

* *The Times*, Tuesday, April 8, 1913.

of Ambassadors. The business now was to give effect to the decisions of the Great Powers, and ' in this Germany was determined to co-operate most energetically.' After the fall of Adrianople one could assume that there would soon be peace. Unfortunately that had not been the case. Turkey had accepted the peace proposals of the Powers. The reply of the Balkan States, which had not been received until Saturday, had now to be considered by the Great Powers altogether, and he could not discuss the matter now because, in view of the challenging resistance of Montenegro, the great point was that the firm co-operation of the Powers should continue. All the Great Powers, with the exception of Russia, who, however, had approved of the action in itself, were taking part in the naval demonstration. He would repeat that the London decisions must be carried through with all speed and with emphasis, and then a peaceful solution would be found for the questions still unsolved.

" The Imperial Chancellor then dealt at length, in language which must be given textually, with the consequences of the new situation for Germany. After remarking that everything showed how closely events in the Balkans touched, and might disturb, the relations of the Great Powers, * he said :

" ' For the future the decisive point is that into the place of European Turkey, whose State life has become passive, there have entered States which exhibit a quite extraordinarily active vitality. It is in the interest of us all that this vitality shall stand the test in works of peace, as it has done in war, and that the Balkan States shall enter upon a long period of peace, which will bring them into association in the economic and other spheres of progress with their neighbours and with the whole fabric of European States, so that they will constitute a factor of progress and of peace. But one thing remains

* How damnably prophetic !

beyond doubt—if it should ever come to a European conflagration, which sets *Slaventum* against *Germanentum*, it is then for us a disadvantage that the position in the balance of forces, which was occupied hitherto by European Turkey, is now filled in part by Slav States. This alteration of the politico-military situation on the Continent has passed through its preliminary stage, and now that it is a fact we should be acting unconscientiously if we did not draw the consequences. I do not say this because I regard a collision between *Slaventum* and *Germanentum* as inevitable. Many publicists take a contrary view, and the proceedings of these writers are very dangerous. Such conceptions are like catch-words, which fall on the ears and work by suggestion. They fertilize the soil upon which misdirected popular passions grow up and ripen.

"With the Government of Russia, our great Slav neighbour Empire, we enjoy the most friendly relations. Since I came into office I have regarded it as my duty to maintain frank and sincere relations with the Russian Cabinet, and from the course of events, and from my own personal relations with the statesmen who, in accordance with the will of the Emperor Nicholas, maintain Russian policy upon the lines of good-neighbourly relations with Germany, I have won the conviction that my efforts are reciprocated. I know of no direct antagonisms of interests between us and Russia. Germany and Russia can work to strengthen themselves economically and to progress without interfering with one another's rights. The racial antagonisms between Slav and German will not by themselves lead to a war between us and Russia. We, at any rate, shall never stir up such a war, and I do not believe that those who at present hold power in Russia will ever do it. It is, however, as well known to the Russian statesmen as it is to us that the Pan-Slav currents, about which Bismarck

even in his day complained, and which caused him uneasiness, have received a powerful stimulus from the victories of the Slav States in the Balkans. Bulgarian victories over the Turks have been celebrated in these quarters as victories of the Slav idea in contrast with the Germanic idea. Together with the real conflicts of interests these tendencies have contributed to the tension which has prevailed this winter between Austria-Hungary and Russia. I need not refer to the excited controversies between a part of the Russian and the Austrian Press. In these passionate disputes we hear the echo of old differences which the Balkan problem has caused to arise between Austria-Hungary and Russia. As loyal allies of Austria-Hungary we endeavour as far as possible to mitigate the tension, but that does not allow us to bury our heads in the sand. For, as I need not insist, we preserve our loyalty as Allies not only within the range of diplomatic mediation. Because of the new and acute revival of racial instincts, the alteration of the politico-military situation which has arisen from the Balkan War acquires an increased significance. We are compelled to take it into account when we think about the future."

The Imperial Chancellor does not, therefore, regard a collision between *Slaventum* and *Germanentum* as inevitable.

Why, indeed, should it be so?

What have the Slavonic elements, at least so far as Russia and the Southern Slavs are concerned, got to gain by attempting to annex any of the lands occupied by Germanic races? These lands are fully peopled, and are sources for the supply of emigrants. In the whole course of their history the Slavs have never yet tried to occupy any territories inhabited by Germanic populations, even though, as in the case of Germany between the Elbe and the Niemen, these lands were

once peopled with Slavs and have now been Germanised. Russia is the typical expansive power. Her conquests have only in two instances been at the expense of her civilised neighbours. She was forced to occupy north Finland for strategic reasons; she had been for centuries the hereditary enemy of the Poles, and their disunion made them dangerous to the internal peace of Russia.

On the other hand, it is the Germanic peoples who have advanced eastward over Slav territory. As I have already said, all Germany east of the Elbe was peopled by Slavs in the tenth century.

Slaventum is now represented within the German frontiers merely by the Wends of the Spreewald, a rapidly disappearing "speech-island," and the Poles of Posen and Silesia, whom the Imperial Government are making every effort to Germanise by fair means or foul. The Baltic Provinces of Russia represent German conquests from the Lettish and Finnish races. In Austria, if we make a very doubtful exception in the case of Bohemia, the Slav cannot be said to have advanced at the expense of the Germans.

Compare the aims of the Pan-Slavists with those of the Pan-Germans. The Pan-Slavists have never claimed to incorporate any territories inhabited by non-Slavic races on purely historical grounds. Even when Skoboleff, in a fine fit of imagination, wished to carry the frontiers of a Pan-Slavic Empire to meet those of Italy at the Isouzo, he would not have been forced to trample down the liberties of any Germanic races to enable him to effect his purpose. The broad belt of Slav populations, which stretches across Austria from the Galician frontier to the Adriatic, is interrupted merely by Magyar and Ruman-speaking lands; the only Germans included in it are the Saxons of Transylvania, themselves a colony, and a few German settlements in the Hungarian plain, who are of scarcely more importance relatively to the

population than the "Dutch" of Pennsylvania are to that of the United States.

The Pan-Germans, however, dream of nothing less than the reconstitution of the Holy Roman and German Empire, and to achieve their ends would willingly annex not only the independent Dutch and Flemings, who, though of Germanic origin and tongue, are, perhaps, closer akin to the English than to the South Germans, but also the Walloons of Belgium, the French of Picardy, of Champagne and of Burgundy, Switzerland, with its three races, and in Austrian lands the Slavonic Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovenes of the mountain lands which lie between Vienna and Trieste. Which, then, is the aggressive force in Europe to-day, Germandom (*Germanentum*) or Slavdom (*Slaventum*)?

Surely we should bear these considerations in mind when considering the effect which the substitution of a Balkan Confederation for Turkey may have upon Austria. Politically it bars her path for ever to Salonika and may exercise a dangerously attractive influence over her Southern Slavs. Economically, her manufacturers may lose much by the substitution of the high Balkan tariff on manufactured goods for the present Turkish one *ad valorem*.

Cannot, however, these differences be accommodated? Let us leave the question of the Albanian coast-line on the Adriatic and Channel of Corfu out of the question.

I believe that they can be. Experience in Morocco has proved that trade questions can be settled by internationalising the trade; that is to say, by leaving the trade of all nations free to enter the country on equal terms with that of the Power of which it is a protectorate. If a Balkan Confederation would guarantee the maintenance of the present Turkish *ad valorem* tariff to all nations for a long term of years, and would regulate such questions as those of railway charges on

a permanent and equitable basis, Austria, who, as it is, holds a great interest in the Balkan railways, would have no real grounds for complaint.

As to the political side of the question, it is doubtful whether a Balkan Confederation would feel any wish to annex any Austrian Slavs.

Let Salonika be open to all the Balkan States, and neither Servia nor the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar can have any need for obtaining access to the Adriatic, although Montenegro might still have some grounds for complaint as to her restricted coast-line.

As Major Gregoriades has pointed out,* the economic development of all the Balkan States is very backward. Their male population has been greatly reduced by the present war. Their new territories are fertile and, for the most part, thinly peopled. For years to come the inhabitants of a Balkan Confederation would find ample scope for their energies in internal colonisation. They would find Albania with its hard-working, migratory inhabitants far more useful to them than Croatia. Moreover, in such a Confederation, there would be a large minority of non-Slavs—Greeks, Albanians, Kutso-Vlachs, Jews, and Turks. The Slav element itself would, moreover, be divided into two nationalities with very divergent interests, the Serbs and the Bulgars. In a Balkan Confederation the non-Slav element would play the part of balance. If, however, Servia, by the addition of the Croatian lands, became Great Servia, she would be able to hold her own against her other partners. On political grounds, then, there would be but little temptation to a Balkan Confederation to incorporate the Croatians, let alone the other Austrian South Slavs.

But from an economic point of view these South Slav countries would bring equally little advantage to a Balkan Confederation. Croatia is mainly agricultural,

* *The Times*, Friday, April 25, 1913.

whilst Bosnia-Herzegovina are a mass of forest-clad mountains merging into the Karst, or upland limestone steppes, and the rocky coasts of Dalmatia. The Balkan States, at present at least, and if we leave out the seafaring element in Greece, live mainly by agriculture. What would these millions of peasant proprietors have to gain by admitting Croatian produce to compete with their own? The chief reason why they cannot come to a satisfactory commercial arrangement with Austria-Hungary is because the Dual Monarchy, in deference to its Agrarian Party, refuses to grant admission to the agricultural produce of the Balkan States at low rates of duty, in exchange for low import duties in their tariffs on Austrian manufactured articles. Nor, so long as the port of Salonika was open to Servia, would she feel any desire to cross the Bosnian mountains to seek the sea in the Dalmatian harbours.

Italy, however, would have some reason to fear a Confederation which controlled the Albanian ports and those in the Ægean Islands, and thus threatened her coasts both on the Gulf of Taranto and on the Adriatic, and her communications with her possessions in Africa.

But, on the other hand, if Montenegro were a member of a Balkan Confederation, which included Albania, she would have no reason to haggle about Skutari. A Montenegrin who was a citizen of such a Confederation would be free to establish himself anywhere in the Peninsula, just as a Bavarian farmer is free to take a farm in Prussia or in Alsace.

In an Empire like the German territorial boundaries matter little. In the old German Confederation before the establishment of the Customs Union it was a matter of the greatest importance to the several Confederated States, kept apart as they were by Customs tariffs, to control as much land as possible. With the establishment of the Zollverein this motive disappeared. Prussia

annexed Hanover in 1866 purely on political grounds; in 1871 the Grand Duke of Baden refused to accept Alsace, since it could not bring any advantage either to himself or to his people.

Thus the establishment of an Eastern Empire, on the lines of the German Empire, might do much to put an end to the fears and suspicions which keep apart *Slaventum* and *Germanentum*, by closing for ever one of the fields for the intrigues to which they owe their birth. Since the rise of Bulgaria Russia seems to have renounced her ambitions of reaching Constantinople by an advance from the Danube. Weak and divided States are, indeed, the most fertile source of wars. They awaken the territorial greed of other and stronger Powers.

Austria would be the gainer if an Eastern Empire were formed.

But what about Albania itself, which the Powers have agreed shall constitute an autonomous State with a northern and north-eastern frontier drawn so as to leave Skutari to Albania?

As Sir Edward Grey said in his speech in the House of Commons on April 8:

"There is no reason why the same sympathy which was felt for Montenegro or other countries contending for liberty and national existence should not be extended to the Albanian population of Skutari and its district, who are mainly Catholic and Moslem, and who are contending for their lands, their religion, their liberty, and their lives.

"For these reasons His Majesty's Government have no hesitation in being parties to the agreement of the Powers about Albania. The agreement of the Powers respecting the frontiers of Albania was reached after a long and laborious diplomatic effort. It was decided that the littoral and Skutari should be Albanian, while

Ipek, Prizren, Dibra, and (after much negotiation) Djakova should be excluded from Albania. This arrangement leaves a large tract of territory to be divided between Servia and Montenegro as the fruits of victory."

Mr. Nevinson put the case of the Albanians in even stronger terms. " The tactics of Montenegro's supporters in this shameless war of conquest are to confuse public opinion by mixing up Turks with Albanians—the Sultan's supremacy with Albanian independence. The Montenegrins themselves suffer under no such confusion. Their purpose is to conquer Skutari and its neighbourhood from the Albanians and keep it for themselves. ' Hereafter,' they openly boast, ' there shall be no Albanian question,' and by that they mean that they will kill off the male population, and ' Slavise ' the women and children by compulsory marriages, by compulsory Slav schools, the prohibition of the Albanian language, and the persecution of the Moslem religion and Catholic Christianity."

Austria was the Power which, at the cost of heavy sacrifices to herself and even at the risk of war with Russia, stepped in to save the Albanian nationality. Surely this good deed must be placed to the credit of the House of Hapsburg, which, however, has done far more for the cause of civilisation than most historical students, perhaps, recognise. By a series of treaties dating from 1617, and frequently confirmed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), Austria had obtained from the Porte certain rights of protectorate over all the Turkish subjects belonging to the Roman Catholic religion, of a kind similar to those which Russia acquired by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774 over all Turkish subjects of the Greek Confession. These rights had been allowed by Austria to lapse as regards the greater part of Turkey, but she had always maintained

them with regard to Albania, where, of late years, Austrians have expended large sums in the establishment of Roman Catholic schools and missions. Austria, in short, had every right both on historical grounds and under International Law to intervene as she did on behalf of the Albanians.

It is, however, very hard for an outsider to picture to himself Albania as a nation.

The physical geography of the country itself, the character of its population and of its social organisation, the strongly marked differences of religion and of dialect, although these latter, perhaps, are not more strongly marked than in Italy, all help to confuse our minds, and to prevent us from seeing the question in its true perspective.

Yet the Albanian nationality is a strong one. The "Land of Rocks" (Shkyiperi), as these Albanians call their country, has only one large and fertile plain, occupying the borders of the Lake of Skutari, which may be looked upon as the real frontier of Albanian territory. The Albanian population is divided into two great branches, the Ghegs in the north and the Tosks in the south, who speak a language of Indo-European origin, which resembles Greek more closely than any other language, existing or recorded, of that great family. Some, indeed, consider the Albanians to be identical with the ancient Pelasgians, but the first clear traces of their nation are to be found in Roman times in the Pindus region, from which in the sixth and seventh centuries they spread all over Greece.

So distinct, however, are the Tosk and Gheg dialects that it is extremely difficult for a southerner to understand a man from the north. The usually accepted figures for the Albanian population are 1,400,000 in Turkey, of whom 130,000 are Roman Catholics, inhabiting the north of Albania, 1,000,000 Moslems in its centre,

and 280,000 members of the Greek Church in the south. In addition to these there are 250,000 Albanians in the Hellenic Kingdom, and 100,000 in Italy, mostly in Sicily. They descend from refugees who emigrated from Albania in the fifteenth century, and it is interesting to remember that the English, who fought for the freedom of the Netherlands in Elizabeth's day, often crossed swords with Albanians, who were amongst the best troops in the Spanish Army and were known as the Regiment of Naples.

Family ties are very strong amongst the Albanians, amongst whom the authority of the father is supreme. These families never forget their common descent, even when the name of the common ancestor is lost, and as Clans, called *Phis* or *Pharas*, unite to defend their common interests. The ties of blood-brotherhood, as in Servia, are also very strong.

But the physical geography of Albania is another reason why Albania has never united as a nation.

To quote the words of that eminent authority on the Near East, Mr. D. G. Hogarth, when lecturing before the Royal Geographical Society:* "The greater part of Albania is formed by a series of long and very narrow valleys running across the Belt from an almost impassable mountain spine on the eastern frontier to a sea which is fringed with inhospitable malarious strips filling short intervals between rocky spurs. The flanking ridges confining the valleys are high and very steep, and there is no natural road down the length of the belt even along its coast. These features are most fully developed in Central Albania. Below the Voyutsa Valley, where anciently Epirus began, they are modified somewhat, but the orographic configuration which replaces them —short lateral ranges curving back from the main

* *The Geographical Journal*, April 1913, "The Balkan Peninsula," by D. G. Hogarth.

eastern spine and enclosing small plains—exerts much the same effect on society."

Here, indeed, as throughout the East, the ties of a common religion to a great extent replace those of nationality, and it is fortunate that, as a rule, the various religions inhabit distinct and well-marked regions of the country. It must not be forgotten, however, that although Turkish authority has only been really established in Albania since the fall of the famous Ali Pasha in 1822, the Albanians, until they were subjected to very galling insults by the Committee of Union and Progress, in its desire to effect the Unification of Turkey, have for three generations been attached to Turkey by ties of self-interest. The Albanian troops have been the most highly paid and trusted soldiers in the Turkish service. Albanians who have emigrated to earn their living by honest labour are to be found all over the Turkish Empire. Like the Swiss of the Grisons, and under the pressure of the same economical necessities, the Shkyipetars leave their mountains at the commencement of winter and go far away to practise their industry in the plain. Most of them return in the spring with a few savings, which the cultivation of their ungrateful rocks could not have procured to them; but there are those who emigrate without intending to return. A large number of Albanians who have become rich return to end their days in their native land, and build beautiful houses which surprise one in the midst of the rugged rocks of Epirus.

In short, it is not to be wondered at that many Albanians have voluntarily fought for the Sutan during the present war, or that they are disinclined to be absorbed into the various Slav nationalities.

But the fact that the Albanians are in so many ways like the Swiss of the Grisons has suggested to one of the most enlightened Albanian leaders a model for a reorganisation of Albania.

He would like to see Albania an Eastern Switzerland, with a cantonal system based upon the clans, but in which the cantons should be controlled by a central government, at the head of which he would place a Prince with hereditary rights.

It seems highly probable that the adoption of such a scheme would solve many difficulties connected with Northern and Central Albania, where the Moslem beys fill a position very similar to that occupied by great families like the Plantas and the de Salis in the nominally democratic League of the Grisons before 1797, and where religious differences are quite as acute as they were in Switzerland or in the Grisons in the seventeenth century.

Southern Albania, however, stands on a different footing. It has a Greek-speaking population, the great majority of which belongs to the Greek Church. Nowhere, indeed, is purer Greek spoken than at Yanina, its greatest centre. Albanians form a large proportion of the population of the Hellenic Kingdom, whose present population is indeed believed by a certain school of ethnologists, of whom the late Dr. Fallmayer was, perhaps, the chief, to be almost entirely of Albanian descent.

The natural destiny of Southern Albania, the ancient Epirus, would seem, indeed, to form part of Greece, on grounds which have been well stated by that eminent Greek historian, Professor S. Lampros, who has been twice Rector of the Athens University and is himself a native of Epirus.

"By leaving to Greece Santi Quaranta, with the coast-line south of the Bay of Khimara, the protection of Corfu is assured. This point of the coast is an inevitable outlet for the trade of both Joannina and Argyrokastro, and for the defence of the former. The master of Santi Quaranta ought to be master of Joannina

and Argyrokastro, and conversely. The line of the little River Kalamas (proposed in 1880) left too many Greek districts outside it, and had no strategic qualifications. For these reasons the above-suggested frontier is that which would secure peace between Greece and the new Albanian State." *

As Mr. D. G. Hogarth points out, " Though walled off from Epirus by the very steep range of Pindus, Greece has two easy ways of entry, one on the south by the Gulf of Arta, and one on the north by the pass of Metzovo."

But, as Mr. Hogarth adds, there is a large minority of Albanian Moslems even in this district, and " to detach this part from the Albanian belt is to rob the future autonomous province of its most open and fertile district, in which alone settled ways of life are at all well established."

The only real and permanent solution of these difficulties will be found in the formation of a Balkan Confederation, with Albania as one of its members, which would be too strong a Power for other nations to attack.

For the moment, however, the question of the delimitation of the southern frontier of Albania is greatly complicated by the differences between Italy and Greece. Italy, not unnaturally, is extremely jealous of the rise of a naval power in the Mediterranean in a geographical position which not only threatens the communications of the Italians with their African possessions, but which, if it held both sides of the Channel of Corfu, not to mention the harbours to the north of it, would threaten the whole eastern seaboard of Italy herself.

To the Italians and Austrians, the future Greek Navy, whether merely Greek or as the Navy of the Balkan League, is almost as direful a portent as the

* *Morning Post*, Wednesday, February 8, 1913.

German Navy is to ourselves. Greece holding the strategic points of the Channel of Corfu, of Rhodes, and of Astypalaea, not to mention Suda Bay, would entirely transform the existing balance of naval power in the Mediterranean. From a Greek point of view this is a valid reason for Greece using every effort to bring about the formation of an Eastern Empire; for if Greece remains an isolated kingdom, in possession of strategic points of such importance, but with a population of, at the most, nine million souls, she must either ruin herself in naval and military expenditure, or at any moment find herself the prey of any Power strong enough to carry out territorial schemes of aggrandisement.

If Servia has to gain by the establishment of an Eastern Empire an outlet to the sea, which will not have earned her the hatred of Italy, of Austria, of Bulgaria, possibly of Greece; if Montenegro has to gain from such an Empire a field for economic expansion which she can enjoy without disturbance from the Great Powers or her Albanian neighbours,—Greece has to gain from such an Empire security, whether for her territorial possessions or for her sea-borne trade. A weak Greece, in possession of strategic points of the utmost importance to the balance of power in the Mediterranean, would be a misery to herself and a standing danger to the world. A peaceful and prosperous Albania, likewise, can exist only as a member of an Eastern Empire.

It is, doubtless, from her fear of the future Greek Navy that Italy is showing herself so determined to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, which bind her to hand over to Turkey the islands she occupies in the Archipelago as soon as the Porte has withdrawn the regular Ottoman troops from Tripoli and the Cyrenaica. She also, on similar grounds, refuses to recognise Greece as possessor *de jure* of the islet of

Sasseno, lying off Cape Linguetta, at the entrance to Vallona harbour, which she occupied early in the war. Greece claims Sasseno as a dependency of Corfu, and as having been ceded to her with that island by Great Britain in 1864. It should be added that in the map of the Balkan Peninsula in *The Times* Atlas, Sasseno is coloured as Turkish territory.

For these reasons Italy, as an Adriatic power, claims an equal voice with Austria in the settlement of Albania, and a joint Austro-Italian plan for its organisation is said to have been already drawn up.

At the beginning of the war two Italian princes, the Count of Turin and the Duke of the Abruzzi, were named as possible candidates for the throne of Albania, but the scheme seems to have lapsed. Another candidate was the Duc de Montpensier, who is of French blood, being a descendant of Louis Philippe, but a Spanish prince. He is a near kinsman of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and belongs to a nation which forms part of neither of the great European groups. By religion he is a Roman Catholic. Since, however, the Albanians themselves are said to prefer a Protestant ruler, one may ask if such a man could not be found amongst the princes of that Royal House of Denmark from whom King Constantine of Greece descends. They are the near kinsmen of the sovereigns of Russia, of England, and of Germany. Could not such a man do for Albania what the late King George did for Greece?

CHAPTER XV

THE GREAT DIVAN

HE Peace Conference had assembled in due course at St. James's Palace on December 13. It consisted of delegates from the Allied States and Turkey; amongst whom the most prominent were Reshid Pasha, and Osman Nizami Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador at Berlin, the representatives of Turkey; M. Venezelos, the Prime Minister of Greece, and Dr. Daneff, the Bulgarian first delegate, who usually took the chair at the meetings. At the same time the Ambassadorial Conference, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Grey assembled at the Foreign Office. As we have already seen, the members of the Conference were received in London with the greatest hospitality. To some of them the life of a great city was a novelty, and even the dirt and noise of London, the "fumus strepitusque Romae," excited their admiration. But though the Conference dined, and, perhaps, danced, it did not march.

To the Ambassadors of the European Powers, perhaps even to the Allies, the Turks seemed but a victim crowned with garlands who had been led to the London altar to be offered up with due solemnity and state in sacrifice to the diplomatic gods. The Turkish statesmen who had to sign the compact knew that they themselves might be the victims in their own proper persons if they excited the wrath of their fellow-countrymen. They

deliberated under the shadow of the sword. They heard the revolution rumbling under the flower-strewn surface of the London banqueting halls, and they knew that a formidable party both at Constantinople and in the army was ready to rise in revolt on the day when Adrianople was finally given up. The question of Adrianople thus came, as we have seen, to be the main obstacle to peace, and a crisis, if not a revolution, had become inevitable at Constantinople from the day when the European Powers in their Collective Note of January 9 demanded that Turkey should surrender it to Bulgaria. In this note even Austria and Germany had acquiesced, the former willingly, the latter with reluctance. As the *North German Gazette* put it:*

"The Note to be handed to the Porte is not the outcome of partisan views, and cannot be regarded as an exercise of unjust compulsion. It signifies a friendly, if at the same time earnest, counsel, which contains nothing that, according to the mature consideration of the Cabinets, is derogatory to the well-considered interests of Turkey herself, who is counting on the friendly co-operation of the Great Powers for her future recuperation. Moreover, the fear that the work of European diplomacy might be partial is not well founded. For towards the Balkan States, too, an activity by the Powers in the direction of compromise and moderation has never ceased. At present it makes itself felt, *inter alia*, in the difficulties which have arisen between Rumania and Bulgaria, of which we hope that they will find a solution in the way of diplomatic negotiations."

Germany, indeed, was in a chastened mood. The Kaiser, meditating over the rise of the new Slav Powers and the failure of Marshal von der Goltz' work in Turkey, had become distrustful of the German Michael's strength, and, at the same time, was beginning to see that the

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, January 13, 1913.

interests of Germany lay in Asiatic and not in European Turkey. Moreover, the course of the diplomatic discussions during the war had revealed unexpected points of contact between English and German policy. It seemed possible that the friendship of England might be gained, and consequently an extreme pro-Turkish policy appeared inadvisable. The newly appointed German Ambassador to London emphasised Anglo-German kinship in his speeches.

In Austria, who was far more nearly interested in the Balkan question than was Germany, men were reluctant to drive the Turks to extremes. Statesmen in Vienna know what the East is.*

"In official circles the pessimism which appears predominant in London is not shared, although the gravity of the situation and the greatness of the difficulties to be overcome are not underestimated. Hope is not abandoned here that it will be possible to reconcile the divergences in London itself, and that, as a consequence, the projected step of the Powers in Constantinople need not be taken. The Turkish Government are aware of the possible consequences of further resistance, and especially the danger of a reopening of the Armenian and Lebanon questions.

"In a portion of the Vienna Press meanwhile the expectation of a favourable turn to the difficulties which is held in official circles is regarded with scepticism. Stress is laid on the want of unanimity among the Powers, which is shown in connection with the *démarche* in Constantinople, and their inactivity in not hindering a Rumano-Bulgarian conflict is blamed.

"Several journals say that King Charles of Rumania declared to the Russian as well as to the Austrian Ambassador, that 'I did everything to convince Bulgaria of the absolute necessity of coming to an arrangement

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, January 13, 1913.

with Rumania. Then I gave my word that I would wait three days longer. This promise I shall keep.' "

One more hope remained, however, to Turkey of once again saving Islam through the divisions of her Christian foes, and that hope, which subsequent events have more than justified, centred on the dispute between Bulgaria and Rumania; for, as we have seen, the latter State had demanded territorial compensations from Bulgaria, not only as a reward for having remained neutral, but to maintain the balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula, which had been disturbed by the unexpected successes of the Allies.

We must be fair to Rumania. Her attitude towards Balkan questions, selfish and indeed short-sighted as it may seem to outsiders, is not altogether an inexplicable one. Save for their religion the Rumanians have very little in common with any of the ruling races in the Balkans, whether by blood, by language, or by history, and even, as regards religion, the national Rumanian Church is very far from being the humble slave of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. During the Roman occupation their remote ancestors the Getae or the Daci, whoever they may have been, became thoroughly mingled with the Roman colonists sent to Dacia by Trajan, and to this day the Rumanians speak a dialect which, though greatly influenced by the Slavonic tongues, is a Romance tongue, and in many respects is nearer akin to primitive Latin than is any other member of that linguistic family. The Rumanians of to-day look upon themselves as the Romans of the East. The Greek is to them an object of hatred. They cannot forget that during long centuries of Turkish rule their provinces were the spoil of the Greek ecclesiastics of Constantinople, and of the Greek adventurers from the Fanar who wrung from Moldavia and Wallachia vast sums to repay themselves those bribes to the Sultan which

had procured them their hospodarships. Nor do they forget how the Greeks have sought to hellenise their Kutso-Vlach brethren in Macedonia and in Thessaly. The Bulgarian peasants are to the Rumanian but the hewers of wood and drawers of water, who, wrapped in filthy sheepskins, yearly cross the Danube to till his fields and reap his harvests. He cannot yet reconcile himself to the thought that it was through the blood of his soldiers that Bulgaria was called back to life, and that a great power has risen up at Sofia. Can we imagine King Solomon receiving in state an embassy from Gibeon? Finally, though hitherto Rumanian expansion has mostly taken place north of the Danube, yet King Charles, by birth a Hohenzollern, and in appearance, if not in reality, a devoted servant of the Triple Alliance, has long cherished dreams of one day being himself crowned at Constantinople as Emperor of the East. He had himself, after the fall of Prince Alexander, refused the crown of Bulgaria, and to him it was no welcome sight to see Tsar Ferdinand, of the rival house of Coburg, thundering at the lines of Tchataldja with a victorious Bulgarian army. The Rumanian soldiers firmly believe that it was they who saved the Russian hosts from ruin in the Turkish War of 1877, and since that time their army has become even more perfect.

By sending a division or two across the Danube King Charles could have at any time checked his Bulgarian rivals in their onward march. What wonder, then, that he should expect from them some recompense for his neutrality? That recompense, as we shall see, he determined should be Silistria, the possession of which would give him the means of linking up Bukarest by a direct route across the Danube with his seaboard in the Dobruja, and also a sufficient extent of coast-line on the Black Sea to enable him to convert his port of Mangalia into a naval basis.

Dr. Daneff, ere the meeting of the Conference in London, had been to Bukarest to discuss these subjects, and in January he was followed to London by M. Take Jonescu, as the representative of Rumania, to come to a settlement under the auspices of the Powers. Germany was, indeed, doing all she could to favour the claims of the Rumanians, who, alone of the Balkan States, had assented to the request of the Powers and had taken no part in the struggle against Turkey.

The discussion reached the most critical stage just at the moment when the Conference had come to a deadlock on the Adrianople question.

As the *Mir*, the leading Sofia journal, pointed out, Rumania was on very dangerous ground when she put forward the principle that claims for territorial compensation between States should be given effect to on the basis of the number of co-nationals of one State left under the domination of another. In that case Rumania would have to apply to Austria-Hungary for compensation for the two and three-quarter million Rumanians massed in the Banat, in Transylvania, and in Bukowina, as against a mere handful in Bulgaria. Bulgaria would require compensation for the Bulgarians in the Dobruja; Albania, which Austria-Hungary wished to constitute an autonomous principality, would include a large population of Kutso-Vlachs, who would also come in great numbers under the Greek and Servian flags in the new rearrangement of the Balkans. In a word, Rumania should, in logic, address her demands to both Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Allies, as well as to Bulgaria. She might thus find herself involved in a very serious dispute with her present supporter, Austria. Rumania might, however, be asked to organise the Albanian State, which would contain a large number of Kutso-Vlachs, and thus, at the same time, prevent dangerous friction between Austria and Italy.

M. Take Jonescu, on the other hand, whilst denying that Rumania had ever threatened to use military force against Bulgaria, pointed out that in March 1903 M. Bratiano,* as Foreign Minister of Rumania, had plainly stated that Rumania could not remain indifferent to future changes in the balance of power in the Balkans. This circular was well known to the Allies before they began the war.

The rise of a great Bulgaria, in whose *Military Manual for Recruits of all Arms* it was distinctly laid down that the Dobruja, through which province Rumania, with her foreign trade of £40,000,000 a year, could alone gain access to the sea, and two Servian provinces, were "unredeemed Bulgaria," was to the Rumanians a national danger. The last Christian ruler of the Dobruja, prior to 1878, when Rumania received the province from Turkey as compensation for the cession of Bessarabia, with its million Rumanian inhabitants, to Russia, had been Mircea the Great (1386–1418), who was Prince of Rumania, Silistria, and the Dobruja, and became tributary to the Turks in 1391.

From the Dobruja Rumania is cut off by the Danube, and just below Silistria the river divides into two branches, flowing northwards. The frontier between Bulgaria and the Dobruja meets the river just at the point of this delta, which is formed throughout its length by a belt of marshes. Consequently the only railway communication between Bukarest and its port of Constanza has to pass through this marshy belt by a bridge over nine miles long, whereas if Rumania held Silistria, or even the territory coming down to the belt of gardens round that town which was originally ceded to her by the Treaty of Berlin, together with a small island in the Danube opposite the place, she would be able to reach the seaboard by a railway bridge only one and a quarter

* *Daily Telegraph*, Monday, January 13, 1913.

miles long and easily defensible. Bulgaria might complain at having to give up some Bulgarian citizens to Rumania, but, after all, there were 200,000 Rumanians in Servia and 40,000 in Bulgaria itself in the district round Widdin.

The Bulgarians, however, pointed out that if Rumania had joined the Balkan League, Turkey would have given way and her Christian populations might probably have been liberated without a war. Rumania had not mobilised because she, like the Great Powers, expected that the Allies would be defeated, and if she was entitled to be compensated for her neutrality, the Great Powers had a similar claim. As it was, Bulgaria was offering through Russia to grant Rumania a slight modification of the Dobruja frontier, comprising twenty rural communes, including Medjidi Tabia, religious autonomy for the Rumanians in Macedonia, and an engagement to renounce her aspirations as regards the Dobruja, and this offer formed the basis of the negotiations in London. M. Take Jonescu went back to Bukarest on January 16, to report progress, but refused an invitation from Count Berchtold to meet him on his way through Vienna, and it was announced that the negotiations, in regard to which neither success nor failure could be asserted, would be carried on between M. Mishu, the Rumanian Minister in London, and Dr. Daneff. As the *Kölnische Zeitung* said, "Decisive progress depends on Bulgaria seeing whether Turkey is at last ready to conclude peace." However, a pleasure trip which M. Filipescu, the Rumanian Minister of Domains, undertook about the same time to Constantinople, cannot be regarded as having been singularly well timed, if an understanding with Bulgaria was desired.

Austro-Servian relations were also in a somewhat critical stage. Austria and Italy were willing to leave

Servia in possession of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, Uskub, Kumanovo, Prilep, Pristina, and the district of Kossovo, but, in the interests of Albania, they were determined that Prizrend, Ipek, the Servian Holy of Holies, Djakova, and Ochrida should remain Albanian. Nor would Austria disband a single man until Servia had withdrawn her troops from Albania.

These circumstances were well calculated to induce the Turks to persist in their refusal to hand over Adrianople, which was still holding out so gallantly, to the Bulgarians.

But false prophets are rarely wanting when a nation is being led to its doom, and these false prophets were in January 1913 to be found at Berlin. Such prophets were the instruments of the Divine Judgment against Turkey, as they had been its instruments against Ahab. "Dominus locutus est contra vos malum," "The Lord hath spoken evil concerning you," might well have been spoken to the statesmen at the Porte, even though their hands were to a certain extent clean of the blood shed by Abdul Hamid and by the Young Turks.

The language held by certain Berlin newspapers, although not by the recognised organs of the Foreign Office, constituted a direct incitement to Turkey to continue the war, and to disregard such signs as the pledge given by Servia on January 10 that she would withdraw her troops from the Adriatic coast directly after the conclusion of peace.

Public opinion in Germany held that their Government had displayed an improper partiality in joining in the representations to the Ottoman Government alone, whilst the Constantinople correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* wrote* "that official circles there 'recognise the quiet, but effective, work of German diplomacy in favour of Turkey.' He adds: 'It has here once more

* *Daily Telegraph*, Saturday, January 18, 1913.

been shown that, as in all serious epochs, Turkey possesses only one absolutely disinterested friend, namely, Germany, and those who stand closest to affairs know that it is only through Germany, which in this case has decisively influenced the policy of the Triple Alliance, that Turkey has been saved from the shameful and injurious intervention of the Powers, and that Germany has been prevented from rendering more far-reaching services only by unavoidable consideration for the other group of Powers or by the interests of her own allies.'

"This correspondent is assured 'that the last visits of the former War Minister, Mahmud Shevket, to the German Ambassador, Baron Wangenheim, and the Austrian Ambassador, Margrave Pallavicini, had a high political character, and must be considered in connection with Mahmud Shevket's growing chances of regaining great influence.' He also states that authoritative circles in Turkey 'are firmly resolved to disregard the advice of the Ambassadors, even if it should be tendered in the most friendly of forms.'"

Under these circumstances it was not to be wondered at that Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet at first showed no inclination to accede to the demands made by the Powers in their Note of January 9, which was handed to them on January 17. However, they decided to convene the Grand Council on January 22, and to await its decision before sending their reply.

The proposals of the Powers, as we have seen, were not unfair ones. Turkey was, it is true, plainly counselled to yield Adrianople to the Allies, and to surrender the Ægean Islands to the Great Powers, who would decide as to their fate. But, at the same time, the Powers pledged themselves, after the conclusion of peace, to give the Sultan their material and moral support in repairing the evils of war, in consolidating his position at Constantinople, and in developing his vast Asiatic territories, pointing

out that the prolongation of the war might endanger both. They agreed to protect all Mussulman interests in Adrianople, and so to regulate the Ægean Islands question as not to menace the security of Turkey. The Note contained no threat of coercion whether by a naval demonstration or by other means.

The terms proposed bore witness to the fact that a better relation was beginning to prevail between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, thanks, possibly, to the growing friendship between England and Germany.

The Balkan delegates in London were not very sanguine that Turkey would give an affirmative answer to these requests. If they were refused Sir Edward Grey would be asked to assemble another meeting of the Conference. When the delegates had met, the Allies would put a definite question to the Ottoman Mission. To this they would expect a definite answer within a prescribed period and would act accordingly. As Dr. Daneff pointed out, the Balkan Allies had commenced the war together, and would either sign peace or recommence hostilities in complete accord. He had full powers to instruct the Bulgarian delegate General Savoff without reference to Sofia, but, of course, would not use them without having consulted his colleagues of the other Balkan Missions.

The Bourses at Vienna and at Berlin were buoyant at the prospect of the conclusion of peace, and satisfaction was everywhere felt "except among those strange friends of Turkey who have been trying to undermine the action of the Powers." In these quarters*—that is, in the Jewish financial Press—the joint policy of Europe was still described as a policy of blackmail. The *Kreuz Zeitung*, the Conservative and military organ, sharply criticised this "extraordinary campaign and the monstrous

* *The Times*, Thursday, January 23, 1913.

demand that Austria and Germany shall plunge into a general war in order to preserve Adrianople for Turkey." The most critical phase of the Balkan question was thought to be over, although several features of the international situation still checked the growth of optimism.

Opinion in Russia was equally sanguine. *The Times* correspondent at St. Petersburg wrote: *

"There appears to be reason for hoping that the Turkish reply to the representations of the Powers will not be of such a character as to render inevitable the resumption of hostilities by the Allies. At sea the Turks have played what is practically their last card and have lost. At Tchataldja the Turkish lines are now confronted by equally strong Bulgarian entrenchments. If hostilities are resumed the issue for the Turks can at best result only in a stalemate. At the same time, circumstances are conceivable in which the chances of war might favour Turkish arms to such an extent as to compel Russia to intervene. If Bulgaria were in any danger, Russian public opinion would insistently demand this intervention. Possibilities of this kind, to which the attention of the Porte has been drawn, cannot but have weighed very considerably with Turkish statesmen in their deliberations during the last few days.

"The general outlook is more hopeful, especially in view of the better prospect of an equitable settlement as to the Rumanian compensation claims by means of direct negotiations between Bukarest and Sofia. Russia, whose mediation was invoked at a very early stage, has done her best to promote an agreement. Russian policy continues to be directed to the expansion of Bulgaria to the Ægean, to the creation of a self-contained Servia with the usufruct of a port on the

* *The Times*, Thursday, January 23, 1913.

Adriatic, and to the ultimate transfer of the Ægean Islands to Greece."

Moslem opinion in India was much agitated, and the Council of the Moslem League adopted a resolution expressing horror at the terms of the Note, and regret that it had been signed by England. They implored the King-Emperor's Government not to disregard the feelings of millions of loyal Moslems by attempting to coerce Turkey to submit to an ignominious peace.

Such were the circumstances under which the Grand Council met on January 22. I will not attempt to add anything to the report of its proceedings which was published officially by the Turkish Government, or to the introductory comment on them which appeared in *The Times* of Thursday, January 23:

"The Grand Council met in Constantinople yesterday and accepted the view of the Government that peace was necessary. From the account of the proceedings telegraphed by our Constantinople correspondent and the wording of the statement issued by the Porte, it is clear that Turkey has decided to follow the advice of the Powers as regards Adrianople and the Aegean Islands.

"As was pointed out in *The Times* yesterday, although Turkey has obviously decided to yield, it would be rash to expect her to yield all at once or without making reservations and conditions. Our Constantinople correspondent believes that the Porte in its reply to the Collective Note will offer to yield with regard to Adrianople and the Aegean Islands if no further demands are made by the Allies. The Porte at the same time is almost certain to ask the Powers what form the support promised by them is to take.

"Whether the reply will lead to a speedy conclusion of peace will largely depend upon what further demands, if any, the Balkan States intend to bring, and particularly

upon their attitude with regard to the exaction of a war indemnity. In this latter question the Powers take a great interest. They are all anxious that the new, reduced Turkish Empire should be able to consolidate itself, which would scarcely be possible if it were burdened with charges so heavy as to leave too little revenue over to support a tolerably efficient Administration. Some of the Powers, especially France, are likely to make their influence felt in support of the interests of the holders of existing Turkish bonds."

"The Government has issued the following statement:

"'To-day the Grand Council, composed of Senators, the leading Ulema, and other military and civil dignitaries, met in the Imperial Palace. The Grand Vizier and the Ministers for War, Foreign Affairs, and Finance having given certain explanations in the name of the entire Cabinet, a frank and sincere exchange of views followed with regard to the situation of the Government. The Council finally accepted the point of view of the Government, and, trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Great Powers, left to the patriotic hands of a loyal Cabinet the task of working, with the effective support which has been promised by the Great Powers, for the future prosperity of the country and for the assurance of its vital financial interests.'

"The Grand Council assembled at the Palace of Dolma Baghtche at noon. There were present some forty-five Senators, including Prince Said Halim, Chief of the Committee of Union and Progress, and about forty other civil and military dignitaries. Prince Yusuf Izz-ed-Din, the Heir-Apparent, and several of the senior members of the Imperial Family were present at the meeting, but did not take part in the debate.

"After the Sultan had given audience to the Heir-Apparent and to two other Princes, he summoned the Grand Vizier, who was ordered to open the deliberations

of the Council in the name of the Sultan. Kiamil Pasha accordingly entered the great reception hall of the Palace, where the members of the Grand Council were assembled, and, after saluting the Council in the name of the Sultan, opened the proceedings by explaining the functions of the ' Grand Divan.' This assembly, he said, was purely consultative. No vote would be taken. The Cabinet simply proposed to give an *exposé* of the situation and to explain its policy to the principal dignitaries of the Empire, who represented the Ottoman people. After the Grand Vizier had ceased, his secretary, Said Bey, read a translation of the Collective Note of the Powers. The Ministers of War, Finance, and of Foreign Affairs then made their statements concerning the situation of the Empire as viewed from the standpoint of their respective Ministries. The meeting was held within closed doors, and therefore it is impossible to give more than the merest sketch of their speeches.

" Nazim Pasha is believed to have informed the Council that while the Army was now in excellent condition it was not powerful enough to undertake a war of conquest. The Navy had done its best, but nothing more could be hoped from that quarter. Abd-er-Rahman Bey described the financial situation in gloomy colours. Nuradunghian Effendi's speech was read for him by Said Bey. In it the Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that in the present circumstances the Government would be compelled to follow the advice of the Powers. He appears to have laid stress upon the menacing attitude of Russia, and upon the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire would be exposed in the event of a renewal of the war. He concluded by requesting the Council to give its opinion in clear and decisive terms.

" It soon became evident that the majority of the Council supported the Government. Speeches in this sense were delivered by the Hodja Assim Effendi, Damad

Ferid Pasha, Marshal Fuad Pasha, Aristidi Pasha, Logotheti Bey, the Ex-Grand Viziers, their Highnesses Said Pasha and Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha, and by Reshid Akif Pasha, whose speech made a profound impression. The Procureur-Général, Ismail Hakki Bey, alone spoke in favour of war. Neither Prince Said Halim nor any other of the members of the Committee present opposed the Government.

"At 4.10 Kiamil Pasha declared the meeting over. He had sat during the meeting between the Sheikh-ul-Islam and his old opponent 'Kutchuk' Said Pasha. At the close of the meeting the Grand Vizier gave his hand to Said Pasha and asked him to forget past quarrels in this hour of national tribulation. Said Pasha answered him cordially, and the two aged statesmen walked out of the Council room hand in hand—a symbol, this, of the general reconciliation that is necessary if the Ottoman Empire is to profit by the lessons of the last three years.

"The Council of Ministers will meet to-morrow to discuss the Turkish answer to the Collective Note. It is believed that the Porte will request the Powers, as reported yesterday, to guarantee that no further demands will be made on the part of the Balkan League, and on the receipt of such a guarantee will be ready to comply with their wishes and make peace.

"The town is quiet to-night, and it is believed that the public has resigned itself to the inevitable and will accept peace without demur."

But for the selfish greed of the Young Turks the decision of the Grand Council would, indeed, have been accepted without demur. The intrigues of Nuradunghian Effendi, the ambitions of Shevket Pasha and of Enver Bey, have dyed the world incarnadine. But such deeds have, sooner or later, to be atoned for by the perpetrators.

As the event proved, that vengeance was not long

delayed. On June 11 the Grand Vizier, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, to whom the January revolution was in great part due, was murdered by some civilians whilst on his way to the Ministry of War. The assassins escaped in a motor-car, but were suspected to be the agents of the Turkish Opposition. He was buried in great state on the Hill of Liberty, near the monument of the Revolution of 1908. The blood so uselessly shed like water at Adrianople, at Yanina, at Skutari, and at Tchataldja has indeed pursued those through whose greed and rashness it was shed.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TURKISH REVOLUTION

January 23–February 3, 1913

E have seen that the Great Divan, which had been assembled on January 22 by Kiamil Pasha, had recommended the Porte to accept the Terms of Peace proposed by the Ambassadorial Conference in London, even though these terms included the renunciation of Adrianople and of most of the Ægean Islands.

But the Powers had reckoned without the Young Turk party, although their attitude had excited the anxiety of the Turkish Cabinet ever since the discovery of the abortive Republican conspiracy in November 1912.

The leader of the new conspiracy was Enver Bey, who had been Turkish Military Attaché in Berlin, and had afterwards played a leading part in organising the resistance of Tripoli against the Italians. After the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne he had returned to Europe, and had been in active communication with the war party in the army, who, doubtless, were led by him to imagine that they could count upon the moral, if not upon the active, support of Germany. By his admirers Enver Bey is styled the "Turkish Bonaparte," and his conduct, indeed, was not wholly unlike that of Bonaparte on the 18 Brumaire.

The conspirators, who included most of those leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress who had taken

part in the November Conspiracy, and who were in touch not only with the garrison of Adrianople but with many subaltern employés in the Ministries at Constantinople, had planned to strike with dramatic suddenness. It was their intention to seize power at the moment when the Ambassadors of the Great Powers had just received the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepting their proposals; unfortunately, however, their information proved to be erroneous, for the conspirators reached the Porte before the Note had been sent off.

A proclamation issued by the Committee of Union and Progress clearly stated the objects which the conspirators had in view.

After attacking the Cabinets of Mukhtar and Kiamil Pashas for pusillanimity and incompetence, it proceeds substantially as follows:

"Seeing this weakness of the Government, the Allies have demanded Adrianople and the Archipelago. The representatives of the Allies have won over the Powers to their side, and the Kiamil Cabinet has given its assent to these sacrifices. In a consultative Council yesterday the Cabinet destroyed and betrayed the country and the Ottoman spirit. Kiamil handed over Adrianople to the Bulgarians and the Archipelago to the European Powers, and, to conceal his treason, he summoned this consultative Assembly. The Ottoman nation could not endure such a Government of traitors. When the existence of the country is in danger the nation thinks of exercising its right of revolution. That right it exercised to-day, and the Kiamil Cabinet accordingly resigned.

"In an interview Talaat Bey said: 'This movement means that we are going to save the national honour or perish in the attempt. We do not want a continuation of the war, but we are determined to keep Adrianople. That is a *sine qua non*.'" *

The outbreak was carefully timed so as to prevent the

* *The Times*, Friday, January 24, 1913.

details reaching Europe too soon. The boat for Constanza, through which port the mails from Constantinople were despatched during the war, left at half-past ten on the morning of January 23. At eleven o'clock Talaat Bey called upon the Grand Vizier and urged him to resign. He refused, and the Council of Ministers continued to deliberate on the Collective Note of the Powers, until two o'clock, when they went to luncheon.

During the morning the usual guard at the Porte had been sent to do its musketry exercise, and had been replaced by the Uchak battalion, which was devoted to the Committee.

About 3.15 P.M. Enver Bey arrived at the Porte, preceded by a small party of fifteen or sixteen persons, carrying banners, some of which bore cartoons of him as the saviour of Turkey in 1908 and 1909. He was attended by a couple of hundred ignorant Arabs on foot, who were yelling, "Overthrow the Government!" "Long live the Empire!" The guard at the Porte offered no resistance, and Nadji Bey, who well knew that they would not do so, bared his breast and shouted dramatically: "I have come to save the honour of the Fatherland, which has been trodden under foot by a traitorous Government. Shoot me if you will, so that I may carry to the grave the knowledge that no honour has been left to Turkey."

The mob fired upon the officers on guard, but their fire was not returned.

Enver Bey, Nadji Bey, and Talaat Bey, with several officers in mufti, entered the Grand Vizierate. The Minister attempted to call up troops and police by telephone, but no one came to his aid. The demonstrators attempted to force their way into the Council Chamber where the Council of Ministers was sitting. Kiamil Pasha's aide-de-camp, Nafiz Bey, attempted to stop them in the anteroom, and drew a revolver, with which he fired a shot at the intruders, killing Mehmed, one of their number, and they at once shot him. The doors of the

hall were at once shut, and Memdukh Pasha, Commandant of Constantinople, stood at the door, and would let nobody come in. Nazim Pasha, hearing the disturbance and the shots, rushed from the Council Chamber and began to reproach Enver Bey and his comrades, calling them ill-mannered curs, but was almost immediately struck by a bullet, and fell dead at the feet of M. Hugonin, a director of the Anatolian Railway. The assassin was rumoured to be Mumtez Bey, an agent of the Committee, whose name is known in connection with the murders of Zekki Pasha and Ahmed Sammin. A secret police agent and an attendant on the Sheikh-ul-Islam were also killed. One man fell on the side of the demonstrators.

Enver Bey made his way inside the Council Chamber and told Kiamil Pasha that the nation would not endure the loss of Adrianople, and that the Cabinet must resign at once. Kiamil Pasha, who had been conferring with M. Hugonin, Mr. Kingham of the National Bank, and the Minister of Finance on the subject of a loan, was perfectly cool and collected. He said he would resign rather than continue the war, and forthwith wrote out and signed his resignation, which Enver Bey pocketed and left the Porte. From the steps of the building he addressed the mob, and then motored straight to the Palace, where he asked to see the Sultan. The whole scene at the Porte had lasted only twenty minutes.

"The new Cabinet was formed as follows:*

Marshal Mahmud Shevket Pasha	Grand Vizier and Minister of War.
Prince Said Halim .	President of the Council of State.
Hadji Adil Bey . .	Minister of the Interior.
Mukhtar Bey . .	Temporary Minister of Foreign Affairs.

* *The Times*, Saturday, January 25, 1913.

General Tschuruk Sula Mahmud	Minister of Marine.
Ibrahim Pasha . .	Minister of Justice.
Rifaat Bey. . .	Minister of Finance.
Batzaria Effendi . .	Minister of Public Works.
Hairi Bey . . .	Minister of Evkef.
Djelal Bey . . .	Minister of Agriculture.
Oskian . . .	Minister of Posts.
Shukri Bey . .	Minister of Public Instruction.

"After taking the oath of office at the Palace, the new Ministers proceeded to the Porte, where they held their first Council, in order to consider the draft of the reply to be given to the Note of the Powers. According to official circles, the Turkish Note will insist on the retention of Adrianople by Turkey, and will point to yesterday's demonstration as the real manifestation of the national will. Nuradunghian Effendi, the outgoing Minister for Foreign Affairs, was summoned to report to them upon the foreign situation."

"In the opinion of competent European observers, the Cabinet was the weakest since the Constitution was proclaimed, with the exception of the interregnum Cabinet under Tewfik Pasha formed after the mutiny of April 13, 1909.

"Halil Bey, uncle of Enver Bey, was appointed Commandant of Constantinople, and Essad, the Fetva Emini, was made Sheikh-ul-Islam.

"Many arrests were made. That of Ismail Hakki of Gumuldjina, a strong opponent of the Committee who was to have taken part in the revision of the trial of the murderers of Zekki Bey which had just begun, and which would have recalled the attention of the public to that crime, was especially noteworthy." *

The new Prime Minister, Shevket Pasha, had been,

* *The Times*, Saturday, January 25, 1913.

with his henchmen, Enver Bey and Talaat Bey, one of the chief leaders in the Revolution which drove Abdul Hamid into prison in 1909. For three years nominally as Minister of War, in reality as dictator, he kept together a semblance of government in Turkey. In July 1912 he had been removed from office at the behest of the Military League and of the mutinous garrison of Monastir. His stern unbending character had made him a multitude of enemies amongst his former political associates. Some accused him of leaving Tripoli defenceless by withdrawing troops, others of too great leniency to the rebels, but he reaped the most hatred from his decree forbidding military officers to take part in politics. This led the Committee of Union and Progress to declare war on him. A pretext for his removal was, as I have said, found in the revolt of the garrison of Monastir. The mutineers would have surrendered upon terms, but the stern disciplinarian, who was struck to the core by this proof of his failure to keep the army efficient, refused to treat with them. The revolt threatened to spread to other divisions, and to save themselves the Government deprived Shevket Pasha of office.

Within six months Shevket Pasha was Grand Vizier, and once more the dictator of Turkey.

Shevket Pasha was a native of Bagdad, and a plain, blunt, somewhat Puritanical soldier rather than a diplomat. During the Italian War he toiled hard to organise the army, and used to sleep in his uniform in his room at the War Office. Had he had his way he would have wished to meet the Italian army on Turkish soil, since he believed that the Turk is invincible when well led. "Let our chance come," he said, "and we will show what we can do." Unfortunately, when the Balkan War broke out, he was still in high dudgeon at his removal from office and refused the command offered him by his successor. His friends believed that Turkey could only be saved by a dictator, and pointed to Shevket Pasha as the man for

the task. By their wish he headed the revolution which made him the master of the State.

Talaat Bey was formerly Minister of the Interior, but afterwards a zealous opponent of Kiamil's Government. At the outbreak of the war he joined his regiment at Adrianople, but was dismissed and sent to Constantinople on a charge of attempting to undermine the loyalty of the garrison, which he succeeded, however, in refuting. He was implicated in the plot for establishing a republic which was discovered in November.

Strenuous efforts were made to prove to the world that Nazim Pasha's murder was an unpremeditated act, and Unionists quoted as a confirmation of this assertion the fact that Reshid Pasha, the late Minister of the Interior and a great enemy of the Committee, had been allowed to go unscathed.

Nazim Pasha was given a stately funeral, which took place at the Sulimanieh Mosque. The procession started from the Gulane Hospital at Seraglio Point, and although Shevket Pasha and the Ministers were unable to be present, the Sheik-ul-Islam and two Turkish princes followed the coffin, which was covered with a richly embroidered Arabic pall, and was borne on the shoulders of soldiers. To prove that the death was an accidental one Enver Bey and all the Military Attachés attended in full uniform. The city was quite quiet, nor was there any demonstration when Shevket Pasha and Enver Bey attended the Selamlik. Enver Bey declared to correspondents that England's friendship is always precious for the regeneration of Turkey, and Turkey will be grateful for the continuance of her aid.

The resignation of the Kiamil Cabinet was announced in the following official statement, which serves to show the grounds on which the Revolution was brought about:

"The decision of the Kiamil Cabinet, taken in response to the Note of the Powers, to abandon Adrianople and

part of the islands, and the convocation of an extraordinary assembly, to which that decision was submitted, a course contrary to the prescriptions of the constitutional charter and violating the sacred rights of the people, roused the indignation of the nation, with the result that the people made a demonstration before the Sublime Porte, and brought about the resignation of the Government."

If the Revolution came as a surprise to the European Powers and to the Allies, it was not for want of warning, for both the Turkish Delegates in London and Kiamil Pasha himself had repeatedly told them that any giving way on the subject of Adrianople would cause the fall of the Government.

It was quickly seen that the advent of the new Cabinet to power was fatal to all hopes of peace. Kiamil Pasha was the sole hope of Turkey. He would have built up a strong, prosperous, and compact empire out of the fragments which remained to Turkey, and it was to the interests of all Europe that he should be allowed to do so. The Turk is at home in Asia Minor, and Kiamil Pasha saw clearly that in Asia Minor the future for the Ottoman must henceforth lie. But he was surrounded by enemies whose cry was " War to the knife," and the cession of Adrianople was, as he had foreseen it would prove, the signal for his fall.

The new Cabinet were, it is true, patriotic men, but like the French Defence Government in 1870 they identified their country with the triumph of their party. Mahmud Shevket Pasha was a soldier not a statesmen, and had not the breadth of view to enable him to see that Turkey would be all the stronger for giving up provinces in Europe such as Macedonia and Albania, which she had only occupied effectively during the last ninety years, and which have exhausted the strength and resources of those Osmanli lands in which the Turk, who is the real motive power of the Empire, forms the majority of the

population. "Talaat Bey is the Jacobin of the Cabinet, a man who sees his goal and makes for it regardless of whom he tramples down in his course. Another inflexible doctrinaire, the St. Just of the Turkish Revolution, is Hadji Adil Bey, the Minister of the Interior. Prince Said Halim, a man of the keenest intelligence, is also of the 'No Surrender' party."*

Europe saw the Revolution with amazement and annoyance. The "Peace of London," that fairy fabric conjured up by Mr. Asquith in such burning eloquence, had melted into thin air; the delicacies of the Guildhall had proved to be but a funeral feast. Peace fled back to her native heaven. Once more grim-eyed war sat gibbering at the doors. The Turkish Revolution might well have given the signal for a European Armageddon. That this disaster was averted is in great part owing to the cool-headedness and wisdom of the Tsar of Russia and of Sir Edward Grey.

In Germany the more bellicose elements hailed the advent of Shevket Pasha to power with delight, as he was supposed to be a keen supporter of the Turco-German Alliance. Within a few days it was announced that the Deutsche Bank was about to receive the concession for the Metropolitan Railway of Constantinople, which was to unite Stambul with Galata and Pera by a tunnel under the Golden Horn. In Austria, which was feeling the economic strain caused by the prolonged mobilisation upon her Galician and her Servian frontiers most severely, it was clearly seen that everything depended upon the answer which the new Government might return to the Collective Note of the Powers. The first impression was that hostilities would be resumed and that Russia would try to intervene single-handed. This the Powers would refuse to permit, but rather than allow a European war to break out through dissensions between them, it was

* *Daily Chronicle.*

supposed they would break their neutrality and undertake a naval demonstration. This step was indeed wholly contrary to the views of the Triple Alliance, which dreaded doing anything which might lead to the destruction of Turkey as a State, and was well aware that M. Giers, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, when he handed the Joint Note to the Porte, had used very serious language to Kiamil Pasha, and had even threatened that Russia would send an army to Armenia and reopen the Armenian Question if the demands contained in that Note were not complied with. Rumours were, moreover, in circulation that the Powers of the Triple Entente had already arrived at an understanding as to the partition between them of Asiatic Turkey into spheres of influence which would be put in force if hostilities were resumed before Tchataldja. In short, a rupture between the Powers was considered as highly probable, and the Viennese Bourse had a bad attack of nerves. French feeling was more calm. The Entente between the six Powers was thought to remain entire; that between England, France, and Russia was known to be as strong as ever, for though M. Poincaré had resigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on his election as President of the Republic, his successor, M. Jonnart, was an equally firm supporter of it; for the moment the party represented by the *Temps*, and, possibly, to a certain extent by M. Clemenceau and M. Caillaux, which cannot be said to be wholly in favour of the understanding with England, remained marking time.

One of the greatest difficulties which the new Government in Turkey had to face arose from the murder of Nazim Pasha. As a Circassian he was popular amongst the officers of the army, who knew him not only as the courageous champion of freedom in the days of Abdul Hamid but as a commander who, even after the disastrous defeat of Lule Burgas, could still look forward to ultimate

victory.* In 1904 Abdul Hamid had thrown him into a cell in an Asiatic fortress where he underwent a long and dreary imprisonment, counting himself fortunate that he had not been put in a sack with a few pounds of ballast at his feet and thrown into the Bosphorus. But a fortnight before the proclamation of the Constitution he escaped to Russia, whence he returned to Constantinople so poor that he had not even money to buy a military uniform, and never forgot the kindness of an Englishman who lent him £7 for that purpose. After the proclamation of the Constitution he commanded the Second Army Corps at Constantinople and greatly improved its efficiency. When the Revolution of April 1909 broke out he commanded the garrison of Constantinople, whilst Shevket Pasha and the Third Army Corps from Adrianople were without the walls, determined to overthrow Abdul Hamid. It will probably never be known if on this occasion Nazim Pásha betrayed his trust. At the outbreak of the war he declared that he would either lead the Ottoman Army victoriously to Sofia, or leave his body on the field; he did neither. What earned him the antipathy of the Young Turks it is difficult to say; only two months before he fell under their daggers he had threatened to resign the commandership-in-chief unless those of them who had been arrested on the suspicion of being concerned in the plot against Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet were released.

"It is pleasant to recall, now that Nazim is dead, the cordial meeting between himself and General Savoff, the chief of the Bulgarian Staff, when they met to arrange peace preliminaries in a village near Tchataldja. Savoff, with a display of more emotion than might have been expected from him, shook his adversary warmly by the hand and said: 'I am glad to meet so brave a soldier.'

"The deceased War Minister was educated at St. Cyr,

* *Daily Chronicle*, Saturday, January 25, 1913.

and his sympathies remained pronouncedly French to the last. In private life Nazim was a strict Mohammedan, but during his residence in France he became imbued with Western ideas, which went to the extent of bringing his wife and daughters out of the prison-like seclusion which convention imposes on Turkish women. He was a man of warm domestic affection, and those Europeans who have been privileged to visit his house in Constantinople carried away with them the happiest memories of a genial host and a delightful social atmosphere, with the accompaniment so unusual for Turkey of the voices of the women of the family circle mingling in the evening's music and laughter." *

The first business which lay before the new Government was to draw up a reply to the Joint Note, and although no Minister could be found to take the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs until it was accepted by Prince Said Halim Pasha, a cousin of the Khedive and General Secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, on January 26, we have seen that as early as the evening of January 23 Mahmud Shevket Pasha summoned the former Foreign Minister, Nuradunghian Effendi, to his assistance.

Next day the attitude of the Delegates had become somewhat more favourable to peace. *The Times*, writing on January 25, said:

" Both the Turkish Delegates in London and Kiamil Pasha himself had repeatedly warned the Powers and the Allies that any yielding on the question of Adrianople would cause the fall of the Government. The news of the *coup*, however, came like a bombshell, and neither the Allies nor the Powers have yet made up their minds how to treat the new situation. As was stated in *The Times* of yesterday, the first impulse of the Allies was to break off negotiations and denounce the armistice at once. Yester-

* *Daily Chronicle*, Saturday, January 25, 1913 (M. H. Donohoe).

day Dr. Daneff, M. Venezelos, and other Delegates called at the Foreign Office and the Embassies to discuss the situation. In the afternoon an informal meeting of the Bulgarian and Servian Delegates and of the chief Delegates of Greece and Montenegro was held at the Hyde Park Hotel. After a discussion which lasted from five o'clock to six it was decided to take no immediate action. Telegrams asking for instructions were sent by the Delegates to their Governments, and it is believed that the Servian and Montenegrin Delegates asked for authority, which the Bulgarians and Greeks already possess, to break off negotiations as soon as they see fit. After the meeting Dr. Daneff called on Sir Edward Grey. Another meeting is to be held to-day.

"Among diplomatists there is almost complete unanimity that there is nothing to be gained by rushing matters. The new Turkish Cabinet is reported to be drawing up its reply to the Collective Note of the Powers. Although this reply is certain to be unfavourable, the Delegates were urged on all hands to await its reception before taking any drastic step. It is reported, though not on very direct authority, that Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, the ex-Grand Vizier of the Committee party, is now on his way to London, in order, it is believed, to take part in the negotiations. Patience is counselled to the Allies, and it is still hoped, though without much confidence, that the war will not be renewed. The belligerents are financially exhausted, and it is not believed that any one really desires to fight any more.

"Some anxiety is felt as to the possible attitude of Rumania in view of the new crisis, but the best opinion seems to be that she is not likely to alienate the sympathy of the Powers by attempting to take advantage of it. Obviously out of apprehension with regard to the position of European residents the Italian Government has despatched two warships to Constantinople. Ambassadors

of other Powers are understood to be authorized to wire for additional vessels should they believe help to be needed." *

It was reported on good authority " that Bulgaria had renewed her invitation, given to Rumania before the beginning of the war, to join the Balkan League, and that Rumania was now considering whether to accept it and promise the League military help in return for territorial concessions in case hostilities with Turkey were resumed.

" The *Reichspost* declared that such an agreement would naturally have an important effect on Austrian foreign policy.

" The *Zeit* received a message from Bukarest saying that the Rumanians were indignant with ' perfidious Austria,' but denying that Rumania intends to abandon the Dreibund for the Balkan League and the Triple Entente." †

The attitude of the Sofia Government showed that Bulgaria remained determined to achieve her objects whatever might be the cost.

" The news of Colonel Enver Bey's *coup d'état* came as a great surprise, since the favourable tone of the meeting of the Grand Council seemed to foreshadow presupposed acceptance of the advice contained in the Collective Note of the Powers. The obstinate attitude of the Young Turks, however, so far from creating apprehension, is hailed by the Government with secret joy. The responsibility for any resumption of hostilities now lies with Turkey, which is considered here to have insulted the Powers deliberately. The results of further fighting are awaited with equanimity, since the Bulgarian Army has been fully prepared for the last three weeks, and it is realized that there can be no further question of bargaining, but that

* *The Times*, Saturday, January 25, 1913.
† *Morning Post*, Wednesday, January 29, 1913.

the territorial demands of the Allies for Adrianople will now be settled to their complete satisfaction. In the meantime the Bulgarian Government is awaiting more precise information as to the exact situation. The tenor of the Turkish reply to the Collective Note of the Powers will decide whether the Government will present the projected ultimatum of the Allies or will break off the armistice. In the case of a resumption of hostilities it must be understood that the Allies will not stop until they have reached Constantinople. If Turkey chooses to gamble her last hold upon Europe she must risk the consequences." *

Within a day or two public feeling in Europe grew somewhat cooler. All the Powers considered it fair to allow the new Turkish Cabinet some little time to consider their reply to the Joint Note. The fears of separate action by Russia against Turkey gradually faded away. It was considered most unlikely that the Tsar would allow the festivals in honour of the Tercentenary of the accession of the Romanoff Dynasty to the Russian Throne in February 1613 to be disturbed by a war. The Powers of the Triple Entente remained in the closest contact chiefly through their Ambassadors and Sir Edward Grey in London. One weapon, indeed, was left to them by which they could prevent, so it was hoped, a war. None of the belligerents were believed to have any money left. The Triple Entente determined officially not to lend money to any of them, and it was believed that the German Government would not countenance the proposed German loan to Turkey. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe private financiers proved too strong for their Governments, and all the Balkan States found the means to continue to carry on the war.

Anxiety continued, however, to prevail at Berlin, and this feeling was expressed by various German diplo-

* *The Times*, Saturday, January 25, 1913.

matists in their speeches at banquets held in honour of the Emperor's birthday, which were thought, considering the occasion on which they were delivered, to have a somewhat gloomy sound.

"At the festivity of the German colony in Paris the Ambassador, Baron von Schön, said, 'The present situation is grave, the fire in the East has not been extinguished, the world is bristling with arms, oppressive anxieties are weighing on men's minds.'

"In his speech at a banquet in Dresden the Prussian Minister, Herr von Bülow, declared that though the situation had become somewhat better, they were, in consequence of the events of the last few days, still far from being able to speak of peace being ensured.

"In the Reichstag, on January 28, answering a question put by the National Liberal leader, Herr Bassermann, the representative of the Government said that the Chancellor was familiar with the rumours that several Powers had come to an agreement as to a delimitation of spheres of interest in Asiatic Turkey. There were no official reports whatsoever as to this matter. On the other hand, the unambiguous and trustworthy declarations by representatives of the Great Powers named (Great Britain, France, and Russia) made the existence of such an agreement appear out of the question." *

Many Turkish and Austrian politicians believed, indeed, that the new Ministry would be overthrown by a rising in the army. The Committee of Union and Progress had seized their position by storm, but they could no longer count upon the undivided support of the army. Junior officers might revolt at the thought of giving up Adrianople, but more keen-sighted observers saw that, thanks to their absorption in political conflicts, the Turks had, for the time, lost those pre-eminent military and diplomatic qualities by which they had so

* *Daily Telegraph*, Wednesday, January 29, 1913.

long maintained their rule. The mass of the people cared only for peace, worn out as they were by long months of war. Moreover, there was no Arab in the Ministry and, with the loss of the European provinces of Turkey, the Arab deputies had acquired a dominating influence in the Turkish Parliament. Some friends of Kiamil Pasha, such as Cherif Pasha, urged that the French and English Governments should refuse to recognise the Government of assassins, and should organise a demonstration to compel the formation of a Government of honest men. A section of the Italian Press was thought to be working for the same object.

These ideas were, of course, chimerical, but for a day or two it appeared far from improbable that a counter-revolution would be effected by the army in the Tchataldja lines, where disaffection was very rife.

As early as January 27, reports, based upon Turkish official telegrams from Constantinople, were in circulation at Vienna that a military revolt against the Young Turks had broken out and that a severe conflict had taken place between the adherents of the assassinated War Minister Nazim Pasha and the supporters of the Committee. These rumours were not confirmed, but Talaat Bey left in a hurry for the front, and a number of wounded, many of them suffering from bayonet wounds, were smuggled into the capital by night. Another report that Abuk Pasha was marching upon Stambul with the Fourth Army Corps was thought, even by shrewd English observers, to be true.

All the rumours of troubles at Tchataldja proved to be unfounded, and Shevket Pasha remained wholly uninfluenced by fears of the action of the military.

A correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle*, writing on January 29, said:

"Shevket Pasha accorded me a brief interview this afternoon just before the Cabinet Council. The Grand

Vizier was busy when I entered, reading and signing scores of documents.

"He declared: 'The reply to the Joint Note of the Powers will be presented to-morrow, and I can say that it will be good (this he said with emphasis) and will satisfy everybody. We have found the solution of the Adrianople question—the only reasonable solution.

"'With goodwill on both sides it will mean durable peace; if not, there must be war.

"'Tell the Liberals of England that I came here three years ago to secure constitutional government, and I am here now on the same task, and to ensure the liberties of our people. I expect the support of the British nation. You see how I work and what a heavy task I have.'" *

Turkish hopes were undoubtedly encouraged by a Press agitation in favour of the Porte at Berlin, not uninfluenced it may be supposed by those German financiers who had just obtained the concession for the Constantinople Metropolitan Railway.

Many leading journals there were urging the Government to adopt a stronger policy to protect German interests in the Near East. They alleged "that Germany's joint action with the other Great Powers in bringing even the faintest pressure to bear on the Porte in favour of the Balkan allies will be a serious blow to German interests in the Near East, and will be all in the interests of the Triple Entente.

"A curious fact about this new agitation is that it is led by newspapers about whose robust patriotism there has been hitherto considerable doubt, and which have hitherto generally opposed separate action on the part of the German Foreign Office. Their point seems to be that everything done to weaken Turkey, especially in Asia Minor and the Islands—for example, the Russian occupation of the Armenian provinces of Erzeroum and Trebi-

* *Daily Chronicle*, Thursday, January 30, 1913.

zond, or the ceding to Greece of the Islands on the Levantine coast—will practically shut out German influence from those regions, and destroy for ever the hopes which Germany had entertained of paramount power.

" Not only is the German Foreign Office conjured to take no part in any policy with this end in view, but it is urged to ' Secure a satisfactory economic sphere of expansion and influence.' Germany, it is pointed out, can secure this with the help of its Allies if it makes its demands seriously enough. There must be an end to the see-saw policy in which German interests are the main consideration.' " *

At Constantinople itself, Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, speaking at a banquet on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday, touched upon the problem of Asia Minor. He said, " Neither to-day nor in the future will any one be able to lay a hand on Anatolia, where we have vital interests."

The Ambassador thus clearly outlined the ideas of Germany as to the future of Turkey. Like Von Moltke and Duke Adolf of Nassau sixty years before, he saw that the real centre of Turkish strength lay in Asia Minor, and that it was to the interest of Germany to keep that centre under her own influence.

The Turkish reply to the Joint Note of the Powers was published on January 30. The official text was as follows:

" In their communication the Great Powers thought fit to advise the Imperial Government to consent to the cession of the town of Adrianople to the Balkan Allies and to allow them (the Powers) to determine the fate of the Aegean Islands.

" The Imperial Government thinks it right to point out that it has already given undeniable proofs of a

* *Daily Chronicle*, Thursday, January 30, 1913.

conciliatory spirit by consenting to immense sacrifices. Adrianople being an essentially Mussulman town and the second capital of Turkey, and being, therefore, indissolubly bound up with the Empire, the mere rumour of its cession provoked a sentiment of reprobation throughout the country, and such excitement as brought about the resignation of the last Cabinet.

" Nevertheless, in order to give a final proof of its pacific disposition, the Imperial Government is prepared to place itself in the hands of the Powers as regards that part of the town of Adrianople which is situated on the right bank of the river Maritza, while keeping the part situated on the left bank.

" The Mussulman mosques and other historic and religious monuments being in the part of the town situated on the left bank of the Maritza, the retention of this part of the town under the direct sovereignty of Turkey is, for the Imperial Government, a necessity of which it cannot fail to take account without exposing the country to a commotion which might bring about the gravest consequences.

" As for the Aegean Islands the Imperial Government takes the liberty of observing that while some of these islands are, by reason of their immediate neighbourhood to the Dardanelles, indispensable to the defence of the capital, the others, which form an integral part of the Asiatic possessions of the Empire, are no less indispensable to the security of Asia Minor.

" Any solution which would tend to diminish the authority of the Imperial Government in these islands would result in transforming them into so many centres of agitation, which would extend their action to the adjoining shores. The consequence would be the creation of a state of unrest similar to that which existed in Macedonia, and which threatened and still threatens the tranquillity of Europe.

" Therefore the Sublime Porte would be willing to abide by the decision of the six Great Powers regarding the status of the islands occupied by the Balkan Allies so long as they take account of the considerations set forth above and of the care that ought to be given to the integrity of the position of the Dardanelles, which the Sublime Porte holds to be a question of the highest European interest.

" The Sublime Porte takes note with real satisfaction of the benevolent dispositions and promises of the Great Powers regarding their moral and material support with a view to repairing the ravages of the war and developing the natural resources of the Empire.

" To this end it is indispensable that the Powers should recognise now and henceforth the right of Turkey to proceed unfettered with the adoption of an autonomous Customs tariff, the conclusion of treaties of commerce on the basis and the principles of modern law, and the application to their subjects of the Ottoman fiscal laws to which Ottoman subjects are and will be subjected, and that the Powers should consent meanwhile to an increase of 4 per cent in the Customs duties.

" The Porte believes that it is only less indispensable to abolish the foreign post office existing in Turkey, on conditions which it would be easy to determine, that would offer commerce all the necessary guarantees of celerity and security in postal matters.

" The Sublime Porte also thinks that a declaration by the Powers of their desire to put an end to the Capitulations system in the Ottoman Empire, and the opening after the conclusion of peace negotiations for the joint consideration of the means to realise this end, will form, with the economic matters enumerated above, an *ensemble* of measures which will make possible the realisation of the promises of the Powers set forth in the above-mentioned Note."

The views entertained at Vienna as to these offers showed that they were regarded at the outset as likely to afford a basis for negotiations, at least in the opinion of the members of the Triple Alliance.

It was stated that "the Powers will continue their efforts to prevent the resumption of hostilities, although the chances of success had been considerably lessened by the Bulgarian notice to terminate the armistice. At all events, should hostilities reopen, the Cabinets will work for the localisation of the war and the preservation of European peace.

"The Triple Alliance Powers consider the offer, made in the Turkish reply, a considerable concession, and sufficient basis for further negotiations.

"What the Turks offer is practically a considerable part of Adrianople, for on the right bank of the Tundja, which flows through the town, lies the suburb of Adrianople called Ildirim, which includes five powerful forts and large barracks. All this would fall to the lot of Bulgaria as well as the bridge leading from the western bank of the Tunja over the Maritza River. The Turks would thus retain only that part of Adrianople between the left Tundja bank and the northern bank of the Maritza, containing the sacred tombs and mosques." *

The reply of the Allies was not long deferred.

Their delegates arranged to quit London, although one representative of each State still remained there, and M. Grouitch, the Servian Minister, called upon Reshid Pasha to announce that the armistice would be broken off within four days from 7 P.M. on Thursday, January 30. The Bulgarian delegation absolutely refused to accept any terms short of the cession of Adrianople, or to allow it to be formed with the surrounding vilayet into a neutral State with a Governor to be appointed by the Powers. The Greek Minister, at a farewell luncheon to the

* *Daily Chronicle*, Friday, January 31, 1913.

delegates, proposed a toast to the enduring alliance of the Balkan nations. General Savoff addressed his troops in a stirring order of the day:

"From the course of the peace negotiations it becomes evident that the enemy are unwilling to yield an inch of the territory conquered by our victorious arms. They wish, by a stroke of the pen, to destroy all that you and your brave brothers who have fallen in battle have won.

"Will the heroes of Kirk Kilisse, Bunar Hissar, Lule Burgas, and Tchataldja allow this affront to the glorious army of Bulgaria to go unanswered? Prepare then for fresh victories, and with your irresistible 'Forward!' show the enemy and the whole world that Bulgaria, our fatherland, deserves more respect."*

Yet the tone of the Turkish reply was considered by the Great Powers to be conciliatory, and hopes of the resumption of negotiations seemed to be justified by the fact that representatives of the belligerent Powers remained in London. Final appeals were made to Bulgaria to treat on the basis of the Turkish proposals, Germany being especially active in this direction, and it seemed certain from the tone of her official Press, which urged the Great Powers to continue their policy of united action, that she had their entire concurrence in doing so. The speeches delivered by the Balkan delegates in London before their departure allowed it to be hoped that the struggle would not be a prolonged one.

Dr. Daneff said:

"There is no pretext for remaining longer, and once more the guns must speak and bring home to the Turks the position which every one but themselves has already realised. Probably the contest will be short and sharp; but in any case, if and when peace comes the details will have to be settled in London. Probably there is in store for the world a bigger surprise than the earlier events of

* *Daily Chronicle*, Thursday, January 30, 1913.

the war provided. But the Turks must take note that after Monday the terms of the Allies will be very different from those already imposed. The Midia-Rodosto line will be a thing of the past."

M. Venezelos, the Greek Prime Minister, said:

"I do not say 'Good-bye,' but only 'Au revoir,' for I am persuaded that we shall again be in London in a few weeks to settle the details of peace. The Turks must admit that they are beaten, and before another peace conference meets the Ottomans will have to sign the preliminaries of peace on the battlefield. Then, and then only, can we tackle details. We know the Turks, and we are convinced that war is the shortest way to peace. The Allies are profoundly persuaded that the only means to arrive at a speedy and a lasting peace is to resume hostilities.

"As to suggested differences between the Allies, this is quite beside the question. In face of the common enemy we are one. *Differences between ourselves will be settled after the conclusion of peace.* We have but one common aim, and that we will unitedly follow.

"It is to the interest of us all to live at peace with Turkey, and, so far as Greece is concerned, with the question of the islands definitely settled by their cession to Greece, which is the only way of assuring peace and tranquillity, there should be nothing in the future to divide us." *

On February 1 the following official note was issued at Constantinople:

"The Porte has ordered the Ottoman delegate not to leave until after the resumption of hostilities, and similarly orders have been given to the Ottoman troops not to fire until the Bulgarians have begun hostilities.

"The Porte has considered it necessary to give these instructions in order to convince public opinion that the

* *Daily Chronicle*, Monday, February 3, 1913.

responsibility for a resumption of hostilities will rest exclusively with the Allies."

But the blood of Nazim Pasha was crying from the ground, and the crimes of the Young Turks prevented them from yielding to the representations of the diplomatists.

The war began once more on the evening of February 3.

CHAPTER XVII

TURKEY AFTER THE ARMISTICE WAS DENOUNCED

HE failure of the Bulgarian attack on the Tchataldja lines on November 17-18, 1912, a failure due rather to the cholera than to the Turkish guns, marked the end of the first stage of the war. About the same date Monastir fell, and 80,000 Turks surrendered to the Servians. On November 19 the Montenegrin and Servian troops, who had met before the town on the previous day, took Alessio by assault, and the colours of the Allies floated over a haven of the Adriatic. But the few miles lying between Alessio and San Giovanni di Medua separated Servia from those open waters which she had so longed to reach.

In the meantime Constantinople was no very delectable residence. " Disease is at present the deadliest enemy of both sides, but there is no danger from that source for us Europeans, who know better how to guard ourselves against such an enemy. Cholera, dysentery, and typhus have already claimed thousands of victims. Over five hundred cases are reported every day. Trains arrive in the capital daily laden with cholera patients. The dead are first piled into a van which is detached, and those still living are taken to the hospitals. The station reeks with disinfectants. The guns are now distinctly audible in the capital, now within twenty miles of the Turkish fighting line, which started at Little Chekmedje, a place nearer to

Constantinople than St. Albans is to London. The enemy have no ships. Marcus says that in his ride he saw bodies piled into the trenches by scores, while the able-bodied men were fighting for loaves of bread. Deficient organisation and transport difficulties are mainly responsible for the Turkish disasters hitherto. A probable revolution in the capital is the immediate peril to be feared." Had Bulgaria possessed a navy the city must have fallen.

Santa Sophia was turned into a cholera hospital, although the Turks did not despair of remaining its possessors. The keys of the mosque are kept by one of the Under-Secretaries of State. When the Bulgars were rapidly nearing Constantinople, the Greek Patriarch, fearing to see the sanctuary fall into the possession of a race which has since 1872 been under the ban of his excommunication, went to the guardian of the keys and asked him to give them over to him to prevent its seizure. The Turk is said to have replied, " All is predestined by Allah: it is I who am predestined to keep the keys, and I shall remain their custodian."

But all parties were wearied by their exertions, and on December 9 an armistice was concluded to enable a conference of the belligerents to meet in London, whilst the ambassadors of the Great Powers, with Sir Edward Grey in the chair, were deliberating at the Foreign Office. Mr. Asquith, when welcoming the delegates at the Guildhall, spoke hopefully of the speedy conclusion of a Peace of London. But fate decreed otherwise. The Balkan land had been drenched red for centuries with innocent blood, and that blood was only to be purged with blood. The question of Adrianople was the great stumbling-block; it was settled at last. But the Turkish Cabinet which had sanctioned the surrender was overthrown by Enver Bey and the Young Turks. Nazim Pasha fell by Turkish hands; a Government pledged to resistance to the death took possession of the Porte; and the war, which had

never ceased round Skutari and Yanina, burst forth once more.

In the meantime life in Constantinople had never been gayer. The refugees might shiver and starve on the bare bleak plains without the walls; cholera, combated only by a handful of heroic nurses, might fence round whole villages with unburied corpses, but men in the clubs and cafés at Pera scoffed at the horrid rumours from San Stefano. Balls and parties, brightened by the naval uniforms of most European countries from the great fleet of guardships in the Bosphorus, filled Pera with carriages each night; and on Sundays in the Grande Rue the holiday crowds scarce deigned to turn an ear towards the quarter whence came the deep rumblings of distant siege guns.

Within a month or two the war was destined to take a course which all but brought about a European conflict. Had peace been concluded in January, it is possible that the rivalry between Russia and Austria which, in reality, lies at the root of the Balkan problem, would never have assumed the prominence which it subsequently did. The Powers would have accepted accomplished facts; and, in cooler blood, might have taken into account the course of events since 1878, and recognised that the new Powers would neither be the humble serfs of Russia nor exercise an irresistible magnetic attraction on the Slavs of Austria.

As the *Neue Freie Presse*, the great Viennese journal, wrote on February 5:

"Reflection on all that has happened since the Crimean War shows that in reality both Russia and Austria-Hungary have missed their aims. The old Emperor Nicholas wanted, not to liberate, but to conquer the Balkans. He failed. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy wanted to prevent the smashing of Turkey, and has also failed. The reasons for the old discord between us have

disappeared, but confidence is not robust and needs to be strengthened. Let us bury the hatchet and send a mission of goodwill to our frontiers. It would be hard to conceive a finer outcome of the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter to the Tsar."

That letter had been carried to St. Petersburg by Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, a favoured friend of the Russian Court. For a moment his mission seemed to have proved successful. Release appeared in sight for the thousands of recruits who had been cooped up for months in schools and barracks in Galicia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, suffering greater hardships than the military authorities are ever likely to admit. Six thousand petitions for discharge had been received at the Austro-Hungarian War Office.

Even the German military authorities seemed to have acquiesced in the results of the war. The Military Estimates for the year came before the Reichstag, and not a hint was given that any extraordinary expenditure was contemplated.

But the sky soon clouded over. Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe arrived in Vienna with the Tsar's reply on February 10, but it was soon found that that reply was not conciliatory.

The questions which were in dispute may be roughly summed up as follows:

1. The question of the frontier line between Bulgaria and Turkey, for Bulgaria was claiming an outlet on the Sea of Marmora, which Russia was not disposed to concede to her. She has no desire for the acquisition of territory by a third Power on that sea before the question of the straits is settled.

2. The question of the islands in the Ægean. Here two factors come into play. Turkey declares that she cannot allow any Power, except herself, to retain islands which either dominate the entrance to the Dardanelles or command positions on the coast of Asia Minor, if she is to

retain any control over her Asiatic Provinces. Italy, who views with jealousy the up-growth of a strong maritime power in the Ægean, and who bound herself by the Treaty of Lausanne to return to Turkey the twelve islands she had occupied, including Rhodes, and the very important naval base of Astypalaea, had, in the discussions which preceded the Turkish Revolution, insisted that the question of the future of the Ægean Islands should be left to the decision of the Powers.

These two questions directly interested Turkey, but there were two others which, in the long run, were to prove of far greater importance, namely:

3. The territorial compensations to be given by Bulgaria to Rumania for having remained neutral during the war.

4. The question of the delimitation of an autonomous and independent Albania, which for Montenegro meant:

The question of the future ownership of Skutari, a town considered by the Montenegrins indispensable for their economic development, and which had been, for a century before 1484, a Montenegrin city, but which is now Albanian and Catholic.

For Servia:

An outlet on the Adriatic and the ownership of Ipek, Djakova, and Prizrend.

For Greece:

The delimitation of the Southern Albanian frontier, involving not only the ownership of Yanina, before which the Greek guns were still thundering; but that of the island of Sasseno, which commands the entrance to the harbour of Vallona, the key of the Adriatic, and which the Greeks claimed had been ceded to them by England as a dependency of Corfu in 1864.

To Italy and Austria the question of an autonomous Albania is vital.

Austria affects to dread that if the great harbours on

the Albanian coast were in Slav hands one of them would be ceded to Russia. The latter Power, during the wars of the French Revolution, held the Ionian Islands, or some of them, for several years, and cast covetous glances upon Cattaro, a port which the Montenegrins still claim as their own on the ground that they assisted the English to expel the French from it in 1814. Indeed the wags of Berlin used to assert that during one of the most crucial meetings of the Congress of Berlin Lord Beaconsfield had been induced by some ribald jester to propose that Turkey should make over the "Bocche di Cattaro" to Montenegro as a peace-offering, with the result that the Austrian representative all but had an apopletic stroke from the haste with which he bounded from his chair to point out Cattaro on the map. The Montenegrins, indeed, still retain possession of the mountain of Lovtchen which dominates Cattaro, whilst the Austrians are equally irritating as neighbours because they hold a promontory which commands the entrance to Antivari—the sole Montenegrin port.

Moreover, Austria has always exercised a kind of protective right over the Catholics of Albania on the ground of a treaty dating from 1617, and frequently renewed afterwards, which gave her such a right over all the Catholics in Turkey.

Italy, again, dreads the menace of a strong Power being in possession of those harbours, and to meet the danger had suggested as the future Albanian king either the Count of Turin or the Duke of the Abruzzi. The German Count of Urach, a kinsman of the King of Würtemberg, also seemed to desire the honour.

Such were the four questions which on the morrow of the Turkish Revolution awaited settlement.

The first question in dispute, that of the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, was the first to receive a provisional solution, due to the fall of Adrianople. Russia, having

vetoed the acquisition by Bulgaria of an outlet on the Sea of Marmora, a frontier farther inland was the natural sequence. Was that frontier to leave Adrianople with its Holy Places in Turkish hands? Such questions can only be decided by force of arms; hence the first task before Bulgaria, after the armistice ended on February 3, was the capture of Adrianople. Her forces before Tchataldja, which, during the armistice, had been supplied by the railway passing Adrianople, had once more to fall back upon their bullock trains. They had strongly fortified their own positions: and two hostile lines equally strong faced one another at a distance of about five kilometres ($3\frac{1}{8}$ miles) apart.

The bombardment of Adrianople, which had been severe from November 22 to December 3, was resumed on February 3, although rather as a demonstration and a warning than a serious attack. Reshid Pasha had been instructed to remain in London, and it was thought both sides desired a settlement. The Bulgarian troops, however, were eager for the fray; when the guns began to boom eastward of Adrianople cheers went up, and there were joyous calls for news over the telephone from Dimotika and Mustafa Pasha. Shrapnel was fired intermittently all night, but the Turks did not reply, and remained quiescent the following day. The weather was delightful, the snow had disappeared; the roads were excellent.

Operations were also resumed by the Bulgarians against the lines of Bulair, which had been constructed during the Crimean War by English engineers to defend the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and some fighting took place at Kavakli and Myriophito, in which the Turks were defeated with a loss of 1200 men.

Enver Bey, however, burned to show his skill in combined naval and military operations, and got together a motley squadron, including the penny steamers on the

Bosphorus and some pontoons from the Galata Bridge. With these transports, convoyed by the battleships *Torgut Reis* and *Barbarossa*, with the cruiser *Medjidieh*, the gunboat *Zuhaf* and some torpedo-boats which formed an inshore squadron, he steered for Shahkeui in order to check the Bulgarian advance from Hexamili on Bulair. Under cover of a heavy fire from the ships the troops which formed a part of Enver Bey's own division, the Tenth, began their landing about twelve on February 8 near Indjir Point west of Shahkeui. The *Zuhaf* and the torpedo-boats covered the actual landing. Previously from nine to ten in the morning the main squadron had bombarded the hills above Shahkeui. Two pontoon bridges were got into position, and the advance guard landed under cover of the fire of the main fleet. Suddenly a heavy fire of artillery and musketry burst upon the transports with great effect from the woods between Shahkeui and Indjir Point. The Bulgarians had waited till half the force, consisting of the best part of two divisions, were on shore. The hills were bombarded again by the fleet, and the Bulgarian flag was hauled down at Shahkeui late in the afternoon. When the hills above Shahkeui were occupied, the Bulgarians retired to higher ground inland. The fighting was at very close quarters and many hand-bombs were used. The struggle went on in the hills all through the night, the Turks being assisted by the searchlights of their ships. The Turkish losses during the two days' fighting amounted to 15 officers and 800 men. But reinforcements reached the Bulgarians, who continually harassed the Turks, and on Monday morning, February 10, made a vigorous attack on the enemy, who were driven back to the shore and forced to re-embark under cover of the cruisers' guns. The Bulgarian losses were about 100, the Turkish very severe. All Enver Bey had effected was to delay the Bulgarian advance on Bulair, which, however, they reached on

February 10. These failures rendered opinion in Constantinople more favourable to peace, but no definite proposals were as yet put forward.

Reconnaissances were also carried out at Midia, but of a body of Mohammedan Circassians who were landed there, not half got back on board. The Greeks, on the other hand, made no attempts to land on either the European or the Asiatic coast.

From Indjir Enver Bey proceeded to Bulair, where were Fakri Pasha and Fethy Bey, the Chief of the Staff, but owing to a hostile demonstration of the troops he was compelled to take refuge in the battleship *Hair-ed-din Barbarossa*.

Meanwhile the diplomatists were toiling and moiling, all eager to find some potent charm which might win the Turk to sanction with a good grace the surrender of Adrianople. Never were spiders more industrious; never were filaments more deftly spun. Yet cobwebs are cobwebs and, in the end, these arch-masters of the craft were left, like the foolish Arachne, bending

> Tristi in su gli stracci
> Dell' opera che mal per lor si fe!
> DANTE, *D. C.: Purg.* xii. 40–41.

"Pensive o'er the tatters of the workings wrought so ill."

In vain learned Germans turned over Puffendorff, and brushed the dust from the Memoirs of statesmen who had been giants in their art. Baron von Wangenheim gained for a moment great credit by suggesting that Adrianople should be divided into two parts. That to the north of the Maritza, which contains the Mosque of Sultan Selim and the Holy Places, was to remain under Turkish sovereignty and to form a kind of Leonine City such as Victor Emmanuel I. would have granted to the Pope in 1870, had not its inhabitants refused to agree to his proposal. By another plan, copied from the arrangements

about Morocco, the administration of the city was to be handed over to Bulgaria, but the spiritual representative of the Sultan, the Naib-es-Sultan, was to exercise his spiritual authority there. Neither plan found favour with the Bulgarians, who, indeed, haggled greatly about permitting the foreign residents to leave the town or allowing a neutral zone to be formed at Karagatch, where the European houses are.

Another diplomatic suggestion was nearly adding a fifth miniature State to the map of Europe in the shape of Mount Athos.

The eastern tongue of the Peninsula of Chalcidice, is, like Gibraltar, nearly cut off from the mainland, to which it is joined by a sandy peninsula, once cut through by Xerxes' canal. From it rises a superb mountain of chalky rocks. It is Mount Athos, the Holy Mountain, whence the eye ranges across sea and land from Thessalian Olympus to the Asiatic Heights of Ida, whither the shepherd Atys, maddened by the goddess he had betrayed, fled to hide his shame amongst the boars and stags. According to tradition, it was from Athos that the Devil showed to Christ all the kingdoms of the world. To-day, amid the groves of chestnut, oak, and pine which fringe its slopes, rise the bold lines of fortified monasteries, those of the Holy Mount. For fourteen centuries no female creature has entered this sanctuary. As hens may not be kept there, eggs must be brought from Lemnos. Almost all the 6000 monks are Greeks, but one monastery is Russian, and two were built by the old kings of Servia.

This curious community diplomacy proposed to form into a Republic, to be placed under the suzerainty of all the Orthodox Powers. Since Austria, who has many Orthodox Sees in her dominions, put in a claim to be represented on the Board, England did the same, on behalf of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus and the Patriarchate of Alexandria. If the scheme had been

carried out the *Hagion Oros* would not have been one of the least curious amongst our protectorates. Meanwhile, the monks of Sketes, one of its monasteries, were quarrelling vigorously as to whether the name of Jesus is or is not divine.

The proposals for a Republic of Mount Athos, however, came to nothing. They were rejected by the Russian monks on the ground that it would be against the statutes of the community. They demanded that Greece should govern Mount Athos, and hoisted the Greek flag over their monastery. Then Adrianople fell.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FALL OF ADRIANOPLE

HE fall of Adrianople was to Europe a dramatic surprise.

During the course of November large Servian reinforcements, some thirty-five thousand strong, had been sent to the Bulgarian forces, and the Servians had taken over the north-western sector of the besiegers' lines. It is characteristic of the Balkan States that many of these troops were from the Rumanian-speaking districts of the Timok division.

At Sofia an assault was regarded by many as needless, since it was certain that Bulgaria would acquire the place at the conclusion of peace. The King and the Government shared these views, but they finally yielded to the arguments of the generals, who said that if the Bulgarians failed to take Adrianople their enemies would always have grounds for doubting their military power. The general assault was ordered for Monday, March 24, soon after midnight. The commander of the Second Army was ordered to attack and carry the outlying positions of the enemy on the eastern sector. All the sectors were bombarded from two in the afternoon till eight in the evening, the Turks replying with all their siege artillery. Then the troops began to prepare for an attack on the advanced positions. At one in the morning of March 25 the Bulgarians began a general simultaneous advance on all sectors. By about 3.30 A.M. the Bulgarians on the eastern sector dashed on the enemy with the bayonet and

drove them from the Maslak works, the fort of the same name, and the positions on the ridge immediately to its east. The enemy kept up a heavy fire on the advancing troops, to which the Bulgarian artillery replied, and by daybreak all the outlying positions on the eastern sector were in their hands. The 50th Regiment had been equally successful on the northern sector, as had the troops on the southern. The 20th Servian Regiment occupied the hill to the north-west of Kadinkeui, and the left wing of the Servian Timok Division captured Ekmek-tchikeui. The Servian Danube Division attacked Papastepe. The losses on both sides were frightful, and it was, indeed, rumoured at Belgrade that one Bulgarian and one Servian regiment had been blown to pieces by the explosion of mines. After the advanced positions had been taken, a furious cannonade began from all the besiegers' guns against the forts themselves, which rose in a line seemingly impenetrable from the nearly level heights. Those to the east of the city were ranged in a long straight line stretching north and south. On the western side they were arranged in a chequer-pattern looking not unlike the plan of a football eleven. The Bulgarian attack was aimed at the point of the angle where the defences on the east and north joined. To attack them successfully could only be done by overwhelming them with shell fire, and this the Bulgarians resolved to do from batteries hidden behind the ridge of the rising ground to the north.

All though February and March the weather had been terrible. Snow lay six feet deep in the siege trenches, and railway facilities were completely wanting. No means of transport for the ammunition was available save the ox-wagon, and each wagon could hold but six shells. Through the snow ploughed the teams far out on the dreary plains, and at last the ammunition for the bombardment had been accumulated in the batteries, whilst the fighting men were

lodged in casemates invisible from the Turkish positions. No Turkish aviator seems to have discovered their existence. The forts to be attacked were Aivas-Baba, Hadjioglu, Kestanlik, Kuru-Chesme, Yildiz, Topyolu, and Kavkas.

By about ten in the morning of Tuesday, March 25, the troops on the eastern sector, covered by a heavy artillery fire, reached a point within two or three hundred yards of the forts where a thousand Turks had been spending the night. They were captured with a quantity of artillery, and the captured pieces were at once turned on the Turks. The cannonade continued all that day, and at night orders were given for an infantry attack on the forts themselves. It was Easter week, and the bright Paschal moon had but just begun to wane. All night long the black masses stole over the slopes in deathly silence, without a sound to arouse the Turkish sentries. The men about to die marched as if they were already dead. But they had stern work to do ere they fell for the fatherland. At four in the morning, just as the faintest dawn was breaking, the order was given for the rush against Aivas-Baba. At once the army of spectres changed into flesh and blood and hurled themselves against the wire entanglements which stretched round the fort for hundreds of yards. Then the Turks awoke and began to pour in a heavy fire. There was no time to cut the wire, but the men had their greatcoats, and in a trice the strands were covered with lines of thick felt. The last hope of the Turks was gone; the Bulgarian field batteries thundered over the heads of the charging troops; by five o'clock they had carried the ramparts with a rush. The Turks had lost Aivas-Baba, the key to the defences of Adrianople. The fort was a miserable place. Adrianople was a piece of bluff, as the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* puts it, and the famous forts consisted of casemates of brick covered with a little earth, with gun emplacements hollowed

out of the soil as might be done in a field battle. There was not a cement wall, not any sort of a protecting work, no fosses, no scarps nor counterscarps, and the guns of the permanent armament were antiquated. Shukri Pasha did not even have all the guns with which he was credited. He cleverly multiplied his artillery by changing its position. As soon as an attack became pronounced at one spot, he reinforced the threatened point by moving batteries, thus giving the illusion of formidable defensive preparations. In short, had the Bulgarians known the real state of affairs, they could have carried Adrianople by assault months before.

Two questions suggest themselves to my mind. The first is whether the events of the siege of Adrianople do not, in a certain degree, go to show that forts which are supposed to be obsolete, such as the defences of Portsdown Hill, can yet offer a very prolonged resistance even to modern guns. The second is whether the facts do not cast grave doubts on the practical value of reconnaissance by aeroplanes or even by dirigible balloons. Bulgarian aviators had repeatedly flown over the forts of Adrianople, and must often have seen the interiors of their defences, yet not one of these scouts had ever discovered what shams they were. Can, then, such reconnaissances by night, as the famous airships are supposed to have carried out over England, yield any very valuable results, so far, at least, as the condition of fortifications is concerned?

After the fall of Aivas-Baba, the whole line of eastern forts was carried one after the other by the Bulgarians.

Shukri Pasha himself fell into the hands of the Bulgarians about two o'clock on the afternoon of March 26. He had been at his headquarters at Yildirim, when the troops of the eastern sector burst into that quarter, and he at once gave orders to cease fire. Those troops were the 20th Servian Regiment, which formed part of the division commanded by General Stepanovitch. To him Shukri

Pasha sent a *parlementaire* offering to capitulate. Major Milovan Gavrilovitch of the Servian army was sent to see the Turkish General. He passed through the dark casemates of the fort, and entered Shukri Pasha's cabinet, where he was received by the General, who was standing surrounded by his staff. " I saluted, saying, ' Excellency, Milovan Gavrilovitch has the honour to inform you that you are now under the protection of the Servian army.' I purposely avoided the expression ' prisoner.' " Shukri Pasha answered in a voice trembling with excitement, " I knew before that the Servians are a chivalrous, brave people. During this campaign I have learnt it personally." After a very pleasant conversation with the General and his Staff, Major Gavrilovitch left, but was approached by a Bulgarian officer who asked to be taken to Shukri Pasha. The Servian refused to deliver his prisoners to the Bulgarians without a written order, so the Pasha spent the night in the fort, and with his staff was only handed over to the Bulgarians next morning. Such was one Servian version of the surrender.

According, however, to Shukri Pasha himself, about half an hour after he had given orders to cease fire, and had had a blanket hoisted on a wireless telegraph post as a sign of surrender, the Bulgarian Colonel Marcholoff came to him, remaining about an hour. The Pasha then went with two Bulgarian officers of the Guards to the headquarters of General Vasoff in the lower town and motored with him to the Maritza Bridge, where he formally surrendered to General Ivanoff. According to Colonel Gekoff, Shukri, who was in the old Kaik fort on the west side, surrendered at nine o'clock in the morning, but did not meet General Ivanoff till three o'clock, at the place known as Kurin Tchesme (Dry Fountain). Shukri Pasha looked very pale, serious, and depressed. The conversation took place in French. " I recognise," said the Bulgarian General, " that the defence has been con-

ducted with energy and courage; you have bravely done your duty."

"For my part," Shukri Pasha replied, "I say that your soldiers are brave men and that the Bulgarian army deserves its victory."

"In what condition is the town? Are there any epidemics?"

At this point General Ivanoff perceived that Shukri Pasha had no sword, and turning to General Vasoff, he asked in Bulgarian, "Why is he without a sword?"

"He left it in his office," General Vasoff replied, "after ordering all his officers to give up their arms."

Before the surrender Shukri Pasha had destroyed all the military stores, and Ibrahim Pasha, commander of the Eleventh Army Corps, had blown up the Arda Bridge. These measures were destined to occasion great suffering amongst the civilian population of the city.

From Adrianople Shukri Pasha was sent to Sofia, where he arrived on March 29. An enormous crowd, including several deputies, M. Zgouroff, Vice-President of the Chamber, and the military commander of Sofia awaited his arrival. The railway officials greeted him in French as follows:

"A welcome to your Excellency. The whole world admires both victor and vanquished. Bulgaria cherishes profound respect towards the illustrious hero of Adrianople. Your Excellency may rest assured of our sincere sympathy and admiration."

Shukri Pasha, who was evidently touched by these words, said that he was filled with similar feelings, and felt deep respect for the bravery of the Bulgarian soldiers. He was lodged in the Hotel Splendid Palace, where sumptuous apartments, with every luxury and comfort, had been prepared for him and his staff.

So fell Turkish Adrianople, the one place, save Broussa, where art in Turkish hands had displayed some of those

powers which made Moorish Spain so glorious. It had been Turkish for five hundred and fifty-two years. The siege had lasted five months.

The tidings of the fall of Adrianople had reached Sofia on March 26, though the capital had been prepared for it by the news of the great assault on the previous day. By ten o'clock in the morning the streets were thronged, and a crowd had gathered outside the War Office awaiting the latest news. The reception of the official bulletin was marked by a scene of enthusiasm; the town was beflagged as if by magic. After the news of the fall of the fortress a group of students made a street demonstration and went to the Legations of Servia and Greece.

With Adrianople had fallen the second of the great triangle of fortresses, Adrianople, Yanina, and Skutari, which were regarded as the impregnable basis of Turkish power.

The popular demonstrations in St. Petersburg were as enthusiastic as those at Sofia and at Belgrade. A service of thanksgiving was held at the Church of the Saviour. The most dramatic moment occurred outside the Servian Legation, where the crowd sang the national anthem and "Lord save our People and bless our Heritage," at the same time throwing their hats in the air. The Servian Minister stepped out on the balcony, but he had hardly begun to make a speech when mounted police galloped up, and slashed at the crowd with their *nagaikas*, several people being injured.

The news of the fall of Adrianople was received in Vienna with surprise, though not with dissatisfaction, for it was supposed to clear the way to peace. It was received at Constantinople with dignified resignation. The Turks described it as an event which, if disastrous to the Ottoman arms, was yet in no way discreditable to the honour of the Ottoman Army. Shukri Pasha was praised by the entire Press for the constancy and skill of his resistance.

His military career had been a rapid one. He refused, on the ground that a soldier should have no politics, to join the Committee of Union and Progress, and was reduced to the rank of Major-General. For his services during the siege of Adrianople he was promoted to be Lieutenant-General. Like the late Nazim Pasha, whose kinsman he was by marriage, Shukri Pasha is of Circassian origin.

Wild was the enthusiasm in the Sobranye when M. Gueshoff announced the fall of Adrianople in the following terms:

"The Bulgarian soldier, united with his Servian brethren, has traced with his blood a glorious page in Balkan history, and has marked a memorable date in the history of the world. Adrianople, the second capital of Turkey and the most strongly fortified place in the Balkans, fell yesterday, and the legend that Bulgarian troops, though excellent in the open field, would be powerless before fortresses, has been shattered. Yesterday's victory fills the Bulgarian nation with sincere joy, but her grief for the heroes fallen on the field of battle is deep."

M. Gueshoff then invited the deputies to show their homage to the brave conquerors, and to bow in reverence before the graves of the dead.

Their heroism well deserved this tribute, for the assault of Adrianople had been terrible.

The appearance of the ground round the entanglements of the Aivas-Baba fort, that minute grey forest of iron stakes, solidly planted and upholding an immense spider-web of barbed wire, tremulous, uncertain, and pearled with dew, was terribly eloquent. Hand grenades and certain powerful bombs, much used in Macedonia, played a large part in the final assault. One saw horrible wounds caused by these explosives—arms and legs wrenched off and muscles stripped from bones. Had not the wire been loosely stretched the assailants would have paid an even


Koyubunar
Nalbantlari
Wall
Terfeli
Bulgarian
Bielija
Maya Kurfali
Talashmanli
Golemo Manastir
Choban Azmak
Malko Tirfeli
Diljileri
Mali Manastir
Kayalidere
Hasan Begli
Seykulari
Yavuzdere
Chukurovo
Kalchulare
Sofulare
Kara Pilit
Minechevo
Sinapli
Shahli
Gajilovo
Pasha mahale
Glavan
Krusevo
KAVAKLI
Duganovo
GERDEME
Novoselo
SREM
Dermendere
Koyunli
Salihler
KAURALAN
Vakov
R. Tundja
Urum Begli
Tekke
Dere
Bunarchevo
Arabajikeui
DIRINJI
Hajikeui
Kustukeui
R. Checkurtka
Hamzabeli
Yeni Yagh
DERVISHAMOG
Tatarkeui
Demirkeui
SARANLI
Sujak
Syulyakeui
Mehya
Demirhan
Hajikeui
Kara Bashna
Donkeui
Buyunli
River
Bunakli
LEFKE
Mustrakli
Mihalich
Hanli Yenije
Uleje
Belitsa
HEBIBCHEVO
Ohanli
Aladagh
ISKUDAR
Pasha Mahalle
Hajikeui
Chomlekjikeui
Pravodiya
Tulbe
Dinikli
Hayikeui
Biyuk Smodleha
Yeniskeui
Murajilar
Vozgach
Ahirkeui
Akbunar
MUSTAFA PASHA
Karahadir
Doghanja
Kurujukeui
Alvandre
Mezek
Kirchali
Kemal
Havaras
Karajakeui
Sufilar
Karayusu
CHERMEN
Viranteke
Karageuz
Kurtkeui Kale
Hadikeui
Karagach
Karabagh
Buldurkeui
Yurushi
Kuyunli
Hamza Agach
Pelevan Chairi
Yailajik
Beshtepe
Espetli
Sederli
Deli-Elias
Kiremitli
Arda R.
Karagach
ADRIANOPLE
Kavkas
Merkes
Chorekkeui
Doghanja Arazi
Battery
Skenderkeui
Devedere
SARIHADIR
Kumanli
Simenli
Samana
Emirli
Salpistatar
Dere
Emirler
Akhorkeui
Biyuk Tatarkeui
Kuchuk Tatarkeui
Yenioglu
Kara Kassim
Azadli
Injirli Kaya
Bektashli
Chingirli
Framkeui
Gaidohor
Barracks
Lija
Ortakeui
Sallakli
Bakcha Dere
Yenikeui
Kliseli
Atari
Drebishna
Chausheui
Doghanja
Yejekeui
Hissarlik
Bufkeui
Khalaji
Karlikeui
El Burgas
Shaminji
Elcheli
Uch Evlar
Zarnazan
Shadman
Janbaz
Kulakli
Pazarli
Umurbey
Palaghun
Kuzulje
Akalan
KILKIKEUI
Chukur Tuvor
Chobanli
KARAJALI
URLU
MURSATLI
Bashatli
Yeni Begli
Kurmushli
Popovo
KIZIL AGATCH
Dobrudja
Guch Beiler
Daut Begli
HAMBARLI
Evrenli
Arapli
Chitalovo
Elemenli
Kurtalan
Buyuk Derbent
Hamzabeli
Donkeui
Demirkeui
Lahana
Pravodiya
Tulbe
Kaipa
Hadirn
Karayusu
Demei
Gebe
Havkas
Kavakli
Kayalik
Tash Tabia
Arvas Baba
Devekeui Yol
Kestanlik
Kuru Chesme
Yildiz
Topvolu
Bashlik
Chataldja
Ainalu
Semerskeui
Hadirlik
Chair Tepe
Arda R.
Kiremitli
Kuchuk Tatarkeui
Kara Kassim
Azadli
Elcheli
Shala

SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

BY PERMISSION OF THE PROPRIETORS OF The Times

greater toll to Death. Beyond the entanglements lay dead Bulgarians with their blue eyes staring and their mouths open, as though uttering that last shout with which they had burst upon the unsuspecting Turks just as the first flush of dawn tinged the sky. "To the bayonet, to the bayonet! Hurrah!" yelled the soldiers, hurling themselves forward after crossing three wire entanglements without having raised the least alarm. In a few seconds they had found themselves at the last barrier, and the Turks had fled almost without resistance. Now the victors lay stark and still. Burial parties collected the corpses and ranged them one beside the other in ranks, as though for a final review, and this battalion of death was saluted by the troops as they passed in tragic silence.*

The town itself appeared at first sight to show but few traces that it had gone through a five-months' siege. Children were playing about in the streets, indifferent to the din and panoply of war; women were sifting barley, seated on the threshold of a house, whilst chickens were scuttling about picking up the grains as they fell; the crowd at the bakery doors was quiet and orderly. How different from the sights in the bourgeois quarters of Paris in January 1871! The Bulgarians had given the defenders time to provision the city, and as it is situated in a very rich and fertile region, it had proved possible to collect, at a season when the barns were full of grain, supplies sufficient for six or seven months.

Until almost the last moment no one had endured any very serious hardships. It was only after the close of the armistice that articles in common use reached famine prices. Petroleum was 30s. a tin, salt and sugar 6s. 8d. a pound, and charcoal was practically unobtainable. Bread sold at 7d. a loaf, consisting mainly of barley husks, bran, and canary seed. Fodder failed, the oxen became

* Cf. Luigi Barzini in *Daily Telegraph*.

very thin, and snowy weather prevented the sheep from benefiting by the pasture at lambing time, so that at one moment it was feared that all might perish. Luckily a thaw set in quickly, green shoots pushed up, and fresh meat became procurable.

All through the siege Shukri Pasha had kept up the spirits of his men by spreading rumours of victories which might have been real ones had he chosen to employ his troops to support the Turkish armies in the field. Abuk Pasha, who commanded the left wing of the army at Kirk Kilisse, was to have operated in conjunction with Adrianople; Shukri Pasha set out to join him, but mistook his road, had an unexpected encounter with the enemy, and withdrew to Adrianople, where he remained behind entrenchments which owed their strength to their position alone. The escarpment up which the Bulgarians charged was almost a Gibraltar, and should have been practically inaccessible. Only once, on February 9, did he order a sortie, and his troops hurried back under the shelter of the fortress in their haste to escape from the murderous Bulgarian fire.

It is difficult to say whether Shukri's fairy tales, which conjured up relieving armies out of every quarter of the compass, were believed by his troops. The inhabitants, however, were well aware of the real state of affairs, for the Bulgarian aeroplanes dropped proclamations into the town, and soldiers on scouting duty often brought back newspapers which had been left behind on purpose at the Bulgarian outposts. The editor of the Adrianople paper does not appear to have availed himself of these sources of information, but seems to have kept standing in type the plucky assurance, " We are firmly persuaded that we shall be victorious."

The bombardment of the eastern sector, by which the Bulgarians advanced, was very fierce, and the Turks replied by firing round after round of shell, in order to

use up their ammunition and not leave it as spoil to the victors.

The inhabitants themselves seem to have been completely taken by surprise when the Bulgarians marched in. Despite the roar of the bombardment, the city, over which the great white dome of Sultan Selim's mosque rose phantom-like into the night sky, lay sleeping. Suddenly the frightened citizens were awakened by the rush of men. Down the streets in wild confusion hurried the Turkish soldiers, casting away their uniforms and loudly calling for admission to the houses. There was some though little pillage, and the fugitives had soon found hiding-places with their friends. Then was heard the clattering of horses' hoofs through the stony labyrinthine streets. It was the Bulgarian cavalry.

King Ferdinand, accompanied by Princes Boris and Cyril, arrived at Adrianople on Friday, March 28, and entered the town by motor car through endless lines of Turkish prisoners of war. His Majesty then proceeded to the Military Club, where Shukri Pasha was interned, and after seeing his own troops march past, received the captive General, who handed him his sword. The King returned it.

Every square was now a bivouac, every courtyard was filled with horses. The little Turkish cafés were crowded with officers black with grime and sweat. Motor cars flitted about carrying generals and pashas. Thousands of wagons, streams of wounded, filled the streets, over which hung clouds of dust.

But the confusion did not last long. The Bulgarian headquarters were soon installed in the splendid rooms of the old Konak, hung with texts of the Koran inscribed in golden characters upon black grounds, which had housed Shukri Pasha.

Within a week each street had become a bazaar, and itinerant merchants were doing a roaring trade in olives,

goats' milk, cheese, and similar articles. The weather took a turn for the better. The Prefect of the Sofia police worked wonders with the thousands of wagons which were pouring provisions into the town. Unfortunately Shukri had been misinformed when he told General Ivanoff that the health of the army and town were good. Cholera broke out amongst the Turkish prisoners, who were interned upon a large island in the Tundja, approached by two ancient stone bridges. It spread to the Bulgarian troops. For the time all the efforts of the doctors were in vain. Correspondents asked why the tall leafless plane trees on the island were stripped of bark. At the foot of every trunk was a little bivouac. The prisoners had made hollows in the ground to provide themselves with shelters against the wind, and already they seemed half-buried. The men belonging to Adrianople were better off; they had laid aside their uniforms, and their wives brought them bread, sugar, and tea, and if they were asleep, squatted patiently by little fires of twigs to await their wakening. Elsewhere figures in ragged uniforms, with sunken eyes and hollow livid cheeks, huddled in wretched dens. They could scarcely stir to drain muddy water from a dirty pannikin. An insupportable odour rose from the ground. In the background trains of biers were passing over the bridge bearing corpses to the long trenches which served as common graves.*

But one gleam of good fortune was yet to light upon the Turkish arms. A week of fierce fighting before Tchataldja, from March 25 to March 31, ended with the failure of the Bulgarians to pierce the lines.

The object of the Bulgarians was to cut off the Turkish force holding the high ground west of Lake Chekmedje from the main army in the lines. On March 27 and March 28 the Turkish positions were vigorously bom-

* Cf. Luigi Barzini in *Daily Telegraph*.

barded. By a night attack, carried out in heavy rain, the Bulgarians seized the Turkish positions at Lahanakeui. Next morning, however, when the Bulgarians attempted to advance, they were, after a severe struggle, expelled from the position and fell back a couple of miles on either flank. Skirmishing also took place at the southern end of Lake Derkos, and at night the boom of the heavy artillery could be heard at Constantinople. The attack of the Bulgarian infantry on the Chekmedje position was favoured by a fog which hung over the low ground in front of the lines, but they were exposed to a violent flank fire from Fanasakris, were unable to climb the steep hill of Tchataldja, and being vigorously attacked by the Turks, fell back in headlong flight, throwing away their rifles. On the afternoon of March 30 the Turks advanced from Buyuk-Chekmedje against the right wing of the Bulgarian army. The Turkish advance, which was covered by the fire from eight warships, was soon arrested by the Bulgarian troops, whose infantry then made a counter-attack with the bayonet, and forced the Turkish troops to retire in disorder, leaving many dead and wounded on the field.

These partial successes, however, gratified Turkish pride. On March 31 the Ambassadors of the Great Powers at Constantinople submitted to the Porte a Collective Note, by which they communicated to Turkey the proposals for peace elaborated by the Conference of Ambassadors in London and already laid before the Allies.

Turkey accepted these preliminary bases without alteration, although they were more unfavourable to her as regards the Thracian frontier than the ones submitted to the Allies. She placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Europe for the establishment of peace. Instead of a frontier running in a direct line from Enos to Midia, she accepted one which gave the mouth of the River Maritza and the lower course of the River Ergene to Bulgaria.

On April 5 the Allies returned their answer to the same Note. In their reply they stated that they accepted the line proposed for the frontier in Thrace as a basis for negotiation, and not as the definite line. They insisted upon the cession of all the Ægean Islands. They asked that the principle of a war indemnity to be payable by Turkey should be admitted, and that, therefore, all the financial questions should be regulated by a Commission in which the Allies would be represented. They expressed a hope that Albania would be delimited upon the lines which they had suggested in London, although King Nicholas again spoke publicly of Skutari as his capital.

Bulgaria concluded an informal armistice with Turkey on April 16, which was subsequently put into a regular form and extended from April 23 to May 5. Greece and Servia followed her example.

Such was the outcome of the fall of Adrianople, and the second attack on Tchataldja.

We must now, however, retrace our steps to the rupture of the armistice on February 3, in order that we may understand the course of the negotiations between the Powers which had ended in the presentation of the Collective Note offering their mediation between the Allies and Turkey.

CHAPTER XIX

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

HILST the cannon were thundering at Adrianople the efforts of diplomacy to restore peace had not altogether ceased. To the Germans and to the Austrians the victories of the Allies were anathema maranatha. The Germans and the Magyars of Austria-Hungary saw with apprehension the rise of great Slav States at their very doors. Germany trembled as she watched the fabric of Turkish power, which she had done so much to organise, crumble into dust; for the failure of German methods made her dread lest the German Michael, too, might stand on feet of clay. But Austria could not, as she would have done, throw her sword into the scale. The churches, schools, and barns throughout Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia might be crowded with her half-starved, half-frozen reservists, and her gunboats might cluster like threatening sharks about Belgrade, but she could not let her armies from the leash. Beyond the Galician frontier lay embattled the great hosts of Russia in a Poland seething with disaffection; and the Christmas trade of Vienna must be paralysed, and the columns of her newspapers be filled with bankruptcies, whilst the trader, the doctor, and the peasant shivered on the Vistula, to keep the Russian eagles from swooping down to the rescue of their Slav brothers on the Maritza and the Morava. Austrian credit seemed gone.

The one hope for Austria lay in her aged Emperor. At last Francis Joseph acted. He sent Prince Gottfried

Hohenlohe, a man well known and loved in Russia, a soldier, not a diplomatist, to St. Petersburg with an autograph letter from himself to the Russian Tsar, and all Europe waited in deep anxiety for the result of that fateful audience. But the dreary days of February passed on, and nothing was made known to the public as to the nature of the Tsar's reply. Day after day the reservists—Austrian and Russian—waited for the orders dismissing them to their homes; day after day they saw their hopes deferred. At last the official *communiqué* appeared, and profound was the disappointment of the public. In words at least a partial demobilisation was promised, in practice that demobilisation was still delayed by a wrangle as to its details. On February 25 the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, informed an influential Parliamentary deputation that there existed well-founded hope of a general slackening of international tension in the not distant future. On the morrow the semi-official *Fremdenblatt* belittled the significance of this declaration, which was said to have been made in agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in a leading article which the *Neue Freie Presse* rightly described as a "semi-official polemic against Count Stürgkh." The *Fremdenblatt* spoke of Count Stürgkh's statement as an acknowledgment, with thanks, of the Russian Premier's friendly words to an Austrian publicist, and added that it strengthened the frame of mind created by the efforts of the Great Powers to reconcile antagonisms, "as far as this is compatible at all with the protection of the weightiest interests." But the two Premiers could say nothing concrete, and could only express hopes and wishes. The *Fremdenblatt* proceeded to draw a black picture of the situation in various parts of the Balkans, to allude pessimistically to the Bulgaro-Rumanian dispute, and to the Albanian question "which is by no means settled, but still shows, on the contrary, considerable differences of opinion."

The conciliatory spirit already shown by Austria in this and other questions rendered the bridging over of these antagonisms a matter of great difficulty.

On the other hand, the clerico-military *Reichspost* gave out that Prince Hohenlohe's mission to St. Petersburg had now been attended by a gladdening result. The Russian Government had declared its readiness to countermand the special military measures taken on the Galician frontier. A part of the Austrian reservists called to the colours in Galicia would be discharged, and these announcements were to be published at the same time in Vienna and St. Petersburg. The *Reichspost* added that this first step towards an Austro-Russian agreement would be warmly welcomed, although serious differences still existed with regard to four points of the Albanian question. Servia made some reservations on the subject of Durazzo; the guarantees for the security of Skutari and of the adjacent littoral were not yet settled, and the future of Djakova and Dibra was still contested. Besides, the situation might at any moment be complicated by the fall of Skutari. Nevertheless the *Reichspost* expressed confidence in the triumph of pacific tendencies, and averred its readiness to rejoice over every step taken in the direction of peace,without sacrifice of the prestige and the vital interests of the Monarchy.

Such was the situation at Vienna on February 26. What wonder that the Austro-Hungarian public was utterly bewildered. Cool observers, however, saw no apparent reason why Count Berchtold's diplomacy and the pacific will of the Emperor should not triumph in the end.

This prediction proved correct. An identic Austro-Russian *communiqué* was published as to the partial demobilisation; but much wrangling ensued as to a postscript which was attached to it by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, to the effect that the recent conversa-

tions had shown that Austria did not cherish aggressive designs against her southern neighbours. This postscript, which alluded to an "understanding with the Vienna Cabinet" as the source of the Russian conviction that an attack on Servia was not contemplated, was the outcome of negotiations subsequent to Prince Hohenlohe's mission. It was followed by Press comments in Austria which taxed the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs with disloyal conduct. These allegations were withdrawn in a manner which, as the *Zeit* pointed out, reflected but little credit on Count Berchtold's talent for Press management. Fortunately, however, these disputes, which were chiefly inspired by—to foreign eyes—very unnecessary *amour propre*, did not affect the situation. By March 16 the discharged reservists were gradually returning from Galicia, others were granted leave of absence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, whilst the fleet returned to Pola. The one outstanding interest for Austria was the fate of Skutari, but Austrian observers thought diplomacy must be left to go its own way. "Let us assume," wrote the *Zeit*, "that Skutari has fallen. Then, if there is unity in Europe, let it be unanimously settled what is to be done. That is the real task. Everything else is but play and pretence." Cynical German writers remarked, however, that only 22,000 Austrian reservists had been discharged, in comparison with 350,000 Russian time-expired men. Evidently Austria knew "no argument but force" where Southern Slavs were concerned.

The history of Prince Hohenlohe's mission has been carried to its conclusion, because the first steps taken in the matter dated from before February 3, when the armistice in the Balkans came to an end, and fighting was renewed round Adrianople. To the beginning of February, then, we must now go back in order to get some idea of what position the combatants were in when the struggle was renewed.

It was supposed that Izzet Pasha, who had succeeded the murdered Nazim as Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, had 200,000 men at his disposal behind the Tchataldja lines, and another 50,000 in the Gallipoli Peninsula. There were probably 40,000 men left in Adrianople, and there were besides the garrisons of Yanina and Skutari, but all these garrisons were restricted to a defensive rôle, unless a Turkish field army should appear to relieve them.

But in Epirus, in Albania, and in Macedonia no such army was in existence, with the exception of a few scattered forces in Albania and of 40,000 men under Djavid Pasha, who, in the course of March, were destined to surrender to the Servians near Monastir. I have already described how Enver Bey's efforts to take the offensive were foiled, and his failure seems to have inclined the Young Turks to peace, even if peace involved the surrender of Adrianople, a difficult matter for men who had made a revolution to save Adrianople, and some of whose firmest supporters were amongst the officers of the Adrianople garrison.

The Turkish Government decided to resort to diplomatic measures, and even to its usual policy of bakshish to secure the favour of the Powers. A new vali was appointed to the Lebanon, it was said on the recommendation of M. Bompard, the French Ambassador at Constantinople. Hakki Pasha was despatched to London with an offer to the British Government to open negotiations relative to the granting of certain British requirements in connection with the extension of the Bagdad Railway towards the Persian Gulf and the future status of Koweit, with which, it may be added, our diplomatists do not consider that Turkey has any claim to meddle, in return for the promise of British diplomatic support to the Ottoman claims to half of Adrianople and the islands, as laid before the Powers in the Porte's answer to the Collective Note. The Deutsche Bank

was promised the concession for the Tube Railway from Stambul under the Golden Horn to Galata.

All these offers, real or imaginary, met with no success. Europe was not to be lured into such very palpable nets.

At the same time stories were circulated as to the massacres of Macedonian Moslems by the allies. It was alleged that Moslems had been massacred at Seres, in the Strumnitza region, and between Gumuldjina and Keshan. Christians had suffered in the Drama-Nevrokop zone, where over 800 Bulgarians were killed on November 4 at the village of Plevna, 182 were burned in a barracks near Demir-Hissar, while many more were slain in the Djuma-i-Bala-Nevrokop region and in the country between Gumuldjina and Keshan.

What wonder if a few undisciplined Komitadjis avenged on Moslems the murder of these hundreds of helpless and innocent victims? But their acts were sternly discountenanced by the Bulgarian administration. The guilty were severely punished.

European opinion remained unmoved. The Turkish Cabinet began to see that like its predecessor it must bow to the inevitable. Its position was a ticklish one, for it by no means enjoyed the undivided support of the army and knew that a counter-revolution might break out at Constantinople itself at any moment. As I have already said, Enver Bey's life was, undoubtedly, threatened when he visited the Tchataldja lines, where as early as the beginning of February there was a very serious brawl, resulting in about 160 wounded men being sent to the hospitals on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. On February 3, gendarmes and policemen took the place of the soldiers on duty at the Porte, where the guards were doubled, showing that Government expected an outbreak. Some of the Kurdish levies, especially the irregular horsemen of the Milli clan, whose chief,

Ibrahim Pasha Milli, of Viranshehr, had been attacked by troops shortly after the proclamation of the Constitution and killed, were rather restive. The Anti-Committee organisation had also shown unexpected strength, and forced the Government to water down their intended policy considerably. Only one of that organisation, Ferid Pasha, who had presided over the court-martial which ordered the arrest of a number of members of the Committee shortly after the defeat of Lule Burgas, and was afterwards deprived of his post by Nazim Pasha's orders, was in any way punished. He was appointed to the command of a reserve division at Diarbekr.

Thus on February 14 the first overtures for peace were made in the independent newspaper *Tanin*. "Why," it asked, "should we deny facts? We can deceive neither the nation nor ourselves. Tripoli prepared the way for the loss of Rumili (the European provinces). Let Turkey be aware lest the loss of Rumili be the prelude to the loss of Constantinople and the Straits. The time for illusions is past."

A period of doubt and stagnation followed. The Government was able to obtain sufficient cash to meet its most pressing needs by the issue of Treasury bonds, the sale of concessions, and other expedients. But the civilian opponents of the Committee made party capital alike out of financial successes and military reverses. Arab and Armenian elements recommenced their criticisms of the Central Government. The Committee in the first flush of their success had openly discussed the convocation of the last Parliament, which had been "unconstitutionally" dissolved by Mukhtar Pasha, immediately after the conclusion of an honourable peace. Parliament, therefore, necessarily played an important part in their calculations. Owing to the loss of the European provinces, the Arab element would

in that Parliament gain a considerable relative increase of strength. The Committee, therefore, made offers of decentralisation to the southerners, which, for the time, seem to have pacified them.

The army, too, was more divided than ever. The differences which raged between the "Committee" officers and "Halaskiaran" were rendered yet more bitter by the quarrels which centred on the personality of Enver Bey. After his failure at Sharkeui he had returned with the Tenth Corps to San Stefano. He had been there but two or three days when he was accused by many officers, not a few of whom were politically neutral, of interfering with military appointments and commands in a way to benefit the Committee rather than the army.

It was natural that Enver Bey should be hated, for no honourable officer can respect a comrade, however talented, who had identified himself with a political outbreak which had led to the murder of his Commander-in-Chief, and whose military talents had been manifested against helpless old men at the Porte rather than against the Bulgarians in the field. The agitation increased in Constantinople as military discontent increased at San Stefano.

It was from a capital seething with conspiracy that the Porte sent on February 28 to demand the mediation of Europe. Mahmud Shevket Pasha had never concealed his desire for an honourable peace, and most of his colleagues in the Cabinet supported him. But it was not easy to persuade many of the members of the Committee that peace might have to be signed, if not on the League's terms, at least on the basis of the Joint Note of January 17. The Rumeliote deputies who were present at several meetings of the Committee, of which, indeed, an ex-member for Adrianople was a prominent member, were specially hard to convince.

The opposition of the military had to be taken into account, and the organisers of the *coup d'état* knew that it was they who would run the greatest risks if the Government fell after the conclusion of peace. The promise that a new Parliament should be elected directly after peace was signed, and that no attempt should be made to reassemble the discredited Rump of that dissolved by Mukhtar Pasha, failed to satisfy the malcontents. At last officers, including, it was said, Enver Bey, were sent to negotiate with them. They bore a message somewhat to the following effect: "The country needs peace and internal tranquillity. We cannot make peace alone. To obtain your support for a peace policy we offer you a certain number of seats in the Cabinet. The Coalition Ministry will make peace and immediately order a general election. The new Parliament will judge between us. We demand your support on patriotic grounds."

The Committee Party were paying dearly for their headstrong conduct on January 23. They had to lose Turkey as much or more than Kiamil Pasha would have done, and popular vengeance would fall, they feared, upon their heads. This the opposition clearly saw, and refused the overtures. They were supported by half the junior officers in the army, who clamoured to try one more pitched battle in the field, whether Adrianople fell or not. Only then would they confess that Turkey was beaten. But the would-be combatants were kept apart by a sea of mud.

Europe had consented to mediate, but the proposals put forward by the Allies were generally seen to be absolutely unacceptable. It was supposed that they were intended merely as the prelude to a bargain. Consequently diplomatic opinion favoured a plan for considering the Allies' reply as an acceptance of mediation, whilst pressure should be brought upon

them to secure its modification or withdrawal. In the end it was certain that the Powers themselves would have to formulate the conditions of peace. The negotiations, however, were likely to prove long and difficult, as the Powers had lost prestige not only by their fiasco at the beginning of the war, but by the wrangle between Russia and Austria as to the delimitation of Albania. Hence both the Allies and Turkey were, in a sense, disposed to treat their mandates with polite contempt. Once again it seemed as if Turkey would be saved by the disunion of the European Powers.

The Allies also were fighting amongst themselves. The friction was especially great between Greece and Bulgaria. Greeks and Bulgarians had come to blows at Nigrita, and the collision had provoked some sharp discussions in the Bulgarian Sobranye and in the Greek Chamber.

The proposals were, therefore, not taken too tragically at Constantinople in official circles. There was absolutely no doubt that the Turkish Government were prepared to cede Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and to leave the question of the islands in the Ægean to the Powers. It might even agree to set off certain claims made by the Allies for the maintenance of prisoners of war and the commandeering of merchant vessels, against the portion of their share of the Public Debt charges in the districts which the Porte expected to be compelled to cede.

The financial question was, indeed, that in which for the moment Europe was most keenly interested. If Turkey had to pay a war indemnity it was the financiers of Europe who would be called upon to provide her with the means to pay it. How could a Turkey reduced to a strip of territory in Thrace, in Asia Minor, and in Syria give them any security for the loan? On the other hand, the Balkan States pointed out with some justice that their finances had been seriously injured

by the war, that they had counted on the Turkish indemnity as a collateral security for their war expenditure, and that it was the financiers of Europe who were the persons most deeply interested in the maintenance of their credit.

The question was rendered still more complicated by the fact that whilst Germany held very large stakes in Turkey, French financiers held very large stakes both in Turkey and in the Balkan States, and, therefore, could only speak on the subject with a divided voice.

But apart from economic considerations, there were military, naval, and political aspects of the questions at issue which were of equal importance. The Turco-Bulgarian delimitation involved the question of the defence of Constantinople and the Straits, and with that question of the Straits, the international position of Russia as a Maritime Power was inextricably interwoven. Bulgaria claimed a portion of the European coast-line of the Sea of Marmora. It was impossible for Russia to support the Bulgarian claims until the question of the Straits was, in her opinion, ripe for settlement. She would not complicate it by giving a second Power access to the Sea of Marmora which would have a right to claim admission to any conference on the subject. It is sometimes forgotten that Rumania, as a littoral power on the Black Sea, and as the possessor of a good though small navy, has, like Russia, a claim to be consulted on the question of the Straits, and that her voice, though she is not formally a member of the Triple Alliance, might well formulate their wishes on such a subject. A Bulgaria, puffed up with victory, and already a Black Sea Power, might, if she obtained a coast-line on the Sea of Marmora, prove a very awkward obstacle in the path of Russia to the open sea.

Consequently the question of the frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria came to be one of a line drawn

across Thrace from the Black Sea to the Ægean, and for this line several schemes were put forward.

The Porte favoured one drawn from Enos, on the Ægean, and lying on the east bank of the River Maritza, to Midia on the Black Sea, 52 miles south-east of Burgas, and, therefore, well to the north-west of the entrance to the Bosphorus.

The retention of Enos would secure to Turkey the possession of the whole of the Gulf of Saros, which lies between the Peninsula of Gallipoli, forming the western coast of the Dardanelles, and the mainland of Thrace. Were the Gulf of Saros in hostile hands it would be easy at any time to attempt to take the European forts of the Dardanelles in the rear.

Enos itself cannot be called a very desirable acquisition. It is a town of 7000 inhabitants, mostly Greeks, who outnumbered the Bulgarians, two to one, before the war, and it lies in a malarious marsh. Its harbour is choked with sand, and admits only small vessels; others have to anchor four miles out in a roadstead exposed to the south-west winds. But such as Enos is, it commands both the entrance to the Maritza and to the wide plains around it. Dedeagatch, which lies twelve miles to the north-west, connected by rail with Dimotika and the line from Adrianople to Constantinople, and which possesses an insecure roadstead without good anchorage, is the only port to which Bulgaria can lay an absolute claim. The harbour of Kavala, the birthplace of the famous Egyptian ruler Mahomet Ali, lying far away to the westward of Dedeagatch, on a gulf of its own name, sheltered by the island of Thasos, affords, it is true, a far better port, but it is not only from a physical point of view less accessible from the plain of the Maritza and the central regions of Bulgaria, but is situated in a Greek-speaking region, and forms part of the Macedonian province of Drama.

Consequently Bulgaria, whilst claiming in any case to retain Enos, asked for the whole coast-line of the Gulf of Saros, and when her request was refused by the Powers, suggested that the new frontier should start from a point ten miles to the east of Enos.

Iniada did not long figure in the negotiations as the proposed terminal point of the frontier in the Black Sea. Its place was taken by Midia, the spot where Enver Bey had landed troops in a vain attempt to cut the line of the Bulgarian communications with Tchataldja, but which is otherwise of no special importance. It lies at the foot of the rolling forest-clad Istrandja Mountains, on an exposed coast-line facing the Black Sea and sparsely inhabited by a population which is mostly Greek. The Enos-Midia line was proposed by Russia in order to end the war speedily.

The question of the delimitation of the line running between these terminal points assumed a still greater prominence in the negotiations. The solutions proposed were: 1. A straight line Enos–Iniada. 2. A straight line Enos–Midia. 3. A line following the course of the Maritza River and its great left-bank affluent the Ergene. 4. A variation of this line would have carried the frontier up one of the right-bank affluents of the Ergene, either the Uskub Dere or the Karagatch Dere, so as to leave Lule Burgas to Turkey. Either line meant giving back to Turkey districts which had been administered by Bulgaria for months. However, the majority of their populations is Moslem.

The question of the Ægean Islands concerned Greece and Italy rather than Turkey, except as regards the islands lying near the Dardanelles and on the coast of Asia Minor, those in the first group being Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, and Tenedos, in the second, Mitylene, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. At the instance of Italy, who dreads the rise of Greece as a naval rival

on the flank of her road to Africa, the Great Powers have retained the settlement of this question in their own hands. Throughout the discussion the Triple Entente supported Greece, the Triple Alliance Italy.

An equally difficult problem, which was well calculated to awaken hopes of dissensions between the Powers in the breasts of Turkish statesmen, was that of the compensation which Bulgaria was to give to Rumania for having remained neutral during the war. The Rumanian sovereign is by birth a member of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns, and is thus a distant kinsman of the German Emperor. It is true that King Charles has never formally entered the Triple Alliance, yet it is certain that his foreign policy is conducted in accordance with its behests. As Herr von Jägow, the German Foreign Minister, said in his speech on the German Foreign Office Estimates on April 14, "Our efforts on behalf of Rumania have been made, in the first place, on the ground of our long-standing relations of friendship to that country, and, in the second place, because Rumania was the only Balkan State which fulfilled the wish of the Powers that it should not intervene. Under the wise government of King Charles Rumania has always been an element of peace and order." It is, perhaps, foreign to the point to inquire whether the neutrality of Rumania at this juncture was inspired by a wish to keep her powder dry, so that she may be prepared, if the Austrian Empire breaks up on Kaiser Francis Joseph's death, to restore the kingdom of Dacia by incorporating the Rumanians in Hungary, Transylvania, and Bukowina. Such was not the argument advanced by her diplomatists.

Her claims as against Bulgaria were very ably stated in a letter to *The Times* dated from Bukarest, February 19, by M. A. C. Catargi, who during ten years was Rumanian Minister in England. His Excellency wrote: "Our

attitude during the present war has been as frank and open as possible. We must not forget that the first thing which the Allies did was to proclaim that they had no territorial aggrandisement in view, and that their sole object was to force Turkey to carry out the Treaty of Berlin both in the letter and in the spirit. On their side the Powers proclaimed officially that they would not allow the *status quo* to be infringed." Rumania, he went on, might have followed the example of Austria and Russia by mobilising a part of her army, but she preferred to aid the cause of peace by a benevolent neutrality and did not call a single man to the colours. When, however, the Balkan States threw off the mask, Rumania could not allow the Treaty of Berlin, by which she had been forced to cede Bessarabia to Russia, to be torn up without protesting. It was a question of national honour. As it was impossible for her to recover Bessarabia, she was entitled to claim compensation in other quarters, and it was no disloyal act upon her part to claim it from Bulgaria.

"I will only adduce the following facts to show that after having shed our blood to call Bulgaria into being, we have never ceased to support her as she took her first tottering steps into the world. In 1877 we decided the war by taking Plevna, and thus delivered the Bulgarians from the age-long yoke of Turkey.

"In 1885 Servia asked us to help her in crushing Bulgaria and to share in the spoils. I can state this all the more positively because I was personally informed by my nephew, King Milan, of the proposals which he then made to my sovereign and which would have given us the whole of the territory between the Danube and the Balkans. They were refused by the Rumanian Government. In 1887 Stambuloff came to offer King Charles the crown of Bulgaria, and proposed the personal union of the two countries under his rule. His Majesty

declined the offer. Had we mobilised in September we should have prevented the Bulgarian Army from gathering the laurels of Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas. We refrained from making the slightest military demonstration. Now that the Treaty of Berlin is to be torn up, we have given Bulgaria a friendly hint that, in that case, we intended to obtain reparation for a crying injustice, but we still refrained from mobilising to support our diplomatic efforts. No one can assert that we have no claim to some compensation because we have taken no part in the war. I will only cite the modern instances of Austria-Hungary obtaining Bosnia and Herzegovina and England Cyprus on grounds which were certainly fair enough, but far weaker than our own case."

Fortunately both Bulgaria and Rumania decided to refer the question to the mediation of the Powers.

The Rumanian demands included the cession of the town of Silistria with the important positions round it, the rectification of the frontier of the Dobruja, by the cession of various territories which lay in the way of the development of that province, and the cession of a strip of coast-line lying to the south of the port of Mangalia, so as to allow that harbour to be developed as a naval base. To the Rumanians the question of Silistria was chiefly important because of the existence of an island in the Danube in front of that town which, if in their hands, would enable them to connect the Dobruja with Wallachia by a bridge across the river. To the Bulgarians the fact that the town had a large Bulgarian population was conclusive against the cession, whilst the well-known refusal of Rumania to carry out Art. 44 of the Treaty of Berlin, by which she had guaranteed the civil and religious rights of the Rumanian Jews, rendered various important politicians unwilling to see any Bulgarian Jews transferred to her rule. The

Bulgarian peasants, likewise, in the districts proposed to be ceded, commenced an agitation against the suggestion. Their experiences when living as emigrants in Rumania, as many of them annually do, have given them no love for the Rumanians. The Bulgarians, though unwilling to cede Silistria itself, were thought to be prepared to dismantle its fortifications, including those of Medjidieh-Tabia; to permit Rumania to fortify positions commanding the district, and to construct a bridge at any point; and finally to meet the wishes of Rumania as regards the Dobruja frontier line and Mangalia, whilst granting special liberties to Rumanian co-religionaries in Macedonia. It may be added that there is no special ground for the interest which Rumania manifests in her Macedonian brethren, as the people themselves—the Kutzo-Wallachians—absolutely reject the relationship, although there are some proofs in the Byzantine historians that a Rumanian dialect was spoken in those countries in the sixth or seventh century.

There was some diplomatic wrangling before the question was finally submitted to the mediation of the Powers, since whilst Bulgaria accepted the proposal unreservedly, Rumania made reservations; but in the end the matter was placed in the hands of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg.

The question, however, was not to be settled without a bloodless war.

CHAPTER XX

AFTER THE FIRST WAR

HE war has at last come to its close. What is to be its outcome? Vast territories have been wrested from Turkey, dependent for the possession of Constantinople and of the territories left to it in Europe solely upon the jealousies of nations anxious as to the naval balance of power. Russia has gained little, Austria and Italy somewhat by the war; but whilst Russia has gained the love both of the Servians and the Montenegrins, Austria and Italy have won the undying hatred of both the Serbs and the Greeks. It is true that both Austria and Italy were in the right so far as the constitution of the Albanian nation is concerned, but Montenegro will not soon forget the loss of Skutari, nor will Greece forgive the Power which cost her so much of Southern Albania and which may, in the end, leave so many islands in the Archipelago peopled by the Greek race under Turkish rule. The short-sighted policy of Italy may yet prove to be one unworthy of the countrymen of Macchiavelli. She will gain little in the end by having substituted Rhodes or Chios for Crete, as storm centres in the Near East, even if by doing so she has delayed for a few years the rise of Greece as a naval power. Her policy has cost her the friendship of the Hellenic race, and it is as yet uncertain whether either Austria or Italy has won that of the Albanians in any real or tangible shape.

Rumania has obtained Silistria and a belt of territory covering her communications through the Dobrudja with the sea, but her acquisitions have earned her the hatred of the Bulgarians. It is as yet uncertain whether she remains a Balkan Power or whether her recent policy has ousted her from that orbit and left her a kind of Holland in Eastern Europe. The future of Albania is even more uncertain, even though the constitution of an autonomous Albania with a southern frontier at the Kalama leaves the entrance to the Adriatic and the great harbour of Vallona in the hands of a Power which self-interest will lead the Triple Alliance to support. Turkey in Europe will yet form the object of Bulgarian jealousy unless, indeed, her frontier in Thrace is, in the end, so delimited as to leave Bulgaria no ground for seeking further territorial acquisitions so as to secure her access to the Ægean at Enos. The course of the campaign before the lines of Tchataldja must have taught Bulgaria that she can never hope to reach Constantinople without extraneous aid, and that aid the support of a maritime power.

Such is the position in the Balkans in the middle of September 1913. It is not one which gives a very satisfactory outlook for their immediate future. Yet possibly that future may be full of promise.

Just as Austria was formed into an Empire under the pressure of the Turks, and held together long enough to become an indispensable element in the constitution of Europe, so, under the pressure of Austria and Italy, backed up by Germany, the Balkan peoples, with or without Rumania and certainly for the moment without Constantinople, may be forced to reconstitute the Eastern Empire.

In the reconstitution of an Eastern Empire on the German model, that is to say of an Empire consisting of Federal States, retaining to a carefully defined extent

their own individualities, but governed by a hereditary ruler chosen, in the first instance, by the confederated States, with a common Imperial Council and a common Parliament, and united by a Customs Union, lies the best hope of peace for the Balkan States and the world. That Eastern Empire can only be held together by Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria as its hereditary sovereign, and it will be for the best interests of Greece, of Servia, of Montenegro, and of Albania if they recognise this fact. In this age of democracy such an empire can only be constituted by the will of the peoples, and of the Balkan peoples the majority are Slavs. Consequently their Emperor must be a Slav, and of the three Slav-Balkan rulers the Tsar of Bulgaria is undisputably the foremost. Moreover, his election would not awaken the jealousy of the Triple Alliance in the same measure as would that of the King of Servia or the King of Montenegro, for a Bulgarian Tsar would have no reason, as I have tried to show elsewhere, to wish to strengthen the purely Slav element in the Empire by drawing the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary into its orbit, thus making the Servians practically the masters of a Balkan Parliament.

Is it impossible that such an Empire might be formed with the cordial goodwill of Europe?

I think the chief difficulty which stands in the way is that of the naval balance of power in the Mediterranean; in other words, the questions of the Albanian coast harbours and of the Ægean Islands, more particularly Rhodes and Astypalaea.

Such an Empire can do much to satisfy Austria and Germany, whose interests in the Balkan Peninsula are mainly financial and economic. It can give guarantees to the financiers of Europe which cannot be given either by Turkey or by the Balkan States as isolated entities. Its constitution would open up new fields

for European enterprise and would do much to preserve peace in the Balkans and, therefore, in Europe, for it would at once decide all the existing disputes as to the delimitation of the territories wrung from the Turks, and would leave the Balkan peoples free to devote themselves to the task of developing those unpeopled wastes.

But by what means can the assent of Europe to the re-establishment of an Eastern Empire be obtained?

Perhaps by the same means as those which were employed to secure the consent of the Powers to the division of Morocco into spheres of French and Spanish influence, by the means employed in the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, the Franco-German Conventions of 1904 and 1911, and the Treaty of 1912 between France and Spain.

Let the peoples of the Balkans offer Europe guarantees that the present Turkish tariff system will be maintained in perpetuity, that the railways will be regulated so as to give trade perfect equality and freedom, that the Jews, Moslem and non-Orthodox populations shall be given full religious and civil equality, and that the same guarantees as those given with regard to the fortifications round Tangier shall be applied to certain strategic points in the Ægean and on the Albanian coast, and I believe that it would be possible to secure the consent of the Powers, especially if the portion of the debt taken over from Turkey were made a Federal charge. Such guarantees an Eastern Empire, of which the majority of the inhabitants would be members of the Greek Orthodox Church, could well afford to give.

In these days it is only weak countries who are, as a rule, intolerant. Strong Governments rarely are so.

The creation of such an Empire is an economic necessity imposed upon the Balkan States by two considerations—(1) the position of the two Serb peoples;

(2) the position of Salonika ; and is, though in a somewhat less degree, a necessity of almost vital importance to Greece, perhaps even to Albania.

I have placed these considerations in the order of their relative importance, for I think that though it is always dangerous to prophesy as to politics, Servia will be the first Balkan Power to call for the creation of that Balkans Customs Union which will be the origin of the Eastern Empire, just as the Zollverein formed the first step in the development of the German Confederation into the German Empire of to-day.

The Chambers of Commerce of Belgrade and of Sofia have already endeavoured to render the commercial relations between Bulgaria and Servia more close, and even at Bukarest faint whispers have been heard as to the desirability of a Balkans Customs Union in which Rumania may be included. But it is Servia from whom the first proposals for such a Customs Union will probably come; for to liberate her commerce from economic dependence upon Austria she must have access to the sea, and it is only through a Customs Union that she can obtain that access unless at the cost of incurring the deadly enmity of Bulgaria and Greece if she seeks to reach the Ægean, or by undertaking great expenditure on building a railway from Prizrend down the White or Black Drin valley by either Podgoritza or Skutari to the Adriatic coast, merely to acquire an outlet which she can only enjoy by the goodwill of Montenegro or of Albania. The only independent inland State in Europe is Switzerland, and, were it not that Switzerland, from her geographical position, is an absolutely necessary member of the European family, she would soon be crushed out of existence under economic pressure from her rivals. Servia has no such guarantees; by Austria, at all events, she is regarded simply as a nuisance, and thus an assured outlet to the

sea is for her of the most vital importance. This outlet she can obtain as a member of an Eastern Empire formed on the model of the German Empire, in which she would hold the same position with regard to Salonika which Bavaria occupies with respect to Hamburg. It is therefore, I think, from Servia that the first impulse towards the creation of an Eastern Empire may come.

Nor is the problem a less vital one for Salonika. To Salonika the Hinterland of the Vardar Valley is what access to the sea is for Servia, the absolute breath of her economic life. Greece will gain nothing by the possession of Salonika, if Salonika is shut out from her Hinterland by Servian or Bulgarian Customs barriers. Salonika will only attain her full growth if she becomes the greatest port of a Balkans Customs Union destined to grow into an Eastern Empire.

To Greece the creation of an Eastern Empire is equally important. Her acquisitions in the Archipelago will render it necessary for her to become a naval power; and, what is more, a strong naval power if she is to defend possessions of such strategic value as Suda Bay against Powers desirous of obtaining coaling stations in the Ægean. Her new acquisitions in the Archipelago will entail upon her an expenditure for which they will bring her little economic compensation, and Greece by herself can do but little to meet a fresh unproductive outlay. She requires all her resources to develop her own neglected lands.

An independent Greece will be the puppet of every Power with a strong navy in Mediterranean waters; as a member of an Eastern Empire she will be able to speak with her enemies in the gate. Which is the more prosperous—a Bavaria which in the eighteenth century was the puppet of France, or the Bavaria of to-day strong as a member of the German Empire, and yet in full possession of her rights and of her freedom?

Where would the factories of Nuremberg be to-day were not Bavaria protected by the German navy?

Albania's harbours will always attract the greed of her neighbours. To an Eastern Empire the incorporation of Albania would be of advantage both by removing a source of perpetual trouble from its borders, and by the acquisition of a race who, whatever may be their faults, have given the Turkish Empire good soldiers, industrious workers, and even some capable administrators.

Finally, to Montenegro, as a member of an Eastern Empire, boundary questions would matter little. For the Montenegrin what is necessary is to obtain access to the sea and to the plain. If he can reach the sea through Durazzo or Alessio, and if he can settle in the fertile plains of Macedonia, as a citizen and not as an alien, the question of the boundaries of Montenegro itself will be as unimportant as that of the precise boundaries between Baden and Bavaria are to a Bavarian to-day. Yet, within a year of Waterloo, at a time when the German States were united merely by a loose political Confederation, whilst keeping up to the full the Customs barriers which had kept them apart for centuries as if by some Great Wall of China Europe was within an ace of being once more involved in war by a boundary dispute concerning a few square miles of territory between Bavaria and Baden.

The consolidation of Germany and the unification of Italy have made for the preservation of peace in Europe. The constitution of a Balkan Empire will have the same tendency; and except as regards Constantinople, there is no reason to suppose that an Eastern Empire, which will have enough to do to develop its own internal resources, will become an aggressive or a colonising power.

I would first give my reasons why I think the Eastern Empire should, in the main, take the Constitution of the German Empire as its model.

Briefly, this Constitution is the only one in existence which has succeeded in reconciling the claims to independent existence of Monarchical States with an historic past, and with populations stable and with strongly marked distinctive racial characteristics with those of a Central Government. The experiences of British India are beside the point. Nor are the conditions of the United States of America or even of Switzerland quite identical with those of Germany, for in neither do considerations of dynastic interests come into question, whilst the national existence of Switzerland is assured by the self-interests of the neighbouring Powers.

Whatever may be the defects of the German Constitution as to the relations between the Reichstag and the Emperor, between the Legislative and the Executive Powers, there can be no doubt that it is a singularly happy contrivance for uniting in one common body fitted for common action twenty-six independent States separated by their histories, by their racial and by their economic characteristics, and which but the other day were sovereign in all but name. The Bundesrath is as efficient from the point of view of the State and its rulers, as from the point of view of the individual and the subject the Reichstag is defective. The existence of a State Council in which no one State has a dominating majority but which, in the last resort, does exercise a real control over the policy of the Confederation whether at home or abroad, enables the confederated States to maintain their existence as independent entities in many essential particulars. The Bavarian peasant knows himself to be a citizen of the mighty German Empire; in all the everyday relations of life he remains a Bavarian. Forms and externals which to a Court and to a Government mean so much are rigorously observed. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at Munich transacts business not only with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

in London, but with the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Berlin: in the Bavarian capital reside not only Ministers Plenipotentiary from France and England, but there are Prussian and Saxon Legations, with a complete staff of members of the diplomatic profession, and a Consulate General for Würtemberg. Indeed the German Ambassador to Russia has often been the tenant of a Legation by the Isar before he mounted to the banks of the Neva. There are Bavarian Legations at Rome and at Paris, and in the absence of the German representative to those capitals the Bavarian envoy *de jure* takes his place. Whilst he is present, the Bavarian envoy is only bound to conform himself to his instructions.

Nor are the internal liberties of Bavaria, even of Hamburg, less completely respected. A Bavarian Parliament summoned in the name of the Bavarian king legislates at Munich. The military administration of Bavaria is conducted in the name of its King; only in time of war does the command pass into the hands of the German Emperor as War Lord. The legislation is promulgated in his name, in which also the work of judicial and civil legislation is conducted. The coins and the stamps bear his image and superscription; the blue-white flag of Bavaria is far more familiar to the peasant than is the red-white-black emblem of the Empire. Bavaria pays a matricular contribution to the Empire, but the taxes out of which it is defrayed are determined by the Bavarian Parliament. The Jesuit who is, in law, forbidden to enter Prussian territory is welcomed in the Bavarian pulpits. Finally, the Bavarian sovereign still reigns by the grace of God, and Kaiser William is his equal, not his sovereign, for he reigns as German Emperor, not Emperor of the Germans, as *primus inter pares*, first amongst his equals, not as *Dominus Imperator*, their sovereign and Emperor.

In short, Bavaria retains all those prerogatives of

a sovereign State which she did not renounce to the Empire in 1870 by solemn treaty, and, in return, she is left full liberty at home, where the Prussian official counts for as little in the life of the ordinary Bavarian citizen as he does in that of the ordinary Frenchman. Abroad she can make her will respected in the Councils of the Empire, for she is *de jure* the President of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is convoked in the gravest crises to decide as to their conduct, and in that Committee Prussia does not control the majority of votes, whilst, as in the case of Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chancellor may be a Bavarian and not a Prussian subject. Nor, as we have lately seen in the discussions as to the Military Contribution and, indeed, as to the position of the Jesuit Order in Bavaria, can the wishes of the individual States of the Empire as to the conduct of affairs at home be altogether disregarded by the Imperial Government.

Such is the constitution of the German Empire of to-day, and it is easy to see what a good model it affords for the constitution of the future Eastern Empire. That constitution, whilst repecting the rights and liberties of the individual State, of the individual dynasty, and of the individual citizen as a member of his own State, does secure a degree of central control which during forty-two years has held together twenty-six independent units—ranging in size from Prussia to a free city like Lübeck with a population scarcely as large as Brighton, or a Principality like Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt which in England would not be a constituency large enough to return even an Irish Member—into a body which is, perhaps, the most powerful State in the world for action abroad, and which at home has grown in the same interval from an impoverished country with thirty millions of inhabitants to a wealthy nation of sixty millions. Let the States of the Balkan League take the

German Constitution as their model, let Bulgaria furnish the elected legal hereditary ruler as Roman Emperor of that Empire, and let the other States assume by treaty the position of Bavaria, with the same rights and the same prerogatives. Let there be a Customs, but not a Railway Union. Let the Empire have an Imperial flag, a common commercial code, a coinage differing only in the emblems inscribed upon it, and an Imperial army and navy organised upon the German system; finally, let the capital be Salonika, and the Eastern Empire, in which Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Albania can take their places side by side as equals, will speak with a potent voice in the Councils of Europe and can wait in patience for the day when Constantinople, not Salonika, will be its capital; for, thanks to the Bulgarian failure before Tchataldja, and to the prudence, to use no harsher word, of European diplomacy, the question of Constantinople is as certain to give as much trouble to the Chancelleries of Europe during the next decades as the Roman question did in the 'sixties. Yet their hands were not tied as regards the Sultan as Napoleon III.'s were as regards the Pope, whilst Mohammed V. might have reigned as a powerful sovereign at Broussa, where Pius IX. would have left the Vatican only to eat the bread of exile under another's roof.

The present war has served to show that sea power is all-important as regards Constantinople. It will be equally important to the future Balkan Confederation. The Greeks are a maritime race, and consequently a Balkan Confederation will have a navy to defend its sea-borne commerce. Moreover, such a Confederation will have a frontier on three seas—the Ionian, the Ægean, and the Black Seas. The Black Sea, with its port of Varna, which affords an admirable base for an invasion of Bulgaria by a force coming oversea, would

be cut off from the other seas by the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. Varna would lie open to the attacks of the Russian, Rumanian, and Turkish navies. Would it be possible for the Allies to keep up separate fleets with separate naval bases to defend it, and would not this be a motive why a Balkan Confederation, constituted without Constantinople, would always be striving to become possessed of it? It may be said that the Turks would be in the same position as regards their coast-line in Asia Minor; but the naval defence of the Black Sea ports is not of the same importance to Turkey, since the table-land of Asia Minor would never be invaded from Sinope or from Trebizond.

The best friends of the Turks must wish them, henceforth, to concentrate their efforts on Asia Minor, a country which they are so well fitted to develop, even if they could not rely upon the help of Germany, who no doubt will be, in fact if not in name, their protector in the future. It would seem waste of energy, therefore, if the Osmanli retained Constantinople and any possessions on the European side of the Bosphorus. I quite admit that it would be difficult to draw a frontier across the peninsula on the Asiatic side from the Gulf of Ismid to the Black Sea, but I submit that under Mr. Hogarth's scheme the same difficulty would arise on the European side.

Mr. Hogarth would simply make Constantinople the most terrible source of European strife, and as much a danger to the peace of the world as Gibraltar or the Cape Peninsula would be if they were to become miniature States under their own flags, like the Principality of Monaco. If the Balkan Confederation held Constantinople with a frontier on the Asiatic side there is not the least reason to believe that they would ever seek to carry their dominions farther into Asia Minor, for they would be fenced in by lands inhabited by an utterly

alien race, and that race would probably be supported by all the power of Germany. The fact that Constantinople is a Levantine city, and as such might corrupt the morals of its possessors, does not, I must confess, seem much to the point.

Persian luxury has long been surpassed by that of London, Paris, and Berlin. The gilded youth whether of Cairo or of Constantinople wear patent-leather shoes and ride in motors; but the guardsman who has been quartered in Egypt does not appear in the Ladies' Mile in a turban and slippers. Most Russians I have met think that it would be a mistake for Russia to occupy Constantinople, partly on the ground that she would have to remodel much of her existing railway system in order to connect it with the lines round the Asiatic side of the Black Sea, by which alone, under existing conditions, she could reach Constantinople through her own territory; partly because of the difficulty and expense of annexing and holding Asia Minor; lastly, because if the Court and Government were transferred to Constantinople, as they well might be, St. Petersburg and Moscow would be ruined. Who would live on an island in the Neva when he could have a villa on the Bosphorus?

As for the inhabitants of the Balkan States, I suppose that now that their capitals are connected with Western Europe by railway, it is perfectly open to any of them who can afford to do so to visit Vienna, London, or Paris whenever they please. If Constantinople becomes the capital of an Eastern Empire, it very likely will become a great centre for the leaders of the social world, whether Europeans or Americans, and from that point of view be once again a second Rome. I can hardly imagine that it will be more Levantine than Bukarest, and except from the point of view of that imaginary dream of Arcadian innocence and pastoral simplicity, which, probably, have long since vanished from any

civilised part of the Balkan Peninsula, I cannot see what harm Constantinople can do to Balkan morals. In short, after reading Mr. Hogarth's remarks I can only once more reaffirm my belief that the best thing for European peace is that the Eastern Empire should be re-established and that Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria should be crowned its Emperor at Santa Sophia.

CHAPTER XXI

AFTER THE ARMISTICE OF APRIL 1913

S has been said elsewhere, Bulgaria signed an armistice with Turkey on April 13. That armistice was to continue only until April 23, but was shortly afterwards prolonged until May 8. The main object which Bulgaria had had in view in signing it was to secure the possibility of withdrawing her troops from Tchataldja, for her disputes with her allies were becoming a greater source of disquiet than was her moribund war with Turkey. To the Balkan Peninsula, indeed, these disputes were as important as the question of Skutari was to Europe as a whole.

The disputes as to the partition of the conquered territories between the members of the Balkan League went back to the occupation of Salonika. It will be remembered that the Greeks had been the first to enter the town, but the Servians had not been very far off, and the Bulgarians claimed that the slight efforts at resistance made by the Turks would have been far greater but for the presence of their army near Seres, where General Todorov had been delayed by the Turks for a few days. Otherwise, it was said, he would have entered Salonika by the side of the Greek king.

It is true that, historically speaking, Salonika never formed a part either of the Bulgarian or of the Servian empire, but, with the exception of the very short period

in the thirteenth century during which it was in Frankish hands, had remained a Greek possession until it was taken by the Turks. But Salonika is not a Greek city, two-thirds of the population being Spanish Jews, whilst only a quarter are Greeks; whilst, although the peninsula of Chalcidice and the coast-belt as far east as Seres are mainly Greek, the valley of the Vardar, through which Salonika communicates with Central Europe, is peopled in the south by a Bulgarised Moslem population as far north as Kuprili, from which place to the frontier of the Sanjak a Bulgarised Christian population gradually fades away into Serbs, who are the oldest population of the district, mingled with Albanian immigrants. To the west, although the peasants in the Vistritza valley speak Greek, they are Vlachs by blood. In short, on ethnological grounds alone, the Spanish Jews would seem to be the race who have the real right to Salonika.*

Again, although at the time of the first formation of the Balkan League a Treaty had been concluded between Bulgaria and Servia by which their shares in the spoils which might be taken from the Turks were completely regulated, no such arrangements existed between Greece and the other Allies. Greece had, it was asserted, entered the League with the nominal object of securing the reform of Macedonia and not its liberation from Turkish rule; consequently, she had no treaty rights on which to base her claims for territorial compensation as against the other Allies, and thus her claim to Salonika came to rest mainly upon the rights of priority of conquest, which had, from the first, been disputed by Bulgaria. Thus, as soon as the immediate pressure of the Turks was removed, it was found that materials for a conflict between the Allies were everywhere abundant. Danger alone, as the words

* *Geographical Journal*, April 1913, D. G. Hogarth.

of the Cretan bandit Skides showed, had brought together races held apart by the memories of thirty years of religious civil war. The followers of the Greek Patriarch and of the Bulgarian Exarch have but too good reason to hate one another to the death.

Very shortly after the occupation of Salonika rumours that serious friction existed between the Greeks and Bulgarians began to spread.

The causes of this friction are not hard to explain from a Bulgarian standpoint. In their eyes the Macedonians are Bulgars who wish to be Bulgars. They believed, moreover, that the Greeks had not co-operated with them loyally from a military point of view, and had made a rush for Salonika with a political object in place of encountering important Turkish forces or besieging an important fortress. Crown Prince Boris of Bulgaria could, so the Sofia politicians said on somewhat doubtful grounds, have entered Salonika ten days before the Greeks, since he was then at Kresna and there was no army to oppose him. In Government circles at Sofia it was already said that Bulgaria would insist upon retaining Salonika for herself, or, in the event of Greece proving intractable, would proclaim it a free port under international control. In the latter case Bulgaria would make every effort to create a great town and seaport at Orfano, south-east of Seres, and would build a railway thither from Sofia down the Struma valley, so as to place the capital in direct and easy communication with the Mediterranean. Orfano lies four miles to the east of the mouth of the Strymon, on the Gulf of Rendina, and is seated in a region inhabited by a mixed population of Turks, Greeks, and Bulgars. Thus Salonika would be deprived of its Hinterland, and would lose much of its importance.

As regards Servia, no trouble whatsoever arose until much later in the war, when Servia claimed com-

pensation for having made far greater military exertions than had been originally stipulated for.

By the original agreement of March 1912 the boundary of Bulgarian Macedonia began at a point near Egri Palanka, passed between Karatovo and Kumanovo to a line between Kuprili and Uskub, thence over the highest mountain peak to Kritchevo and the river Sutieska to the mouth of the Black Drin at the north-west point of the Lake of Ochrida, thence passed over the lakes and followed the line of peaks eastward to the south of Lake Ostrovo, and thence to the Gulf of Salonika. There had been originally some dispute as regards Kumanovo and Uskub, and an agreement had been made to submit it to an arbitrator, who was to be either the Emperor William or the Tsar of Russia, but Bulgaria had finally given them up to Servia; she had also agreed to support Servia with all her power in obtaining a port on the Adriatic despite any opposition from Austria-Hungary.

Servia and Montenegro had a political convention of their own to settle any territorial questions between them.

It will be seen that the limits thus laid down were not unlike those assigned to Bulgaria under the Treaty of San Stefano, except that by that Treaty she received Dibra and Kastoria as well as the districts of Vranya and Pirot, and was given a Mediterranean port at Kavala. The arrangement of 1912 was, therefore, far fairer to Servia than was that of 1878, and the limits laid down for Bulgaria included, with the exception of a small Albanian intrusive element, and a certain proportion of "Pomaks" or Moslem Bulgars, mostly Christian Bulgarians.

All through the winter the disputes between Greece and Bulgaria continued, and they undoubtedly reacted unfavourably upon the progress of the war, especially

after the rupture of the armistice on February 3. It is true that Tsar Ferdinand had been warned by both Russia and England to abstain from entering Constantinople, and may even have received promises of compensation for his self-denial, but if he had intended to do so there is no doubt that he might have received very material aid from the Greeks, whose fleet could have covered a convoy of transports which could have landed troops on the west side of the peninsula of Gallipoli, and thus turned the lines of Bulair and brought about the fall of Gallipoli. Thus the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora would have been thrown open to the Allies. Greece, as we have seen, at first refused to sign the armistice of December, as she did not wish to suspend her operations in Epirus and the Ægean, but to this Bulgaria and Servia could have no reason to object. In fact, the abstention of Greece was the result of a mutual arrangement, since the necessity for maintaining the blockade of the Ægean and of exercising the right of search was recognised by both the Greek and the Bulgarian delegates at Tchataldja.

However, the Greeks were not slow to accuse the Bulgarians of looting and of committing unspeakable outrages against the life and honour of private persons, especially Turks in towns and villages in the province of Seres. At Doiran the Bulgarians were alleged to have seized and imprisoned the rich Turkish residents, whom they had released after the payment of enormous ransoms, but whom they then lured into an ambush where sixty of them were massacred. The Bulgarians, in their turn, alleged that the Greeks had plundered the houses of many Salonika Jews, and had caused the death of many Turks by blowing up a magazine. Most of these reports proved to be exaggerated.

The Greeks were equally indignant at the accusation that they had not taken their fair share of the burden

of the war. They pointed to the fact that in the two battles of Sarandoporo, where the Turks had 30,000 men in the field, and at Janitza, where they were opposed by 33,000, of whom only 6000 were fugitives from Sarandoporo, they had made 37,000 prisoners, captured 106 guns, 75,000 rifles, and enormous quantities of stores and munitions. Hassan Takzin Pasha, the defeated Turkish Commander-in-Chief, had himself acknowledged that the battle of Janitza had decided the fate of Salonika.

In January the Servian newspapers reported that the Allies had agreed that Salonika should be made a condominium of the Balkan League with a free port and a Hinterland of 2000 square kilometres (about 896 square miles), but this prospective settlement did not avail to prevent the trade of the port from being crushed by the Bulgarian and Servian Customs duties, which were brought into force in its immediate neighbourhood, so as to cut it off completely from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula.

I have already mentioned the very serious collision between the Greek and Bulgarian armed forces which took place at Nigrita, and which, but for the death of the King of Greece, might well have led to a dispute between the Allies even before the fall of Adrianople. The Metropolitan of Seres and many other bishops from towns claimed by the Bulgarians were present amongst the Greek bishops at the funeral of the King, and Greece concentrated the troops set free by the fall of Yanina in South-Eastern Macedonia. It was even said that she was contemplating an alliance with Servia directed against Bulgaria. In these circumstances Bulgaria could only free her hands for action by concluding an armistice with the Turks.

Her dispute with Servia was even more serious, because upon the purely legal grounds of the case Bulgaria was in the right.

" The Treaty of Alliance which was concluded between Servia and Bulgaria in March 1912, besides specifying the nature of the military assistance mutually to be rendered by the two States, also prescribed the future division of any territorial conquests which the Allies might make in a successful war jointly to be undertaken against Turkey. At the time the Treaty was signed autonomy for Macedonia was contemplated, while the formation of an Albanian State was not foreseen. It was also expected that Austria-Hungary's interests in the Sanjak of Novibazar would preclude any chance of its becoming spoil of war. By the terms of this Treaty two spheres of Ottoman territory were prescribed, one for each Ally, within which the future sovereignty of each was mutually recognised. As the destiny of certain districts could not then be determined, a certain area between the two spheres was defined, and it was agreed that the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia should be accepted as deciding the exact division of this debatable area between Bulgaria and Servia.

" The area left for arbitration consists of the *Kazas* of Kumanovo, Uskub, Kritchevo, and Dibra, and also the *Nahié* of Struga in the *Kaza* of Ochrida. Owing to the decision of the Powers a large part of the *Kaza* of Dibra has been included in Albania. In consequence of the formation of this State the Servians, who are in military occupation of Monastir and the country to the north and east of it, desire to modify the territorial agreement of March 1912, and have manifested a desire to retain not only the whole of the area left for arbitration, but also a considerable extent of the territory which in that instrument is recognised as being within the Bulgarian sphere." *

Servia, moreover, alleged that she had failed to secure the outlet promised to her on the Adriatic, and also

* *The Times*, April 18, 1913.

that she had put far more men in the field than was originally contemplated. On these grounds she claimed territorial compensation.

Bulgaria, however, traversed the Servian claims by pointing out that although it had not been intended originally that Servia should send troops against Adrianople, she had undertaken to aid Bulgaria in her operations in South-Eastern Macedonia, and this assistance she had not been called upon to supply owing to the collapse of the Turks. This refusal threw Servia into the arms of Greece. The districts claimed by the Servians included the whole region west of the rivers Vardar and Bregalnitza, a river flowing into the Vardar on its left bank some 37 miles south-east of Uskub. By her arrangement with Greece, Servia was to obtain Struga, Ochrida, Monastir, and Prilep, whilst the Greek territory would extend to Lake Prespa, and Greece would obtain Salonika, Vodena, Florina, Kukush, Seres, Drama, and Kavala. With regard to these proposals it may be pointed out that the Christian Macedonians living in the district between Veria on the east, Kastoria on the west, and Monastir on the north, were originally hellenised, and have only gone over to the Bulgarian Exarch within the last generation. There are also some large and very ancient colonies of true Turks between Veria and Kastoria, and south and west of Kastoria.*

It was certain, however, that Bulgaria would never abandon her claim to the districts which under the Greco-Serb agreement were assigned to Servia. Not only did she take her stand upon the original Treaty of 1912, by which they were assigned to herself, but in the eyes of every Bulgarian, from the King to the peasant, the districts in question are the most thoroughly Bulgarian part of Macedonia, and were recognised as such by the Turks, who established in them the

* *Geographical Journal*, April 1913; D. G. Hogarth, *op. cit.*

Archbishoprics of Monastir, Ochrida, and Dibra. During the late war they furnished thousands of volunteers to the Bulgarian army. The area of the territory in dispute between Bulgaria and Servia amounted to 30,000 square kilometres (13,315 square miles).

In April a mixed commission of Bulgarian and Greek officers sat to examine the question as to the priority of occupation at Salonika, but the inquiry led to no definite result. To Servia the Bulgarians replied that though under the Convention of 1912 the Tsar of Russia was to arbitrate in any dispute as to Kumanovo, Uskub, Kritchevo, and Dibra, there could be no dispute as to the fate of Southern Macedonia, which Bulgaria had occupied until her troops were recalled for service in Thrace. By the middle of April the Greeks had concentrated 120,000 men in and around Salonika. Salonika with a Hinterland sufficiently deep to allow the town to be defended and to ensure its commercial prosperity was the Greek minimum, and from this M. Venezelos refused to budge, whilst the Servian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, was equally firm in declaring that no inch of the land conquered by Servia would be ceded to create a Greater Bulgaria.

Servia concentrated 140,000 men with 220 guns at Monastir, and 35,000 Bulgarians reached Seres. The Bulgarian Press appealed to the Macedonian Bulgars to commence a "fresh war of liberation" against their Servian and Greek oppressors; Belgrade leader-writers rejoined that "Servia must exterminate the ungrateful Bulgarian beasts of prey." But the commercial men of both countries were more awake to the real requirements of the situation, and, as I have already said, the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce on April 24 invited the Servian Chamber of Commerce to visit Sofia during the Easter holidays.

Unfortunately the more militant spirits in Macedonia

were not so peacefully inclined. Constant skirmishing went on between the forces of the League, although little information on the subject reached Western Europe. The wounded were brought into Salonika by night, and visitors were rigidly excluded from the hospitals. Persistent rumours were current that the Bulgarian troops were about to be withdrawn from Salonika, and on April 26 their commander, General Hassapchieff, said he expected to leave within two or three days. At the last moment, however, he received orders to remain, while at the same time the Bulgarians were moving troops at Doiran and Kukush.

To the outside world the intervention of Russia seemed the only means by which peace could be maintained between the members of the Balkan League, but those behind the scenes had learnt to count upon the hard common sense of the Prime Minister of Greece.

Yet M. Venezelos had firmly refused to allow the Bulgarians to occupy the much-coveted position of Orfano, which was in Greek occupation, but which, as I have said, they hoped to make their outlet on the Ægean.

The Bulgarian military party were most anxious for war, but their Government still pressed for a peaceful settlement, and the bulk of the Bulgarian army still remained to face the common enemy in front of the lines of Tchataldja and Bulair, whilst they had only 60,000 men in Southern Macedonia, which was held by 220,000 Servian and Greek troops as far as the shores of the Gulf of Orfano and all along the left bank of the Vardar.

As *The Times* wrote on May 3, whatever might be the case as to Greece, the " solution of the Serbo-Bulgarian difficulty practically rests in the hands of Russia. In accepting the task of arbitration in regard to a certain zone defined in the Treaty she has virtually sanctioned the arrangement and made herself a party to it. She

has further agreed to arbitrate in regard to other questions presenting themselves at the time of the final settlement. The resolve of Servia to annex the Macedonian districts lying beyond the zone in question would presuppose the decision of Russia in her favour, inasmuch as the occupation of the districts further south would be impossible should Russia assign the intermediate zone to Bulgaria. It remains for Russia to assert the authority attributed to her by both sides in regard to this matter, and the longer she delays to do so the greater the danger of a collision between the two States. Such a conflict could only redound to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and prove ruinous to Slav interests in the Peninsula. It might, indeed, bring about the final 'liquidation' of Servia, who would find herself encompassed by enemies on both sides. At present there is no understanding between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, but circumstances may bring such a compact into existence. The present situation bears a close resemblance to that existing in the autumn of 1886, when the absence of nearly all the Bulgarian forces on the eastern frontier tempted King Milan to invade Bulgaria. *Absit omen*, but the time has arrived for Russia to take energetic steps to avert an internecine struggle between two Slav States."

Russia was indeed doing her best both at Sofia and at Belgrade to bring about a settlement, and the two Governments agreed to accept her arbitration should their attempts to come to an independent understanding fail. The Greeks and Bulgarians, however, were facing one another with forces on a war footing. Kavala was fortified by the Bulgarians to resist the Greek fleet, whilst as the Bulgarians retired northwards from Doiran and Kukush to watch the Servian concentration the Greeks followed occupying the positions they evacuated. Despite all this it was said that Bulgaria was ready to renounce her pretensions to Salonika and most of the Hinterland

desired by Greece if she would negotiate independently, but Greece now desired that all the territorial arrangements should be made by the four Allies acting together. M. Venezelos had learnt by experience that "Union is Strength." Fighting, however, took place near Portos, and the Bulgarian Sobranye on May 9 voted a credit of 50,000,000 francs for war expenditure. The war had already cost Bulgaria 86,000 killed and wounded.

The mixed Greco-Bulgarian Commission appointed to decide as to the priority of claims of occupation was dissolved without coming to any decision, but, on May 12, M. Saratoff, formerly Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, was despatched to Athens to endeavour to come to some agreement about the frontier. As skirmishing still continued, an attempt was made to lay down a neutral zone between the armies. The Greeks had occupied the country between the coast-line of the Gulf of Orfano and Mount Panghaion, famous in antiquity for its gold mines, and had thus trespassed upon territory which had originally been occupied by the Bulgarians, who had sought to prevent them from taking possession of various strategic points; such at least was the Bulgarian version of the incidents. Servia, too, appeared determined to retain possession of the districts occupied by her troops in Old Servia and Macedonia, notwithstanding the provisions of the original Treaty, but yet found time to protest against the occupation by Austria of the little island of Ada-Kaleh in the middle of the Danube, near Orsova, between Hungary, Servia, and Rumania, which had remained Turkish territory through the action of Austria at the time when the Servian fortifications were evacuated by the Turks in 1867.

Meanwhile Bulgarian troops were crowding into the province of Seres, and it was even said that Bulgaria threatened to destroy all hopes of stability in the Balkan Peninsula by proposing the establishment of an autono-

mous Macedonia, even at the risk of seeing Greece propose the autonomy of Thrace.

Russia, however, was taking action, and the Servian Government seemed inclined, in consequence of her representations, to cede Monastir to Bulgaria, and proposed that a commission of the four Balkan States should settle all pending questions. Greece, on the other hand, continued intransigent, although the report of the conclusion of a Treaty between Greece and Servia was denied at Belgrade. The meeting of the Peace Conference in London did nothing to relieve the strain. Bulgaria attributed the delay of Greece and Servia in signing the preliminaries to a wish to keep the Bulgarian troops engaged at Tchataldja until the Allies had occupied the districts they coveted in Macedonia. The Bulgarian forts at Kavala fired on some Greek war-vessels, and on May 22 a fierce conflict, which extended over 45 miles of front, took place owing to an attempt made by the Bulgarians to cross Voultsista Bridge at the foot of the northern slopes of Mount Panghaion and to enter the Greek zone. King Constantine and his staff thereupon left hurriedly for Salonika, where they were received by the population with acclamations, but treated with neglect by the Bulgarian officers. M. Venezelos and M. Gueshoff tried to find a means for establishing a neutral zone to separate the various armies, but failed to do so, and on May 26 M. Pashitch, the Servian Premier, declared that the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty no longer existed, and that the conquered territories must therefore be divided in accordance with the real condition of affairs. Greece, however, was now said to be willing to accept mediation. The signature of peace with Turkey made but little change in the situation, although reports circulated that Bulgaria was willing to resign Salonika to Greece in exchange for concessions in the Panghaion region. Russia now clearly showed that she could only mediate when the Allies were ready for

arbitration and prepared to act upon her decisions without reserve. The situation was, however, once more complicated by a speech of M. Pashitch before the Servian Skupshtina, in which he proved that Servia was not bound by the Treaty with Bulgaria, because the conquered territory had now to be divided between four instead of two Allies, whilst the war had been prolonged in order to enable Bulgaria to acquire Adrianople and the regions to the east of it, thus forcing Servia to put 100,000 more men in the field, although she had not received the outlet on the Adriatic promised to her by the agreement.

To Servia an independent outlet is a matter of life and death. As Austria has excluded her from the Adriatic, she must assure herself of a road to Salonika, and this she can only secure by having a common frontier with Greece, who, in consideration of the sacrifices made by her for Bulgaria, has a right to retain some Slav territories. Servia refused the whole of the Vardar valley with Salonika when they were offered her during the negotiations for an autonomous Albania and the evacuation of the places she held on the Adriatic littoral, because it would have been contrary to the interest of the Allies for her to accept them.

M. Pashitch ended by saying, "It is the duty of the four Allies to settle among themselves in harmony all questions, including questions of territory, so that the relations of the Allies shall be fortified and placed on a still wider foundation.

"The solution of the Balkan question has perhaps injured the material interests of certain States, and it remains our duty to heal these wounds with the passage of time, and to create friendly and healthy relations with all States imbued with a desire for the development of the Balkans and desirous of living in tranquillity and friendship with the Balkan States." *

* *The Times*, Thursday, May 29, 1913.

As a result of this speech it was arranged that he should meet M. Gueshoff on the frontier near Tsaribod, but feeling in both countries ran high and significance was attached to the reported recall of Dr. Daneff from London to Sofia. The attitude of Servia produced great irritation in Russia, and the *Novoe Vremya* spoke of her refusal to accept Russian arbitration as insulting. Bulgarian public opinion was at first exasperated by M. Pashitch's speech and by reports brought by refugees from Macedonia of the efforts which the Servian authorities had made to induce them to renounce their nationality, but Russia stood firm, and MM. Pashitch, Venezelos, and Gueshoff never ceased to work for peace. M. Venezelos saw King Constantine at Salonika and succeeded in inducing His Majesty to attempt another negotiation with General Ivanoff for the establishment of a neutral zone, and also met the Bulgarian special envoy, M. Saratoff. The main dispute continued to be over Salonika, which the Greeks insisted upon retaining, whilst the Bulgarians claimed it as the chief port of Macedonia. Kastoria due south of Monastir was also claimed by both parties. MM. Gueshoff and Pashitch also met at Suchovo on the Servian frontier on June 1, and, although Bulgaria at first seemed determined to retain her Treaty rights, the meeting proved a most friendly one; and on June 2 it was announced that a Conference would be held between the Premiers of the four Allied States for the joint discussion of all questions arising out of the war, and that it would probably meet at St. Petersburg at an early date. Their task would, naturally, be a very difficult one.

To quote M. Chedo Mijatovich, a Servian statesman, "It is a tremendous task which the four Premiers will have to handle. They will not have to act as four judges, sitting in a Court of Justice, to examine the text of written contracts. They will have to face the brain storms raised by the excessive patriotism of three high-spirited nations.

The strength of their already-concentrated armies, the justly enhanced pride of their soldiers, may prove rather a hindrance than a help to the calm and deliberate diplomatic work. Can M. Venezelos abandon Salonika and its modest Hinterland? Absolutely impossible. Can M. Gueshoff abandon the Bulgarian claim to the territories on the right bank of the Vardar? To speak frankly, I do not see how he can. But will M. Pashitch dare to order the Servian army, which has won and now holds Monastir, Ochrida, Prilep, Veles, and Dibra, to deliver those towns to the Bulgarians? He may do so, as he has dared many a risky problem in his public career, but I doubt very much whether the army would obey such an order.

"Yet all the four statesmen ought to make strenuous efforts to come to an amicable arrangement, which will make an appeal to arms unnecessary. Not that I doubt the good chances of the Servian and Greek armies, which will necessarily march together. But I have reason to believe that the diplomatic position of Bulgaria is much stronger than ours. The Austrian and Hungarian Press—echoing the inspiration of the Austro-Hungarian Government—is unanimously against Servia and for Bulgaria in this quarrel. There is for me no doubt whatsoever that Austria, in an eventual conflict between Bulgaria and Servia, will support the former."*

On June 3 M. Gueshoff resigned, and it was thought probable that Dr. Daneff, who had been suddenly called back from London to Sofia, would be sent for to form a Cabinet. As he was known to be a firm if not a somewhat intransigent supporter of the Bulgarian claims, his appointment was considered to be an omen of trouble. However, delay was considered to be an advantage, since if Bulgaria had at that moment replied to the Servian note, the only possible response would have envenomed the situation. Russia, who was doing all she could to keep

* *Daily Telegraph*, Wednesday, June 4, 1913.

peace in the Balkans, even though to do so she was forced to favour Servia at the expense of her former favourite Bulgaria, proposed that the meeting of Premiers should take place at Salonika, and that if they failed to come to an agreement they should come on to St. Petersburg and enjoy the benefits of M. Sazonoff's mediation. At the same time Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassadorial Conference in London were discussing the fate of the Ægean Islands and the frontiers of Southern Albania. To reconcile the claims of Greece and Italy it was suggested that Greece should receive, with restrictions, all the islands except those near the mouth of the Dardanelles (Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, and, possibly, Lemnos), and that in exchange Greece should not insist upon her claim to the whole of the mainland opposite Corfu or to the town of Koritza, which lies in a district inhabited mainly by Kutso-Vlachs, who, though Orthodox, do not, as a rule, speak Greek, and occupies a geographical position which renders it of some importance to the security of Monastir. On June 5 it was reported that the Rumanian Cabinet had fallen, and that a new Cabinet would be formed under the presidency of M. Filipescu, a Conservative, and the most violent opponent of Bulgaria in the country. It was expected that the Rumanians would now demand from Bulgaria the cession of the whole of the Silistria-Baltchik district in place of the small area of 3000 square kilometres (1158 square miles) which they were to receive as compensation under the proposed convention. Still matters bore a somewhat improved outlook, since King Ferdinand was known to be opposed to a Serbo-Bulgarian war, for which Servia, however, was quite prepared. He was, however, unable to prevent M. Gueshoff from resigning, for his Cabinet were sharply divided upon the question of the relations of Bulgaria with Servia and Greece. The members of the Tsankovitch party were anxious to follow the advice of Russia and counselled

moderation ; the Nationalists clamoured for a big Bulgaria, including Salonika, Vodena, Monastir, Ochrida, Prilep, and Veles, thus throwing down a challenge alike to Servia and to Greece. King Ferdinand, however, kept the direction of Bulgarian policy in his own hands, and upon him the decision depended. Much depended upon the attitude of Russia and Austria.

In Austria, however, " in competent and impartial quarters," the view still prevailed that the territorial dispute between the Balkan Allies was likely to be settled without war. " The representatives of the respective Balkan States are less confident. Much is expected to turn upon the apparently impending reconstruction of the Bulgarian Cabinet."

" The *Reichspost*, which draws its information from the Foreign Office Press Bureau, states that the critical situation in Bulgaria is being watched with the closest attention here, as a complete change in the Russophil course of Bulgarian policy seems in sight. It appears to be out of the question, adds the *Reichspost*, that M. Gueshoff, who was Russophil and whose resignation has already been accepted by King Ferdinand, will preside over the new Administration, nor is Dr. Daneff regarded as the coming man. Great impatience is noticeable in Servian military circles, which regard the conference of the Balkan Premiers as a Bulgarian manœuvre to gain time for the completion of Bulgarian armaments against Servia. General Putnik, concludes the *Reichspost*, has telegraphed to General Savoff saying that any further movement of Bulgarian troops will be answered immediately by the advance of the whole Servian Army against Bulgaria.

" These statements doubtless correspond to the Austro-Hungarian semi-official view of the situation. They correspond also to the apprehensions of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, who fear that the appointment of a mainly Stambolovist Administration at Sofia would

render war inevitable and suspect Bulgaria of bad faith in sending a Premier *in statu dimissionis* to confer with his Greek, Servian, and Montenegrin colleagues. The view of the Serbo-Bulgarian controversy prevailing in the Southern Slav circles of the Monarchy is that, if law is on the side of Bulgaria, equity is on the side of Servia. Deep disappointment is felt that the two countries should apparently be unable to rise above the conflict of the moment and safeguard their permanent interests by an equitable arrangement of their differences." *

In Greece, too, it was thought that the Cabinet might have to resign if Koritza, or any other districts in Epirus occupied by Greek troops were incorporated in Albania. The Epirot officers in the Greek army talked of resigning their commissions and making common cause with their compatriots in resisting the withdrawal of the Greek troops.

In vain King George V., when he received the delegates of the Peace Conference at Buckingham Palace on June 7, urged that there should be no resumption of hostilities. Turkey by her refusal to restore the legal *status quo* as before the war to residents belonging to the belligerent nations, and by her demand for special privileges for the Moslems in their territories, not only led to the dissolution of the Peace Conference on June 19, but by securing the adoption of a Protocol, to the effect that these arrangements should be effected by separate negotiations between the Governments concerned, still further inflamed the mutual jealousies of the Allies. At the same time the old Turkish party were again raising their heads and protesting against all reforms, and they found supporters in the German Press, which knew that the foreign advisers of Turkey, for everything except military matters, would be English or French. The *Tanin* published an article from the Cologne *Gazette* which, though Marshal von der Goltz had urged the Turks to devote their first efforts to

* *The Times*, Saturday, June 7, 1913.

the reorganisation of their army, warned them to beware of all reforms which were contrary to their ancient religious and historical traditions, and stated that European legislative institutions are inapplicable to Turkey.

The Tsar of Russia, however, continued to use his utmost efforts to preserve peace. In a telegram to the Kings of Servia and Bulgaria he called upon them to submit their disputes to his arbitration in accordance with their pledges given to him by Treaty, and stated that Russia would view with displeasure the attitude of either Power if it refused to submit its claims to arbitration; a fratricidal war in the Balkans would stain the glory of the Allies and be a disaster to the cause of the Slav nations. M. Venezelos also seconded his efforts by telegraphing to the Allies to ask them to arrange for a meeting of the four Premiers either at Salonika or under the Tsar's arbitration at St. Petersburg, and Prince Nicholas of Greece was despatched to Russia with the same object. Diplomatists noticed that the Tsar's telegram coincided closely with King George's speech at Buckingham Palace. Servia at once accepted the Tsar's invitation, but M. Pashitch resigned. King Peter persuaded him to withdraw his resignation; Servian diplomacy continued to work for the meeting of the Premiers. King Ferdinand, however, replied to the Tsar's letter in a somewhat haughty tone, pointing out that Bulgaria could not be expected after all her sacrifices to give up the territory which was secured to her by her treaty with Servia merely because the military arrangements had to be altered in consequence of the change in the military situation. His reply made a disagreeable impression at St. Petersburg.

The reasons for King Ferdinand's coolness to Russia lay deep, and were revealed by *The Times* correspondent at Sofia, even before the Royal reply could have reached St. Petersburg. He says: "The causes of M. Gueshoff's retirement, which have hitherto been veiled in obscurity,

may now be disclosed. In the second week of March Servia for the first time communicated to Bulgaria and Russia her demand for a revision of the Treaty of Alliance. The demand was kept secret here and in St. Petersburg, inasmuch as disclosure would have encouraged the Turks to prolong their resistance. After the fall of Adrianople great preparations were made for storming the Tchataldja lines, the greater part of the troops hitherto occupied in the siege of the city, together with the artillery, being now free to take part in this offensive movement. Russia now became alarmed at the prospect of the Bulgarian entry into Constantinople, and urged the Bulgarian Government to desist from the proposed attack on Tchataldja, promising in return to compel Servia to abide by the Treaty and hand over the territory beyond the contested zone to Bulgaria. At the same time Russia undertook to exercise her right of arbitration in regard to the contested zone, basing the decision on ethnical considerations. On the strength of these assurances the Bulgarian Government gave up the idea of attacking Tchataldja, and an armistice was concluded with Turkey through the exertions of Russia. When the Conference met in London, the Bulgarian and Turkish delegates were ready to sign the Treaty, but the Servians and Greeks raised difficulties, and Servia profited by the delay to press her demand for the revision of the Treaty in St. Petersburg. What influences were brought to bear on the Russian Government it is difficult to say, but, shortly before the signature of the Peace of London, Russia, notwithstanding her previous assurances, suggested to the Bulgarian Government the abandonment not only of the whole of the contested zone to Servia but also the districts of Kratovo, Veles, and Krushevo lying beyond it. These concessions were represented as necessary for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the Alliance.

"On receipt of this communication M. Gueshoff

resigned. He was confronted with the alternative of accepting a proposal to which the nation would never consent or of rejecting it at the risk of a rupture of the Alliance and war. He considered that so grave a decision should be taken by the representatives of all the parties in the State, and King Ferdinand apparently arrived at the same conclusion, since before the Prime Minister tendered his resignation his Majesty took counsel with various Opposition leaders. The course taken by the King naturally confirmed M. Gueshoff's decision. It was resolved that they should maintain the Treaty, but it was considered that they should associate all parties with the responsibilities of government in such a crisis in the national history. The proposed 'concentration' proved impossible owing to the difficulties raised by some of the Opposition chiefs, and Dr. Daneff has formed a Ministry composed of the representatives of the two parties who have hitherto held power. The new Prime Minister enjoys the unbounded confidence of the King. He is a *persona grata* in St. Petersburg, and possesses a wide knowledge of the international situation which will prove highly valuable in the present juncture." *

Under these circumstances both Austria and Rumania began to see an opening for regaining their former influence in the Balkans. The Austrian Press published articles pointing out that if Russia were to acquire a species of protectorate over the Balkan League the position of Austria would be one of great danger, whilst M. Bratiano, the leader of the Rumanian Opposition, stated in the *Vittorul* of Bukarest that the object of Rumania must be to establish a satisfactory equilibrium in the Balkans; Bulgaria, by the cession of a strategic frontier extending from Turkutai to Baltchik, would preserve a peaceful understanding with Rumania. Should she fail to come to an arrangement with Rumania the latter Power would be

* *The Times*, Tuesday, June 17, 1913.

forced to preserve the equilibrium of the Balkans by preventing Bulgaria from extending her limits beyond her present territories. On June 16 the *Neue Freie Presse* announced that as further diplomatic action to secure demobilisation in the Balkans seemed, after the Tsar's telegram, to have no practical value, Austria would in future refrain from taking any part in it, whilst Germany and Italy appeared to regard the Tsar's telegram with some favour and would not withdraw from that action out of respect for the decision of the Great Powers. In Bulgaria and Servia the armies were getting impatient as the harvest was drawing near, and the privates, who are mostly small proprietors, were anxious about the safety of their crops; whilst in Macedonia the "Internal Organisation," which had so long urged war against the Young Turks, was again taking the field for the protection of the rural population. The attitude of Bulgaria also awakened anxiety in Greece, where much ill-feeling was caused by the way in which the Bulgarians had insulted some Greek soldiers whom they had made prisoners near Panghaion.

The Tsar, however, appeared to think the danger over, for on June 17 the Rescript addressed by his Imperial Majesty to M. Sazonoff appeared in the papers.

"The hearty reception accorded to me on the part of the German Emperor and the people of Berlin and the friendly meeting with the King of England were all the more gratifying to me in that I could see in them, not only the tradition of old friendship, but also an expression of harmonious feeling in the main questions of European policy at the present time, which is a sure pledge for the preservation of the peaceful relations so necessary for the happiness of all nations. In recognition of the fact that in the heavy labours which fell to your lot in consequence of the events in the Balkans you not only have fulfilled in every detail all my instructions, suggested to me by the interests of my beloved Russia, but have also contrived

with keen perspicacity and steadfastness in the defence of your views, and also by a conscientious treatment of every question, to win for yourself the trust of all those who have taken part in the international settlement of complicated and trying questions, I consider it my duty to express to you my sincere gratitude.

" Expressing the esteem in which I hold you, I remain your ever well-wishing

"NICHOLAS."

The objects at stake were, of course, important enough, for though the 10,000 square kilometres (3860 square miles) in Western Macedonia, as to which Bulgaria and Servia were disputing, may be inhabited by Bulgarians, yet, as M. Pashitch pointed out, if Servia were not given access to the sea through the valley of the Vardar, an object that could only be secured if she had a common frontier with Greece, her economic future would be ruined. She had fought the war to gain her future as a nation. Moreover, the Serbo-Greek forces were in an excellent strategical position, and though Greece had not yet ratified the Treaty with Turkey, the Greek fleet had regained its liberty of action, whilst Rumania might yet turn the balance by actively intervening in the fray. Yet Greece and Servia were both anxious to settle their disputes with Bulgaria by arbitration, and Bulgaria alone held back. She has paid dearly for her folly, yet despite all that has passed, one thing was ever growing clearer. Peace could only be preserved in the Balkans by the establishment of the Eastern Empire on the German model, with Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria as its elected hereditary ruler.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PEACE OF LONDON

NOTWITHSTANDING the Turkish Revolution, Destiny had decreed that Mr. Asquith was, after all, to prove a true prophet, and the Peace of London has now been inscribed by History amongst the Treaties of the world.

As we have already seen, the Turkish Ministry had by the end of February placed itself without reserve in the hands of the Great Powers, to whom it left the task of mediating with the Allies. The failure of Enver Bey in the field and the discovery at Constantinople of a plot to overthrow the Ministry in which Hutfi Bey, the secretary of Prince Seba ed-Din, together with the leaders of the Military League, was involved, forced them to this step. It was not without significance that the conspirators had held out promises that Adrianople should be a neutral zone, that a large loan should be issued, and that there should be no European interference in Turkish affairs for a period of thirty years. The Revolution had failed, and Djavid Bey, ex-Minister of Finance, left for Europe in connection with certain proposed financial arrangements. About the same time the Turkish flag, which floated over an islet in Suda Bay as a token of the Sultan's suzerainty over Crete, together with the flags of the Protecting Powers, was hauled down with military honours by a detachment of blue-jackets from H.M. cruiser *Yarmouth*, and the flag of Greece was hoisted in their place. The best harbour in the Levant had with Crete passed into Greek

hands, nor had the Sultan been asked to sanction the transfer of his rights.

Hakki Pasha had arrived in London on February 17, and, although certain rumours were denied that he had come to secure English support for the retention by Turkey of Adrianople by granting concessions to her interests in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia, yet subsequent events proved that they were not without a substratum of truth.

In reply to the request of Turkey for mediation the Powers merely intimated that no reply to their Collective Note of January 17 had been received from the Porte, and that until it was answered they could take no further steps in that direction. The Bulgarian Minister of Finance took an early opportunity of stating that Bulgaria would insist upon a war indemnity from Turkey to cover her losses, and that the Allies would insist that its immediate payment should be guaranteed upon the surplus revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt. On the representations of the creditors of Turkey that such an indemnity would involve her finances in hopeless ruin, it was pointed out that the Great Powers, more especially France, were also creditors of the Alled States, and that they would be equally the sufferers if the interest on the debts of the Balkan peoples was not met. As a matter of fact, from a financial point of view, it is known that Turkey will be a gainer by the loss of her European provinces, as they merely constituted a drain upon her treasury, which derives its resources from her Asiatic provinces. The financial readjustments which would have to be made after the war were, in reality, of far greater real interest to the Powers of the Triple Entente and Germany than were the merely territorial arrangements, but the Foreign Minister of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano, on February 22, during the discussion in the Chamber on the Foreign Office Estimates, declared that it was the inten-

tion of Italy to intensify its activity, both in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean, and to assert itself as a Great Power in any future territorial changes which might come about in those seas. He further intimated that Italy would probably enter into a pact with Spain about North Africa similar to the friendly arrangements which it already had in those regions with France and England. His declaration created some searchings of heart in the Chancelleries until it was shown to refer merely to some unimportant police arrangements as regards the Spanish sphere in Morocco and Tripoli. The Triple Entente had no wish to see a member of the Triple Alliance trifling with the affections of Spain. Montenegro, at the same time, declared that it would retain Skutari at all costs, and addressed a final appeal to the Emperor of Russia against the decision of the Powers that Albania should be autonomous. Bulgaria was equally determined to secure Adrianople and an extension of its boundary southward.

Such was the position when the Powers undertook once more the task of mediating between the Porte and the Allies.

On February 27 it was rumoured at Sofia that the Russian Government had informed Bulgaria that a report had been received from the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Giers, stating that the Porte would be ready to negotiate with Bulgaria on the basis of the surrender of Adrianople, and that this proposal was to be discussed by the Council of Ministers. On the same day Sir Arthur Nicholson informed Tewfik Pasha that the Powers would willingly resume mediation between Turkey and Bulgaria on two conditions, firstly, that the Powers' last Joint Note should be taken as the basis of negotiations, and, secondly, that Turkey should undertake to accept unconditionally the result of the Powers' negotiations. In that Joint Note, as we have seen, the Powers urged Turkey to cede Adrianople and to give up the

Ægean Islands into their hands, whilst engaging to safeguard Mussulman interests in Adrianople and to regulate the question of the Archipelago in a way which would not menace the security of Turkey. It was proposed that the peace negotiations should be carried on through the Ambassadorial Conference in London, which, however, would not deal for the moment with the delimitation of Albania.

On March 5 Turkey informed the Great Powers that she placed herself entirely in their hands, and agreed in advance to accept whatever terms the Powers might decide upon, and the Balkan Allies were informed of her decision. Mahmud Shevket Pasha and his Government were, in truth, in no plight to refuse, for they were menaced with revolution at home. Constantinople, where fresh plots against the Government had been discovered, was in a state of extreme apprehension; the roads to the Porte were closed to the public, and the Ministers' houses guarded against possible attacks. Even the severe weather did not diminish the excitement. Highly placed officials acknowledged that large numbers of officers at Tchataldja were involved in these plots, and placards, which were quickly torn down by the police, were discovered posted upon St. Sophia and Eyoub, calling upon the people to rise and sweep away a corrupt Government which had not fulfilled its pledges, had proved unable to retain possession of Adrianople, sold their cemeteries to the Jews, and violated the decrees of Islam. A mutiny of some Arab troops at Gallipoli, who alleged that they were too numbed by the cold to fight, also added to their embarrassments. Fifty mutineers were shot by way of example. Shevket did not attend the Selamlik on March 8, and did not punish Achmet Abouk Pasha, an Albanian general, who was second in command at Tchataldja, for telegraphing to him that the movement for punishing the assassins of Nazim Pasha was growing amongst the officers.

Despite all the efforts of the Government to prevent it, the Suleimanieh Mosque, where Nazim Pasha is buried, was thronged with worshippers when a memorial service was held in his memory, although twenty-five officers who attended the commemoration were arrested the same night. A reorganisation of the Cabinet with the aid of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha and Nejmeddin Pasha, ex-Minister of Justice, was thought to be imminent.

The Allies, however, proved by no means willing to accept the mediation of the Powers, unless the Powers would secure them the minimum of their demands. Their procrastination was explained by the fact that they hoped that Skutari might fall before a combined assault of the Montenegrins and the Serbs, for which great preparations were being made, for the Servians were transporting timber, pontoons, airships, field guns, and munitions of war in enormous quantities on Greek vessels to Durazzo. It was believed, however, at Vienna, that it would be possible to organise a general rising of the Albanian tribes against them, should they attempt to hold the country.

It had not been easy to persuade many of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress that peace might have to be signed, if not upon the League's terms, at least on the basis of the Joint Note of January 17.

Athens and Belgrade took some time before replying to the offer of mediation by the Powers; whilst though at Sofia peace was earnestly desired the good faith of the Young Turks was regarded with scepticism.

On March 14 the Allies at last submitted to the Powers the conditions upon which they would accept mediation.

These conditions were:—(1) That practically all the territory conquered and Adrianople and Skutari should be ceded by Turkey. (2) Ægean Islands to be ceded. (3) All interests in Crete to be renounced. (4) Payment of a war indemnity. (5) Rights reserved to settle by

treaty their trade relations with Turkey, and the treatment to be accorded to their subjects. (6) War to continue meanwhile.

The fifth condition was inserted on account of the difficulties which had occurred after the Turco-Greek War in settling the position of Greek subjects in Turkey.

It was seen at once that the mention of Skutari raised a very delicate question. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 11, Mr. Asquith had said that the dispute as to Servia's access to the Adriatic might be regarded as settled. The Powers had unanimously accepted the principle of an autonomous Albania under a European guarantee, and though other points had to be settled, they could not be regarded as vital. It was believed that the Powers had earmarked Skutari as the future capital of Albania.

The Allies' reply also stated that after the conclusion of peace Adrianople was to be formally handed over to Bulgaria, the Ægean Islands to Greece, and Skutari to Montenegro.

Opinion in Europe saw at once that these terms could not possibly be accepted, but it was thought that they might be modified under pressure from the Powers. The Ambassadorial Conference discussed them on March 15, but came to no decision. Diplomats were in favour of treating them as an acceptance of mediation, and of using them as a basis for further negotiations, although it was foreseen that in the end the Powers might have to draw up the Treaty of Peace themselves and to recommend both parties to accept it.

But it may well be doubted whether, in the whole history of diplomacy, there has ever been an instance in which the negotiations between the actual belligerents have been so obscured by side-issues. To Europe at large the least important question was whether peace was concluded between the Allies and Turkey or not. Turkey, believing

that its European provinces were lost for ever, felt little interest in their fate. All thoughts were turned towards the relations between Powers which had not fired a shot for the liberation of Macedonia or of Thrace, and the Powers who had poured forth their blood like water to free them from the Turk. It mattered little except to Turkey and Bulgaria themselves at what precise point the frontier between them was drawn in Thrace, and the interest which Turkey felt as regards the status of the islands which adjoin the coast of Asia Minor was, perhaps, somewhat Platonic; but Italy was keenly interested in the question of the Archipelago and of Albania; Austria was at daggers drawn with Russia over the future of Skutari, even though it seemed as if she might have to pay for the expulsion of the Montenegrins from the future capital of Albania by handing over Vallona, the key of the Adriatic, to her rival and ally Italy; Rumania was eager to wrest Silistria and a stretch of the Euxine coast from Bulgaria in payment for a neutrality which had been dictated solely by what she, perhaps blindly, looked upon as her interests. With all these questions I have dealt already in some detail, so I will here only summarise the course of events which once more brought the belligerents together in conference at St. James's Palace.

After the fall of Adrianople, and still more after the second repulse of the Bulgarians before Tchataldja, it became clear that a formal cessation of hostilities between the belligerents was merely a question of days. The Balkan Powers were, as a whole, disposed to accept the proposals of the Great Powers as a basis of peace. Bulgaria, however, objected to the Enos-Midia line proposed by the Powers for her frontier in Thrace, as being too near the railway from Adrianople to the coast of the Ægean, and because it left Tchorlu and other battlefields in Turkish territory. In its place she at first proposed a Rodosto–Midia line, in view of its comparative shortness

and of her trade with Constantinople and Asia Minor. When, however, in deference to Russia, the Powers refused to allow her access to the Sea of Marmora, she proposed a line from Cape Malatra, south of Midia, which would cross the Ergene River near the railway between Inàdja and Halkodja, and run thence to Cape Dragodina. The port of Enos would thus fall to Bulgaria.

These objections were taken due note of in the Collective Note of the Powers which was presented to the Porte on March 30 by their six Ambassadors at Constantinople through their *doyen* Marquis Pallavicini.

In their reply, which was communicated to Marquis Pallavicini on March 31, the Porte accepted the preliminary basis for the conclusion of peace recommended by the Powers without any reservations. The Committee organs published articles to show that to do so was the only course open to Turkey, and the news was joyfully welcomed by the population of the capital, who, ever since the revolution of January 23, had been longing for an early peace. On April 3 Herr von Jägow made an important speech in the German Reichstag in which he explained the view which Germany took of the proposed conditions.

The Foreign Secretary referred to the "Collective Note" which was sent to the Porte before the fall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet. The purpose was, he said, to secure for Turkey after her collapse all that was possible. The events in Constantinople rendered the efforts of the Powers fruitless. All the financial questions would be discussed in Paris with the help of experts, and preliminary discussions had been proceeding for some time. The Midia–Enos frontier had, at the instance of Russia, been proposed to the belligerents by the Powers in order to end the hostilities as soon as possible, and it had been accepted by Turkey. The replies of the Balkan Allies to the mediation proposals had not yet been received. The question

of the islands contained considerable difficulties. German policy aimed at a solution of this question in such a way that the Asiatic possessions of Turkey would not be imperilled. As regarded the Asiatic possessions of Turkey, German diplomacy aimed at the maintenance of the *status quo* and the support of Turkey's vitality. No Power had raised the question of the Dardanelles.

"In reply to further questions, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Herr Zimmermann, said that the meetings of Ambassadors in London had arrived at a provisional agreement regarding the principles which should apply to the association of the Balkan States in the Turkish State Debt. The Balkan States would take over that part of the debt which corresponded to the revenues of the territories ceded to them, and they would take the place of the Turkish Government as regarded all concessions and contracts in the ceded territories. The details would be settled by an International Commission, which would meet at Paris, and in which Turkey and the Balkan States would be represented, and the decisions of the Commission would be included in the Treaty of Peace. The Commission would meet as soon as possible, and preliminary discussions were being conducted by the French Government and the Councillors of Embassies of the Great Powers, together with prominent financiers and delegates of the Ottoman Debt as technical advisers." *

In France, however, certain passages in Herr von Jägow's speech aroused a feeling of distrust, especially as regarded England, which tallied with the views current in Turkish circles, many of which are in touch with France.

"In general the whole tenor of the Chancellor's allusions to foreign politics is received here with diffidence. There seems to be a feeling that Germany is not beneath following the counsels of General Friedrich Bernhardi,

* *The Times*, Friday, April 4, 1913.

who, in his book on *Germany and the Future War*, published in March last year, boldly advocated the most Macchiavellian policy yet proposed since the days of Macchiavelli himself. That policy was to detach England from the Entente, to prevent Russia from being of any practical use to her ally, and then turning upon France with the whole force of the German Empire, to crush her for ever in a war for which pretexts should be purposely created, either in Europe or in the colonial field, so that France should again appear as she did in 1870, the aggressor, and Germany the injured party. There is something in the tone of the Chancellor's speech in which some French minds already detect 'the injured party.'

"The *Débats* very pointedly calls attention to the words of the Chancellor, in which he says that he would not say that 'at no moment war had not been at their door, and that on several occasions it required on the part of all the Cabinets a full sentiment of their responsibility to prevent a violent explosion.' Comparing this, says the *Débats*, with the words of Sir Edward Grey, that the agreement as regards Albania was just in time to prevent peace from being broken, it seems that there were certain very critical moments."

I have treated this episode with more attention, perhaps, than it deserves, but it is never wise to neglect any sign which can throw light upon any trend of public opinion, and it is not too much to say that during the last few months the "man in the street" must have sometimes thought that, as regards France and Russia, Sir Edward Grey at times walked upon very thin ice.

The reply of the Allies was delayed owing to certain modifications suggested by Servia and Montenegro, but was finally handed to the Powers at Sofia on April 5.

"The Allies express their gratitude to the Powers for their efforts to bring about the conclusion of peace, and,

desiring sincerely to facilitate their task, accept their conditions for mediation subject to the following reservations:

"1. In the definitive determination of the frontier in Thrace, the line indicated in the conditions formulated by the Powers shall be taken as a basis and not as the definitive line.

"2. The Ægean Islands shall be ceded by Turkey to the Allies.

"3. The Allies consider that they should know beforehand the frontiers proposed for Albania, trusting that they will be in conformity with those which they proposed in London.

"4. The demand for a war indemnity must be accepted in principle, the task of fixing its amount being left to the Commission which is to study the financial questions, and on which the Allies will be represented.

"5. The Allies agree that the operations of war shall cease as soon as the above conditions have been favourably received and admitted."

Thus the only questions really left open were those of the Ægean Islands and of the delimitation of the southern frontier of Albania. I have already explained that the sole reason for the importance of these questions was the apprehension felt by Italy lest Greece should become a naval power.

In the meantime public opinion in Bulgaria had become more favourable to peace; the last defeat at Tchataldja had been severely felt in Sofia itself.

On April 8 the Ambassadorial Conference drew up a reply to the Note of the Allies, which was despatched to them through Sir Edward Grey. This Note was on the following lines:

"1. The Powers agree to accept the Enos–Midia direct line as a basis for negotiation of the new Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

" 2. The question of the status of the Ægean Islands, the majority of which will go to Greece, is reserved to the Powers.

" 3. The question of a war indemnity, together with all financial questions arising out of the war, will be considered by the Financial Commission to meet in Paris.

" 4. In regard to Albania it will be declared that the frontiers of the north and north-eastern portion of that State have already been decided by the Powers, by whom, also, the remaining part of the boundary is being discussed.

" In conclusion the Powers will recommend the Allies to cease hostilities."

Peace in fact appeared at length to be in sight. The Bulgarian Government, to facilitate agricultural work, dismissed all men from the columns who were over forty-five years of age, although a party headed by Dr. Daneff urged that war should be continued until the Powers had done something for Bulgaria's ally Montenegro. At Berlin a semi-official Note in the *Lokalanzeiger* admitted that the horizon was beginning to clear a little, and noted as hopeful signs the willingness of Bulgaria to conclude a preliminary peace, of Greece to acquiesce in the proposals of the Powers with regard to the southern frontier of Albania, and the fact that Montenegro, in the negotiations which were being carried on under the leadership of Italy, showed some readiness to accept an equivalent for Skutari either in money or in territory taken from the fertile plain round it.

An official statement issued on April 10 by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the views of Russia.

" The principal object pursued by the Russian Government at the time of the military successes of the Balkan Allies was to assure for the victors the fruits of their victories in the largest possible measure. This object has been attained as the result of complicated and difficult

negotiations, for the Allies could not look for success except by virtue of non-intervention by the Powers.

" To appreciate at its just value the importance of the services rendered by Russia towards the Balkan States, the complexity of the international situation, with the collision of opposing interests, must be fully taken into account. The localisation of the war was only possible on two conditions—first, the renunciation by the Great Powers of their individual territorial and other advantages ; secondly, the renunciation of any individual action on their part.

" These negative conditions implied a third and positive condition, namely, the revision of the situation created by the war and its reconciliation with the interests of the Great Powers, interests which they could not renounce, and the adjustment of which could only be effected by the European Concert whose decision should be rendered in the name of the whole of Europe. Hence individual action could not be taken by any of the Powers, except on condition of the unanimous recognition by them that the decision of Europe had a compelling force.

" In these circumstances the Conference of Ambassadors in London was convoked. That Conference has just completed the heavy task of determining the frontiers of North and North-Eastern Albania in opposition to the interests of Montenegro and Servia, with their very natural tendency towards expansion."

The comments of the Montenegrin Government on the communication did not lack a certain dignity.

The *Glas Tsrnogortza*, the official organ, printed the Russian *communiqué* with the reply beneath it.

" After pointing out that certain passages of the Russian statement tend to confirm the belief that Russian diplomacy was not accurately informed, the reply cites as an example the statement that King Nicholas had received advice to desist from his personal ambitions and not to

commit the Montenegrins to useless sacrifices. The *communiqué* continued:

"'His Majesty the King is unwilling to see in these words an attempt to excite the people against their Sovereign. That would be contrary to all moral laws, and we therefore ascribe this passage to total ignorance on the part of the Russian Foreign Office. In Montenegro the will of the people is identical with the will of the Ruler, and the latter has for his sole aim the honour and prosperity of his country. As regards the assertion that King Nicholas desired to drag Russia into a European war, we affirm, on the contrary, that His Majesty begged Russia not to declare war solely in order to assist Montenegro. This can best be proved by the official documents of February 14 and March 22, and we should be very grateful to the Imperial Government that Russian blood should not be shed except in the interests of the Russian Fatherland. Montenegro will never shed the precious blood of her sons save when necessary for the honour and safety of the country, her national existence, and her glorious past.'" *

The presence of M. Popovitch, the Montenegrin Peace Commissioner in London, was, however, supposed to show that means were being taken to open a way of retreat for King Nicholas from the position he had taken up.

The decision and clearness of the tone of the Russian *communiqué* as regarded King Nicholas and the Pan-Slav movement met with great appreciation at Vienna. In Montenegro depression prevailed when it became known that the king was negotiating for compensation for Skutari. Greece, too, felt that she was left out in the cold whilst Bulgaria got all she desired. It was suggested, however, that the Southern Albanian frontier inland could be arranged by a mixed Commission, to be delimited in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, whilst the

* *The Times*, Monday, April 14, 1913.

point from which it was to start on the seashore could be settled by direct negotiation with Italy, and the neutrality and non-fortification of the shores opposite Corfu, although not south of that island, could be guaranteed by Greece. Bulgaria and Servia were willing to accept the terms of the Powers.

The Foreign Office communication, moreover, utterly cut the ground from under the feet of the Russian Opposition. The Pan-Slavist agitation was as dead as a door-nail. The notion that M. Sazonoff was pursuing his own personal policy whilst the Premier was playing into the hands of international Jews was dispelled once and for ever. It came to be seen that the policy of Russia had undergone no change since the outbreak of the war, and that it emanated from the Tsar himself, and would be carried out regardless of any change in the personality of the Ministers.

Nor was Russia idle at Sofia. On Wednesday, April 16, the *Daily Telegraph* was able to announce that news had been received by the Russian Government that an armistice between Turkey and Bulgaria had been concluded at Tchataldja owing to Russian representations to the Bulgarian Government. On the following day the terms were officially published at Constantinople.*

" ' A suspension of hostilities consequent upon a verbal agreement between the Ottoman and Bulgarian armies on the following terms is officially announced :

" ' *Article* 1. Hostilities will be suspended at Tchaltadja and Bulair until April 23.

" ' *Article* 2. If the peace negotiations do not come to an issue in this interval, the period can be prolonged with the assent of both sides.

" ' *Article* 3. A commission to be appointed by both parties will fix a neutral zone between the two armies.

" ' *Article* 4. In the event of a resumption of hostilities

* *Daily Telegraph*, Friday, April 18, 1913.

the two parties will have to give forty-eight hours' notice. This delay will commence at eight o'clock in the evening of the day on which the notice is received by the other party.

"'*Article* 5. During the time of the suspension of hostilities the Ottoman fleet will not oppose the revictualling of the Bulgarian army with provision of foods between the Gulf of Saros and the coast of the Black Sea.'

"The term, 'suspension of hostilities,' which is used may be explained thus. Generals in the field have the power to 'suspend hostilities' without reference to their Governments, while a formal armistice cannot be so concluded.

"The advantage from the Bulgarians' point of view of the present arrangement is that they have thus been able to come to a separate agreement with the Turks, which is not an 'armistice' in name, though it is an armistice in fact, without breaking outwardly the letter of the treaty of alliance, which stipulates that the Allies shall only make peace in unison."

The first step had been taken on the path which was to lead to the Treaty of London.

From the first, Bulgaria, which was preoccupied mainly with its disputes with Rumania and with the Allies, declared itself ready to accept the proposals of the Powers with certain unimportant reservations. Greece and Servia accepted the mediation proposals; Montenegro was thought to be changing her attitude.

The dispute between Servia and Bulgaria was considered by competent Austrian authorities to be one which would probably be settled without recourse to violence, for Bulgaria could only gain by taking the interests of Europe as a whole into account. If she betrayed Balkan interests she would be kept for ever to the east of the Vardar, and would find her gains in other directions counterbalanced by the undying hatred of Servia. On

the other hand, Servia, in her own interests, should not oppose justified Bulgarian claims or retain Bulgar districts which she did not require for paramount strategical reasons. In financial circles peace was held to be assured, but it was seen that no financial settlement could be effected until territorial questions were settled. Russia undertook to bring about an agreement between Bulgaria and Rumania. To less cool-headed observers matters looked critical enough. The Servians were despatching fresh troops from Kumanovo to Monastir, where they were arresting Bulgarian residents. Bulgarian bands were active in the Servian district of Prilep, and in the Pravishta district, which lies contiguous to the much-coveted Gulf of Orfano, the Bulgarians had advanced as far south as Samakov and lay facing the Greeks a mile off at Mustegna.

But behind the Balkan peoples the Great Powers stood as grim warders of the marches, and it was rapidly becoming clear that the Great Powers were resolved that the Balkan War should be brought to an end.

Speaking on April 23, at a dinner of the Institute of Foreign Journalists in London, Mr. Asquith said, in the presence of the Foreign Ambassadors and the Bulgarian Minister:

"You have as fellow-guests of your association the Ambassadors of the Great Powers of Europe. We have been sitting together round a table this afternoon in prosecution of the great task of conciliation and of common counsel, upon which, under the presidency of my right hon. friend and colleague, Sir Edward Grey, they have been engaged now for months. Shallow and impatient critics are ready enough to jibe at what they consider the cumbrous and dilatory methods of the European concert. But the results which are being slowly but surely achieved are, in my opinion at any rate, well worth the time, the energy, and the tact which have been so unsparingly given to their attainment.

"The Great Powers, more than one of whom are acutely and directly interested in the upheaval of the old *régime* in the Near East, have worked so far successfully for an honourable peace among themselves. Their mediation has now we hope been at least in principle accepted by the actual combatants. I do not say that points of difficulty may not and will not emerge—one such is prominently before our minds to-day—which will call for the exercise of the same qualities of forbearance, of mutual understanding and accommodation, of willingness to subordinate particular interests and susceptibilities to one great governing purpose—the common pursuit of a durable peace—and we may, I think, believe without an excess of optimism that sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, we shall reach the goal which has been so long and so laboriously sought."

Speaking at the London Chamber of Commerce on the following night, the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, emphasised the fact that the friendly understanding between France and England was a guarantee for the peace of the rest of the world.

The fall of Skutari, so pregnant with danger in the eyes of the chancelleries of Europe, had very little direct effect upon the negotiations between the Allies and Turkey. Indeed, during these eventful concluding days of April when a mountain kingdom, not half the size of Wales, might at any moment have plunged the world into war, the London Press scarcely even alluded to the subject. But Bulgaria, who had to keep the armies in the lines before Tchataldja and Bulair, whilst Greeks and Servians were marching from strength to strength in Macedonia, and the wheat-fields and the rose-gardens lay untended in her plains, had every reason to remember that war was still at her gates.

The Bulgarian official journal, the *Mir*, pointed out that the Allies were beginning to forfeit in the eyes of Europe

the prestige which they had acquired in the war of liberation, and that Europe would be irritated and alarmed by seeing the general peace jeopardised by their quarrels. However, Bulgaria would not forget the great work of liberation, and would continue to hold the common enemy in check despite the efforts of others to exploit the situation. Right would triumph in the end.

So confused was the position of affairs that the Turkish journal *Tanin* seriously discussed the question as to whether an armistice had been verbally concluded with Servia and Greece, who had accepted mediation by a Note of April 22. It is true that they were no longer in contact with any Turkish troops, so the question was an academic one. However, Greece and Servia agreed to be represented at the London Conference, although Turkey delayed to appoint her plenipotentiaries. Meanwhile the armistice was prolonged until the middle of May. Cordial relations prevailed between the Bulgarians and Turks before Tchataldja. The men danced and played cards together, and many Turkish officers and men received leave of absence. Austria, too, had resolved not to demobilise her armies in the south until peace was concluded between the Balkan Allies and Turkey, so had a deep interest in expediting the deliberations in London.

As we have seen, on May 5 it became known that Montenegro had agreed to hand over Skutari to the Powers, and the way now seemed clear for the meeting of the Conference.

The Porte, meanwhile, to facilitate the negotiations was treating for the purchase of dreadnoughts and destroyers from Brazil, proposing to sell the arsenal at Tophane to the Constantinople Quay Company in order to procure the purchase money, for it was hoped that the possession by Turkey of this powerful fleet would make Greece more complaisant as to the question of the Ægean Islands.

Bulgaria also, in accordance with the decision of the

arbitrators at St. Petersburg, concluded an arrangement with Rumania as to the territorial compensations to be accorded to her. The subsequent change of government in Rumania, and the advent to power of the Conservatives under M. Majorescu, left it doubtful as to whether the agreement would be ratified.

The Times correspondent at St. Petersburg wrote: *

"According to the *Bourse Gazette*, the protocol contains four points:

"First, Bulgaria cedes to Rumania Silistria with a radius of three kilometres; secondly, Rumania will give fixed compensation to Bulgarians desirous of leaving this territory on its transfer to Rumania; thirdly, both countries undertake not to erect fortifications in the neighbourhood of Silistria; fourthly, the Kutzo-Vlachs, in the newly-acquired Bulgarian territory in Macedonia, are guaranteed religious and educational freedom.

"It is certain that no territory is ceded except Silistria, and some doubt exists whether the undertaking regarding fortifications is correctly given."

Bulgaria had thus cleared for action, and reports were soon current that Rumania had twice offered to help her should she decide upon attacking Servia and Greece. King Charles has a long memory and does not forget either the trouble which Greece has caused him over the property in Rumania which was claimed by Greek religious foundations, or that 7 per cent. of the population of Servia are Rumanians. The first Servan regiment which entered Adrianople was composed of Rumanians from the Timok district.

Greece, however, continued intansigent. She urged that by their Note of April 22 the Allies had accepted nothing but mediation, and claimed that the Treaty drafted by the Ambassadorial Conference in London should be so amended as to allow the fate of Albania, of

* *The Times*, Friday, May 16, 1913.

Mount Athos, and of the Ægean Islands to be decided by the Allies and the Powers jointly. She refused to allow any decision, to which she had not been a party, to be forced upon her. Her attitude was easily explicable. She alone of the Allies did not know what territory she would gain by the war. Bulgaria by her Treaty with Greece was bound to support the Greek claims as Greece had done hers in Thrace. For herself she desired a more exact delimitation of the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier than was contained in the draft Treaty which had been submitted to her by the Ambassadorial Conference. On May 12 the Bulgarians, Servians, and Greeks returned an answer to the Note of the Powers in which they stated that they could not believe that the Powers would refuse to discuss with them the questions of the delimitation of Albania and the fate of the Ægean Islands which were so vital to their interests, and with this non-committal answer, accepted Sir Edward Grey's invitation to a Conference in London. The Bulgarian Government authorised M. Madjaroff, the Bulgarian Minister in London, to sign the Peace Preliminaries drawn up by the Powers.

By these preliminaries Turkey ceded all her territories in Europe west of a line drawn from Enos to Midia, although this line was not defined in detail, except that Albania gave up all rights over Crete, and left the fate of the Ægean Islands in the hands of the Powers. Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia were entrusted with the task of delimiting Albania and fixing its organic statute. All financial questions arising out of the war were to be settled by a Technical Commission sitting at Paris, on which the belligerents were to be represented, and all questions relating to the condition of peoples depending on the High Contracting Parties, trade, industry, etc., were to be settled by particular conventions, so far as possible, which were to be ratified at the same time as the general Treaty of Peace.

But though Bulgaria had signed the Peace Preliminaries Greece had not done so, and it was thought that both Servia and, possibly, Montenegro would join her in her refusal to give the Powers a blank cheque as to Albania and the islands.

However, by May 15 most of the delegates had arrived in London, and it was hoped that the Conference would open on May 20.

They included—

"TURKEY:
Osman Nizami Pasha, Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.
Batzari Effendi.
Reshid Bey.

"BULGARIA:
Dr. Daneff, President of the Sobranje.
M. Madjaroff, Bulgarian Minister in London.
General Paprikoff and Colonel Jostoff as military experts.

"SERVIA:
M. Novakovitch, ex-Prime Minister.
M. Nikolitch, President of the Skupshtina.
M. Vesnitch, Servian Minister in Paris.

"GREECE:
M. Skouloudis, ex-Foreign Minister.
Dr. Streit, Greek Minister in Vienna.
M. Gennadius, Greek Minister in London.

"MONTENEGRO:
M. Lazar Miyushkovitch, Count Voynovitch.
M. Popovitch."

The personnel of the Conference differed but little from that which opened on December 16, 1912, and broke down on January 29, 1913. The most notable absentee was M. Venezelos, the Greek Premier.

Osman Nizami Pasha replaced Reshid Pasha as Chief Turkish delegate.

Their main object was to discuss the many details which would have to be settled after the signature of the Treaty. Had it only been requisite to sign the Treaty Sir E. Grey had drafted some time before, there would have been no need for them to come to London. Both M. Madjaroff, the Bulgarian Minister, and M. Gennadius, the Greek Minister, had already been authorised to sign it when the other allies were ready, but the Treaty had not been signed and there seemed no obvious reason for the delay.

It was believed in Bulgaria that this delay was due to the wish of the other allies to keep the Bulgarian troops before Tchataldja whilst the division of the conquered territory was being discussed. It was true that the question of the Ægean Islands and that of the delimitation of the southern frontier of Albania were vital to Greece, but it was felt that the Servian delay was owing to a secret understanding with that Power, especially as Servia could not make up her mind to allow Russia to arbitrate as to Kuprülü, Ochrida, Priplep, and Monastir, which she wished to retain for herself. Yet the Belgrade Ministerial journal *Samouprava* conveyed the impression that Servia contemplated not only a peaceful settlement with Bulgaria but the continuance of the Balkan League. Turkey also was getting restive, and was disinclined to conclude peace with Bulgaria unless she could do so at the same time as the other allies.

In the meantime Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassadorial Conference were unceasing in their efforts to get the Treaty signed as soon as possible, and were seconded by Bulgaria, who, it was thought, if further delays occurred, might break away from her allies and sign peace on her own account. It was thought that the rights of the Allies to discuss the Albanian and Archipelago

questions with the Powers might be safeguarded by a modification in the wording of the Treaty, and that a provision granting Servia a commercial outlet on the Adriatic might be inserted in the Albanian Constitution. These suggestions met with the approval of Bulgaria. Had that Power signed a separate Peace Greece and Servia would have regarded the Balkan League as at an end. The Greek Minister in London issued a statement that the delays were due to the wish of all the Allies, including Bulgaria, to secure certain modifications in the Treaty, and were in no way connected with the disposition of the Bulgarian army. "If Bulgaria suffers inconvenience, Greece suffers no less, especially since she is kept in a perplexing and detrimental uncertainty as to frontiers which, in other instances, are fairly well determined."* Still the deadlock continued, but whilst the delegates in London were trying to find a formula which, attached to the Treaty in the form of an *annexe*, would enable them to dispense with any modification in its text, the fighting between the Greeks and Bulgarians and the growing tension between the Bulgarians and Servians rendered the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Allies increasingly urgent. There was, indeed, imminent danger of a serious conflict between the Allies themselves.

It had been hoped that the Peace would have been signed on May 27, but on May 26 *The Times* published news that the Greek Admiral and his fleet whilst passing Kavala had been vigorously cannonaded by the Bulgarian batteries, that no improvement was to be noted in the dangerous quarrel between Bulgaria and Servia, and that, despite categorical denials from Belgrade, it was believed at Sofia that an understanding directed against Bulgaria had been concluded between Greece and Servia. Moreover, although the delegates in London had not been able to discover a formula which would allow the Allies and

* *The Times*, Friday, May 23, 1913 (M. J. Gennadius).

the Turks to sign the Treaty of Peace, not only Turkey and Bulgaria, but Servia and Montenegro were thought to be ready to sign the Treaty as it stood. Only Greece stood out, although Italy and Germany had, it was said, agreed to cede nearly all the Ægean Islands to her, even if recent fighting in Tripoli might make Italy inclined to retain some of them until the regular Turkish troops were withdrawn from Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

Once more Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassadorial Conference saved the situation. On May 26 the delegates of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro decided to ask Sir Edward Grey to convoke all the Peace Delegates to a formal meeting of the Conference at St. James's Palace, as the informal conversations between the Turkish and Greek delegates had led to no result. The Bulgarian delegates were not present at this meeting. Their attitude had all along been that the Treaty should be signed as it stood, although they would admit the modifications proposed by the Greeks if the Turks would accept them. On the same afternoon, at the Conference of Ambassadors, a resolution, which had been proposed by them on May 22, and which had now been sanctioned by all the Powers, was adopted. That resolution urged the belligerents to sign the Treaty at once.

Accordingly, on May 27, Sir Edward Grey summoned all the chief delegates, except the Montenegrins, to the Foreign Office, and received them separately.

In each case he opened the conversation by communicating the following resolution which had been passed by the meeting of Ambassadors on the previous day: "The meeting regrets the delay in signing the Treaty of peace, and continues of the opinion that a discussion as to modifications of the Treaty would entail endless delays, and that it must be avoided." *

"Sir Edward then declared that the delegates had now

* *The Times*, Wednesday, May 28, 1913.

been in London for more than a week and had not yet come to terms. This could not be allowed to go on. The Powers expected them to sign the Treaty without more ado. If they could not make up their minds to do this there was no object in their remaining in London any longer. To the Turkish Delegate, and possibly to others, Sir Edward said that if any of the belligerents still refused to sign those who did sign could count upon the moral support of Great Britain. Questions not settled in the Treaty could be made the subject of supplementary protocols which, so far as the Powers were concerned, the belligerents could negotiate with one another.

" In reply to this M. Novakovitch, the first delegate received, expressed great surprise at what he called this unexpected development, and said he must refer to his Government for instructions. M. Gennadius replied in the same sense. Dr. Daneff and Osman Nizami Pasha declared themselves ready to sign the Treaty at once. Both the Servian and Greek delegates have since telegraphed for definite instructions. It is believed that they have urged their Governments to comply with Sir Edward Grey's demand for immediate signature, and that peace will now be concluded in a day or two."

Amongst the delegates who had been holding out for modifications great indignation was expressed at what they described as the brutal plainness of Sir Edward Grey's language. The intimation that they would be expected to leave London if they refused to sign the Treaty especially ruffled their feelings. On the other hand, even those who held out most strongly against signing the Treaty as it stood were obviously relieved that an end was being put to an impossible situation by the energetic intervention of the British Foreign Secretary.

Never since Lord Castlereagh in 1814 saved Europe by threatening to withdraw the subsidies from England, and thus forced Russia, Austria, and Prussia to advance upon

Paris, when Napoleon's army was in their rear, has a British Foreign Minister played the part which Sir Edward Grey played on the morning of May 28. It was owing to himself and to the Tsar of Russia that he was able to speak in the name of a united Europe, and well had he deserved the eulogy which Lord Curzon had passed upon him at the dinner of the Royal Geographical Society the evening before.*

" His lordship said that within his experience of public life no Foreign Minister before had been so completely assured of the confidence and support of the nation. So far as they could judge, Sir Edward Grey had played the part of our representative in the councils of Europe with great calmness, with a complete lack of self-interest or self-advertisement, and with commanding influence."

Sir Edward Grey said that " Lord Curzon had referred with great kindness to his official work. ' However good the intentions of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs or of the Government, however hard he may work, the proportion of success must depend in a very great degree upon the extent to which it is the impression not merely at home, but abroad, that the policy has the support of the nation. That we have enjoyed in a very high degree. It is right that I especially should lose no opportunity of admitting to what a remarkable extent it has been the case that, not only in the party which supports the Government, but also in the Opposition, foreign policy has been accorded in a most invaluable and most generous manner the support of both sides of the House of Commons.' "

Sir Edward Grey's warnings produced a salutary effect, and in due course the Governments of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro instructed their delegates to sign the Treaty, although Greece still desired to make certain reservations as to questions which specially concerned her.

* *Daily Telegraph*, Tuesday, May 27, 1913.

Owing to the delay which occurred before the Servian delegates received their instructions it was impossible for the signature of the Treaty to take place on May 29 as had been at first proposed. From a historian's point of view the delay was an unfortunate one, for otherwise the Treaty, which, it was believed, had for ever freed Thrace and Macedonia from the Turk, would have been signed on the 460th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, which took place on May 29, 1453.

The Greeks, however, had some justification for their delay, as they wished a protocol to be signed securing to subjects of the Allies living in Turkey the same privileges as before the war, pending the negotiation of a regular Convention to that effect. They remembered that after the war of 1897, Hellenic subjects were not able to obtain the restoration of their immunities for twenty-seven months. The Turks, however, said that the immunities would be restored as a matter of course, so would not sign the protocol, and the matter dropped.

The Times summarised the provisions of the Treaty as follows: *

"It puts into treaty shape the conditions of peace laid down by the Powers in their Note of April 13, and accepted by the Allies on April 21.

"Article I. provides that after the formal ratification of the Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and amity between the contracting parties.

"Article II. provides that Turkey shall cede to the Allies all Turkish territory on the mainland of Europe situated west of a line to be drawn from Enos to Midia, and that this boundary shall be delimited by an International Commission.

"Article III. provides that the delimitation of Albania, and all other questions relating to Albania, shall be left to the Powers.

* *The Times*, Friday, May 30, 1913.

"ARTICLE IV. provides that Turkey shall cede to the Allies the island of Crete, and shall renounce in their favour all her sovereign and other rights in the island.

"ARTICLE V. provides that the contracting parties shall leave the Powers to decide the fate of all the Turkish islands situated in the Ægean, with the exception of Crete and the peninsula of Mount Athos.

"ARTICLE VI. provides that the contracting parties shall leave to the International Commission, which is to meet in Paris, the settlement of the financial questions arising out of the recent war and out of the consequent redistribution of territory.

"ARTICLE VII. provides that questions relating to prisoners of war, jurisdiction, nationality, and commerce shall be settled by special conventions.

"The last Article provides that the Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible."

In the House of Commons, on the same evening, Mr. Bonar Law, as leader of the Opposition, and other speakers, warmly complimented Sir Edward Grey upon his success. The news of the conclusion of peace was received at Constantinople with relief, in the other European capitals with the utmost joy.

The Treaty was finally signed at noon on Friday, May 30, on a warm summer's day, when London looked at her best. The delegates assembled at St. James's Palace in the room known hitherto as the Picture Gallery, but which will be in the future styled the Balkan Peace Room, the finest apartment in the Palace. *

"It is carpeted in dark red. Its walls are adorned by life-sized portraits of the Kings and Queens of England in heavy and wide gold frames. Two great marble mantelpieces over the wide fireplaces have on them big gold clocks and candlesticks, two of the latter in the shape of angels, carrying in their hands golden wreaths of laurel.

* *The Times*, Friday, May 30, 1913.

Some one tried to represent them as angels of peace, but they look more like angels of victory.

"In the middle of this long and wide room stands a large polished mahogany table, which gives you at once the impression of strength and solidity. On each side of the table are placed ten chairs of red morocco and gilt frames, so that, with the president's chair at the top and the chief secretary's seat at the bottom, there are altogether twenty-two chairs around the table. On the table itself are laid twenty-two writing-pads in black morocco leather, and about as many square and heavy glass inkstands. The windows of the room, with heavy damask curtains of warm dark red colour, which are drawn aside, look down on the garden of the palace and across the road to St. James's Park. Only the screen, with its ill-omened peacock in Gobelins tapestry, which was in front of the fireplace when the Peace Conference met for the first time last December, was no longer there.

"Altogether the room, with its solid and warm furniture and the Royal portraits, mostly in Coronation robes, presented a fitting aspect of grave dignity, and in that hall and under such circumstances a great historical act was solemnly performed."

The Chief Delegates present were Turkey—Osman Nizami Pasha; Bulgaria—Dr. Daneff; Servia—M. Novakovitch; Greece—M. Skouloudis; Montenegro—M. Popovitch. Sir Edward Grey took the chair at 12.30 P.M.

After welcoming the delegates he formally opened the Conference. The delegates exchanged their *pleins pouvoirs*, and immediately signed the Treaty, of which I have already given a full summary.

Dr. Daneff then proposed a protocol to the effect that the Turco-Bulgarian frontier should start from the east of Midia, and follow the Thalweg of the Ergene river down to Muradli, passing south of Airebolu, then

between Keshan and Malgara, and thence over the crest-line to Cape Ivridje.

Osman Nizami Pasha replied that he had no powers to agree to such a line, but that Turkey would accept the frontier worked out on the spot by the International Commission under Article II. of the Treaty. He, however, after Sir Edward Grey had left, agreed to refer to his Government another Bulgarian proposal declaring that the legal status, which had been interrupted by the war, should be restored at the peace, and assented to a proposal by M. Skouloudis that the straits should be reopened to the passage of merchant ships, and that Turkey should not change the international laws which regulate the maritime traffic there.

"It is a matter of course," simply replied Osman Nizami Pasha, "and such a demand seems quite unnecessary."

The delegates, through M. Skouloudis, their senior in age, expressed their thanks to Sir Edward Grey, and to His Majesty the King for the graciousness with which he had allowed them to sign a Treaty of Peace, "which will constitute a landmark in history," in that historic palace.

"After the principal Turkish delegate, Osman Nizami Pasha, had associated himself with the remarks made by the Greek delegate, Dr. Daneff delivered a short address in which he drew attention to the historic character of the occasion. The end of the war would allow the States engaged to resume their relations as friends and neighbours. Common tasks awaited them, and the world would judge them according to the manner in which these were performed. The Bulgarian delegate concluded by paying a cordial tribute to the indefatigable efforts of Sir Edward Grey to promote a settlement. Indeed the happy issue at which they had arrived was first and foremost to be ascribed to the perseverance which the Foreign Secretary had shown. Dr. Daneff concluded by expressing the

thanks of the delegates to the British nation for its hospitality, as well as their sense of the King's act in placing St. James's Palace at their disposal.

" M. Novakovitch and M. Popovitch, the Servian and Montenegrin delegates, also spoke. M. Popovitch said that Montenegro had been made the whipping-boy of Europe. Great Britain had taken a leading part in depriving the Montenegrins of Skutari, and they now looked to her to secure at least a modification of the Albanian frontier so as to give them lands for cultivation and a natural route between Podgoritza and Ipek.

" Sir Edward Grey thanked the delegates for the friendly sentiments expressed by them. He informed them that St. James's Palace was at their disposition for their further deliberations, and, wishing them every success, withdrew from the Conference room."

After making arrangements to discuss the protocols in which the details, which are not settled by the Treaty itself, were to be regulated, the delegates withdrew. The Conference had lasted but an hour, but that hour had, men hoped, seen the disappearance of Turkey as a European Power, and the end of the long tragedy both of her rule in the Balkans and of the Balkan War.

The signature of the Treaty of Peace did not, however, end either the labours or the difficulties of the Conference of London. As I have said, by Article VII. of the Peace of London it is provided that questions relating to prisoners of war, jurisdiction, nationality, and commerce should be settled by special conventions, and it was, therefore, arranged that the Conference should continue its sittings until the protocol dealing with these subjects, which was to be annexed to the Treaty, had been drawn up.

But, meanwhile, the difficulties between the Allies were increasing daily, and those disputes reacted upon the attitude of Turkey, which was encouraged by the substitution of Dr. Daneff for M. Gueshoff as Prime Minister of

Bulgaria, and by the greater activity of the party in Rumania which was anxious to intervene actively in the Balkan resettlements. Turkey delayed issuing orders for the demobilisation of her army, and continued to send reinforcements to the Tchataldja lines. The Committee for drawing up the protocol met at St. James's Palace on June 4. The subjects which Turkey desired to have dealt with in the protocol included:

1. The amnesty.
2. Evacuation of troops.
3. The re-establishment of the postal and telegraphic communications, which was of pressing importance, since Constantinople could only communicate with Europe by the Constanza cable.
4. Turkey demanded compensation for the damage inflicted during the war on religious property, and a guarantee that in future no expropriation of any kind would take place.
5. The question of the nationality of the Turkish subjects living in the conquered territory. The solution proposed by Turkey aimed at retaining under her influence as far as possible the Ottoman nationals in the Balkan States. Turkey also expected that the Treaty would be put in force as soon as the protocol was signed.

None of these questions was expected to prove difficult to settle, but the refusal of Turkey to consent to the re-establishment of the legal régime in force with regard to Greek subjects before the war, that is to say, to the re-establishment of the Capitulations, had profoundly annoyed the Greek delegates, who, in consequence, were not present at the meetings.

The labours of the Conference were not destined to prove successful. The Committee held several meetings but decided nothing, and at that on June 7 a very serious dispute took place between Turkey and Bulgaria, which did much to envenom the disputes between the Allies.

It must be remembered that the annexation of the territories which Bulgaria had taken from Turkey raised her population from 3,154,000, of whom 12½ per cent. were Moslems, to one of 7,000,000, of whom one and a quarter millions were Mohammedan, who form the majority in the regions east of the River Mesta, in the city of Adrianople, and in the eastern portion of the Maritza basin.

Turkey, on the other hand, was anxious to restrict as much as possible the privileges enjoyed by the foreigners living within her borders. The Young Turks pose as a Party of Progress, and to them the Capitulations are as odious as the Treaty-rights formerly enjoyed by foreigners in Japan were to the Japanese. Turkey wishes to be mistress within her own borders, and, in view of the very large Greek population on the coast lands of her Asiatic provinces saw a real danger in restoring her former Treaty-rights to the Hellenic kingdom. Greece only claimed the establishment of the legal *status quo* before the war, but her claims could only be met if the Turks and Bulgarians abated their pretensions as defined in the clauses which they respectively put forward.

(1) Turkey gave her assent to the re-enactment of all the conventions and treaties in existence before the war, conditionally upon the acknowledgment of her claims as to the régime under which, in the annexed territories, the "Vakoufs" and Crown properties were to be placed, viz. that no measure of expropriation could be enforced by the Balkan States, and that the properties in question would be managed in conformity with the regulations in force during the period of Turkish rule.

(2) Bulgaria agreed to the re-enactment of all the treaties and conventions but one—the convention arrived at between her and Turkey in 1909, whereby the Ottoman population of the Bulgarian kingdom retained their muftis, etc.

In the Mohammedan religion the muftis are Doctors of Ecclesiastical Law, who act as the chiefs of the population in ecclesiastical matters. The Turkish claims, therefore, would have created a " State within a State " in Bulgaria, where the Moslems would have held a position very similar to that occupied by the members of the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey whilst under the protectorate of Russia by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774), and which was far more independent of the Bulgarian administration than the Greeks had been of the Ottoman administration under the Capitulations. Greece has very few Moslem subjects and so could accede to the Turkish demands without danger; for Bulgaria to do so was impossible. Thus Turkey not only created a deadlock in the Conference, but increased the friction between the quondam Allies. On the same day the Peace delegates were received by His Majesty at Buckingham Palace. In welcoming them the King expressed the earnest hope that their labours would soon arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, and that there would be no resumption of hostilities; but the royal words had no effect upon his guests.

On Monday, June 7, the delegates signed a protocol, leaving to their respective Governments the task of proceeding separately to the conclusion of the acts for carrying out the provisions of Article VII. between themselves, and closing the sittings of the Conference.

Thus new causes of mutual suspicion were created between the Allies, since each of them was left free to bargain with Turkey, a freedom of which Greece, who only desired the renewal of the previous treaties, was willing to avail herself. Turkish cunning had triumphed.

Once more, however, war was destined to be postponed owing to the interposition of the Tsar of Russia. On June 11 he addressed an energetic despatch to the Kings of Servia and Bulgaria, in which he expressed his

pleasure at the news of the projected interview of the four Premiers at Salonika, but regretted the delay in carrying it out. He warned the Balkan States against dimming the lustre of their achievements by engaging in a fratricidal war, and reminded the two sovereigns that they had engaged by treaty to submit their differences to arbitration by Russia. His message ended with the words:

"Regarding the functions of an arbitrator not as a prerogative, but as a painful duty which I cannot avoid, I feel it incumbent upon me to warn your Majesty that a war between the Allies could not leave me indifferent.

"I wish to make it known that the State which begins this war will be responsible in the eyes of the Slavs, and that I reserve to myself all liberty as to the attitude which Russia will adopt in regard to the results of such a criminal struggle."

Diplomatists commented on the fact that the Tsar used the same tone in this message as the King of England had employed on the previous Saturday; and Sir Edward Grey, in replying to a question in the House of Commons, also deprecated a struggle between the Allies. It became known that Bulgaria had, even before the signature of the Treaty of London, appealed to the Tsar to arbitrate in accordance with the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, but that Servia had hitherto refused arbitration.

The Tsar's message, however, appeared to have produced its due effect; Servia, as well as Bulgaria, agreed to submit their claims to arbitration, with the reservation that the Prime Ministers should meet in St. Petersburg, and that the Tsar's sole task should be to define the frontiers of Bulgaria, whilst taking into account the change of circumstances since the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty was signed. The military party in Austria grumbled at the interference of the Tsar with the Southern Slavs, but His Majesty's efforts were actively supported by M. Venezelos, who pointed out that he had always advocated that

the Allies, if they failed to agree as to the division of the conquered territories, should submit their disputes to arbitration or mediation, so as to avoid being drawn into a fratricidal strife. Both Servia and Greece, moreover, asked Bulgaria to agree to a partial demobilisation and to refrain from concentrating her troops on their frontiers, whilst the murder of Shevket Pasha for the moment contributed to hold back Turkey from an intervention in their strife. Peace seemed assured.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

HE hopes expressed by Mr. Asquith that the Peace of London was destined to prove the commencement of an era of happiness and tranquillity in the sorely-tried Balkan lands were soon seen to be but vain imaginings. Amongst young nations success is apt to breed megalomania, and megalomania was peculiarly rife amongst the politicians and generals at Sofia in June 1913. Outside observers thought that the failure of the London Conferences in December 1912 was due to Dr. Daneff's want of tact as chairman. Dr. Daneff, himself, however, was but little likely to forget that he had been the Chairman of a Peace Conference which will figure for ever in the history of Europe. He had won Adrianople for Bulgaria and with the shrewdness of a provincial pettifogger he proceeded to make further conquests, by holding Servia to the very letter of the bond by which before the outbreak of hostilities she had agreed to divide with Bulgaria the territories to be wrested from Turkey.

To Dr. Daneff it mattered not one jot that the Bulgarian gains had exceeded the utmost dreams of avarice, and that to hoist the Bulgarian flag on the dome of Sultan Selim's Mosque at Adrianople, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece had been forced to prolong until May, and for the sake of Bulgaria alone, a struggle which, but for the question of Adrianople, might easily have been terminated in January.

In the original agreement with Servia it had been contemplated that any territorial acquisitions from the Ægean regions of Turkey would be made only in Macedonia, whilst Servia was to receive a port of her own on the Adriatic. No arrangement had ever been come to with Greece as to the division of the future conquests. Montenegro was to look for compensation to Albania, perhaps to the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

In the result, by the Treaty of London, Bulgaria had gained not only the much-coveted territories in Macedonia, but nearly the whole of Thrace, and it was to be left to the Powers to lay down the frontier between the extreme points of Enos and of Midia, which was to determine how near she was to be brought to Gallipoli, to the Sea of Marmora, and to Constantinople. Servia, on the other hand, had profited but little by the war. The jealousy of Austria and of Italy had excluded her from the Adriatic, which she could only reach under conditions which made her in fact if not in name the humble servant of Montenegro and of Albania; her gains in the Sanjak with its bleak pasture lands would have to be shared with Montenegro; whilst those in Kossovo and in Old Servia neither gave her a direct access to the seaboard of the Ægean nor provided her with any compensation for the blood and treasure which she had expended for Bulgaria in Thrace. Montenegro saw herself robbed of Skutari, which she had won by the death of a tenth of her adult males, whilst the territories which had been assigned to her in Albania could only be occupied at the cost of a fresh war with the Roman Catholic tribes of the north. Greece, whose boundaries with Albania had not been settled by the Treaty of London, saw herself faced with a fresh struggle if she was to retain control of the Greek coastlands of Macedonia, whilst the very elastic conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne rendered it possible for Italy, if so minded, to deprive her of the *de facto* possession of the

islands occupied by Italian troops in the Ægean, amongst which were numbered Rhodes and Astypalaea, until the Turks had withdrawn their regular forces from Tripoli and from Cyrenaica. The British occupation of Egypt, the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina were in the first instance to be temporary ones. Greece had no reason to be enamoured of the outlook.

In short, by the Treaty of London the sole Power which had gained far more than could have been anticipated even by the wildest dreamers at the outbreak of the war, was Bulgaria, and those gains she had to a great extent made with the help of her Allies.

Yet, of all the Allied Powers, Bulgaria was the only one which showed herself unreasonable. The Bulgarians ignored the sacrifices of their Allies, and held only to their ethnographical claims real or pretended. Whatever may be the case in Eastern Macedonia, the Bulgarian populations west of the Vardar are to a very large extent Bulgarised but not Bulgarian, and include a mass of Servian, Greek, Turkish, and Albanian elements, many of whom have only adopted the Bulgarian language since the middle of the nineteenth century. Moreover the main object of Servia in engaging in the war, if we leave out of account her wish to liberate her oppressed kinsmen in Macedonia, was to obtain an independent outlet to the sea so as to free herself from her economic dependence upon Austria. Since she had been debarred from obtaining that outlet upon the Adriatic under any acceptable conditions, the valley of the Struma or of the Vardar must remain open to her if she was to be free to reach the Ægean, whether through a port of her own or by commercial arrangements with another Power, but from such access she would be debarred if Bulgaria extended her frontiers westward across Macedonia so as to meet the new boundary laid down by the Powers for Albania. Servia had no desire to exchange commercial slavery to Austria for commercial

slavery to Bulgaria, and as the acquisition of a Servian port on the Ægean would have involved her not only in great expense to defend her communications with it, but would have ended in constant disputes with both Bulgaria and Greece, she preferred to seek economic salvation in a commercial treaty with Greece as owner of Salonika, the natural port of the basin of the Vardar, through which Servia can most readily find access to the Ægean.

But Bulgaria, as we have seen, ignored all such considerations, and held Servia strictly to the letter of the Treaty of March 13, 1912, which had been entered into at the instance of the Servian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, who in view of the superior military strength of Bulgaria had wished to secure to Servia beforehand a due share of the spoils.

That Treaty provided for the cession to Servia of all the territory north of the Shar Mountains, namely, Old Servia and the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, whilst the country east of the Rhodope range and the Struma river was to go to Bulgaria, the remainder of Macedonia remaining autonomous. But if an autonomous Macedonia could not be formed those territories were to be divided in such a fashion that everything north of a line drawn from the junction of the former Turkish, Bulgarian, and Servian frontiers at a point a little to the north-west of Kustendil, to Struga at the northernmost extremity of the Lake of Ochrida, should go to Servia, whilst Bulgaria should retain Kratovo, Veles, Monastir, and Ochrida, and the fate of the remaining districts of this portion of Macedonia, namely the Kazas of Kumanovo, Uskub, Kritchevo, and Dibra with the Nahié of Struga should be left to the decision of the Tsar of Russia as arbitrator. Of these latter districts the population is mainly Albanian and Serb.

Had these arrangements been carried out Servia who would have had an outlet on the Adriatic would have been

cut off from Greece and from the Ægean by a broad belt of Bulgarian territory.

But Servia held, and probably rightly, that as she had been cut off from the Adriatic, and as the war had been prolonged for four months so as to enable Bulgaria to acquire Adrianople at the cost of Servian blood, she was entitled to a revision of these arrangements, especially as much of the disputed territory, for instance Prilip and Monastir, was already held by Servian troops. This revision Bulgaria refused to grant; mainly upon the grounds that Servia had not ben called upon to give her the military support in Western Thrace which had been provided for by the military convention.

With Greece, as we have seen, Bulgaria had made no preliminary arrangements whatsoever as to the disposal of the future conquests.

The problem was a complicated one, especially if ethnographical considerations were to be taken into account in its solution.

Roughly speaking, the coast-land of the Ægean from the former Greek frontier to the Mesta forms a narrow strip of territory peopled by Greeks, but both in Epirus and in Thessaly south of the Vistritza the majority of the so-called Greeks in the Hinterland are either Albanians or Vlachs, and within forty miles of Salonika the valley of the Vardar is held by Bulgarised Moslems, and Salonika itself is mainly inhabited by Spanish-speaking Jews. Without its Hinterland Salonika would be of comparatively little commercial importance, whilst, if the Greek frontier was carried east of the Mesta, Bulgaria would be deprived of that access to the sea through the ports of Orfani and of Kavala upon which her hopes were set, and as by the Treaty of London Enos at the mouth of the Maritza had been allotted to Turkey, Bulgaria would see her outlets on the Ægean restricted to a coast-line fifty or sixty miles long, including only the roadstead of Dedea-

gatch, and a harbour on a lagoon at Porto Lagos. If, however, the Powers met the wishes of Turkey by drawing her frontier up the Maritza to its confluence with the Ergene, the Bulgarian communications with Dedeagatch could, at any moment, be cut by the Turks. Such were the questions which were left pending when the Treaty of London was signed.

It was hoped that a settlement might have been reached in a Conference of the Four Allies either at Salonika or under the presidency of Russia at St. Petersburg, but the resignation of M. Gueshoff, who was succeeded by Dr. Daneff, doomed these hopes to disappointment.

In both Servia and in Bulgaria the war fever was rising. In Bulgaria the harvest begins in June, and the soldiers, who are for the most part small proprietors, were therefore anxious to be at home. Similar conditions prevail in Servia, and it was feared that the officers on both sides might provoke hostilities in order to provide a remedy for the growing discontent amongst the military.

Greece, Montenegro, and Servia accepted, moreover, without reserve, the invitation to the Conference of Prime Ministers at St. Petersburg; Bulgaria alone held back on the pretext that she wished to submit the questions at issue to the arbitration of the six Great Powers, and not to that of those of the Triple Entente alone. She thought that, for the time, she was the strongest power in the Peninsula, and she purposed to push her advantage to the utmost. Lord Randolph Churchill ruined himself by forgetting the existence of Mr. Goschen; Bulgaria forgot the existence of Rumania, and her failure to settle the questions pending with Rumania, behind whose ruler the figure of his distant kinsman, the German Emperor, dimly loomed, proved in a great degree the ruin of Bulgarian hopes. Pride, too, bore its share in her downfall, for her soldiery looked down with contempt upon the warriors of Servia and of Greece.

Of the Balkan Premiers Dr. Daneff alone looked askance at the Russian offers of mediation; possibly he did not forget what Bulgaria had endured from Russian tutelage in the time of Prince Alexander. Like the Austrian statesmen he, too, doubtless in secret resented the tone in which the Tsar had offered his mediation to the King of Servia, and wished to show that Bulgaria did not recognise the Russian claims to the leadership of the Slavonic races. The Tsar had, moreover, intervened as the earthly Head of the Orthodox Church in the theological disputes which had troubled the monks of Athos, and Russian marines were employed to bring to reason the disputants, who were endeavouring with fists and bludgeons to persuade their opponents that the name of Jesus is in itself divine. One of the chief grounds on which Russia claims Constantinople is that she is the spiritual heir of the Greek Emperors, and the interference of Russia at this juncture in the religious affairs of Mount Athos was doubtless one of the causes which determined Austria-Hungary, two of whose army corps were still mobilised on the Servian and Montenegrin frontiers, to adopt a line of policy scarcely consistent with that indicated by the Tsar.

Speaking in the Hungarian Parliament on June 19, the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, made some important declarations as to the foreign policy of the Dual Empire.

Austria, he said, had always defended the principle of the *status quo* in the Balkans, even when Bismarck contemplated a certain partition of territories amongst the Great Powers. She had been the first State, moreover, to declare that the Balkan peoples must not be robbed of the fruit of their victories. Subject to two conditions, namely that Servia should not occupy any territory on the Adriatic coast, and that the independence of Albania should be preserved, she only wished to see the Balkan

peoples left free to determine their own destinies, whether they chose to do so by war, mediation, or before a tribunal of arbitration. But the existence of such a mediating or arbitrating power could not give that power any rights to interfere with the political independence of the Balkan States, and, added Count Tisza, " It goes without saying that we would only accept a settlement that assures the true, complete independence of the Balkan States. Nor can we allow any other State to acquire prerogatives detrimental to our fundamental principle of Balkan independence, which has been accepted by all the Great Powers. The observance of this fundamental principle we deem to be a vital interest."

In answer to the Hungarian Premier *The Times* correspondent at Vienna contented himself by pointing out that the Tsar's offer was based upon the powers conferred upon him by the treaties between the different Balkan States to act as arbitrator in the case of irreconcilable differences arising between them, " and established no new protectorate, nor privilege, for Russia in the Balkans, and no special influence other than that which Austria-Hungary herself might easily have acquired had her Balkan policy appeared in the Balkan States during recent years to be based on the principles which Count Tisza retrospectively defines. The other consideration is that, while recognising the rights and freedom of the Balkan States to make war upon each other, Austria-Hungary speaks not as an impartial observer, but as a strong man armed on the very threshold of two at least of the belligerents in an eventual conflict." *

According to the semi-official organs at Buda Pesth, Count Tisza's declarations were only intended to induce Russia to associate the Dual Monarchy with herself in the settlement of the Balkan question without further warfare. He foresaw what trouble might arise from the

* *The Times*, Friday, June 20, 1913.

intervention of Rumania, whether Rumania was or was not supported by Germany, and no Hungarian Prime Minister can afford to forget that 4,500,000 Rumanians in Eastern Hungary and in Transylvania have fixed their hopes upon the restoration of a Dacia with its capital at Bukarest.

On the same day Bulgaria returned her answer to the Servian proposals. It insisted upon the fact that the delimitation of the conquered territories in Macedonia must be carried out in accordance with Article II. of the Treaty of 1912, which, as Bourchier pointed out, was so clearly worded that it seemed impossible to conceive of any dispute with regard to its interpretation. The Bulgarians, in answer to the Servian claims, replied that their own services to the common cause during the war had been infinitely greater than had been those of their Allies, and that the Adriatic was not even mentioned in the Treaty. At the same time the former Bulgarian organisations in Macedonia were being revived with the connivance of Sofia, and these warned the Government that they could not regard any portion of Macedonia as contested, and that the population would resist any settlement made contrary to its desires. The Bulgarians believed that they were secure of the support of Austria-Hungary who, on account of her economic interests, could not allow Servia to appropriate the valley of the Vardar.

In reply Servia, on June 22, rejected the Bulgarian proposals, and suggested that the original Treaty should be torn up and a newer and wider basis created for Russian arbitration. Servia refused the Bulgarian suggestions for a mixed military occupation of the disputed districts, apparently because she regarded priority of occupation as conferring a right of possession, although, in a second note delivered at Sofia upon the same day, she suggested that each of the parties should reduce its

forces of occupation to one-fourth of their then strength. Despite the existence of a line of delimitation, conflicts were constantly occurring between the two armies, and the excited feelings of the population rendered a mixed occupation impossible.

M. Venezelos proposed that there should be a general arbitration between the Allies, for, if Greece were left out of a Serbo-Bulgarian arbitration, vexed questions would still remain unsettled, since Greece claimed some of the territories, such as Monastir and Gyevgeli, which were in dispute between those powers. Moreover, by the Treaty of London the conquered territories had been handed over to the four Allies in condominium, and must remain so until they had been divided between them. If Russia could come to a sincere understanding with Austria-Hungary and thus enable the Great Powers to inform the Balkan States that their differences must be settled by the Hague Tribunal, it was still to be hoped that war might be averted.

In vain the Great Powers made representations both at Belgrade and at Sofia to induce the disputants to submit to arbitration: the military element was too strong to be disregarded. The Servian officers were for war, urging with truth that Servia had been in *de facto* possession of Western Macedonia for eight months, and that no Servian Government could hand over the route to Salonika to a rival merely in order to carry out the clauses of a secret Treaty. In deference to this feeling, which was exacerbated by the intervention of Russia, M. Pashitch resigned. For a moment the King induced him to withdraw his resignation, and it looked as if the Servian Government would at the request of the French and British Ministers leave the questions in dispute to the Tsar's arbitration. According to the Servian semi-official Press, the Tsar was prepared to decide the questions at issue solely upon their merits, and thus the all-important point as to whether the

Treaty of 1912 was to form the basis of arbitration or not was still left unsettled. M. Pashitch, however, pledged himself to go in person to St. Petersburg.

To Greece the necessity of free communication with Servia appeared vital, and it was deemed all-important to frustrate the designs of Bulgaria to drive in a wedge between their frontiers. The fortifications of Salonika were pushed forward. The town was crowded with fugitives who had fled before the Bulgarians from the Panghaion districts, where fighting between the Greek and Bulgarian forces had been in progress since May. The Bulgarian headquarters were removed to Dubnitza. A significant communication in the Viennese Press from Bukarest stated that Rumania would not remain passive in the event of war, but would retain a free hand and shape her policy according to circumstances. "Any Government which should remain inactive during a new Balkan war would be swept away by the force of public opinion."

On June 24 the King of England welcomed the French President, M. Poincaré, who, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, M. Pichon, was on a State visit to London, at a banquet at Buckingham Palace, and, in the toasts then exchanged, the unanimous efforts for peace which had been made by the Great Powers, as well as the close understanding between France and England, were strongly emphasised. Unfortunately neither the arguments of the Powers nor the warning sounded by Rumania were listened to at Sofia. The military party was too strong.

All through May and June fighting, as we have seen, had been going on between the Bulgarians and the Greeks in the Panghaion district, that range, anciently the Pangaeus and famous for its gold-mines and for its roses, which parts the basins of the Strymon and of the Mesta, and dominates the Greek districts of Seres and

Drama. This district had been occupied by the Bulgarians at the beginning of the war, but their place had been taken by the Greeks when the Bulgarians were perforce withdrawn to reinforce the besiegers of Adrianople. Constant affrays, too, had for months been taking place between the Greeks and Bulgarians at Salonika.

The first battle, however, of the fresh war took place in the early morning of June 28, when the Bulgarians attacked the Servian positions on the right bank of the river Zlatovo, between Kratovo and Kotchana, in great force, and were only repulsed with difficulty. It was suspected at Vienna that this episode was not altogether unconnected with the imminence of the debate in the Skupshtina upon the acceptance of Russian arbitration, and was intended to influence Servian opinion in a sense unfavourable to peace. War feeling ran high in the Servian army, and M. Pashitch, who was remodelling his Cabinet, was unable in consequence to induce any military man to enter it as Minister of War. Montenegrin feeling was strongly in favour of Servia, and it was arranged that Montenegro should undertake garrison duty in the districts ceded to Servia, so as to prevent trouble from Albanians and discontented Macedo-Bulgarians. Austria-Hungary also declared her intention of not intervening further for the moment in Balkan affairs, for, as the Foreign Office *communiqué* put the case—

"Only when a definite result has been attained either by direct agreement between the Balkan States or by arbitration will the Monarchy define its attitude towards the partition of the territory conquered by the Allies, and consider whether Austro-Hungarian interests are not thereby affected. It is self-evident that neither the agreements of the Balkan States between themselves, nor an award based upon these agreements, can have any binding force whatever for the Dual Monarchy."

Such was the outcome of the Hungarian declarations as to the independence of the Balkan States.

Greece at the same time continued to urge the acceptance of general arbitration as a means of avoiding war, but such an arbitration seemed to be precluded by the special engagements assumed by Russia with regard to Servia and Bulgaria. Meanwhile the Turks looked grimly on, and the execution of the murderers of Mahmud Shevket Pasha afforded some excitement to the quidnuncs of Constantinople. Enver Bey now reigned supreme.

It was still, however, hoped that war might be avoided, and that the discussions between Sir Edward Grey and M. Pichon in London might have brought home to Servia and Bulgaria the folly of offending the financiers of Europe. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Premier, speaking on June 27, adopted a somewhat less overbearing attitude than had Count Tisza, and emphasised the fact that Austria-Hungary with its large Slav population was bound to regard the final territorial arrangements in the Balkans with friendly feelings. "If," he added, "the Balkan nations will devote themselves to the great tasks which await them in the field of internal development, they will at the same time best fulfil the political part they are called upon to play in the system of European equilibrium, the dislocation of which would endanger primarily their own successful evolution. The principal object of the pacific policy of the Monarchy is to preclude such dislocation, and to this task the Monarchy will devote itself now as in the past." *

These last words of the Austrian Premier contain the whole truth and nothing but the truth as to the action of the European Concert during the past twelve months.

It was destined once more to show its impotence with regard to the Balkan States, for their military parties recked nothing of the warnings of Europe united or

* *The Times*, Saturday, June 28, 1913.

otherwise. It is much that the Concert has preserved peace amongst the Great Powers themselves.

If, indeed, any one of its members has really exercised any influence in the final Balkan settlement, the somewhat cryptic telegrams exchanged after the signature of the Peace of Bukarest between the German Kaiser and the King of Rumania may, perhaps, show that Germany, which all through the contest had remained so carefully in the background, had in reality been pursuing the wisest policy. If the Peace of Bukarest is the work of Germany, German diplomacy will have more than regained the lustre which it seemed for a while to have lost by its conduct with regard to Morocco. Russia has to a certain extent lost her influence in the Balkans. There is no such thing as lasting gratitude in international politics, and Balkan statesmen nowadays are as little swayed by the memories of 1877 as Italian statesmen were in 1870 by the memories of Magenta or of Solferino. All the efforts of the Tsar failed to prevent the outbreak of the fresh conflict.

Just as the Greek Note to Bulgaria seemed likely to bring about a less strained situation General Savoff attacked the Greek and Servian forces all along the line of demarcation, 300 kilometres long. The Bulgarian General Hassapchieff hastily quitted Salonika at early dawn on June 30, fortunately for himself before the Greeks had received the news that their outposts had been forced to abandon the whole of the Panghaion district, as well as Nigrita and Matsikovo. At the same time the Bulgarians attacked and occupied the Servian lines at Gyevgeli. The Bulgarian Government telegraphed urgent orders to their troops to cease operations, but as M. Coromilas, the Greek Foreign Minister, said in his Note of July 1, " Ils se moquent du monde entier." Bulgarian hotheads had won their point, and not only counted upon an easy victory over the Servian and

Greek armies, but scoffed at the thought of any danger from Rumania, whose attitude was believed to be prompted by military jealousy and territorial cupidity, and whose troops were thought to be far inferior to the victorious Bulgarians. On the other hand, the Greek attitude was equally defiant. As M. Coromilas wrote: "In spite of our constant and sincerely peaceful line of policy, in spite of our steady efforts for conciliation and even concession, the Bulgarian army, violating every understanding, has entered, since last night, into an undeclared war against us—an unjust and fratricidal war. We are therefore compelled to order the Greek army to advance, so as to defend its positions in the occupied territory."*

Bulgaria rushed into war with high hopes of victory, but, as the event proved, General Savoff's calculations rested upon very unsound foundations. He had despised his enemies and had held too high an opinion of his own force. In Bulgarian eyes, moreover, the Greeks were less to be feared than were the Servians, and he had expected to be able to hold the Greeks in check with 90,000 men. Even of these one division was transferred to face the Servians in the north, and when the armistice was signed General Ivanoff had at most 70,000 men to resist 120,000 Greeks. Secondly, Savoff had overlooked the possibilities of Rumanian intervention. Rumania, however, was but ill satisfied with the scanty territorial compensation which Dr. Daneff had granted her by the protocol of St. Petersburg, and her army was mobilised on July 3.

In all the Rumanian army consisted of about 400,000 men. It had five army corps, each of which has in war time two active and one reserve division, and each active division consists of 14,000 rifles, 540 sabres, 48 field guns, and 14 machine guns. It was calculated that the

* *The Times*, Thursday, July 3, 1913.

field army, exclusive of the second line, would probably number 169 battalions, 83 squadrons, and 124 batteries.

"The Rumanian infantry are armed with the 6.5-mm. Mannlicher rifle and short bayonet. The Calarasi cavalry have the Mannlicher carbine, but the ten Rosiori regiments have only the lance, revolver, and sword. The field and horse batteries have the 75-cm. Krupp firing a 14-lb. shell at an extreme range of 6800 yards." * The fortress artillery is mostly of French and German models; the field howitzers and 12-c. and 10.5 Krupp models; the mountain artillery have the Elswick gun.

The Rumanian soldiers, who are trained on French and German models, are good fighting men, and showed their prowess in 1877-1878, when, as all good Rumanians believe, they saved the Russian forces from destruction. The supply of horses is poor, and the large number of fortresses which defend the exposed Rumanian frontiers require large garrisons. It was said that the mobilisation could be completed in five days.

The action of Rumania excited but little surprise at Vienna, although the order for mobilisation was looked upon as a sign that she had fallen away from the Triple Alliance, which had for years counted upon her support, and which would be injured by the displacement of the political balance of forces in the Balkans.

Bulgaria, even at first, gained little by her treacherous action. The Greeks disarmed the Bulgarian garrison in Salonika after a conflict in which artillery was used, and drove them from a position near Gyevgeli from which they advanced upon Kukush; whilst the Servians, though defeated at Strumnitza, waged a fierce four days' battle between Ishtib and Kotchana, which ended in the defeat of the Bulgarians, who previously after three days' fighting had been driven back over the rivers Zlatovska and Bregalnitza. In all, by July 3, the Servians

* *The Times*, Friday, July 4, 1913.

had taken 30 guns, a great quantity of war material, and 2000 prisoners, of whom 60 were officers. They had lost 6000 killed and wounded, and the Bulgarians many more.

During all this time the Bulgarian Ministers remained at Belgrade and at Athens, whilst repeated orders, disregarded by the generals in the field, were flashing over the wires from Sofia, directing the combatants to cease fighting. Already appeals were being made to Russia for intervention. They were not acceded to.

All through July the fighting continued, and the battles were far more bloody than were those in the first Balkan war, whilst the courage of the Bulgarians was rapidly cooling down. This was not, perhaps, to be wondered at. The troops who had been kept in the lines before Tchataldja since the conclusion of hostilities with Turkey were comparatively unacquainted with the events in progress at Sofia, and when they were ordered to entrain for transport to Macedonia many of them imagined that demobilisation had commenced, and that they were to return to their homes. Bitter was their disappointment when they found that they had been summoned to take part in a new campaign, and that against the allies who had fought and died beside them in the trenches at Adrianople. It is no wonder, therefore, that they should not have shown the zeal which they had displayed at Lule Burgas or at Kirk Kilisse, nor that they should have been unable to retrieve the consequences of the mistakes into which General Savoff was hurried by his overweening pride.

The Greeks rapidly recovered from their first surprise, and in a series of actions at Kilkeis, Doiran, Semitla, and other places, drove Ivanoff's forces back upon the old Bulgarian frontier at Djumaya, where the armistice which was concluded on July 31 found the two armies facing one another on the Kresna Pass. At the same

time the Servians defeated their assailants at Ishtib, Kotchana, and other places, and, in a war of wolves, drove them back through the mountain regions which separate the Upper Vardar from the Upper Struma. This warfare, however, decided nothing, for neither the Greeks nor the Servians dared to assail the strongly fortified Bulgarian positions at Dubnitza, which closed the roads from Macedonia to Sofia, but it must have cost the Balkan peoples a loss of at least 120,000 killed and wounded.

The decisive factor in the war came from the north. Observers had all along been watching the action of Rumania, who, they realised, might at any time throw her sword into the scale with decisive effect. King Charles, in fact, held a position similar to that occupied by the Emperor Francis of Austria in the earlier part of 1813 with regard to the combatants in Saxony, but until peace had been made with Turkey he refrained from taking advantage of it. Many, indeed, thought that Rumania would remain satisfied with the comparatively trifling advantages which she had secured from Bulgaria by the protocol of St. Petersburg.

But, like other Balkan statesmen, the Rumanians are amenable to military pressure; the parliamentary situation in Bukarest rendered the existence of any Ministry precarious, and when she saw her efforts to preserve peace amongst the Balkan Allies baffled, Rumania resolved to strike for her own hand. The future alone can show what was the inner meaning of the telegrams exchanged between the German Emperor and the Rumanian sovereign after the signature of the Treaty of Bukarest, but, in any case, despite the protocol of St. Petersburg, fresh claims were advanced for a cession of Bulgarian territory amounting to an area of 7000 square kilometres (2702 square miles), a district about as large as the West Riding of Yorkshire, and, as they

were rejected, she declared war against Bulgaria upon July 10. Silistria was occupied the next day, the Bulgarians offered no opposition, and by July 31 the Rumanian outposts were within twenty miles of Sofia, and the Bulgarians saw that further resistance would be in vain. An armistice was signed on July 31 and plenipotentiaries from all the belligerents met at Bukarest to negotiate for peace. The main dispute was as to Kavala, which Russia and Austria desired to grant to Bulgaria instead of to Greece, but King Constantine, roused to fury by the Bulgarian treachery and by the atrocities which the Bulgarians had undoubtedly committed upon the Greeks and Moslems in Thrace and in Macedonia, and which had driven those two races through terror into a momentary co-operation, refused to give way. On August 10 the Treaty was at length signed, and Bulgaria was enabled to realise all she had lost through the folly of her megalomaniac generals and statesmen.

To quote the words in which *The Times*, when giving the new map of the Balkans, sums up the results of the Treaty of Bukarest:

"The second Balkan War of 1913 arose from quarrels amongst the Allies as to the disposal of the spoils won from Turkey. Servia claimed all west of a line drawn from the north of Egri Palanka to the Vardar near Veles and then down that river to Gyevgeli; Bulgaria insisted upon the observance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March 1912, which gave her all Macedonia to the south and east of a line drawn from the north of Egri Palanka to the northern end of Lake Ochrida. As a result of this war, Servia gains all she claimed and the whole of the rest of the old Turkish vilayet of Kossovo which she had previously been content to leave to Bulgaria. Greece, too, has acquired territories beyond her previous aspirations, while Salonika, at one time occupied by Bulgaria jointly with Greece, and ardently coveted by the

Government of Sofia, is now 50 miles from the Bulgarian frontier." *

Bulgaria also renounced all her claims to the island of Crete.

A reader of Tacitus cannot but remember the celebrated passage in which the historian, when summing up the results of the defeat of Varus, says that the Roman eagles which, before it, had scarcely stopped at the Elbe, afterwards hardly dared to alight at the Rhine.

On the coasts of the Ægean the Greek frontier was fixed at the mouth of the Mesta, and the towns of Seres, Drama, Demi-Hissar, and Kavala are now included in Greater Greece.

To Rumania Bulgaria yielded up Silistria and the rich cornlands lying to the north of a line drawn from Turtukai on the Danube to a point south of Ekrene on the Black Sea. Within two years she was to demolish the fortifications round Rustchuk, Shumla, and in the district of Baltchik.

Montenegro was to receive compensation to her east and southward from Servia.

The frontier between Greece and Servia is drawn on fairly ethnological lines, and proceeds from the north end of Lake Doiran north of Florina and Vodena to the south end of Lake Prespa. Both Powers acquire a large number of Turkish and Bulgarian subjects.

But Bulgaria in the course of the second war has sustained an even greater loss. The Young Turk party took advantage of the fact that only the terminal points of the new boundary between Turkey and Bulgaria, namely at Enos and Midia, were fixed by the Treaty of London, which left the course of that frontier to be settled by a Commission of the Powers, to profit by the confusion. On July 15 the Turkish army crossed the new frontier, and by July 22 Enver Bey with his

* *The Times*, Friday, August 8, 1913.

cavalry had entered Adrianople amid the acclamations of the population. Shortly afterwards the Turks crossed the former frontier of Bulgaria, but withdrew their forces under pressure from the Powers.

On September 17, 1913, an agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey as to their frontiers was reached at Constantinople.

"The new frontier will start from the mouth of the Maritza river on the Ægean Sea. At its Black Sea end it will branch off to the north of Iniada, to the mouth of the Resvaya river. This is some twenty-five miles north of Midia, the eastern end of the border as settled in the Treaty of London.

"On the western side the original terminal at Enos is preserved.

"Under this arrangement, it is added, Turkey will retain Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse, and Dimotika, which lies slightly west of the Maritza, on the Mustafa Pasha–Adrianople–Dedeagatch Railway.

"Bulgaria keeps Ortakeui, Mustafa Pasha, and Malka Tirnovo towards the Black Sea, but she thus secures but a small fraction of the spoils which her brilliant victories had obtained for her under the London Treaty. Even her access to the Ægean Sea at Dedeagatch is rendered relatively valueless by reason of the fact that the Turks sit astride the sole existing means of railway communication between that place and Bulgaria proper.

"The Sofia Government can, of course, build a new direct line from Mustafa Pasha southward, but its cost must be enormous, owing to the mountainous nature of the region traversed, and, except for purely military purposes, it is doubted whether the line would be worth the expense."

The Treaty of Bukarest and the Agreement of Constantinople can hardly prove a permanent settlement.

CHAPTER XXIV

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BUKAREST

N view of the events which have taken place in the Balkan Peninsula since the Peace of London was signed, it may well be asked whether the permanent solution of the Eastern Question is still to be found in the constitution of an Eastern Empire on the German model with the Tsar of Bulgaria as its elected but hereditary chief. To this my answer would be Yes. The history of the nineteenth century is in itself enough to teach us that not only is civilised humanity tending to draw together into larger communities, but that the lead in those communities as a rule falls to the most virile race amongst those composing them. In themselves the Treaty of Bukarest and the re-occupation of Thrace by the Turks are, doubtless, severe blows to the prestige and influence of Bulgaria, but Bulgarian patriots may draw comfort from the thought that worse blows befell Prussia and Sardinia before they won the hegemony in Germany and in Italy to which their peoples were called by their characteristics and by their history.

Prussia was crushed to the dust by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, and seemed, indeed, doomed to remain for ever powerless. In reality, the provinces which she lost were, with the exception of Magdeburg, the real source of her weakness, and when pruned by Napoleon she was far stronger than her rivals Bavaria,

hampered by disaffected provinces like Tyrol, and Saxony. But for Tilsit Prussia could never have taken the lead in the War of Liberation in Germany in 1813. The acquisitions made by Frederick William II. in Poland had brought her from Rossbach to Jena.

Her action in 1813 set Prussia in the place so long held by Austria at the head of the German race. Then, as now, Austria was a mosaic, not a unit.

But Prussian progress upward was not destined to remain without checks. It must not be forgotten that in 1850 Frederick William IV., who by his pusillanimity had ruined the movement for German unity in 1848, bowed in homage before the youthful Francis Joseph at Olmütz. Even after his losses in Italy the Austrian Kaiser, at a moment when parliamentary struggles seemed to have brought monarchy in Prussia to the brink of ruin, might, but for the iron firmness of Bismarck, easily have succeeded in reconstituting a United Germany under the House of Hapsburg at the meeting of Princes at Frankfurt in 1863. Three years later, in 1866, the most powerful members of the German Confederation took the side of Austria against Prussia, and even in July 1870 Bavaria only decided to side with Prussia against France by a very close division in its Herrenhaus. Yet on January 18, 1871, the King of Prussia, at the invitation of the King of Bavaria, assumed the hereditary crown of German Emperor at Versailles.

Again, the King of Sardinia did not become King of Italy without having to overcome many obstacles, which, at first sight, might have seemed overwhelming. Thinkers, from the time of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, no doubt toiled and suffered to call a United Italy into life. But few, indeed, supposed that the ruler of that kingdom would come from the foot of the Alps to mount the Roman Capitol in triumph, and, at one time, a Duke of Modena, at another a Pope, in the person

of Pius IX., could be looked upon as the men who were destined to fulfil Dante's prophecy of the Greyhound in whom Italy was to find her saviour. But the Piedmontese were men, and it was men who were needed to break the chains in which the souls and bodies of the Italians had been bound since the last days of the Florentine Republic. In 1848 Italy might still have been reborn as a confederation; it was the defeat of Novara which made her one. In March 1849 Charles Albert had fled from her shores to die in exile at Oporto, in September 1870 the Italian troops under the generals of his son Victor Emmanuel entered Rome by the breach of the Porta Pia. It is true that Piedmont had triumphed with the help of France and of Prussia, and that she had bought that help from France at the cost of Savoy and of Nice, but by the cession of Savoy and Nice she had, at least in the case of Savoy, freed herself from foreign elements, which, loyal as the Savoyards and Niçois had been for centuries to the Dukes of Savoy and the Kings of Sardinia, would have been out of place in an Italian Parliament sitting at Monte Citorio. Savoy until quite recent years has always been a clerical preserve, and Savoyard deputies would have found it very difficult to reconcile their national and their religious sentiments when their well-loved King drove the Pope from the Quirinal. Prussia again, if she had not lost her Polish provinces in 1807, would have been greatly hampered when she took her place at the head of the German nation in 1813. We have seen how German and Magyar Austria has been kept back by her Poles and by her Croats during the recent struggle in the Balkans.

What holds good as to Italy and as to Germany may well prove true as to the part which Bulgaria is destined to play in the formation of an Eastern Empire. Had the Tsar of Bulgaria acquired in 1913 the Greater Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano he might well

have closed the doors of Santa Sophia for ever against a Bulgarian successor to Justinian and the Comneni.

Greater Bulgaria, had it been formed on the lines laid down by Dr. Daneff and General Savoff, would have included many discordant and, indeed, many hostile elements. It may be true that Macedonia west of the Vardar includes many Bulgarised elements, but those elements are Bulgarised not Bulgarian, and in many cases their conversion from Greeks or Albanians into Bulgarians dates from within the last fifty years, a time wholly insufficient for the formation of a nation.

Again, the coast-lands of the Ægean Sea are almost wholly Greek, with the exception of Salonika, which to a great extent is cosmopolitan or Jewish, and neither Greeks nor Jews are very likely to become ardent patriots under the Bulgarian flag. In a democracy governed under the parliamentary system the principle of nationality becomes all-important. Past experience shows that Bulgaria has been able to absorb its Moslem population, possibly because, as Bourchier has pointed out, the Pomaks are even purer by descent than the Bulgarians themselves, but the case would be very different when the discontented Moslem deputies from the districts east of the Maritza were supported in Parliament by a numerous group of disaffected Greeks and disaffected Jews. By the incorporation of Salonika Bulgaria would doubtless have been strengthened financially, but she would have been weakened politically, and perhaps even in a military sense. In war patriotism is a more valuable asset than mere multitudes of disaffected troops.

Her losses to Rumania are another matter, but it must be remembered that by the Treaty of Berlin the frontier of the Dobruja was drawn close to the gardens of Silistria, and that it was not until the Treaty was revised that the Bulgarians could contemplate the conversion of Silistria into a fortress of the first rank.

Bulgaria profited greatly by the neutrality of Rumania during the first part of the late Balkan War, and for that neutrality she has had to pay the price. Italy won the support of France in 1859 at the cost of weakening, at least for a time, her western frontier by the cession of Savoy and of Nice, nor could France foresee that one of the chief reasons which, fifty years later, was to keep Italy true to the Triple Alliance, would prove to be that she had spent so much money on refortifying her weakened western frontier against France that she was unable to spare sufficient to fortify her eastern frontier against Austria. It is perfectly true that if Rumania is to obtain the full advantages of her coast-line on the Black Sea she can only do so by constructing a bridge across the Danube at Silistria, but the future alone can show whether she has been wise to buy this advantage at the cost of incurring the enmity of Bulgaria.

But, in the end, Bulgaria will, doubtless, prove to have gained rather than to have lost strength by her sacrifices in the Treaty of Bukarest. Like Sardinia in 1850, like Prussia in 1808, she is now all bone and muscle. She may have lost the revenues of Salonika and of Kavala, and the fertile Macedonian plains. Yet she has made one great positive gain by the war, for she has become the sole power which has a frontier marching with that of Turkey on the European side of the Bosphorus, whilst, by the Treaty of Bukarest, she has escaped from a temptation which would have been to her a positive danger, for she has now no reason to dissipate her energies in an attempt to make herself a third-rate naval power. She can devote her strength to her army alone, and it is her army which will find her the naval allies to open to her the gates of Constantinople.

By their action with regard to Adrianople the Turks have forfeited their position in Europe. Never since Leopold II. was forced by the pressure of Prussia, by the

progress of Polish dissolution, and by the revolutionary hurricane in France and Belgium to restore Loudon's conquest of Belgrade to Turkey in 1791 by the Treaty of Szistowa, has Europe ever allowed the Porte to resume its sway over Christian lands which have once been free from its yoke. Unlike Christianity, El-Islam might even at this day be united in a Holy War, and no Power with any Moslem subjects can afford to see those subjects aroused by reports of victories won by the champions of the Faith over Christians in Europe. That the majority of the population in Adrianople itself or in the vilayets east of the Maritza may be Moslem, that the Bulgarians may unfortunately have committed atrocities during their occupation of those territories, is probable enough. But if the rulers of India, the rulers of Algeria, and the rulers of many a Central Asian Khanate forget that any Turkish victory may have a dangerous effect on their less civilised Moslem subjects, and if those subjects are thus led into rebellions destined to restore the temporal power of El-Islam, those rebellions will, in the interests of civilisation, and in the interests, therefore, of those very Moslem subjects themselves, have to be put down at whatever cost of blood and suffering. Every educated and thinking Moslem must in his heart know this to be the truth. The spiritual power of El-Islam will not suffer if the Sultan loses his temporal power at Constantinople. The Papacy enjoys an immeasurably stronger influence over men's minds to-day than it did when Voltaire was writing at Ferney and the Inquisition still reigned at Lisbon. The possession of Constantinople by the Turks is utterly unessential to the well-being of Mohammedanism as a religion.

But if the Turks are to be expelled from Adrianople this task must, it would seem, be the work of the Bulgarians. They are the only possible Power who can take the place of the Turks at Adrianople or at Constantinople,

for they alone command the land approaches to those cities. If Greece or Rumania attempted to hold Constantinople or Gallipoli they could only do so by the employment of sea-power, and the same holds good of Russia unless she undertook a task which might prove overwhelming even for her resources, and which, moreover, would earn her the undying enmity of Germany—the conquest of Asia Minor. But even if Greece or Rumania held the command of the sea she would have to keep up a large military force in her possessions on the Straits, and both Powers would find it difficult to do this without withdrawing troops from their other possessions which would be greatly needed for their defence. It must not be forgotten that both Greece and Rumania have common frontiers with Bulgaria, and that both have been the gainers at her expense by the Treaty of Bukarest. Bulgaria alone can meet Turkey on land without requiring to consider the question of her naval strength. Would Greece have anything to gain by holding Constantinople without the consent of Bulgaria? Her exports into the coast-lands of the Black Sea are insignificant, and, so long as she was on a fair and just treaty basis with Bulgaria it would matter little to her commission-houses at Constantinople whether or not they were under the Greek flag. Moreover, her presence at Constantinople would lead to constant friction not only with Bulgaria, but also with Rumania and Russia, if not with Austria-Hungary as a Danubian Power, and the resultant expenditure on armaments would very quickly swallow up her commercial gains therefrom.

With Rumania the case is perhaps different, as her seaborne trade passing through the Straits is so great, but is it not true that she has not at her command the means for manning the fleet which would be required to protect the long lines of communications by sea from Constanza or Mangalia to the Golden Horn? If King Charles

wished to reign at Constantinople he could only do so as the chosen ruler of an Eastern Empire.

Many may have marvelled at the greeting which Tsar Ferdinand received when he entered Sofia after the signature of the Treaty of Bukarest. One cannot but remember how in March 1849 the burghers of Turin welcomed Victor Emmanuel when he returned from the disastrous field of Novara, nor forget that within twenty-one years and six months from that day his flag, as King of a United Italy, was hoisted amidst the rejoicings of the Roman crowds on the Capitol at Rome.

CHAPTER XXV

THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

HE war opened many questions of moment in the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan which the Powers had professed themselves so anxious to aid him to develop. They had their own ends to gain in the task, their own means to help them to achieve them. Development costs money, and the only source, apart from loans, from which Turkey can obtain money are the Customs duties. These were originally imposed at the rate of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, and that rate cannot be changed except with the unanimous consent of the Powers represented on the Ottoman Debt Commission. England, for example, in 1903, stayed the hand of the financiers who wished to carry out the Bagdad Railway by refusing that consent. They were subsequently increased in order to provide funds to carry out reforms in Macedonia, and the events of the war drove Turkey to request not only that the augmentation then granted might be retained but that they might be raised another 4 per cent. Such was one of the objects with which Shevket Pasha's Government had despatched Hakki Pasha to London early in February.

Some of the most important issues at stake in Asiatic Turkey interested England. They concerned the Bagdad Railway and the shores of the Persian Gulf. These Hakki Pasha was instructed to discuss, and if possible to settle, during his stay in London.

For some months after his arrival nothing transpired in public as to these negotiations, but scarcely had Montenegro consented to withdraw from Skutari when it became known that they were in progress, and reports appeared that England had not only succeeded in settling the terminus of the Bagdad Railway to her own satisfaction, but whilst preserving the sovereign rights of Turkey had acquired all the real influence in Koweit and other parts of the Arabian coasts of the Persian Gulf. These reports were premature.

On the other hand it was stated that the Bagdad Railway Company, which was now an exclusively German one, had advanced a considerable sum to the Ottoman Government, and had in return received the right of constructing the last section of the line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, although in March 1911 it had given up its rights in that section in exchange for the concession for Alexandretta Harbour and for various financial advantages. It was proposed at the same time that the last portion of the Bagdad Railway should be built by an international company in which all the participant countries should hold equal shares, but when England proposed that these countries should be England, France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey, the latter put forward a counter-proposal in which Russia was omitted.

The negotiations in progress with Hakki Pasha had been duly communicated to Germany, who, however, had wished that the more immediately Anglo-Turkish questions, such as those of Koweit and the Behrein fishing rights should be settled before the discussion as to the railway from Bagdad to the Gulf began, since that could only be settled after the other questions had been satisfactorily adjusted.

The negotiations involved, indeed, a general settlement of the political and economic future of the Middle East, which was to be effected by England coming to an

agreement with the German and Ottoman Governments in the same way in which Germany had concluded the Potsdam Agreement as to Persia and Mesopotamia with Russia, and as to the various railway questions (in March 1911) with Turkey.

They might be classed under three heads:

1. Negotiations between England and Turkey on the subject of the Persian Gulf (Koweit, Mohammerah, the islands of Bahrein); the Turco-Persian frontier; the last section (Bagdad to Basra) of the Bagdad Railway; the 4 per cent. new surtax of Customs duties asked for by the Constantinople Government two years ago; the 3 per cent. surtax granted in 1907 for a period of seven years for the benefit of the Macedonian vilayets.

2. Negotiations between Turkey and Germany on the question of the Bagdad Railway, of the 3 per cent. and 4 per cent. surtaxes, of the Capitulations, etc.

3. Negotiations between England and Germany in order to harmonise and to complete the agreements that might be arrived at between both Governments and Turkey on the aforesaid matters. Possibly the recognition of British interests in the southern zone of Persia (under the Potsdam Agreement of 1911, the special position of Russia in the northern zone was recognised by Germany) may eventually come within the range of the pourparlers.

To England, indeed, these questions were of infinitely greater importance than were any connected with the delimitation of Albania or the future of Rodosto. As Lord Curzon of Kedleston pointed out a quarter of a century ago in his *Problems of the Nearer East*, England could never allow a foreign rival to establish a naval base within a few days' steam of Bombay. In May 1903, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in the debate on the Bagdad Railway, warned every one that England would regard any trespass upon the shores of the Persian Gulf as an unfriendly act.

The position assumed by England with regard to the Persian Gulf is that which must be and always has been taken by every State which holds India through her sea-power.

When England grew strong in India one of her first tasks was to clear these pirates from the seas, and the annals of our Indian Navy record many a glorious feat of arms which marked the long struggle.

Early in the last century England put down piracy and the slave trade, and induced the petty pirate chiefs who held the southern shores of the Gulf to enter into engagements, the terms of which vary greatly, some of them treating the chief as an independent sovereign, others reducing him to the position of an Indian feudatory. These so-called trucial chiefs inhabit the Pirate Coast, which extends, roughly speaking, from Cape Mussendom westwards to the Gulf of Bahrein, and forms a territory also claimed by the Sultan of Oman. England has continued to perform the duty of buoying, lighting, and policing the Gulf, and has enjoyed a practical monopoly of its trade.

The northern shore of the Gulf is divided between Baluchistan and Persia, to the south lies the Arabian Peninsula, over the whole of which Turkey claims to exercise suzerainty, although her actual possessions there were for long confined to the single port of Basra. Of late years, however, despite the protests of England, she has seized a position on the Khor Abdallah, a bay at the north-west angle of the Gulf which England claims as belonging to the independent Sheikh of Koweit, and since the ruin of the Wahabi kingdom of Nedj, has occupied the coast strip south of Koweit, known as El Hasa, which, however, is said to have been wrested from her in May 1913 by the Arab chief, Ben Saoud, who has occupied the port of El Kateef. The only places on the Gulf, however, which are actually British territory are the rocky islet of Abu

Musa and one square mile at Bassadore, or Basidu, a village at the western end of the Persian island of Kishm, 75 miles west-south-west of Bundar Abbas, from which the British establishment was long ago withdrawn on account of the heat and of the lack of water, whilst the only territory over which a British Protectorate has been formally proclaimed is the Bahrein Islands. It was thus obviously open to any great European Power desiring to establish itself in the Gulf to obtain a concession from Turkey or Persia, whilst just outside of it lies the Sultanate of Oman, which we are debarred from annexing by our Treaty with France of 1862, and by the mistaken signification, as I venture to take it to be, which the India Office appears to attach to the Commercial Treaties concluded by its Sultan with the United States and the Netherlands. This Sultanate forms a basis for the French subjects who smuggle arms through Chaubar and the desolate bays on the Mekran coast to the tribes on the north-west frontier of India, and who decline to submit to the regulations as to the trade in arms issued by the authorities of Muscat, and thus constitute a permanent and by no means trivial menace to our good understanding with France, as might be shown from one or two unpleasant incidents which took place at the height of the Austro-Servian crisis in December 1912.

Such was our real position with regard to the Persian Gulf, and though, since the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the fears have been dispelled that Russia could make her way through Southern Persia to Bundar Abbas, which, as the explorations of Major Sykes and Mr. Herbert Sykes have shown, is connected with the high tableland of Iran by passes which could easily be traversed by railways, the progress of German enterprise in those regions is not less disquieting. The fear that the Bagdad Railway, if extended to Koweit or even to Khor Abdallah under the sole auspices of Germany, would serve to estab-

lish a German naval basis near the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, was the main reason why the late Sir Charles Dilke induced the British Government in 1903 to frustrate the scheme by refusing its consent to the increase of the Turkish Customs duties, which would alone have made it feasible. This refusal lay at the root of the ill-feeling which found its expression in the attitude of Germany as regards the settlement of Morocco, and in the alleged attempt by Germany to acquire a naval base in Tripoli, which is said to have been frustrated by the outbreak of the war between Italy and Turkey, and is supposed to have furnished its principal motive. A little earlier some German subjects had endeavoured to acquire possession of Abu Musa on the pretext of working mines there, but their attempt was disavowed by the Imperial Government.

It was therefore evident that if a good understanding was to be come to between ourselves and Germany some of the most pressing questions which required settlement were those connected with the Persian Gulf. The needs of Turkey furnished, as we have seen, the opportunity for effecting such an arrangement.

The German chauvinist Press displayed great uneasiness when the rumours of these negotiations became public. The Anglophobe *Hamburger Nachrichten* sneered at the sudden friendship which Great Britain had opportunely transferred to a beaten and ruined Turkey, and at the German Government which had remained so long in ignorance of what was in contemplation, suggesting, however, that Germany could yet regain her position by refusing her consent to the increase of the Turkish Customs duties until she had received adequate guarantees. The *Taegliche Rundschau* lamented that England would obtain control of the best harbour on the Persian Gulf and of the Gulf section of the Bagdad Railway. The *Lokalanzeiger*, however, announced on the authority of its Constantinople correspondent that the Anglo-Turkish

negotiations had been conducted with the participation of the German Government in an entirely friendly spirit.

A full account of them appeared in *The Times* of May 17, 1913.

The object of the Conventions which had been prepared by Hakki Pasha and the representatives of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Board of Trade, with whom he had been working, was stated to be to remove the objections which the British Government felt to the proposed increase in the Turkish Customs duties. These objections were twofold: England could not consent to this additional burden being placed upon her trade, whilst Turkish officials were working to undermine the position which she had secured in the Persian Gulf, nor could she allow the proceeds to be used to finance an undertaking like the Bagdad Railway, which, as it stood, was a serious menace to British interests, both commercial and political.* England must, therefore, necessarily veto the augmentation unless her interests were protected by some binding agreement. It was clear that the drafts which had been prepared of these Conventions defined the respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the Persian Gulf in such a way as to put an end to the existing friction.

It seems certain that by these drafts (1) Great Britain recognises the suzerainty of the Porte over Koweit, which is to be an autonomous *Kaza* of the Ottoman Empire.

(2) The Porte engages not to interfere in the internal affairs of Koweit or in the question of the succession, and explicitly recognises the validity of the Conventions concluded between the Sheikh and the British Government.

(3) The Porte abandons its pretensions to suzerainty over the Peninsula of El Katr, the Bahrein Islands, Muscat, and the territory of the trucial chiefs.

(4) The Porte recognises the right of Great Britain

* *The Times*, Saturday, May 17, 1913.

to undertake, in the future as in the past, the duty of lighting, buoying, and policing the Gulf.

I may explain that by our Conventions with Koweit the Sheikh agreed not to cede any portion of his territory to any other Power without the consent of Great Britain, and as, according to the British view, the territory of Koweit includes not only the Khor Abdallah, but also the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab almost as far up the river as Basra, this agreement would place any possible terminus of the Bagdad Railway in the hands of a chief under British control. The third clause of the agreement is also of great importance, as it gives England not only the control of the harbours of Bahrein and Sharja, but also of the rich pearl fisheries from which the barren peninsula of El Katr derives its wealth. I may note that the draft says nothing of El Hasa with its port of El Kateef. Possibly the reason is that the Turks have never been recognised as the owners of this district by the Wahabi rulers of Nejd, with whom, in the interests of the proposed railway across Arabia from Suez to Koweit, it is of some importance that England should be on good terms.

Should the latest conqueror of these territories, Ben Saoud, enter into any relations with England, doubtless our intercourse with Nejd will become more frequent, and Arab horses of the purest breed will be more commonly imported than at present. In any case we may feel certain that the future of El Hasa has not been lost sight of.

It might be taken as certain that the terminus of the Bagdad Railway would be at Basra, and that the German Company which owned the concession for the line to Bagdad would resume its right to construct this last section of the line to the Gulf. Stringent provisions against any preferential tariffs or facilities would be enacted to safeguard the interests of British trade, and these provisions would apply to the whole of the Bagdad Railway

system. It was thought that two British directors would be appointed on the Board of the line as an additional precaution. France had been kept informed of the negotiations, and, as a large amount of French capital is engaged in the Bagdad Railway, it was expected that she would gladly approve of any agreement which would facilitate its progress. The rights which England possesses with regard to the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates would also be defined so as to give British trade an independent access to the markets of Mesopotamia. Unfortunately the conflicting interests of France and Russia as regards the construction of railways from the ports of the Empire into the interior, and the difficulties of settling the boundary between the French and German spheres of influence in Syria, have hitherto delayed the conclusion of these arrangements.

If Basra becomes the terminus of the Bagdad Railway it will be of the most urgent importance to improve the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab so as to allow the largest sea-going vessels to come up to the city. The river has hitherto been taken in hand by Great Britain at the cost of considerable friction with Turkey, but it is supposed that an Ottoman Commission, with strong British participation, will now be appointed to exercise independently all the functions of a port authority in the waters and on the shores of this water-way. The *personnel* of the authority would be as far as possible of Ottoman nationality, but the heads of the inspection and engineer branches would probably be British. England is the more interested in this question because the Karun River, in which Great Britain has been interested since 1888, flows into the Shatt-el-Arab above the bar. Moreover, the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab belongs territorially to the Sheikh of Mohammera, who also owns private property on the right, or Turkish bank. Very close relations exist between England and the Sheikh, whose territories were

occupied by the British during the Persian War of 1856, but restored to Persia in 1857, and his *de facto* interests in the water-way must therefore be a matter of concern to the British Government. A dispute, however, dating from the seventeenth century, exists as to the Turco-Persian frontier in this region, and the claims of the Sheikh of Mohammera have hitherto been the chief obstacle to its settlement. If the proposed conventions can effect a settlement equitable to both Turkey and Persia it will be a matter of satisfaction to Russia and Great Britain. It was thought also that as one of the conditions of the settlement Turkey would abandon her right of control over Egyptian borrowing.

This agreement when complete and confirmed would, added *The Times*, be of the greatest importance to Asiatic Turkey, and for the promotion of British trade interests in the Middle East.

A few days afterwards Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, left on a private visit to Berlin, but his journey was naturally connected by the public with the negotiations with Germany about the Bagdad Railway. Speaking in the French Chamber on May 16, M. Pichon said that the Anglo-Turkish negotiations constituted no new element in the situation, as they had been in progress for at least two years, and France had always been loyally kept informed of their developments. France had no direct interests in them, but the Government would always consistently maintain the moral and material interests of France in Syria and in Asia Minor. A note in the *North German Gazette* pointed out that neither the German financiers interested in the Bagdad Railway nor the German Government would give their sanction to the proposed arrangements unless after a further exchange of views, by which German interests were guaranteed in an unexceptionable manner, and an equivalent consideration was secured for any German concessions.

Some critics, indeed, asserted that the economic value of the Bagdad-Basra line was open to doubt; its construction would impose a heavy and unremunerative charge on the Turkish treasury with no great advantage to Turkey herself.

They pointed to the fact that Gabriel Nuradunghian, the then Minister for Public Works, and subsequently Minister for Foreign Affairs, had classed the line as one of subordinate importance to Turkish interests in his report on proposed public works in Turkey dating from 1909. Moreover, all the commercial traffic would be dealt with more economically by the river. This was admitted even by the great German authority Dr. Paul Rohrbach.

Speaking in the Senate M. Pichon once more emphasised the fact that France had no special interests in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, as her special interests, which she would know how to safeguard, were confined to certain neighbouring regions.

Replying to a question from the Radical side in the German Reichstag, the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jägow, said on May 30, that Sir Edward Grey had stated upon the previous day that England and Turkey had agreed upon the draft of an arrangement according to which the Bagdad Railway was not to go beyond Basra without the agreement of England, whilst England, on account of her interests, was to have two votes on the Board of Administration of the Bagdad Railway, which consists of twenty-seven members. Sir Edward Grey had pointed out that the agreements were agreements between England and Turkey. Germany, however, had been kept *au courant* of the negotiations. In so far as German interests and rights arising out of the Bagdad Railway agreement were affected by the Anglo-Turkish agreement, both parties had not failed to recognise that Germany's consent was necessary.

Various means for compensating Germany were suggested. A proposal that she should be allowed to purchase those Portuguese colonies in Africa which were allotted to her by the Anglo-German agreement on the subject has already encountered the opposition of the Government in Lisbon, whilst the Belgians have repudiated the suggestion that she should acquire the Belgian Congo, over which, moreover, if Belgium were to dispose of it, France has long enjoyed the right of pre-emption.

Such was the position of these important negotiations in the middle of June 1913.

France, on the other hand, had her own special interests to protect in Asiatic Turkey, although in some instances they unfortunately conflicted with those of Germany, for both French and German financiers were competing for the right of constructing the lines from Samsoun and other Black Sea ports to the tableland of Asia Minor where Russia also claimed rights under her treaty of 1899. There was also some jealousy as to the allotment of the revenue to be derived from the increase in the Customs duties, since France feared lest it should be devoted to the payment of the subsidies guaranteed to the Bagdad Railway, and thus leave the new railways through the coast plain of Palestine by which she proposes to link up the existing Syrian network, without support from Government. Germany, on the other hand, looks to find her profit in the development of Asia Minor, in ancient times so rich, though a desert to-day.

The differences between the Balkan Allies were meanwhile increasing, and certain Turkish journals (they proved true prophets) not only expressed the hope that Turkey would be able to take part effectively in the new campaign, but hinted that England had received Koweit as the price of her neutrality.

APPENDIX *

THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE ALLIES

A. Bulgaria

The law under which the Bulgarian army is organised was passed in 1904.

The liability to military service extends from the age of 20 to the year in which the man completes his 46th year.

The military forces are divided into—

1. The active army and its reserve.
2. The Landwehr, which comprises two bans.

In the active army the infantry remains two years with the colours, the other arms three years.

The reserve includes 18 age classes for the infantry, and 16 for the other arms.

The Landwehr Ban I. includes the men from 41 to 43, who are called up for from 7 to 21 days per annum; the Landwehr Ban II. the men of from 43 to 46, who are called out for from 3 to 7 days per annum.

The men unsuitable for service as well as the Mussulmans (who are exempted from any military service) pay a tax during ten years.

The army is divided into three army inspections—

1st	inspection,	Sofia (1st, 6th, 7th divisions).
2nd	„	Philippopolis (2nd, 3rd, 8th divisions).
3rd	„	Rustchuk (4th, 5th, 9th divisions).

Every inspection includes 3 infantry divisions, 1 brigade of cavalry, 3 batteries of field artillery, and 1 battalion of pioneers. The 1st inspection includes four groups of mountain guns and

* With acknowledgments to the *Revue Militaire Suisse.*

two groups of siege artillery each of two companies, the 2nd inspection two groups of field artillery, and the 3rd inspection one group of siege artillery of two companies.

A division of infantry is composed of two brigades of two regiments, each of which has two groups of mitrailleuses.

A cavalry brigade numbers three or four regiments. Each regiment of field artillery is composed of six batteries, the groups of mountain guns of three batteries. The battalions of pioneers have six companies.

Various units, such as the regiment of horse-guards, the railway regiment, the group of balloonists, the motorists, the battalion of telegraphists, and the battalion of pioneers, are attached directly to the commander of the artillery.

On mobilisation the 72 battalions of the peace establishment form, with the help of the very large number of reservists, 288 battalions of 1000 men each, that is, 72 regiments of 4 battalions, so that the divisions can be doubled. The 36 sections of mitrailleuses become 36 companies of four guns. The first two brigades of cavalry form a division, and the third brigade becomes divisional cavalry.

The field artillery increases its number of batteries by a third; the three batteries of siege pieces are transformed into three groups of three batteries of four guns, etc.

In short, in the event of war, the Bulgarian army forms a force of 18 divisions of infantry. The divisions have 16 battalions, 2 squadrons, 10 batteries, 2 companies of pioneers.

In addition, there is a division of cavalry of 16 to 20 squadrons, 3 regiments of mountain artillery, and a certain number of batteries of howitzers.

The total strength is about 300,000 men.

Behind the army in the field there will be a reserve of from 36 to 72 battalions of Landwehr, or about 40,000 men.

Armament.—The infantry is armed with Mannlicher M. 95 of 8 mm. (inch 0·31496), with ball S. and a magazine with five cartridges; the Landwehr use the Berdan of 10 mm. (inch 0·39370). The cavalry and the pioneers have a Mannlicher carbine.

The mitrailleuses, which are 8-mm. Maxims, are carried on pack animals.

The artillery has Schneider-Canet pieces of the Creusot M. ·04 of ·75 mm. (inches 2·952), with recoil on the carriage and

shield. The range of the shrapnel is 5·900 m. (6453 yards). Every piece has 258 rounds, of which four-fifths are shrapnel.

The mountain batteries are partly supplied with Krupp pieces M. ·04 of ·75 mm. and partly with Creusot pieces ·07 of the same calibre.

Heavy Artillery

24 howitzers, 15 mm. Schneider-Canet (inch 0·59).
24 „ 12 „ „ „ (inch 0·472).
14 siege pieces, Krupp 12 cm. (inches 4·724).
15 „ „ 15 cm. (inches 5·095).

It should be remarked that the artillerymen when on active service are armed with a carbine.

Equipment.—The infantry are supplied with tents and portable kitchens; the transport service for supplies is carried on with ox-wagons and pony-wagons.

The Bulgarian fleet has not so far been very largely developed. It comprises the cruiser *Nadezda* and six torpedo-boats. The port of Varna has not yet been organised as a naval port, and has no means of protection except submarine mines.

B. Servia

A bill for a military law which was drawn up as long ago as 1909 has not yet been carried. Its object was to increase the number of divisions and introduce a system of doubling the units on mobilisation such as is in force in Bulgaria.

Personal compulsory service lasts from 17 to 50, and is made up of the following periods :—

Twenty-four years in the active army, that is—

11 years in the 1st ban, from 21 to 31.
7 „ 2nd ban, from 31 to 38.
7 „ 3rd ban, from 38 to 45.

and 10 years in the militia, namely, from 17 to 21 and 45 to 50.

The recruits nominally undergo a training of eighteen months, but two-thirds of every contingent only undergo one of six months. The reservists are called out every year for a course of twenty days.

Those exempted from military service pay a military tax equal to one-tenth of the yearly tax at which they are rated.

On a war footing the army in the field forms five divisions of infantry, a division of cavalry, a regiment of mountain artillery, and a regiment of howitzers.

The divisions are distributed as follows :—

1st	division	of the	Morava at Nish.
2nd	„	„	Drina at Valievo.
3rd	„	„	Danube at Belgrade.
4th	„	„	Sumalija at Kragujeratz.
5th	„	„	Timok at Zaitchar.

A division includes 2 brigades of infantry of 2 regiments of three battalions, 1 regiment of cavalry of three squadrons, 1 regiment of artillery of nine batteries, 1 company of pioneers, 1 sanitary company, 6 columns of ammunition, telegraphists, pontooneers, a column for supplies, bakers, etc.

A division of cavalry is made up of 2 brigades of 2 regiments of four squadrons, and 2 horse batteries.

The regiment of mountain artillery is of 2 groups of three batteries; the regiment of howitzers of 2 groups of three batteries, one of which is a mortar battery.

The reserve of the 1st ban forms a division of 2 brigades of 2 regiments of four battalions, with 6 squadrons of cavalry, 5 mounted batteries, 1 mountain battery, and 6 companies of engineers.

The 2nd ban furnished five divisions of 3 regiments of four battalions, with 1 regiment of cavalry, and a group of artillery of three batteries, 1 company of pioneers, etc.

The 3rd ban : 15 regiments of infantry of four battalions and five squadrons, the whole of which are intended for garrison duty.

The battalions of infantry of the 1st ban have a strength of 1000 men, those of the 2nd and 3rd bans of 800 men.

The total effective strength of the first two bans may amount to 180,000 men in the fighting line with 660 pieces of artillery.

Armament.—Infantry: Mauser rifle M. 99, calibre 7 mm. (inch 0·275), weight 1·1 kg. (2 lb. 12 oz. about); magazine of five cartridges; elevation (hausse), max. 2000 m. (yards 2187 about); initial velocity, 730 m. (2394⅘ feet).

The 2nd ban has the clumsy M. 80, and the 3rd ban the Berdan rifle.

Mitrailleuses: Maxim of 7 mm. (inch 0·275) on pack saddles.

Artillery: Schneider pieces (Creusot), ·06 quick fire, calibre

7·5 cm. (inches 2·952), with panoramic independent elevation. It is the French piece of 1897. Battery of four guns. Maximum range of the fusing shrapnel, 5500 m. (yards 6015).

The divisions of the 2nd ban have old Banye guns of 8 cm. (inches 3·14).

The mountain artillery has Creusot guns of 7 cm. (inches 2·755).

The heavy guns include 24 howitzers of 15 cm. (inches 5·905) and mortars of 24 cm. (inch 0·648), Schneider pattern.

At Nish there is a Military Aviation Station with two balloons.

C. Greece

A new military law came into force on January 1, 1912.

Under this law everyone is liable to compulsory military service for thirty-five years—

2	years	in the active forces.	
10	,,	,,	1st reserve.
9	,,	,,	2nd reserve.
7	,,	,,	National Guard.
7	,,	,,	reserve of the National Guard.

In consequence of the right which the Minister of War enjoys of sending a quarter of the effective strength on leave from June 1 to November 1, the time during which a soldier is actually present with the colours averages not more than a year and a half.

Men exempted on any grounds from serving pay a military tax.

A law of February 24, 1910, for the organisation of the forces laid down the following distribution in case of mobilisation:—

3 divisions: 1st, Larissa.
2nd, Athens.
3rd, Missolonghi.

Each division to have a strength of 3 brigades of infantry of two regiments, and a battalion of evzones (rifles), or in all 21 battalions; a regiment of cavalry of six squadrons, a regiment of field artillery of twelve batteries; a regiment of mountain artillery of nine batteries, a battalion of pioneers of six companies, a company of pontooneers, a company of telegraphists, and transport, ammunition, and sanitary companies.

The second division also includes a group of heavy artillery of five batteries.

At the end of 1911 the only troops with the colours were 24 battalions of infantry, 4 battalions of evzones, 6 squadrons, 8 field batteries, 3 mountain batteries, and 4 companies of pontooneers: for the rest of the forces there were only cadres with officers up to strength and non-commissioned officers almost up to strength.

The peace strength was 31,250 men, of whom 1889 were officers, with 1621 horses and mules.

The strength on a war footing is calculated as about 125,000 for the army in the field. In addition the National Guard is to make up a strength of 80,000 men, and the Landsturm 60,000.

The organisation law of 1910 has been modified by a law of February 15, 1912, which makes the following provisions for the organisation of the army on a war footing:—

Four divisions. The division includes 3 regiments of infantry, 1 to 2 battalions of evzones (the brigade disappears) and 1 group of mitrailleuses.

The cavalry, the artillery, the engineers, and the auxiliary services are not in future to be distributed over the divisions.

The regiment of infantry comprises 3 battalions of three companies; the battalions of evzones (six in number) have four companies.

The cavalry would form 3 regiments, of which 2 are to have five and 1 six squadrons.

The field artillery forms 4 regiments, of which 3 have six and 1 eight batteries.

The mountain artillery comprises 2 regiments of four batteries.

The heavy artillery, a group of three batteries.

The engineers; 2 regiments having in all eleven companies of sappers, 2 companies of pontooneers, 2 companies of telegraphists, 1 of railway workmen, and 1 of balloonists.

The transport forms four companies.

It seems that this new organisation has been carried out, and that the Greek army has been mobilised with four divisions.

Armament.—The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher rifle M. 1903 of 6·5 mm. (inch 0·2559); range, 2000 metres (yards 2187); initial speed, 720 m. (yards 787); 150 cartridges per man.

It appears that four companies of Maxim mitrailleuses of six pieces, on pack saddles, are in existence.

The field artillery adopted in 1907 a quick-firing gun of Schneider's; of the Creusots twenty batteries had been delivered in June 1912.

Greece also owns some batteries of howitzers (Krupp) of 10·5 cm. (4·1 inches) and mortars of 15 cm. (inches 5·9055).

The army has certainly made great progress during the last few years, but politics still play by far too great a part amongst the officers. The officers' corps is far too old, although an age limit has been introduced.

The men are not wanting in intelligence, and are accustomed to fatigue and hardships, but they often lack the spirit of subordination.

A French Military Mission under the command of General Eidoux, and composed of superior officers, has been employed since the month of February 1911 in the reorganisation of the army.

The Greek Fleet

The Greek fleet is composed of an armoured cruiser, 10,000 tons, the *Georgios Averoff*; of three old armoured coast-guards of about 5000 tons, and twelve new torpedo-destroyers, of a submarine, and of a certain number of old gunboats, torpedo-boats, and training-ships.

An order for an ironclad, two torpedo-destroyers, and six torpedo-boats was placed in Germany in 1912.

D. Montenegro

The Montenegrin army with its compulsory universal service from 18 to 62 forms the typical armed nation. The army is a militia divided into three categories —

1. The class of recruits: young men of 18 to 19, with 48 days' instruction and 15 days' manœuvres per annum.

2. The active army: duration of service, thirty-three years (from the 20th to the 52nd year).

3. The reserve: duration of service, ten years (from 53 to 62).

In the active army the men fit for service with the colours have an annual training of 10 to 15 days: the men not passed for active service are attached to the administrative services, and have four days' training per annum. The reserve is mustered and inspected once a year.

The militiaman can be exempted from one manœuvres period

out of three if he is the supporter of a family, after five years' service in the active army. In this case he must pay a sum amounting to one-tenth of his taxes.

The militiaman has at all times the charge of his arms, ammunition, and equipment.

The Mohammedan subjects are exempted from all military service on paying a tax.

In time of peace only a part of the cadres and some training units are kept on foot.

The army on a war footing is composed of four divisions —

1st	division,	Cettigne,	3	brigades,	15	battalions.
2nd	„	Podgoritza,	3	„	13	„
3rd	„	Nikshities,	3	„	14	„
4th	„	Kolashin,	2	„	12	„

Every brigade also includes 1 detachment of mounted scouts, 1 mountain battery, 1 group of mitrailleuses, 1 section of telegraphists, and 1 section of pioneers.

The division has, in addition, attached to it a detachment of mounted scouts, a section of pioneers, a field battery, and a heavy battery.

A reserve of eleven battalions on a reduced strength is entrusted with the guard of the frontiers and the territorial service.

The total strength of the Montenegrin army may amount to from 40,000 to 45,000 rifles, 104 guns, and 44 mitrailleuses.

The battalion has a strength varying between 400 and 800 men. The battery is of four guns, as is also the group of mitrailleuses.

The organisation of the transport and army service corps is very rudimentary; it was only in 1910 that this service was assigned to special corps; up till that time the men unfit for fighting and the women had to see to it.

Armament.—The infantry of the active army uses the Russian rifle, calibre 7·62 mm. (inch 0·299). The reserve is armed with the Berdan, calibre 10·66 mm. (inch 0·4196).

The mitrailleuses are of the Maxim model, calibre 7·62 m. (inch 0·299), and are carried on pack animals.

The artillery has Krupp guns 7·5 cm. (inches 2·952) and 8·7 cm. (inches 3·425), howitzers and mortars 24 cm. (inches 9·448), bought from Italy in 1911.

The instruction in the schools is in great part given by Russian officers.

The Military Forces of Turkey

After the revolution of July 23, 1908, the new Government came to the very important decision that it would enrol the non-Mohammedans in the army and do away with the exemptions from service which, until that time, had been enjoyed by the inhabitants of the capital and some islands and towns.

The non-Mussulman element formed 25 per cent. of the recruits, viz. 12·5 per cent. of Greeks, 4·5 per cent. of Armenians, 4 per cent. of Bulgarians, 4 per cent. of Catholic Syrians, Levantines, and Jews.

The duration of service with the colours (Nizam) is three years, from the 20th to the 22nd year.

The reserve (Ichtiat) includes six age classes from the 23rd to the 28th year; the Landwehr, 1st ban (Redif), nine age classes from the 29th to the 37th; the Landwehr, 2nd ban, includes twenty classes from 20 to 30 years; the Landsturm (Mustafiz), two age classes, the 38th and 39th years. The Kurdish tribes furnish the cavalry (Hamidieh), a kind of Cossack cavalry, with a length of service of twenty-seven years.

In time of peace the army was divided into three inspections:—

Inspection I. Constantinople,	1st	Corps	Constantinople.
	2nd	„	Rodosto.
	3rd	„	Kirk-Kilisse.
	4th	„	Adrianople.
Inspection II. Salonika,	5th	„	Salonika.
	6th	„	Monastir.
	7th	„	Uskub.
	8th	„	Damascus.

And in addition three independent divisions, the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, at Kotchana, Janina, and Skutari.

Inspection III. Erzindjan,	9th	Corps,	Erzerum.
	10th	„	Erzindjan.
	11th	„	Van.
	12th	„	Mosul.
	13th	„	Bagdad.

The 14th corps Yemen is not under an inspector, nor are the 42nd and 43rd divisions, which were formerly at Tripoli and in the Hejaz.

Every corps d'armée includes three divisions, 1 regiment of rifles, and 1 or 2 brigades of cavalry.

The division contains 3 regiments of infantry, provided with a company of mitrailleuses, 1 battalion of rifles, 1 battery of artillery with three groups, 1 battalion of pioneers, 1 company of telegraphists, 1 battalion transport.

Some corps d'armée have also mountain batteries and groups of howitzers. The fortress artillery is not distributed amongst the corps d'armée.

A regiment of infantry is composed of three battalions, a brigade of cavalry, 2 or 3 regiments of five squadrons, and sometimes a group of horse artillery.

The Redifs are divided into five inspections, those of Constantinople, Salonika, Erzindjan, Bagdad, and Damascus, including a varying number of battalions. Thus the Constantinople inspection includes 11 divisions of the 1st ban, or 102 battalions, and 6 divisions of the 2nd ban, or 56 battalions; that of Salonika, 10 divisions of the 1st ban, or 95 battalions, and 13 divisions of the 2nd ban, or 119 battalions, etc., etc.

The total number is 358 battalions of the 1st ban, and 175 of the 2nd ban.

On mobilisation the army was distributed in Europe in two groups:—

1. The Army of Thrace, formed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th corps, or 12 divisions of the active army, 5 brigades of cavalry, 11 divisions of Redifs of the 1st ban, and 6 of Redifs of the 2nd ban. Total, 217,500 men, 5850 sabres, and 454 guns.

2. The Army of Macedonia, formed of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th corps, of the 22nd, 23rd, 24th independent divisions, or a total of 15 divisions of Nizam, 4 brigades of cavalry, 17 divisions of Redifs of the 1st ban, 13 divisions of Redifs of the 2nd ban. Total, 331,500 men, 5850 sabres, and 506 guns.

It is, however, very doubtful if these strengths were made up. The other corps d'armée remained in Asia, at least at the outset of hostilities.

Armament.—Infantry: Mauser rifle M. ·03, calibre 7·65 mm. (inch 0·3011), weight of rifle 3·9 kg. (lb. 8·595), ball S.; magazine with five cartridges; max. range, 2000 m. (yards 2187); velocity at 25 m. (feet 82·02), 830 m. (yards 907·7).

The Redifs and Mustafiz have the Mauser 87, calibre 9·65 mm.

(inch 0·3799), and the Martini-Henry M. 71, without a magazine; max. range, 1300 m. (yards 1421·67).

Mitrailleuses: Maxim 7·65 mm. (inch 0·3011), horsed, and Hotchkiss mitrailleuses.

Field artillery: guns, Krupp 73 of 75 mm. (inches 2·952), recoil on the carriage, shield, panoramic and independent elevation; 63 batteries of 6 guns and 9 caissons; and in addition 67 batteries of old Krupp model, 73 of 87 mm. (inches 3·425) and 77 mm. (inches 3·031).

Mountain batteries: guns, Krupp 73 of 75 mm. (inches 2·952), 25 batteries of 6 guns.

In 1911 Turkey placed an order with Schneider of Le Creusot for 18 mountain batteries of 75 mm (inches 2·952) of four guns.

The heavy field artillery consists of 18 batteries of howitzers, Krupp 92 of 120 mm. (inches 4·724).

The Turkish Fleet

The Turkish fleet consisted of the following vessels :—

Three ironclads: *Haireddin Barbarossa*, *Torgut Reis*, and *Messudieh.*

Five armoured cruisers: *Assar i Tewfik*, *Feth i Bulend*, *Main Zaffer*, *Ann Illah*, *Idylalje.*

Two protected cruisers: *Hamidieh*, *Medjidieh*

Two torpedo cruisers: *Berk Satmet*, *Peik i Sefket.*

Eleven torpedo-destroyers.

Fifteen torpedo-boats.

The Turkish navy, which had some English officers as instructors, has been greatly developed since 1908.

WAR MAP OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA.



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This book was translated into French and Spanish. Lord Haldane writes from the War Office, 22nd October, 1908: "Dear Sir, I have to thank you for your book on the French Campaign in Morocco. I have already read it through with keen interest and have directed notes to be taken of some of the points to which you draw attention. . . . If you will allow me to say so I think you have succeeded in writing a very interesting account of the Campaign. Yours sincerely, R. B. Haldane.

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